FR

Daily Elections Bulletin

Next bulletin tonight at 5:00 PM (Haiti time).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Candidate registration closed 17 November 2026 with 19 presidential candidacies and 588 total registrations logged a procedural milestone that marks the most advanced point Haiti's electoral process has reached in this cycle. Yet the structural ceiling on credibility is set by two colliding realities: the entire Ouest Department, home to Port-au-Prince and an estimated 681,481 voting-age residents, has zero voter registration infrastructure due to gang control; and the October 6 electoral decree explicitly narrowed candidacy disqualification to UN Security Council sanctions only, contradicting G7 standards. The actionable insight for stakeholders is this the procedural shell of an election exists, but the operational and legitimacy foundations for a credible vote on 18 July 2027 remain unbuilt.

QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

The CEP's revised calendar sets the presidential and legislative first round for 18 July 2027 and the second round, with local elections, for 4 October 2027, following the 6 October 2026 decree that formally abandoned the 13 December 2026 date. Former President Michel Martelly registered approximately 23 October under the DEBLOKE coalition of 11 parties, becoming the highest-profile presidential entrant and the most polarizing figure in the field. At the down-ballot level, the Viktwa coalition's claim of 52 affiliated parties out of Cap-Haïtien represents the largest declared multi-race electoral machine, though its actual weight remains unverified. The figure to watch most closely in the coming weeks is CEP President Peterson Pierre-Louis, whose vetting rulings on the 19 presidential candidacies will reshape the field and trigger the first legitimacy stress test of his tenure. The central risk to the vote occurring is the unresolved Ouest Department registration and security gap no election that excludes Port-au-Prince and its surrounding communes from voter registration and polling infrastructure can be considered credible by any recognized international standard.

DEVELOPMENT 1: ELECTORAL CALENDAR CEP AND FEASIBILITY

The October 6, 2026 electoral decree the third calendar revision in under twelve months reset the presidential and legislative first round to 18 July 2027, with the second round and local elections scheduled for 4 October 2027 and final results on 23 October 2027. This follows a documented progression: the original November 2025 schedule set Round 1 for 30 August 2026; a second revision shifted that date to 13 December 2026; and the October 6 decree formally abandoned 13 December 2026 and established the current calendar. Le National and Le Nouvelliste both confirmed the October 6 decree as the operative legal instrument, citing consultations with security forces, political actors, civil society, the private sector, and government as the basis for the new timeline. The CEP, under President Peterson Pierre-Louis who assumed office September 24, replacing Jacques Desrosiers has been the institutional engine of the procedural calendar. Candidate registration for presidential and legislative offices closed 17 November 2026, with 19 presidential candidacies and 588 total registrations confirmed. Mayor, CASEC, and ASEC candidate registration remains open through 30 November 2026. The CEP confirmed 105 political groups have received official ballot numbers, and the registration dashboard shows 3 Senate seats per department across all 10 departments, for a total of 30 Senate seats at stake, alongside all 119 seats of the Chamber of Deputies. November 17, 2026 The voter registration picture is operationally alarming. The CEP launched voter registration on 20 July 2026 in nine of ten departments, explicitly excluding the Ouest Department due to insecurity. As of the October 13 initial registration close, 820,612 voters had been registered; the Haiti Policy House tracker subsequently logged 888,797 or more as a running figure. Against an ONI database of 6.5 million registrants and an estimated 5.8 million valid CIN holders, registration penetration is critically low. The Ouest exclusion accounts for the most significant single population gap: Port-au-Prince commune alone carries approximately 681,481 voting-age residents, Carrefour 340,878, Delmas 260,178, and Pétion-Ville 259,869. All have zero registration or voting center infrastructure. The CEP has established a legal framework for online voter registration as a partial remedy, but the Haiti Policy House tracker confirms no physical solution for Ouest has been announced as of the brief date. The security variable remains explicitly embedded in the decree language itself. Le Nouvelliste's characterization that even the announced date is not really a date but a conditional promise captures the operative reality: the July 2027 target holds only if security conditions allow. Gang Suppression Force operations in the Ouest and surrounding corridors are ongoing, with CARICOM's Eminent Persons Group conducting a September 2 to 9 field assessment. No public, independent evaluation of GSF capacity at the scale required for free voter movement, polling logistics, and observer access across all ten departments has been released as of 17 November. The International Crisis Group characterized elections as unrealistic in the current security context in a February 2025 report that continues to be cited in current coverage. Approximately 20 municipalities remained inaccessible for candidate filing operations as of September 2026, per the Haiti Policy House gang-controlled communes map, and approximately 1.5 million persons remain displaced by gang violence nationally. Governance of the electoral process is now concentrated in a single unelected executive. The Transitional Presidential Council dissolved 7 February 2026, transferring sole executive authority to Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé. The CPT's mandate was broadly assessed as a failure it neither restored public order nor organized elections within its mandate period. PM Fils-Aimé himself acknowledged publicly in mid-2026 that an August election was unrealistic, one of the few instances in this cycle where a sitting executive publicly contradicted the electoral body's own calendar. The concentration of electoral responsibility in a single, unelected executive has been flagged by observers as a structural legitimacy risk, reproducing the template established in 2015 when Parliament dissolved and the executive governed alone.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The 2015 dissolution of Parliament under Michel Martelly set the governing template that has repeated across this cycle: when elections lapse, the executive governs without a legislature and appoints its own electoral council, embedding the same legitimacy deficit that the CPT and PM Fils-Aimé now carry into the 2027 vote. The October 2015 first-round fraud allegations produced protest, postponement, and re-run rather than a settled transfer of power a direct precedent for the contestation that an insufficiently observed or credibility-challenged 2027 first round could reproduce.

