



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 06, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

saw UN OCHA publish its first 2026 situation report documenting a December 23 gang attack in Montrouis that displaced 1,052 people, confirming the 21-day Port-au-Prince operational pause did not extend to Artibonite Department where gangs continue territorial expansion. A federal court in Washington examined the legality of Haiti TPS termination set for February 3, affecting over 350,000 Haitians. Civil society published a proposal for completing the transition that explicitly recognizes the April 3 2024 Agreement prohibits CPT mandate extension beyond February 7. The US Justice Department charged Haitian nationals with arms smuggling. Port-au-Prince remains calm for the 17th consecutive day. 32 days until constitutional deadline.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

UN OCHA confirms December 23 Montrouis attack displaced 1,052 people during Port-au-Prince pause revealing geographic shift in gang operations.

Federal court heard arguments January 6 on TPS termination affecting 350,000 Haitians with February 3 expiration deadline.

Civil society proposal for transition completion confirms April 3 2024 Agreement prohibits CPT mandate extension.

US Justice Department charged Haitian nationals with arms smuggling from United States to Haiti.

Port-au-Prince operational pause continues for 17th day with 32 days remaining until February 7 CPT expiration.

DEVELOPMENT 1

GEOGRAPHIC SHIFT - MONTROUIS ATTACK REVEALS ARTIBONITE OFFENSIVE DURING PORT-AU-PRINCE PAUSE

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs published Situation Report Number 1 on January 6 documenting armed attacks in Montrouis on the night of December 23 that displaced approximately 1,052 people representing 225 households from the Piatre zone within the Deluge 4th Communal Section to other zones of Saint-Marc commune. This OCHA report provides the first institutional confirmation that the 21-day operational pause observed in Port-au-Prince from December 21 through January 6 did not extend to Artibonite Department. The displacement occurred during the Christmas holiday period when Port-au-Prince experienced zero major gang incidents, demonstrating that gangs executed a deliberate geographic shift rather than a comprehensive cessation of operations. OCHA stated that the security situation in Lower Artibonite remains concerning and noted this attack represents the latest in a series including the November 29 Pont-Sonde attacks and December 1 Est attacks that generated additional displacements.

The strategic logic underlying this geographic shift reflects sophisticated gang operational planning that concentrates violence in peripheral regions while withholding attacks in the capital where Haitian National Police, Gang Suppression Force, and international attention remain focused. The December 23 Montrouis attack aligns with the October BINUH assessment that intentional homicides in Artibonite and Centre increased 210 percent from 419 victims in January through August 2024 to 1,303 victims in the same period of 2025. The UN Panel of Experts documented in September that gangs are consolidating control across a corridor from Centre to Artibonite, creating territorial continuity between Port-au-Prince and northern departments. The timing of the Montrouis attack during the Christmas holiday when security force attention typically decreases demonstrates

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

operational opportunism. MOPAL's January 4 assessment that gangs control the quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and Plateau Central now has institutional confirmation through OCHA displacement data.

The displacement of 1,052 people from a single attack in Montrouis indicates gangs are applying Port-au-Prince operational methods to Artibonite communes, using targeted violence to clear zones and establish territorial control. The Departmental Directorate of Civil Protection of Artibonite is monitoring the situation with OCHA support through the coordination mechanism already in place in Lower Artibonite, suggesting multiple displacement events have necessitated standing coordination infrastructure. The pattern emerging across November 29 Pont-Sonde, December 1 Est, and December 23 Montrouis attacks shows gangs are systematically targeting communes along the National Road Number 1 corridor that connects Port-au-Prince to northern departments. This corridor provides access to agricultural production zones and enables territorial continuity between gang-controlled areas. With 32 days remaining until February 7, the geographic shift creates a strategic dilemma for security forces that must choose between maintaining Port-au-Prince security gains and responding to Artibonite territorial expansion.

