EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Conseil Electoral Provisoire's revised calendar first round 18 July 2027, second round 4 October 2027 has
produced 33 provisional presidential registrants and ballot numbers for 105 political groups, projecting
institutional momentum. That momentum is undercut by three compounding threats: the Gang Suppression Force
stands at 27 percent of its mandated strength; three of the Ouest Department's most populous communes have
zero electoral infrastructure due to gang control; and a mid-cycle decree revision removed the bar on sanctioned
individuals running, allowing Michel Martelly and at least three other internationally sanctioned candidates onto
the provisional roll. The CEP's forthcoming vetting decisions on sanctioned registrants are the single most
consequential near-term test of institutional independence. If vetting fails that test, international credibility and
coalition discipline will fracture simultaneously.
QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS
The CEP's operative calendar is: presidential and legislative first round on 18 July 2027; second round with local
elections on 4 October 2027; final results on 23 October 2027. Candidate registration for president, senate, and
deputy closed 15 November 2026; mayoral, CASEC, and ASEC registration closes 30 November 2026.
The most consequential presidential development is Michel Martelly's registration through the DEBLOKE
coalition under a decree that no longer bars sanctioned individuals from candidacy; CEP vetting decisions,
expected in December 2026, will determine whether he advances.
Martine Moise, widow of assassinated President Jovenel Moise, and diplomat Dominique Dupuy registered as
presidential candidates; no major down-ballot figures have been individually disaggregated in available sourcing
as of brief date.
The Viktwa coalition, launched in Cap-Haitien on 29 August 2026 with claimed adherence of 52 parties, is the
key northern formation to watch as a potential geographic and political counterweight to Port-au-Prince-centric
candidacies.
The central risk to the vote happening is the GSF's deployment deficit: at approximately 1,500 of a mandated
5,500 personnel, the force cannot secure metro Port-au-Prince's gang-held communes sufficiently to open
polling infrastructure before July 2027 without a dramatic acceleration that has not begun.
DEVELOPMENT 1: ELECTORAL CALENDAR, CEP AND FEASIBILITY
The CEP published its revised electoral calendar on 28 October 2026, setting the presidential and legislative first
round for 18 July 2027, the second round with local elections for 4 October 2027, and final results for 23 October
2027. This is the third substantive calendar revision since November 2025. The CEP's 6-7 October 2026 decree
revisions the operative regulatory instruments for the current cycle formally superseded the 13 December 2026
first-round target set after the electoral decree's promulgation on 2 June 2026 and amended on 2 July 2026. The
CEP cited consultations with security forces, political actors, civil society, the private sector, and government as
the basis for the new dates, per Le National and the CEP's official communications at cephaiti.ht. The 13
December 2026 date should be understood only as an abandoned predecessor; the operative planning date is
November 18, 2026
18 July 2027.
Candidate registration for president, senate, and deputy closed at midnight on 15 November 2026, per the CEP
registration dashboard. Registration for mayor, CASEC, and ASEC closes 30 November 2026. The CEP
confirmed by official release that 31 political parties and 17 political groupings representing 228 parties finalized
member and supporter registration by the 9 November 2026 deadline; ballot numbers have been assigned to 105
political groups, per CEP Haiti official communications and the Haiti Policy House tracker. Final candidate totals
for senate and chamber races after the 15 November close have not yet been published by the CEP as of the
brief date. Mid-process figures cited by Prensa Latina as of 30 September 2026 showed 10 presidential, 204
Senate, and 604 Chamber of Deputies candidates figures that predate the November 15 close and will be
superseded by the final CEP list.
The security environment against which this calendar must be assessed remains critical. United Nations figures
document more than 5,700 people killed or injured in gang-related violence between January and
mid-September 2026. Approximately 1.5 million people are internally displaced, including more than 740,000
children, per UN News and the Caribbean National Weekly. The Gang Suppression Force, authorized by the UN
Security Council and led by Kenya, had reached only approximately 1,500 of a mandated 5,500 personnel as of
late October 2026, per Haiti Policy House and UN reporting. The UN Security Council approved a six-month GSF
mandate extension in September 2026, explicitly linking the extension to creating security conditions for
elections. BINUH Special Representative Carlos Ruiz Massieu directly warned the Security Council against
calendar-setting divorced from a realistic feasibility assessment the most explicit caution issued by any senior
international actor in the current cycle.
