2026-01-06

CIVIL SOCIETY REPLACEMENT FORMULA - PROPOSAL CONFIRMS MANDATE PROHIBITION Haiti Libre reported January 6 on a civil society initiative presenting a proposal for completion of the transition ahead of the February 7 2026 CPT mandate expiration. The proposal explicitly recognizes that the CPT has failed to restore security, revive the economy, revise the Constitution, or organize elections, and confirms that the April 3 2024 Agreement stipulates the CPT mandate ends February 7 2026 and cannot be extended. This represents the first concrete civil society proposal in 2026 addressing the constitutional deadline and indicates that parallel negotiation tracks are emerging between CPT silent maneuvers to extend operationally, civil society replacement formula proposals, and CARICOM-OAS institutional continuity coordination. The publication of formal proposals suggests negotiations are underway but not yet consensual, with multiple competing frameworks potentially claiming legitimacy after February 7 if coordination fails. The explicit reference to the April 3 2024 Agreement prohibition on mandate extension aligns with constitutional lawyer Jerry Tardieu's December 7 analysis that Article 6.1 of the May 23 2024 decree requires political parties and civil society to negotiate a replacement formula. January 06, 2026 The civil society proposal emerges in a context where the CPT has maintained operational silence on February 7 succession planning despite the approaching deadline. Vant Bef Info reported December 31 that the CPT is conducting silent maneuvers to extend its mandate operationally without formal announcement, creating ambiguity about whether February 7 will trigger a genuine power transfer or merely cosmetic adjustments. The civil society initiative directly challenges this approach by publishing a proposal that acknowledges CPT failure and demands compliance with the April 3 Agreement prohibition on extension. However, the Haiti Libre report does not specify which civil society organizations are behind the proposal, whether it has support from major political parties, or if international actors including CARICOM and OAS have endorsed the framework. This lack of detail suggests the proposal may represent one faction's position rather than a consensual agreement among stakeholders. The publication in Haiti Libre rather than through institutional channels indicates the proposers are attempting to generate public pressure and frame the post-February 7 debate rather than operating through formal negotiation structures. The proposal's explicit acknowledgment of CPT failure across security, economy, constitutional revision, and elections creates a factual basis for arguing mandate extension would be illegitimate. The CPT's original mandate under the April 3 2024 Agreement included organizing elections, implementing security reforms, and creating conditions for constitutional revision. The January 6 OCHA report documenting continued gang attacks and displacement in Artibonite, the ongoing Port-au-Prince operational pause without resolution, the absence of electoral calendar announcements despite February 7 deadline, and the lack of constitutional revision progress all support the civil society assessment of comprehensive failure. However, this factual case against CPT performance does not resolve the procedural question of what replaces the CPT on February 7. The April 3 Agreement requires political parties and civil society to negotiate a replacement formula but does not specify mechanisms, timeline, or fallback provisions if negotiations fail. This creates a legal vacuum where multiple interpretations of succession legitimacy can coexist. The emergence of parallel negotiation tracks reflects fragmentation among stakeholders who lack incentives to coordinate. The CPT has institutional interest in maintaining power and therefore pursues operational extension through silence and fait accompli. Civil society organizations have legitimacy interest in demonstrating the transition has failed and demanding accountability through new leadership. CARICOM and OAS have regional stability interest in preventing power vacuum and therefore pursue institutional continuity even if that requires supporting imperfect arrangements. Political parties have electoral interest in either participating in new arrangements or delegitimizing competitors depending on their relative strength. These divergent interests make consensual coordination difficult, increasing probability that February 7 produces competing claims to legitimacy rather than orderly succession. The publication of civil society proposals at this stage with 32 days remaining suggests negotiations have not produced agreement and stakeholders are preparing public positioning strategies rather than consensual frameworks.