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Daily Elections Bulletin

Next bulletin tonight at 5:00 PM (Haiti time).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Presidential candidate registration closed on 15 November 2026 with 33 declared candidates, including former President Michel Martelly running under the DEBLOKE coalition and Martine Moïse, widow of assassinated President Jovenel Moïse. The CEP now faces its most consequential institutional test: formal vetting of a field that includes at least three candidates reportedly subject to international sanctions, a screening exercise whose outcome will define whether the July 2027 process is perceived as credible or as a legitimized route back to power for figures international bodies have designated. With zero voting infrastructure in Carrefour, Cité Soleil, and Croix-des-Bouquets, and the Gang Suppression Force at 27 percent of authorized strength, the 18 July 2027 first-round date remains a planning horizon dependent on security gains not yet in evidence. Actionable insight: Missions should condition electoral support disbursements on CEP vetting decisions regarding sanctioned candidates, treating that decision as the single clearest early signal of institutional integrity.

QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

The CEP's revised calendar sets the presidential and legislative first round on 18 July 2027, the second round with local elections on 4 October 2027, and final results on 23 October 2027. Mayor, CASEC, and ASEC candidate registration remains open until 30 November 2026. Presidential registration closed 15 November 2026 with 33 candidates enrolled; at least three are reported by French media to be subject to international sanctions. Michel Martelly's registration under DEBLOKE is the dominant presidential development; it reorders coalition dynamics and will accelerate opposition consolidation. In down-ballot races, 535 Senate candidates and a substantially larger deputy pool have been filed, with 84 candidates contesting 3 Senate seats in the West Department alone. The key figure to watch is CEP President acting on vetting decisions: approval or rejection of sanctioned candidates will define the credibility signal sent to international partners and domestic civil society in the week ahead. The central risk to the vote occurring is the security gap the Gang Suppression Force at approximately 1,500 of 5,500 authorized personnel leaves three major Port-au-Prince communes with no voting infrastructure whatsoever, structurally excluding an estimated 700,000 people from participation.