TALKING POINTS

The 18 July 2027 first round is the operative date per the October 6, 2026 decree; 13 December 2026 is the formally abandoned prior date and must not be treated as current. November 17, 2026 Three successive calendar revisions in under twelve months establish a documented pattern of security-driven postponement; the July 2027 date carries the same conditionality language as its predecessors. The Ouest Department exclusion from voter registration infrastructure is not a marginal technicality it represents the disenfranchisement of Haiti's largest population concentration and the capital's entire electorate. Registration penetration of approximately 820,000 to 889,000 against a universe of 5.8 million valid CIN holders and an ONI backlog of 630,000 renewal-pending citizens signals a legitimacy ceiling, not a legitimacy floor. The CEP under Peterson Pierre-Louis has executed procedural milestones on schedule, but procedural compliance does not resolve the operational and security gaps that determine whether voting actually occurs. BINUH, UNDP, and OAS are providing technical and financial support, but no observer mission commitment has been announced for July 2027, and the absence of such commitments by Q1 2027 would be a strong negative signal.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Missions and multilateral organizations should not lock programming or staffing cycles to July 2027 as a fixed date; contingency planning for a fourth calendar revision should be built into budgets and staffing plans. Observer mission planning bodies OAS, EU, CARICOM, African Union should issue formal announcements of intent or non-intent no later than Q1 2027 to allow field-level preparation and to signal international confidence or caution. Organizations with field capacity in Port-au-Prince should anticipate CEP and government requests for technical and logistical support for any Ouest registration phase, and should begin pre-positioning scenario planning now. Journalists and researchers should obtain and analyze the full text of the October 6 decree, particularly the security conditionality provisions, to track whether future security assessments formally trigger or waive the conditionality clauses. Diplomats should request a formal CEP briefing on the Ouest Department registration solution and timeline, treating any non-answer as an operational red flag for the July 2027 date. BINUH and UNDP programming teams should commission an independent, publicly releasable assessment of GSF territorial coverage relative to the 1,306 operational voting centers, including the gap created by the Ouest exclusion. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS AND COALITIONS