Three high-population communes in the metropolitan Port-au-Prince area Carrefour (estimated population
340,878), Cite Soleil (estimated population 174,571), and Croix-des-Bouquets (estimated population 163,434)
have zero voter registration centers and no voting infrastructure, per the CEP's own registration center data as
reported by Island TV Network and the Haiti Policy House tracker. Voter registration ran from 20 July to 13
October 2026, but registration in the Ouest Department launched ten days late, on 30 July 2026, after a
successful launch in nine of ten departments on 20 July, per Haiti Policy House. Le Nouvelliste reported on 5
November 2026 that many Haitians remain unable to obtain the national identity cards required for voter
registration, creating a structural participation barrier that compounds the geographic exclusion in
gang-controlled communes.
PM Alix Didier Fils-Aime, governing since the CPT's dissolution on 7 February 2026, has publicly and repeatedly
committed to elections as the transition's terminal point, including in an address to the UN General Assembly, per
Anadolu Agency and OAS press releases. OAS formally recognized Fils-Aime's legitimate interim authority under
the Haitian constitution. The operational gap between that institutional commitment and the conditions on the
ground zero electoral infrastructure in three major communes, a GSF at 27 percent strength, and an
underfunded humanitarian response at approximately 50 percent of the 2026 plan is the central feasibility
contradiction of the current cycle, as flagged explicitly by BINUH and implicitly by Genocide Watch's October
2026 report.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Haiti's electoral calendar has been revised, abandoned, or annulled at virtually every contested juncture since
2015. The October 2015 first round produced fraud allegations so widespread that the entire cycle was annulled
November 18, 2026
and re-run in 2016, establishing the precedent that a contested or underobserved first round produces protest
and postponement rather than a settled transfer of power. The 2015 dissolution of parliament after Martelly
governed by decree created the same legitimacy-deficit template that the CPT and PM Fils-Aime now inherit: an
unelected executive operating by decree, hand-selecting its electoral council, and promising elections as the exit.
The February 2004 seizure of Gonaives by the Cannibal Army is the operational antecedent for how armed
non-state actors can collapse a government's political project; Viv Ansanm's February 2024 Port-au-Prince
offensive demonstrated that the 2004 playbook has been refined, not retired.
TALKING POINTS:
The 18 July 2027 first-round date is the CEP's third calendar target in twelve months; the pattern of revision
tracks gang territorial expansion and GSF deployment lag, not administrative setbacks.
Three communes in the Ouest Department with a combined population exceeding 678,000 have zero electoral
infrastructure; excluding these populations structurally from the vote would produce a legitimacy deficit that
cannot be corrected by high turnout elsewhere in the department.
The GSF requires a minimum of approximately 3,000 personnel, by AYITI INTEL assessment, to provide
operationally meaningful coverage of metropolitan Port-au-Prince; it is currently at 1,500, with no publicly
announced acceleration plan.
Voter registration for the Ouest Department launched ten days late and closed 13 October 2026; Haitians still
unable to obtain national identity cards face a structural legal barrier to participation that the CEP has not publicly
addressed.
The 6 October 2026 decree revisions were not accompanied by public justification despite substantively altering
candidacy eligibility rules, including removing sanctions-disqualification language; the Global Initiative Against
Transnational Organized Crime flagged this removal as an electoral integrity threat.
The UN humanitarian plan is approximately 50 percent funded; with 1.5 million internally displaced persons, the
humanitarian and electoral operations are competing for the same scarce international financing and logistical
capacity.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
International missions should formally request from the CEP a public feasibility plan addressing the three
zero-infrastructure communes and specifying the GSF deployment benchmarks the CEP considers necessary
before polling can proceed in the Ouest Department.
Bilateral partners particularly the United States and Canada should communicate their position on the
sanctioned-candidates question to the CEP before the vetting window closes in December 2026; silence risks
being read as tacit acceptance.
Election observer organizations should map their deployment assumptions against a realistic GSF trajectory and
prepare contingency assessments for a scenario in which the Ouest Department cannot be safely covered in July
2027.
November 18, 2026
Humanitarian planners should not reduce IDP programming pipelines based on the electoral calendar; the 1.5
million displaced will not be resettled by July 2027 under current GSF and security trends.