DEVELOPMENT 1: ELECTORAL CALENDAR, CEP AND FEASIBILITY

Haiti's electoral calendar has been revised four times in under thirteen months. The CEP's initial November 2025 submission to the transitional authority set a first-round date of 30 August 2026. That date collapsed when security conditions and executive prerequisites were not met. A second calendar published in mid-2026 targeted 13 December 2026 as the first round, formalized through decrees issued on 2 June and 2 July 2026. That date in turn collapsed when candidate enrollment was extended twice first to 9 October, then to 31 October making the December 13 logistics impossible. The October 6, 2026 revised electoral decree introduced the current, fourth calendar. Le National reported on approximately 29 October 2026 that the CEP fixed the first round for 18 July 2027, the second round for 4 October 2027, and final results for 23 October 2027. The CEP stated publicly that the revised calendar was produced through consultations with security forces, political actors, civil society, the private sector, and the government. Le National separately confirmed in October 2026 that elections would not take place on 13 December. The 13 December date must be understood as November 19, 2026 abandoned; it is cited here only as historical record. Candidate registration under the revised calendar closed 15 November 2026 for president, senate, and deputy, and remains open until 30 November 2026 for mayor, CASEC, and ASEC, per the CEP registration dashboard. The CEP confirmed that 31 political parties, 17 political groupings, and 3 independent candidates completed full member and sympathizer enrollment by 9 November 2026, and that 282 of 320 parties that submitted dossiers in March 2026 received CEP approval. The CEP's vetting process formally validating or rejecting candidates is now the institution's most urgent task and the most observable near-term integrity signal. The security baseline against which this calendar must be assessed is severe. The UN-backed Gang Suppression Force has approximately 1,500 personnel deployed against an authorized ceiling of 5,500, as reported by France 24 and AFP on 29 October 2026. The UN Security Council approved a six-month mandate extension in September 2026. Briefing the Security Council in October 2026, the UN Special Representative warned explicitly, as reported by UN News on that date, that setting new election dates without a realistic assessment of their feasibility would only erode public confidence. Haiti Policy House's election tracker confirms zero voting and registration centers in Carrefour (340,878 inhabitants), Cité Soleil (174,571), and Croix-des-Bouquets (163,434), with Port-au-Prince itself carrying only 11 centers for 681,481 inhabitants. These three communes represent approximately 679,000 people, the majority in territory where gangs exercise operational control. Voter registration, which ran from 20 July to 13 October 2026, was itself compromised at the outset: the CEP launched registration on 20 July in nine of ten departments, adding the West Department only on 30 July. Le Nouvelliste reported in November 2026 that significant backlogs at the Office National d'Identification were preventing citizens from obtaining national ID cards required for electoral registration, with people waiting months for card delivery ahead of the register deadline. The ONI database holds 6.5 million records, but card-in-hand possession is the operative requirement. An estimated 1.5 million people are internally displaced, including more than 740,000 children, and Haiti's economy is forecast to contract for the seventh consecutive year, per UN reporting of October 2026. AYITI INTEL ASSESSMENT: The July 2027 date is better described as a structurally constrained planning horizon than a firm electoral commitment. The four-revision pattern since November 2025 reflects a recurring dynamic in which the CEP sets a date before the enabling conditions security, identity documentation, infrastructure, and funding exist to support it. The humanitarian plan is approximately 50 percent funded, compressing the parallel electoral logistics support pipeline. A fifth calendar revision cannot be excluded and should be a baseline planning scenario for missions. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: Haiti's pattern of election-date collapse is not new. Parliament dissolved in January 2015 and Martelly governed by decree, establishing the template repeated in 2020 through 2026 in which an electoral lapse hands the executive unchecked authority and control over the composition of the electoral council itself. The 2015 fraud-and-annulment cycle, in which a contested first round under thin observation produced protest, postponement, and re-run rather than a settled transfer of power, is the direct structural precedent for the risk now facing the July 2027 process. November 19, 2026 TALKING POINTS: The 18 July 2027 first round is the fourth revised date in thirteen months; each prior revision was preceded by an official assurance of feasibility. The Gang Suppression Force at 27 percent of authorized strength cannot provide election-day security across all ten departments simultaneously; the UNSC mandate review in March 2027 will be a critical confidence signal. Three of the most populous communes in the West Department have zero registered voting or registration centers; this is not a logistical gap that can be resolved in weeks. The UN Special Representative's public candor on feasibility risks an unusual departure from diplomatic restraint signals that international confidence in the timeline is qualified at best. ONI identification backlogs are functioning as a de facto disenfranchisement mechanism for a population that, as reported by Le Nouvelliste in November 2026, cannot complete registration without cards that have not arrived. The 50 percent funding shortfall in Haiti's humanitarian plan structurally constrains the parallel electoral-logistics support pipeline that bilateral donors and UN agencies are expected to provide. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS: Missions and observers should withhold formal commitment of observation-mission resources until Q1 2027 security assessments confirm GSF deployment is on a credible trajectory toward the 5,500 authorized ceiling. Bilateral donors should formally condition electoral logistics funding tranches on CEP candidate vetting decisions regarding sanctioned individuals, using the vetting outcome as the first institutional integrity checkpoint. BINUH and the UNSC should request from the CEP a written operational plan specifying how voting centers will be established in Carrefour, Cité Soleil, and Croix-des-Bouquets before treating July 2027 as a firm date. Election support organizations should commission an independent ONI capacity audit to quantify the identification backlog and project whether it can be cleared before the electoral register closes. Journalists and researchers should track the CEP vetting register as it is published, documenting which sanctioned-candidate dossiers are approved versus rejected, as this record will be essential for post-election legitimacy assessments. Planning documents for all missions should include a contingency scenario for a fifth calendar revision, treating Q2 2027 as the earliest realistic window for a credible first round. CONFIDENCE: Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS AND COALITIONS