November 17, 2026 ANALYTICAL BODY As of the 17 November 2026 close of presidential candidate registration, 19 presidential candidacies have been officially logged with the CEP. This represents the first time Haiti's electoral process in this cycle has produced a fully registered presidential field. The CEP must now conduct vetting reviewing compliance with eligibility requirements including décharge (financial clearance from prior public office), residency, and criminal record conditions and publish its acceptance and rejection rulings. No confirmed deadline for CEP vetting decisions has been published as of the brief date. AYITI INTEL assesses the vetting phase as the single most consequential near-term development in the presidential race, as disqualifications will reshape coalition dynamics and generate the first formal legitimacy challenges to the process. The highest-profile entrant is former President Michel Martelly, who registered approximately 23 October under the DEBLOKE coalition. DEBLOKE comprises 11 parties, drawing heavily from figures associated with the former PHTK political organization, according to the Haiti Policy House Election Tracker. Notably, PHTK itself is absent from the list of registered party entities the CEP's November 9 release confirmed 31 parties, 17 groupements politiques, and 3 independents in the final approved list suggesting organizational restructuring rather than a clean break with Martelly's prior electoral base. Martelly's registration has generated significant controversy in both the domestic press and the diaspora, reflecting his record as president from 2011 to 2016 and his subsequent role in Haitian political affairs. His candidacy is the most polarizing variable in the current field: AYITI INTEL assesses that his presence could suppress turnout among anti-PHTK constituencies while energizing opposition coalition-building, and that his eligibility ruling from the CEP will be the single most-watched vetting decision of the cycle. Marie Etienne Martine Joseph Moïse registered as a presidential candidate on 16 November, per available reporting. Her candidacy adds a figure connected by name and politics to the assassinated former president Jovenel Moïse to the visible portion of the declared field. Beyond these two, the full 19-candidate field has not been comprehensively named in confirmed local source reporting available to this brief. AYITI INTEL cannot attribute names, parties, or bases to the remaining declared candidates without confirmed sourcing and declines to infer or speculate. The Viktwa coalition, presented publicly at a Cap-Haïtien event on 29 August, claims 52 affiliated parties and positions itself as a unity platform spanning multiple races. This is the largest coalition by claimed affiliation in the current cycle, but its actual electoral weight the number of competitive candidacies it fields, its geographic reach, and its financing has not been independently verified in available sourcing. ANFC, described in research data as including former deputy Gandy Dorfeil, is among the other named groupings. The absence of PHTK as a registered entity, despite the DEBLOKE coalition's PHTK-adjacent composition, is a structural signal for post-election parliamentary dynamics: if DEBLOKE wins the presidency but PHTK is not reconstituted as a parliamentary force, coalition governance of the legislature will require new negotiated arrangements. The CEP's final registration figures of 31 parties and 17 groupements represent a sharp reduction from the more than 300 organizations that filed initially in the March 2026 registration window, reflecting vetting attrition at the party level. This compressed landscape may concentrate the presidential and legislative races among a smaller number of organized platforms, though the proliferation of small parties within larger declared coalitions complicates any straightforward mapping of voter allegiances. The October 6 decree's provision limiting candidacy disqualification to UN Security Council sanctions only is the November 17, 2026 most consequential eligibility question in the presidential field. The UNSC Haiti sanctions list covers seven gang leaders and two armed groups none of whom are registered or credibly reported as electoral candidates. As a result, individuals sanctioned by the United States Office of Foreign Assets Control, Canada, or other bilateral mechanisms for corruption, narco-trafficking, or gang support are not legally barred from running under the operative decree. Civil society organization Nou Pap Domi publicly flagged this rollback, noting that an earlier version of the decree contained broader eligibility conditions that were subsequently removed, per research data. The G7 had explicitly called for exclusion of sanctioned individuals from the electoral process, per reporting cited in the Outre-mer La 1ère and franceinfo sources. The State Department imposed visa restrictions on two CPT members and one cabinet minister on 28 January 2026 for enabling gang activity. AYITI INTEL notes as analysis that this gap between the operative legal standard and international community expectations is likely to produce legitimacy challenges in the post-vetting phase and potentially in post-election recognition dynamics, particularly if a candidate subject to bilateral sanctions advances to or wins a second round.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The October 2015 first-round fraud allegations in which the CEP conducted a vote under thin observation and multiple parties alleged manipulation produced a protest cycle, annulment, and re-run rather than a settled transfer of power. The 2026 to 2027 field's internal dynamics, including a polarizing frontrunner in Martelly, a compressed party landscape, and an international community already divided over eligibility standards, replicate several structural features of that precedent. The parallel is not predictive, but it is instructive for scenario planning.