The operational implication is that the Port-au-Prince pause may represent tactical restraint designed to avoid provoking security force operations while gangs consolidate Artibonite control. If this assessment is accurate, gangs will likely resume Port-au-Prince violence in late January after achieving sufficient Artibonite territorial gains to create a defensible corridor. The February 7 CPT expiration creates a timeline pressure that may incentivize gangs to maintain Port-au-Prince restraint through early February to avoid jeopardizing potential political negotiations, then resume operations if no favorable political settlement emerges. However, the Artibonite offensive demonstrates that tactical restraint in the capital does not indicate strategic de-escalation but rather reallocation of operational resources to less defended areas. Security forces face a choice between responding to Artibonite attacks and thereby reducing Port-au-Prince presence, or maintaining capital security and accepting gang territorial gains in peripheral regions. Either choice creates vulnerabilities gangs can exploit in subsequent operations.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Artibonite Department experienced escalating gang violence throughout 2025 with the October BINUH report documenting a 210 percent increase in intentional homicides from 419 victims in January through August 2024 to 1,303 victims in the same 2025 period. The UN Panel of Experts identified in September that gangs were consolidating control across a corridor from Centre to Artibonite to establish territorial continuity with Port-au-Prince.

TALKING POINTS

OCHA January 6 report confirms December 23 Montrouis attack displaced 1,052 people during Port-au-Prince operational pause.

Geographic shift demonstrates gangs withholding violence in capital while expanding territorial control in Artibonite.

Pattern of November 29 Pont-Sonde, December 1 Est, and December 23 Montrouis attacks shows systematic targeting of National Road Number 1 corridor.

Security forces face strategic dilemma between maintaining Port-au-Prince gains and responding to Artibonite territorial expansion.

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Tactical restraint in capital does not indicate de-escalation but reallocation of resources to less defended peripheral regions.

Expect Port-au-Prince violence resumption in late January after gangs achieve sufficient Artibonite territorial consolidation.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Deploy additional security force units to Artibonite corridor to prevent further territorial consolidation along National Road Number 1.

Establish rapid response capacity in Saint-Marc to address displacement events and prevent gang territorial gains from becoming permanent.

Coordinate with OCHA to pre-position humanitarian resources for anticipated additional Artibonite displacements in January.

Brief international partners that Port-au-Prince operational pause reflects geographic shift not strategic de-escalation.

Prepare contingency plans for simultaneous Port-au-Prince and Artibonite operations in late January as February 7 deadline approaches.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2

TPS LEGAL BATTLE - FEDERAL COURT HEARING COMPRESSES FEBRUARY TIMELINE

A federal court in Washington DC held a hearing on January 6 examining the legality of the Trump administration decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status for Haiti effective February 3 2026. The National TPS Alliance and immigrant rights groups filed the legal challenge arguing that security conditions in Haiti do not permit the safe return of more than 350,000 Haitian TPS beneficiaries. The Department of Homeland Security has begun sending notifications to Haitian TPS beneficiaries warning them to prepare to leave United States territory within approximately one month after the February 3 deadline unless judicial intervention blocks the termination. The January 6 hearing creates a compressed 28-day timeline before TPS expiration and a 32-day timeline before the CPT mandate expires on February 7, creating potential for simultaneous diaspora deportation crisis and constitutional governance vacuum. Vant Bef Info analysis stated that the court judgment could demonstrate that security conditions in Haiti do not allow the return of beneficiaries and underscore the country's inability to absorb a massive diaspora return in current conditions.

The legal arguments center on whether Haiti's security deterioration since the original TPS designation justifies continued protection or whether administrative procedures allow termination regardless of ground conditions. The Trump administration terminated TPS based on administrative authority to end temporary protections when original disaster conditions have passed, arguing that the 2010 earthquake that triggered TPS designation no longer constitutes grounds for continued status. However, plaintiffs argue that intervening security collapse

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

including gang control of 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, 1.4 million internally displaced persons, and economic contraction of negative 16 percent cumulative GDP decline from 2019 to 2025 creates new grounds for protection that supersede original earthquake rationale. The legal framework requires courts to defer to executive branch determinations on foreign conditions unless those determinations are arbitrary or capricious. This creates a high bar for plaintiffs who must demonstrate not merely that conditions are dangerous but that the administration's assessment was procedurally deficient or factually unsupportable.