Investors and businesses should use the August 2026 through December 2026 through July 2027 revision
trajectory as the base case for continued uncertainty and should not treat the 18 July 2027 date as a planning
anchor for commercial activity requiring political stability.
Journalists covering the calendar should report the 18 July 2027 first-round date accurately as the CEP's third
target, source it to the 28 October 2026 revised calendar, and not refer to any date prior to that including 13
December 2026 or 31 October 2026 as operative.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.
DEVELOPMENT 2: PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS AND COALITIONS
Online presidential candidate registration closed at midnight on 15 November 2026 with 33 registrants recorded,
subject to CEP vetting, per Haitian Times, Outre-mer La 1ere, and CEP Haiti official communications. This figure
represents provisional registration; the CEP's vetting process expected to produce approved and rejected
candidate lists in December 2026, based on prior decree logic will determine the final field. No CEP
disqualification decisions had been published as of the brief date.
Michel Martelly registered as a presidential candidate through the DEBLOKE coalition, a vehicle composed of
approximately 11 parties drawn largely from former PHTK-aligned legislators, per Haitian Times and the Haiti
Policy House tracker. Martelly is under active U.S. and Canadian sanctions. His registration does not constitute
final CEP approval. PHTK as a formal party is notably absent from the approved party list per the Haiti Policy
House tracker, making DEBLOKE his operative political vehicle. The 6 October 2026 electoral decree revision
removed a provision that had explicitly barred sanctioned individuals from candidacy, a change flagged by the
Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime as inconsistent with the stated international goal of
preventing illicit-network infiltration of electoral politics. As of brief date, neither the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets
Control nor Global Affairs Canada had issued a public statement specifically addressing Martelly's candidacy
registration, per available sourcing.
Outre-mer La 1ere reported on 16 November 2026 that at least three additional sanctioned male candidates had
registered, without naming them individually. The combination of Martelly's registration and the decree change
that enabled it represents the most significant electoral integrity challenge of the current cycle. AYITI INTEL
assesses that the CEP's decision on Martelly will function as a litmus test of institutional independence: approval
would generate a direct confrontation with international partners; disqualification would generate grievance within
the DEBLOKE coalition and risk spoiler behavior by a figure with demonstrated capacity to mobilize networks
and finances.
Martine Moise, widow of assassinated President Jovenel Moise, registered as a presidential candidate, per
November 18, 2026
Haitian Times and Espas.ht. No party affiliation or coalition vehicle has been specifically named in available
sourcing as of the brief date. Her candidacy carries symbolic weight rooted in the unresolved July 2021
assassination and the organized constituency that surrounded her husband's presidency. Former ambassador
and diplomat Dominique Dupuy registered, per the same sourcing. Marie Anne Hadid Savary also registered, per
Haitian Times. Beyond these named figures, available sourcing describes the remaining registrants as former
senators, deputies, and ministers, per video analysis of CEP registration activity reported by Haitian Times and
Espas.ht. AYITI INTEL has not independently confirmed candidacies beyond those attributed to named sources
above.
Moïse Jean-Charles, leader of Pitit Dessalines, has publicly rejected Core Group declarations on the electoral
process, signaling a strand of nationalist rejection of internationally supervised elections, per the AYITI INTEL
research data. As of brief date, no formal declaration of presidential candidacy by Moïse Jean-Charles has been
confirmed in available sourcing, and his precise registration status is not confirmed. His positioning as an
outsider to the Core Group framework could prove decisive: Pitit Dessalines carries a northern and rural
constituency base, and a formal boycott by Jean-Charles would reduce turnout in areas not covered by other
major formations. AYITI INTEL flags this as an unconfirmed but high-consequence variable.
The Viktwa coalition, launched in Cap-Haitien on 29 August 2026, claimed adherence of 52 parties and
represents a northern-anchored political formation, per AYITI INTEL research data sourced to coverage of the
August launch. Its presidential preference and candidate slate have not been publicly disaggregated in available
sourcing as of brief date. AYITI INTEL assessment: the Viktwa coalition warrants serious monitoring as a
potential northern counterweight to Port-au-Prince-centric candidacies, particularly if it coalesces around a
presidential figure with appeal in the Nord, Nord-Est, and Nord-Ouest departments, where relative stability gives
electoral operations greater feasibility than in the Ouest.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The 2015-2016 electoral cycle established the pattern that now repeats: Martelly, then completing his term as
president, oversaw an electoral process that produced fraud allegations so widespread the first round was
annulled; a re-run installed Jovenel Moise under legitimacy clouds that never fully lifted. Martelly's current
candidacy through DEBLOKE, eight years after leaving the presidency under those conditions, is the most direct
replay of a Haitian political pattern in which figures associated with governance failures reconstitute themselves
through new coalition vehicles rather than reformed parties. The 2015 decree-rule period in which Martelly
governed without parliament for eleven months is the template the current transition has inherited and
reproduced.