TALKING POINTS

Nineteen presidential candidacies are officially registered; CEP vetting rulings not yet scheduled will be the first formal filter on the field and the most consequential near-term development for the presidential race. Michel Martelly's DEBLOKE candidacy is the highest-profile and most politically polarizing entry; the absence of PHTK as a registered party entity is a structural signal for legislative coalition dynamics. The October 6 decree's narrow sanctions bar creates a legal pathway for bilaterally sanctioned figures to contest elections, in direct contradiction of the G7's stated standard an unresolved tension that could affect international observer mandates and post-election recognition. Nou Pap Domi's public flagging of the sanctions eligibility rollback provides a documented civil society legitimacy challenge that diplomats and observers should track as a potential organizing point for opposition coalitions. AYITI INTEL cannot at this time confirm names, parties, or bases for the full 19-candidate field beyond Martelly and Moïse; local source coverage of the broader field should be monitored actively in the coming weeks. The diaspora dimension an estimated two million Haitian-Americans with political and financial leverage, no established diaspora voting mechanism, and activated controversy over Martelly is an underreported structural variable in the presidential race.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

November 17, 2026 Embassies and multilateral missions should formally request the CEP's full list of registered presidential candidates, their affiliated parties or coalitions, and the vetting timeline, and should not rely on partial press coverage of the field. Diplomats should seek bilateral meetings with Peterson Pierre-Louis's CEP leadership to understand the vetting criteria being applied and whether bilateral sanctions appear anywhere in the internal review process, even if absent from the decree's text. International organizations should communicate publicly and formally their expectation that the vetting process will be transparent and subject to published, reasoned decisions silence on vetting standards now will make post-disqualification controversy harder to manage. Journalists covering the presidential race should seek confirmed local source reporting on each of the 19 registered candidates, their parties, geographic bases, and stated platforms before characterizing any candidate as a frontrunner; the field is not yet fully visible in available sourcing. Investors and businesses should treat the presidential field's resolution including vetting, any legal challenges, and coalition consolidation as the primary political variable for their electoral risk timeline through Q1 2027. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3: DOWN-BALLOT MAIN-CITY RACES AND POWER-BROKERS

The 17 November registration close covers all 30 Senate seats 3 per department across all 10 departments and all 119 Chamber of Deputies seats. The CEP registration dashboard confirms 204 Senate candidates and more than 604 deputy candidates registered. These are significant field sizes that, combined with 19 presidential candidacies, produce the 588 total candidacy figure cited in research data, with the full count across all races standing at the broader universe of registered candidacies tracked by the CEP. At the departmental level, the Viktwa coalition's 52-party claim if operationally real would position it as a multi-race competitor for both chamber seats and senatorial slots across multiple departments. ANFC and DEBLOKE similarly present as multi-race platforms, though their specific legislative candidate slates have not been comprehensively reported in available local sourcing as of this brief. The absence of PHTK as a registered party entity means that any legislative candidates running under the DEBLOKE umbrella or affiliated groupements are not formally part of a reconstituted PHTK parliamentary bloc a distinction that will matter for post-election parliamentary governance if the presidential race produces a DEBLOKE or DEBLOKE-adjacent winner. AYITI INTEL assesses this as a structural risk for executive-legislative coherence in any post-July 2027 government, particularly given Haiti's historical pattern of parliamentary fragmentation and the high number of registered parties competing for 119 seats. Mayor, CASEC, and ASEC candidate registration remains open through 30 November 2026. As of the brief date, November 17, 2026 no comprehensive confirmed local source reporting is available on declared mayoral candidacies in the main cities tracked by this brief Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, and Miragoâne. AYITI INTEL declines to attribute undeclared or unconfirmed candidacies to any of these cities and will report mayoral races as confirmed sourcing becomes available in future briefs. The Port-au-Prince municipal situation carries a specific structural overlay: the CPT's dissolution on 7 February 2026 was accompanied by PM Fils-Aimé's appointment of a Commission Municipale for Port-au-Prince on the same date, installed 11 February. The commission comprises Yves Andrel Salomon, Dorothé Ignace Morel, and Esther Cinéas, tasked with managing the commune until municipal elections are held, per Gazette Haiti and Le Monde reporting. This appointed commission governs Port-au-Prince Haiti's largest city in the absence of elected leadership, compounding the city's existing legitimacy deficit under conditions of active gang control. Any mayoral candidacy announced for Port-au-Prince under these conditions will operate in a city where voter registration infrastructure does not exist and gang-controlled zones encompass significant portions of the commune. Cap-Haïtien is the most politically active city in terms of confirmed coalition-building at the down-ballot level. The Viktwa coalition's 29 August public launch in Cap-Haïtien claiming 52 affiliated parties was explicitly framed as a multi-race platform, suggesting it has designs on the Cap-Haïtien mayoral race as well as Nord Department legislative seats. Cap-Haïtien's relative security advantage over Port-au-Prince makes it the most plausible site for high-visibility down-ballot competition. AYITI INTEL notes that any coalition commanding credible capacity in Cap-Haïtien will also carry significant symbolic weight in the North's historically competitive political landscape. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé is the most consequential non-candidate actor in the current cycle. His government controls the operational environment for the electoral process security force deployment, budget allocations for the CEP and ONI, and the administrative framework within which voter registration and vetting occur. His public acknowledgment that security conditions made an August 2026 election unrealistic established that his government's security trajectory, not the CEP's calendar, is the binding constraint. His relationship with the CEP leadership under Peterson Pierre-Louis will determine whether the institutional architecture holds through the vetting phase and beyond. The two CPT members subject to US visa restrictions imposed 28 January 2026 for enabling gang activity not named in available sourcing remain power-brokers whose electoral futures are now technically unimpeded by the October 6 decree. Their downstream political positioning, whether as registered candidates, coalition financiers, or spoilers, warrants continued tracking. Civil society organization Nou Pap Domi functions as an independent legitimacy-monitoring actor whose public statements such as its flagging of the sanctions eligibility rollback carry weight with both the international community and domestic opposition coalitions, making it a de facto non-electoral veto player on process credibility. The Viktwa coalition's leadership has not been comprehensively identified in available sourcing, but its organizational capacity in northern Haiti if the 52-party claim reflects real mobilization rather than paper affiliations positions it as a potential kingmaker in legislative races regardless of which presidential candidate wins.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The 2004 Gonaïves precedent in which the Cannibal Army's seizure of the city triggered a cascade that November 17, 2026 removed a sitting president established that gang or armed actor operations in provincial cities can determine national political outcomes. The approximately 20 communes currently inaccessible for candidate filing operations are distributed across departments beyond Ouest, meaning the security variable is not confined to Port-au-Prince; a security deterioration in Gonaïves, Jérémie, or other main cities could directly affect down-ballot competition and mayoral race viability in the second round.