The timing creates maximum pressure on both judicial and political decision-makers. A court ruling blocking TPS termination would provide immediate relief to 350,000 Haitians but create political confrontation with the Trump administration over immigration enforcement authority. A ruling allowing termination to proceed would trigger deportation proceedings beginning approximately one month after February 3, meaning late February or early March deportations to a Haiti that may have no functioning government if the CPT expires February 7 without a successor framework. The compressed timeline between February 3 TPS expiration and February 7 CPT expiration eliminates buffer time that might allow coordinated international response. If the court rules in favor of termination, the United States would begin deporting Haitians to an ungoverned state with no institutional capacity to receive returnees, process documentation, or provide basic services. This scenario compounds the existing humanitarian crisis documented in the January 6 OCHA report showing continued gang attacks and displacement.

The economic implications extend beyond immediate deportation logistics. Haitian diaspora remittances constitute approximately 38 percent of GDP, with significant portions flowing from TPS beneficiaries who have established stable employment and housing in the United States over 15 years of protected status. Mass deportations would reduce remittance flows precisely when Haiti needs maximum diaspora financial support to address humanitarian crisis. Additionally, 350,000 returnees would overwhelm any residual state capacity to provide documentation, housing, or economic integration. The security implications are equally severe, as returnees would arrive in a context where gangs control most urban territory and state security forces cannot protect existing population concentrations. Returnees with no housing or employment options would face immediate vulnerability to gang recruitment or victimization. International organizations including OCHA, UNICEF, and IOM that already struggle to serve 1.4 million internally displaced persons would face additional burden of 350,000 deportees with distinct documentation and integration needs.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United States granted Temporary Protected Status to Haiti following the January 12 2010 earthquake that killed over 200,000 people and displaced 1.5 million. TPS has been repeatedly extended through subsequent administrations based on continued instability including the 2016 Hurricane Matthew, ongoing political crisis, and gang violence escalation. The Trump administration previously attempted to terminate Haiti TPS in 2018 but was blocked by federal courts.

TALKING POINTS

Federal court hearing January 6 examines TPS termination legality affecting over 350,000 Haitian beneficiaries with February 3 expiration.

DHS sending notifications warning beneficiaries to prepare departure within one month after deadline unless judicial intervention.

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Compressed timeline creates 28 days to TPS expiration and 32 days to CPT expiration with potential for simultaneous crises.

Court must determine if administrative termination authority supersedes intervening security deterioration since 2010 earthquake designation.

Deportations would reduce remittances constituting 38 percent of Haiti GDP and overwhelm residual state capacity for returnee integration.

350,000 returnees would arrive in context where gangs control 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince with no housing or employment options.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Coordinate with CARICOM and OAS to prepare emergency response capacity for potential mass deportations beginning late February.

Brief international partners on implications of simultaneous TPS expiration and CPT mandate expiration creating compounded governance and humanitarian crisis.

Engage federal court through amicus briefs documenting current security conditions including January 6 OCHA displacement report.

Prepare contingency planning for returnee documentation, housing, and economic integration even with minimal state capacity.

Monitor court ruling timeline and prepare rapid diplomatic response to coordinate with February 7 CPT expiration scenarios.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3

CIVIL SOCIETY REPLACEMENT FORMULA - PROPOSAL CONFIRMS MANDATE PROHIBITION

Haiti Libre reported January 6 on a civil society initiative presenting a proposal for completion of the transition ahead of the February 7 2026 CPT mandate expiration. The proposal explicitly recognizes that the CPT has failed to restore security, revive the economy, revise the Constitution, or organize elections, and confirms that the April 3 2024 Agreement stipulates the CPT mandate ends February 7 2026 and cannot be extended. This represents the first concrete civil society proposal in 2026 addressing the constitutional deadline and indicates that parallel negotiation tracks are emerging between CPT silent maneuvers to extend operationally, civil society replacement formula proposals, and CARICOM-OAS institutional continuity coordination. The publication of formal proposals suggests negotiations are underway but not yet consensual, with multiple competing frameworks potentially claiming legitimacy after February 7 if coordination fails. The explicit reference to the April 3 2024 Agreement prohibition on mandate extension aligns with constitutional lawyer Jerry Tardieu's December 7 analysis that Article 6.1 of the May 23 2024 decree requires political parties and civil society to negotiate a replacement formula.