Presidential candidate registration closed at midnight on 15 November 2026, with 33 candidates formally enrolled, as confirmed by Outre-mer La 1ère on 16 November 2026. The field is the largest in recent Haitian electoral history and reflects the intersection of three dynamics: the elimination of the parliamentary décharge requirement as a practical vetting gate (given Haiti's non-functional legislature since January 2020), the removal in the October 6 revised electoral decree of the provision barring internationally sanctioned individuals from running, and the absence of an incumbent or dominant party capable of narrowing the field through patronage consolidation. November 19, 2026 The most consequential registration is that of former President Michel Martelly. The Haitian Times reported on 16 October 2026 that Martelly registered online as a presidential candidate under DEBLOKE, described as a coalition of 11 parties composed largely of former lawmakers affiliated with his dissolved PHTK. PHTK itself is absent from the CEP-approved party list. The DEBLOKE registration is analytically significant on multiple grounds. First, it represents an organizational rebranding designed to rehabilitate a politically toxic brand PHTK governed from 2011 to 2016 and from 2017 to 2021, and its association with the Jovenel Moïse administration has been compounded by allegations, which AYITI INTEL notes are unproven, linking figures in its orbit to gang financing. Second, Martelly's candidacy through a coalition of former PHTK-aligned lawmakers rather than a reconstituted PHTK signals awareness that the original party label carries a disqualifying electoral cost. Third, the décharge controversy the constitutional requirement that former officials obtain parliamentary clearance of their financial accounts before running applies to Martelly, though legal scholars, as cited by Le National, have argued for a de facto waiver given the legislature's incapacity since January 2020. Martine Moïse, widow of assassinated President Jovenel Moïse, has also registered, per Outre-mer La 1ère on 16 November 2026. Her candidacy carries strong symbolic weight in communities that identify with Jovenel Moïse's legacy, particularly in the North and North-East departments. However, her candidacy faces scrutiny, the nature and source of which must be specified: unresolved questions remain from the July 2021 assassination investigation, and her proximity to that event has been raised in Haitian civil society commentary, though no judicial finding has been made against her as a presidential candidate. Dominique Dupuy, a former ambassador and one of the more prominent female candidates in the field, is registered. Marie Anne Hadid Savary is also registered. Outre-mer La 1ère confirmed both registrations on 16 November 2026. The 30 percent female candidate quota mandated by the electoral decree is not met at the presidential level, which creates a potential legal vulnerability quota non-compliance has been cited in prior Haitian electoral cycles as grounds for administrative challenge, though enforcement has been inconsistent. The sanctions eligibility gap is the most significant structural integrity issue in the presidential field. At least three registered presidential candidates are reported by French media specifically via Outre-mer La 1ère and France 24 social media reporting of 16 to 17 November 2026 to be subject to international sanctions. AYITI INTEL notes that these candidates are not named in the available sourced reporting cited in the research data for this brief; their identities are reported but not confirmed in the primary Haitian-outlet record available to this analyst. The October 6, 2026 revised electoral decree's removal of the disqualification provision for sanctioned persons was flagged explicitly by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, which noted that the UN Panel of Experts had identified politically connected financiers of armed groups among those who would benefit from the rollback. Active sanctions regimes relevant to Haiti include US OFAC designations under Executive Orders 13818 and 14059, Canadian designations including Lambert and Latortue, and UK designations. The CEP's vetting decisions on these dossiers expected imminently will constitute the most visible early test of institutional integrity under the revised calendar. November 19, 2026 The 105 political groups that have received ballot numbers, confirmed by CEP Haiti's official site, suggest a highly fragmented field. AYITI INTEL ASSESSMENT: In a field of 33 presidential candidates with no dominant incumbent party and a fragmented ballot, the principal risk is a first-round outcome so fractured that the second round becomes a runoff between two candidates carrying significant legitimacy deficits either through sanctions associations, unresolved legal questions, or narrow geographic bases. Martelly's DEBLOKE registration will likely serve as a consolidating reference point for opposition coalitions: parties that might otherwise not ally will find common ground in preventing his return to power. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: The October 2015 first-round election, in which CEP-certified results showing Jovenel Moïse in first place were disputed across the field and eventually annulled, is the direct precedent. That cycle produced protest, postponement, and a re-run, consuming eighteen months and producing a president Moïse who governed without a legislature from January 2020 until his assassination in July 2021. A repeat of the 2015 fraud-and-annulment dynamic, applied to a 33-candidate field with sanctioned entrants and unresolved décharge questions, would be structurally destabilizing in a context where there is no legislature to mediate the resulting political crisis. TALKING POINTS: The DEBLOKE registration is best understood as a rebranding strategy rather than a new political formation; analysts and observers should track whether the coalition's 11 parties have any organizational infrastructure beyond the former PHTK parliamentary caucus. Martine Moïse's candidacy introduces a sympathy-and-legacy dynamic that could be particularly powerful in rural departments outside the West, where Jovenel Moïse maintained stronger approval; her geographic base warrants tracking against senate candidate lists in those departments. The CEP's imminent vetting decisions on sanctioned candidates will determine whether the October 6 decree rollback translates into de facto ballot access for designated individuals; a failure to screen is not a legal finding but it is a political and reputational signal. The décharge ambiguity is a structural vulnerability across the field not only for Martelly and parties without clear décharge standing may face post-election challenges if they win, particularly if the losing side has international support. The 33-candidate field, with 105 political groups receiving ballot numbers, structurally favors candidates with diaspora financing networks, rural infrastructure, and name recognition advantages that currently benefit Martelly and Moïse over newer entrants such as Dupuy. International missions should map declared candidates against the OFAC, Canadian, and UK sanctions lists as a due-diligence baseline before engaging with any campaign. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS: Embassies should formally communicate to the CEP, through the appropriate diplomatic channel, that vetting decisions on sanctioned candidates will be monitored and factored into assessments of process credibility. Observers and research organizations should request from the CEP the full published vetting register, attributing approval and rejection decisions to the institutional record, and preserve that record for post-election analysis. Journalists covering the presidential field should seek CEP confirmation of which of the 33 candidates have submitted décharge documentation, as this remains an unresolved eligibility question for all November 19, 2026 former officials in the field. Political-risk analysts advising investors should assess whether any registered candidate against whom US OFAC or allied-country sanctions apply has business or financial relationships with entities operating in Haiti; the removal of the disqualification provision creates a sanctions-compliance exposure for those entities. CARICOM and OAS missions should formally ask the CEP what administrative mechanism, if any, it intends to use to screen candidates against international sanctions lists, given the October 6 decree's removal of the automatic disqualification provision. Missions following the Martelly candidacy should track whether a formal CEP or judicial challenge to his eligibility is filed before the vetting deadline, and by whom, as this will indicate the alignment of opposition legal strategies. CONFIDENCE: Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3: DOWN-BALLOT, MAIN-CITY RACES AND POWER-BROKERS