TALKING POINTS

All 30 Senate seats and 119 Chamber of Deputies seats are at stake in this election; mayor, CASEC, and ASEC registration remains open through 30 November 2026. The Port-au-Prince Commission Municipale of Salomon, Morel, and Cinéas governs Haiti's largest city without electoral mandate, compounding legitimacy deficits in a commune with zero voter registration infrastructure and significant gang control. Cap-Haïtien is the most politically active main city at the down-ballot level, with the Viktwa coalition's large-scale organizing effort representing the first confirmed multi-party electoral machine in the Nord Department. Non-candidate power-brokers PM Fils-Aimé, Nou Pap Domi, unnamed CPT members under US visa restrictions, and Viktwa's leadership are shaping the electoral environment as decisively as declared candidates in some respects. The legislative field's fragmentation across 31 parties, 17 groupements, and the absence of a reconstituted PHTK suggests post-election parliamentary governance will require complex coalition negotiation regardless of presidential outcome. AYITI INTEL cannot at this time confirm specific mayoral candidacies in any of the ten tracked main cities; the 30 November municipal registration close will be the first opportunity to assess this dimension of the race comprehensively.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Missions and observers should obtain the full CEP Senate and deputy candidate list by department as soon as it is published, and cross-reference it against known political party affiliations to map the legislative landscape ahead of the first round. Journalists and researchers should commission or conduct on-the-ground reporting in Cap-Haïtien specifically, as the most accessible high-intensity electoral environment in the current cycle, to verify Viktwa's actual organizational capacity and candidate slate. Organizations supporting municipal governance should monitor the Port-au-Prince Commission Municipale's operational effectiveness and public legitimacy, as its performance through the electoral period will shape voter attitudes toward the city's first elected mayor in the post-election period. Embassies should request a full accounting from the government and CEP of which of the approximately 20 previously inaccessible communes have restored candidate filing access, and whether that restoration reflects November 17, 2026 durable security gains or temporary conditions. Investor and business intelligence units should identify which main-city mayoral races particularly in Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, and Les Cayes carry the most direct implications for commercial infrastructure access and municipal contracting, and begin tracking declared candidates as registration closes. CONFIDENCE Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor for CEP announcements on the municipal candidate registration process the 30 November deadline is two weeks away and any procedural guidance, extensions, or security-related exclusions issued this week will shape the down-ballot field. Track local Haitian press Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, Juno7, Radio Kiskeya for any immediate CEP statement on the vetting timeline for the 19 registered presidential candidates; a published schedule or the absence of one is itself operationally significant. Watch for any security incident affecting CEP infrastructure, registered candidates, or electoral commission personnel; any such event in the 24 to 48 hours following registration close would constitute a direct pressure signal on the vetting phase.