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

The civil society proposal emerges in a context where the CPT has maintained operational silence on February 7 succession planning despite the approaching deadline. Vant Bef Info reported December 31 that the CPT is conducting silent maneuvers to extend its mandate operationally without formal announcement, creating ambiguity about whether February 7 will trigger a genuine power transfer or merely cosmetic adjustments. The civil society initiative directly challenges this approach by publishing a proposal that acknowledges CPT failure and demands compliance with the April 3 Agreement prohibition on extension. However, the Haiti Libre report does not specify which civil society organizations are behind the proposal, whether it has support from major political parties, or if international actors including CARICOM and OAS have endorsed the framework. This lack of detail suggests the proposal may represent one faction's position rather than a consensual agreement among stakeholders. The publication in Haiti Libre rather than through institutional channels indicates the proposers are attempting to generate public pressure and frame the post-February 7 debate rather than operating through formal negotiation structures.

The proposal's explicit acknowledgment of CPT failure across security, economy, constitutional revision, and elections creates a factual basis for arguing mandate extension would be illegitimate. The CPT's original mandate under the April 3 2024 Agreement included organizing elections, implementing security reforms, and creating conditions for constitutional revision. The January 6 OCHA report documenting continued gang attacks and displacement in Artibonite, the ongoing Port-au-Prince operational pause without resolution, the absence of electoral calendar announcements despite February 7 deadline, and the lack of constitutional revision progress all support the civil society assessment of comprehensive failure. However, this factual case against CPT performance does not resolve the procedural question of what replaces the CPT on February 7. The April 3 Agreement requires political parties and civil society to negotiate a replacement formula but does not specify mechanisms, timeline, or fallback provisions if negotiations fail. This creates a legal vacuum where multiple interpretations of succession legitimacy can coexist.

The emergence of parallel negotiation tracks reflects fragmentation among stakeholders who lack incentives to coordinate. The CPT has institutional interest in maintaining power and therefore pursues operational extension through silence and fait accompli. Civil society organizations have legitimacy interest in demonstrating the transition has failed and demanding accountability through new leadership. CARICOM and OAS have regional stability interest in preventing power vacuum and therefore pursue institutional continuity even if that requires supporting imperfect arrangements. Political parties have electoral interest in either participating in new arrangements or delegitimizing competitors depending on their relative strength. These divergent interests make consensual coordination difficult, increasing probability that February 7 produces competing claims to legitimacy rather than orderly succession. The publication of civil society proposals at this stage with 32 days remaining suggests negotiations have not produced agreement and stakeholders are preparing public positioning strategies rather than consensual frameworks.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The April 3 2024 Agreement that established the Transitional Presidential Council included explicit provisions that the mandate ends February 7 2026 and cannot be extended. Article 6.1 of the May 23 2024 implementing decree specified that political parties and civil society must negotiate a replacement formula before the deadline. Constitutional lawyer Jerry Tardieu analyzed December 7 that this creates a binding obligation preventing unilateral CPT extension.

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

TALKING POINTS

Civil society proposal published January 6 explicitly recognizes CPT failed to restore security, revive economy, revise Constitution, or organize elections.

Proposal confirms April 3 2024 Agreement prohibits CPT mandate extension beyond February 7 requiring replacement formula negotiation.

Parallel negotiation tracks emerging between CPT operational extension attempts, civil society replacement proposals, and CARICOM-OAS continuity coordination.

Lack of coordination among stakeholders increases probability of competing legitimacy claims after February 7 rather than orderly succession.

Publication in Haiti Libre suggests proposers attempting to generate public pressure rather than operating through formal negotiation channels.

32 days remaining with no visible consensual framework indicates stakeholders preparing positioning strategies not coordination agreements.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor emerging civil society proposals to assess which organizations and political parties are coalescing around specific replacement formulas.

Engage CARICOM and OAS to determine if regional actors are facilitating coordination between parallel negotiation tracks.

Prepare analysis of constitutional and legal frameworks that could provide legitimacy for competing post-February 7 arrangements.

Track CPT public communications for any departure from operational silence that might indicate positioning on succession.