TALKING POINTS:
Thirty-three presidential registrants constitute a large and unvetted field; historical Haitian first rounds with
crowded fields and thin observation have produced contested results and annulments rather than settled
transfers of power.
Martelly's registration through DEBLOKE after PHTK's absence from the approved party list reflects a tactical
restructuring of his political vehicle, not a departure from his political network, per the Haiti Policy House tracker.
The decree change removing the sanctions bar was not publicly justified by the CEP, per AYITI INTEL research;
November 18, 2026
this procedural opacity makes it difficult to establish whether the change was legally grounded or politically
motivated.
Martine Moise's candidacy introduces a sympathy-and-justice dynamic tied to the unresolved assassination case
that no other registrant can replicate; her viability depends heavily on whether that symbolic capital translates into
organizational support, which is not confirmed in available sourcing.
The absence of any U.S. or Canadian public statement on the sanctioned-candidate question as of 18 November
2026 creates a credibility ambiguity that CEP vetting will force into the open.
The Viktwa coalition's 52-party formation in Cap-Haitien has received minimal coverage in Port-au-Prince-centric
media; AYITI INTEL assesses this as an underreported formation with the potential to shape first-round results in
multiple northern departments.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
Embassies in Port-au-Prince should establish direct monitoring of the CEP's vetting process and prepare
contingency messaging for the two binary outcomes on Martelly's candidacy before the December 2026 decision
window.
Election observer missions should map the presidential field's geographic bases against the voter registration
center data, identifying which candidates have constituency concentrations in communes with zero or minimal
electoral infrastructure.
Journalists should track coalition composition for DEBLOKE's approximately 11 parties and the Viktwa coalition's
claimed 52 parties; coalition discipline and defection risks are early indicators of post-first-round fragmentation.
Multilateral missions should request from OFAC and Global Affairs Canada a formal public clarification of their
position on sanctioned candidates' participation before the CEP vetting window closes.
Political analysts and researchers should monitor Moise Jean-Charles and Pitit Dessalines for a formal
declaration of participation or boycott; this decision will be one of the most consequential single acts by any
political figure outside the CEP before the first round.
Investor relations teams should factor the sanctioned-candidate vetting outcome into political risk assessments; a
Martelly approval would likely generate international financing restrictions on entities associated with his
coalition.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.
DEVELOPMENT 3: DOWN-BALLOT, MAIN-CITY RACES AND POWER-BROKERS
November 18, 2026
The legislative and local electoral field is structurally significant but individually underreported as of brief date.
The CEP confirmed by official release that 105 political groups have been assigned ballot numbers for the cycle,
encompassing all races presidential, senatorial, deputy, and local. The CEP's registration dashboard confirmed
all 30 Senate seats, three in each of the ten departments, are at stake in this election, alongside all 119 seats of
the Chamber of Deputies. Mid-process figures cited by Prensa Latina as of 30 September 2026 showed 204
Senate candidates and 604 Chamber candidates, but these figures predate the 15 November close and will be
superseded by the CEP's post-vetting publication. No city-by-city mayoral candidate data has been publicly
disaggregated in available sourcing as of brief date. Municipal races close registration on 30 November 2026.
The geographic distribution of electoral infrastructure creates a structural disparity in legislative and local viability
across departments. Port-au-Prince has 11 voter registration and voting centers; Delmas has 15; Petion-Ville has
20; Carrefour, Cite Soleil, and Croix-des-Bouquets have zero, per Island TV Network and Haiti Policy House. For
candidates seeking senate or deputy seats in the Ouest Department, the absence of any infrastructure in three
of its major communes translates directly into a structurally incomplete electoral constituency regardless of
candidate quality or campaign investment. This is not a hypothetical risk; it is a confirmed operational deficit with
no announced remediation plan as of brief date.