Registration for Senate and Chamber of Deputies candidates closed on 15 November 2026, per Outre-mer La 1ère. A total of 535 Senate candidates have filed, with women representing approximately 15 percent of that total well below the 30 percent gender quota mandated by the electoral decree, confirmed by Outre-mer La 1ère on 16 November 2026. All 30 Senate seats are at stake in this election, with 3 seats in each of Haiti's 10 departments, as reflected on the CEP registration dashboard. The figure of 84 candidates competing for 3 Senate seats in the West Department alone confirmed by the CEP Haiti official site and Le Nouvelliste signals both the high political salience of the West and the structural concentration of political energy in and around the capital. Former parliamentarians dominate the field across parties, with multiple ex-senators and ex-deputies registered in various departments. Mayor, CASEC, and ASEC registration remains open until 30 November 2026 per the CEP calendar, meaning the municipal field is not yet closed. The main-city mayoral races of analytical significance include Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, and Miragoâne. As of 19 November 2026, specific declared mayoral candidacies in these cities are not yet confirmed in the primary Haitian-outlet record available to this analyst, as registration remains open. AYITI INTEL will update this section upon the 30 November close and subsequent CEP publication of municipal candidate lists. The non-candidate power-broker landscape is as consequential as the candidate field itself. Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé holds sole executive authority following the dissolution of the Transitional Presidential Council on 7 February 2026, as confirmed by Andetay News. Fils-Aimé himself acknowledged to Radio-Canada that Haiti was too unstable for elections in August 2026, a candid admission that underscored the gap between the CEP's official calendar and the government's own operational assessment. His administration's control over the electoral logistics environment budgetary allocations, security deployments, and ONI processing gives him structural leverage over the process independent of any personal electoral ambition. The Washington axis of power-brokerage remains active. The US used targeted sanctions against CPT members who attempted to oust Fils-Aimé in early 2026, as reported by AS/COA, reinforcing US November 19, 2026 leverage over the transition and signaling Washington's investment in maintaining the current executive arrangement through the electoral cycle. The OAS Secretary General Albert Ramdin led a high-level mission to Haiti from 16 to 19 August 2026, per OAS press release. CARICOM's Eminent Persons Group conducted a field visit from 2 to 9 September 2026, finding elite-level skepticism about the December 13 timeline even before it was formally abandoned, as reflected in CARICOM's public statements. CARICOM endorsed the revised July 2027 date while reaffirming that elections must be Haitian-led, credible, free, fair, and inclusive. The civil society skeptic current, while minority, is analytically important. Rezo Nòdwès published an op-ed by Raoul Gérard in September 2026, titled Aba Eleksyon Malatyong, arguing that elections under present security conditions are performative and counterproductive. This position, while outside the mainstream of international and institutional discourse, reflects a view held by a vocal constituency that any election conducted with gang-controlled communes excluded will lack the legitimacy required to produce a stable political outcome. The gender quota failure across all races presidential, senate, and deputy is a structural legal vulnerability with operational implications. AYITI INTEL notes that quota non-compliance has historically been cited in Haitian electoral jurisprudence as a basis for administrative challenge and that, in a contested post-election environment, losing parties have incentive to deploy quota non-compliance arguments to challenge results. The 30 percent threshold applies by decree; the CEP's decision not to enforce it at the registration stage transfers the legal risk to the results-validation phase. AYITI INTEL ASSESSMENT: The down-ballot race most consequential for the presidential outcome is the West Department Senate contest. With 84 candidates for 3 seats, the West Senate race will generate the most intense intraparty and cross-party coalition negotiation between now and July 2027. The senatorial networks that emerge from that consolidation will shape campaign finance, constituency mobilization, and potentially the presidential second-round runoff dynamics in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: The collapse of Haiti's legislature in January 2020 the direct result of the electoral