Brief international partners on fragmentation risk and need for coordinated diplomatic pressure to achieve stakeholder alignment before February 7.



CONFIDENCE



Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 4

ARMS TRAFFICKING PROSECUTION - US CHARGES HAITIAN NATIONALS

The United States Department of Justice announced January 6 that Haitian nationals have been charged with unlawfully smuggling firearms from the United States to Haiti. The charges filed in the Middle District of Florida represent the first publicly disclosed US prosecution of Haiti arms trafficking in 2026 and align with the September 2024 UN Panel of Experts finding that illegal arms trafficking into Haiti continues unabated with US-smuggled weapons fueling gang arsenals that control 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince. The Justice Department announcement did not provide defendant names, specific weapons quantities, or operational details about the smuggling network, limiting assessment of whether this represents a significant trafficking interdiction

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

or a minor case elevated for political signaling. However, the timing of the announcement on the same day as the federal court TPS hearing and 32 days before the February 7 CPT expiration suggests coordination between Justice Department prosecution decisions and broader Haiti policy considerations.

Arms trafficking from the United States to Haiti operates through multiple vectors including maritime shipments concealed in commercial cargo, postal parcels, and individual couriers carrying disassembled weapons. The UN Panel of Experts documented that traffickers exploit weak interdiction capacity at Haitian ports where customs inspection is minimal and gang control of territory adjacent to ports enables direct reception of smuggled weapons. Florida serves as the primary departure point for Haiti-bound arms trafficking due to geographic proximity, large Haitian diaspora communities that provide logistics support, and maritime traffic volumes that complicate interdiction. The Justice Department charges indicate that at least some trafficking operations involve Haitian nationals who likely have family or business connections that facilitate receiving networks in Haiti. This creates challenges for prosecution because defendants can claim personal use or family delivery rather than commercial trafficking, and receiving networks in Haiti operate in gang-controlled zones where Haitian law enforcement cannot investigate or corroborate trafficking intent.

The strategic significance of arms trafficking interdiction extends beyond individual prosecutions to questions of whether the United States is implementing systematic interdiction programs or conducting selective enforcement. The UN Panel of Experts found in September that despite repeated calls for enhanced arms control, trafficking continues unabated, suggesting current interdiction efforts are insufficient to disrupt flows. A single prosecution announced on January 6 does not indicate systematic program implementation but may signal Trump administration intent to increase enforcement as part of broader Haiti policy that includes TPS termination and emphasis on border security. However, effective interdiction would require sustained maritime and postal inspection enhancement, intelligence sharing with Haitian authorities where capacity exists, and prosecution resources dedicated to complex trafficking investigations. The absence of these systemic measures suggests the January 6 charges may represent opportunistic enforcement rather than strategic interdiction program.

The operational impact on gang weapons availability will be negligible unless prosecutions scale significantly. Gangs require continuous weapons resupply to replace destroyed, captured, or degraded firearms, and current trafficking flows easily meet this demand. The UN Panel of Experts assessment that trafficking continues unabated indicates existing interdiction efforts remove only a small percentage of total flows, leaving gangs with sufficient weapons to maintain operational tempo. Additionally, gang arsenals already include sufficient stockpiles that even complete interdiction of new flows would not immediately degrade combat capability. The strategic value of arms trafficking prosecution is therefore primarily political and diplomatic rather than operational. Announced prosecutions signal US attention to the issue, create leverage for diplomatic pressure on Haiti regarding corruption that enables trafficking, and provide domestic political benefit by demonstrating action on transnational crime. However, these political benefits do not translate to operational impact on gang capabilities without systematic interdiction programs that are not currently visible.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The UN Panel of Experts has documented for multiple years that arms trafficking from the United States to Haiti continues unabated despite international calls for enhanced controls. The September 2024 Panel report found that smuggled weapons fuel gang arsenals and that traffickers exploit weak Haitian customs capacity. Previous US prosecutions of Haiti arms trafficking have been sporadic without evidence of systematic interdiction

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

programs.

TALKING POINTS

Justice Department charged Haitian nationals January 6 with arms smuggling from United States to Haiti aligning with UN findings of unabated trafficking.