The 105 ballot-numbered groups and the 31 parties plus 17 groupings formally confirmed by the CEP represent
the broadest formal participation in a Haitian electoral cycle in recent history by count, per CEP official release.
That breadth carries a fragmentation risk. AYITI INTEL assessment: in a first round with a large and
undifferentiated field for senate and deputy races, regional strongmen, well-financed local networks, and
organized diaspora-linked parties historically outperform ideologically defined national parties with weak local
structures. The 2015 cycle demonstrated this clearly: local power brokers and figures with direct communal
resource networks outpaced programmatic parties in first-round deputy races before fraud annulled the entire
exercise.
Non-candidate power-brokers shaping the electoral environment include PM Fils-Aime, who controls the
executive instruments of the transitional government and the deployment authority over national police assets
supporting GSF operations; the GSF command structure, which will determine whether security conditions allow
polling in contested zones; and the Core Group, whose statements on electoral process have been publicly
rejected by Moise Jean-Charles of Pitit Dessalines, per AYITI INTEL research. The Rezonodwes commentator
Raoul Gerard's op-ed titled Aba Eleksyon Malatyong, as flagged in AYITI INTEL research, represents a civil
society current arguing elections under current conditions are inherently fraudulent a minority position in formal
politics but resonant at street level and potentially consequential for turnout in provinces where Rezonodwes
carries significant listenership.
For the main-city mayoral races Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haitien, Gonaives, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jeremie,
Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberte, Hinche, and Miragoane no individual candidate declarations have been confirmed in
available sourcing as of brief date. The 30 November 2026 mayoral registration deadline, twelve days from the
brief date, will produce the first actionable candidate pool for these races. AYITI INTEL assessment: Cap-Haitien
is the most electorally significant non-capital mayoral race in the current cycle, given the Viktwa coalition's
northern anchoring and the relative operational feasibility of the Nord Department compared to the Ouest.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The 2015 legislative elections the last substantive Haitian election before the current cycle produced allegations
November 18, 2026
of ballot stuffing, candidate list manipulation, and vote-buying so widespread that they triggered an annulment
and re-run. The CEP's current process inherits that credibility deficit; the removal of a sitting parliament since
January 2020 means there is no legislative body capable of conducting oversight of the CEP's vetting decisions.
Haiti has operated without a functioning parliament for more than six years, a vacuum that has concentrated
lawmaking and electoral rule-setting exclusively in executive hands precisely the structural condition that
produced the 2015 manipulation allegations.
TALKING POINTS:
All 30 Senate seats and all 119 Chamber of Deputies seats are at stake in this cycle; no sourced authority
supports any claim that only a portion of the Senate is up for election.
The 105 ballot-numbered political groups create a legislative field of exceptional fragmentation; first-round
plurality thresholds in multi-candidate district races will be low, increasing the probability of second-round runoffs
in the majority of deputy and senate contests.
The zero-infrastructure communes in the Ouest Department create a structural legitimacy problem for
Ouest-Department senate and deputy seats that cannot be resolved by candidate quality alone; this requires a
CEP operational decision, not a political one.
Mayoral registration closes 30 November 2026; the period between now and that deadline is the primary window
for assessing local power-broker alignment and coalition strategies in the ten main cities.
The Viktwa coalition's 52-party claim has not been tested against a candidate slate; its significance for
down-ballot races in the Nord, Nord-Est, and Nord-Ouest departments is AYITI INTEL's assessment, subject to
confirmation when the coalition publishes its legislative candidates.
The Core Group rejection by Moise Jean-Charles of Pitit Dessalines is a signal for down-ballot candidates in his
sphere of influence; a formal Pitit Dessalines boycott would create open legislative and local seats in its northern
and rural strongholds that other formations would immediately contest.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
Election observer organizations should prioritize legislative race monitoring in the Ouest Department and develop
specific observation protocols for contests where voter registration data is structurally incomplete due to
gang-controlled communes.
Journalists covering Haiti elections should request from the CEP a public statement on whether and how it plans
to address the electoral infrastructure deficit in Carrefour, Cite Soleil, and Croix-des-Bouquets before first-round
operations begin.
Diplomatic missions should track the 30 November 2026 mayoral registration deadline as a primary intelligence
collection milestone; the candidates declaring for Cap-Haitien, Port-au-Prince, and Gonaives will indicate which
national formations are investing in local power.