THIS WEEK

The CEP's vetting review of 19 presidential candidacies is the dominant process to track; watch specifically for any announcement regarding Michel Martelly's DEBLOKE filing, any challenge to Marie Etienne Martine Joseph Moïse's registration, and any ruling on candidates with bilateral sanctions histories. Monitor ONI for any government announcement on emergency CIN renewal processing for the 630,000 backlog; any such announcement is a direct signal of government commitment to expanding the voter universe ahead of a possible second registration phase. Watch for formal statements from OAS, G7 governments, or the UN Secretary-General on the October 6 decree's narrow sanctions bar Nou Pap Domi's public challenge may catalyze international follow-up demands for decree revision. Track the municipal registration window through 30 November for candidacy announcements in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, and Jacmel these are the first confirmable signals of organized down-ballot competition.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

November 17, 2026 The realistic path to a credible 18 July 2027 vote requires, at minimum, three developments that are currently absent: a viable voter registration solution for the Ouest Department; an independent, publicly releasable assessment of GSF capacity across all ten departments; and a transparent, legally defensible CEP vetting process that resolves rather than defers the sanctions eligibility contradiction with international standards. If none of these three conditions is met by April 2027, AYITI INTEL assesses a fourth calendar revision as the more probable outcome than a July 2027 first round. The documented pattern of three prior revisions, the security conditionality language embedded in the decree itself, and the structural scale of the Ouest registration gap collectively support this scenario assessment. The Martelly eligibility ruling is the highest-profile near-term veto point: a CEP acceptance would validate a candidacy the G7 and significant domestic civil society actors have signaled they view as problematic; a CEP rejection would trigger immediate legal challenge and potentially a political confrontation between the DEBLOKE coalition and the Fils-Aimé government. Either outcome carries significant downstream implications for the process's legitimacy and for international observer mission willingness to deploy. International observer mission commitments or the absence of commitments by Q1 2027 will function as the most reliable external signal of whether the international community collectively assesses the July 2027 date as viable. The absence of a confirmed OAS or EU observer mission announcement by February 2027 should be treated as a strong operational warning indicator by all stakeholders planning around the electoral timeline.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Le Nouvelliste lenouvelliste.com principal Haitian daily; electoral calendar, CEP reporting, voter registration coverage Le National lenational.org Haitian daily; electoral decree and calendar revision reporting CEP Haiti Official cephaiti.ht Conseil Electoral Permanent; registration dashboard, official decrees, candidate and party registration data, ballot number assignments Radio Métropole radiometropole.com Haitian radio; electoral and security reporting OAS oas.org Organization of American States; Secretary General Ramdin statement CARICOM caricom.org Caribbean Community; Eminent Persons Group September 2026 field assessment statement US State Department state.gov visa restriction announcement on CPT members and cabinet minister; Deputy Secretary Christopher Lando messaging Rezo Nòdwès rezonodwès.com northern Haiti outlet; Viktwa coalition and Cap-Haïtien political reporting Haiti Policy House Election Tracker haitipolicyhouse.org electoral monitoring tracker; voter registration figures, gang-controlled communes map, candidate registration data Nou Pap Domi civil society organization; public statements on sanctions eligibility rollback in October 6 decree AlterPresse alterpresse.org Haitian news agency and civil society monitor; eligibility and political analysis Gazette Haïti gazettehaiti.com Haitian outlet; CPT dissolution and Port-au-Prince Commission Municipale reporting November 17, 2026