Announcement timing on same day as TPS court hearing suggests coordination with broader Haiti policy considerations.

Prosecution details not disclosed limiting assessment of whether significant interdiction or minor case elevated for political signaling.

Florida serves as primary departure point due to proximity, diaspora logistics support, and maritime traffic volumes complicating interdiction.

Single prosecution does not indicate systematic interdiction program implementation needed to disrupt trafficking flows.

Strategic value primarily political and diplomatic rather than operational impact on gang weapons availability.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor Justice Department prosecutions for evidence of systematic interdiction program implementation beyond opportunistic enforcement.

Engage US Customs and Border Protection to assess maritime and postal inspection enhancement for Haiti-bound cargo.

Coordinate with UN Panel of Experts to evaluate whether prosecution efforts are reducing trafficking flows or merely symbolic.

Brief international partners that announced prosecutions represent political signaling without operational impact on gang capabilities.

Advocate for multilateral arms control measures including Caribbean maritime interdiction coordination and manufacturer accountability.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Federal court ruling on Haiti TPS termination legality expected within days following January 6 hearing with decision determining whether 350,000 Haitians face February 3 deportations or receive continued protection. Court decision will shape diaspora crisis scenarios and compound CPT expiration timeline pressure. Gang operations in Artibonite likely to continue with potential for additional displacement events targeting communes along National Road Number 1 corridor as geographic shift strategy expands territorial control. Civil society proposals for transition completion may proliferate as stakeholders position for post-February 7 negotiations with

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

publication in media outlets signaling lack of consensual coordination.

THIS WEEK

Additional OCHA situation reports may document further Artibonite displacement events confirming geographic shift pattern persists through January. Port-au-Prince operational pause sustainability will be tested as 21-day period extends toward potential late January violence resumption. CPT public communications regarding February 7 succession planning remain critical indicator of whether operational silence continues or Council acknowledges deadline pressure. CARICOM or OAS statements on institutional continuity coordination would signal international actor engagement with parallel negotiation tracks. Justice Department may announce additional arms trafficking prosecutions if January 6 charges represent beginning of enhanced enforcement campaign rather than isolated case.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Late January timeframe represents critical decision point for gang operations as February 7 deadline approaches with gangs likely to resume Port-au-Prince violence after achieving sufficient Artibonite territorial consolidation. February 3 TPS expiration if federal court allows termination to proceed will trigger deportation logistics planning and potential diaspora mobilization against enforcement. February 7 CPT mandate expiration represents constitutional reckoning requiring either consensual replacement formula negotiated among stakeholders or competing legitimacy claims from parallel frameworks. Convergence of TPS deportations and CPT expiration within four-day window creates compounded governance and humanitarian crisis requiring coordinated international response that is not currently visible. Gang strategic calculations regarding whether to maintain operational restraint through February 7 to avoid jeopardizing potential political negotiations or resume violence to demonstrate continued threat will shape security trajectory through constitutional deadline.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Libre article published January 6 2026 reporting civil society proposal for completion of transition ahead of February 7 deadline.

Vant Bef Info article published January 6 2026 analyzing federal court TPS hearing and implications for Haitian beneficiaries.

US Department of Justice Middle District of Florida press release published January 6 2026 announcing charges against Haitian nationals for arms smuggling.

May 23 2024 decree Article 6.1 specifying replacement formula negotiation requirement.

UN Panel of Experts September 2024 report documenting arms trafficking and gang territorial consolidation.

Constitutional lawyer Jerry Tardieu December 7 2025 analysis of CPT mandate extension prohibition.

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Haiti Situation Report Number 1 published January 6 2026 documenting December 23 Montrouis attacks and displacement.

CARICOM November 5 2025 statement on institutional continuity requirements for Haiti transition.

UN Security Council October 2024 resolution extending mandate of multinational security support mission through October 2025.

April 3 2024 Agreement establishing Transitional Presidential Council with mandate expiration February 7 2026.

Department of Homeland Security notifications to Haitian TPS beneficiaries warning of February 3 2026 expiration and departure requirements.

BINUH October 2024 report on Artibonite and Centre intentional homicide increase of 210 percent.