Multilateral missions should factor the parliamentary vacuum no legislature since January 2020 into
November 18, 2026
assessments of post-election governance capacity; a newly elected parliament will be convening in conditions of
near-total institutional discontinuity.
Political risk analysts should model the fragmentation scenarios for legislative races under a 105-group field,
including the probability that no candidate clears a first-round threshold in a majority of senate contests.
Researchers monitoring non-candidate power-brokers should track PM Fils-Aime's national police deployment
decisions and the GSF's operational zone assignments as leading indicators of which communes will have
functional security on election day.
CONFIDENCE
Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.
NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS
Monitor the CEP's official communications at cephaiti.ht for any announcement related to the post-November 15
consolidated candidate registration totals for presidential, senate, and deputy races. Watch for any public
statement from OFAC or Global Affairs Canada on the sanctioned-candidate registration question; as of the brief
date, neither government has publicly addressed Martelly's candidacy. Track whether any additional presidential
candidacy declarations or formal withdrawal announcements are made in the closing days before the CEP moves
to vetting. Watch for CEP or government announcements on the 30 November 2026 mayoral registration
deadline, including any extension of deadlines that would parallel the October pattern.
THIS WEEK
Monitor the CEP's vetting timeline for presidential and legislative candidates; the December 2026 expected
window for approved and rejected candidate list publication means vetting procedures should be visibly underway
by the end of November. Track coalition negotiations between the 105 ballot-numbered groups, particularly any
formal alliance announcements among DEBLOKE-aligned parties, the Viktwa formation, and parties associated
with Martine Moise's candidacy. Watch for a formal public statement from Moise Jean-Charles and Pitit
Dessalines on participation or boycott; this is the most consequential single political declaration pending. Monitor
GSF troop contribution announcements from Kenya and contributing nations; any public commitment to
accelerate toward the 5,500 mandate before Q1 2027 would significantly affect feasibility assessments. Track Le
Nouvelliste, Radio Kiskeya, and AlterPresse for coverage of mayoral candidate declarations in Cap-Haitien and
Port-au-Prince as the 30 November deadline approaches.
STRATEGIC HORIZON
The realistic path to a credible 18 July 2027 vote requires convergence of three conditions that are currently
unmet and moving in adverse directions: GSF deployment to at minimum an operationally meaningful threshold,
estimated by AYITI INTEL at 3,000-plus personnel for metro Port-au-Prince; opening of voter registration and
voting infrastructure in Carrefour, Cite Soleil, and Croix-des-Bouquets or a legally credible alternative mechanism
for their populations; and CEP vetting decisions on sanctioned candidates that either exclude them on
November 18, 2026
documented legal grounds or produce a credible international consensus that their participation does not
compromise process integrity. If the GSF trajectory does not show measurable acceleration by February 2027,
that month represents a natural reassessment point for a potential fourth calendar revision. The pattern of three
revisions in twelve months makes a fourth revision a scenario that planning cannot responsibly exclude.
Concurrently, the constitutional legitimacy of all electoral decrees issued without a sitting parliament and
specifically the October 2026 removal of the sanctions bar cannot be adjudicated through normal legal channels,
creating a structural legitimacy gap that will be exploited by any losing coalition seeking to contest results. The
2015 annulment precedent remains the most likely historical parallel if first-round results are contested and no
credible dispute resolution mechanism exists.
PRIMARY SOURCES
Le National (electoral decree reporting, calendar revision coverage)
CEP Haiti official (cephaiti.ht registration dashboard, ballot number assignments, official calendar)
Juno7 (down-ballot and registration coverage)
Haiti Libre (CEP official communications and party registration)
UN News and BINUH Security Council transcript (Ruiz Massieu warning; GSF mandate extension; IDP and
casualty figures)
Genocide Watch (October 2026 report on CEP postponement rationale)
OAS press release (recognition of Fils-Aime authority; technical support)
CARICOM official statements (electoral decree welcome; Eminent Persons Group visit 2-9 September 2026)
Le Nouvelliste (multiple articles, including 5 November 2026 report on CIN card access barriers)
AlterPresse (transitional governance and security coverage)
Radio Kiskeya (political actor statements and electoral monitoring)
Rezonodwes (Raoul Gerard op-ed Aba Eleksyon Malatyong; Viktwa coalition coverage)
November 18, 2026