cycle's failure to produce a seated parliament in time for the mandated renewal left the country without a legislative branch for more than four years. The legislative races now underway are, in that context, not merely down-ballot contests but the institutional mechanism for ending one of the longest periods of unrepresentative executive governance in Haiti's post-1986 history. The stakes of a flawed legislative election are therefore higher than the ballot positions suggest. TALKING POINTS: The 30 November close of municipal registration will substantially expand the down-ballot candidate pool; analysts should not finalize assessments of local power-brokerage dynamics until the full municipal list is published. The West Department Senate race, with 84 candidates for 3 seats, is the highest-intensity legislative contest in the country and a leading indicator of coalition formation dynamics that will affect the presidential race. PM Fils-Aimé's control over electoral logistics, ONI processing, and security deployment gives him November 19, 2026 structural leverage that is not visible in formal candidate lists but is operationally decisive. The US sanctions instrument deployed against CPT coup attempt participants in early 2026 has demonstrated Washington's willingness to use designation as a governance tool; missions should assess whether this instrument will be deployed in relation to the sanctioned candidates now on the ballot. The gender quota failure at 15 percent Senate candidacy, against a 30 percent mandate, is a structural legal vulnerability that will be available as a challenge mechanism to any party that loses and seeks administrative grounds for contest. Civil society skepticism about electoral performativity, as expressed in the Rezo Nòdwès Gérard op-ed, is a minority position but one with potential mobilizing power if security conditions on election day confirm the fears its proponents have articulated. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS: Observers and civil society monitors should establish a baseline municipal candidate registry as of 1 December 2026 the day after mayoral registration closes to enable tracking of candidate withdrawals, intimidation incidents, and eligibility challenges through to the July 2027 campaign period. Missions focused on gender equity should formally communicate to the CEP the quota compliance gap and request a written explanation of what enforcement mechanism, if any, the CEP intends to apply to lists that fall below 30 percent. Journalists covering the West Department Senate race should map the 84 candidates against party affiliations and former parliamentary tenure to identify which prior legislative networks are attempting to reconstitute themselves under the new electoral framework. Investors and businesses with operations in Port-au-Prince should track the mayoral registration in Carrefour, Cité Soleil, and Croix-des-Bouquets specifically, as the absence of voting infrastructure in those communes raises questions about whether mayoral elections there can be held at all in July 2027. Research organizations should document the gender quota enforcement record across CEP vetting decisions, as this record will be essential for post-election legitimacy analysis if quota-based challenges are filed. Diplomats and multilateral officials should seek briefings from BINUH on the operational plan for establishing voting infrastructure in the three zero-center communes before the campaign period begins, pressing for a written timeline with benchmarks. CONFIDENCE: Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

The CEP is expected to begin publishing formal vetting decisions on the 33 presidential candidates and legislative hopefuls following the 15 November registration close. Any CEP announcement accepting or rejecting the dossiers of reportedly sanctioned presidential candidates will be the most significant near-term integrity signal in the process. Watch the CEP Haiti official site at cephaiti.ht and primary Haitian outlets Le Nouvelliste, Le National, AlterPresse, and Radio Kiskeya for the vetting register. Watch also for any formal challenge filed by a political party or civil society organization November 19, 2026 against Martelly's eligibility under the décharge provision or the DEBLOKE party-status question.

THIS WEEK

Municipal candidate registration closes 30 November 2026; the full mayoral, CASEC, and ASEC field will be established at that point. Monitor for the volume and geographic distribution of municipal candidacies as an indicator of whether party networks have rural and secondary-city depth or are concentrated in the West Department. Track any CEP communication on a plan to establish voting infrastructure in Carrefour, Cité Soleil, and Croix-des-Bouquets. Watch for coalition announcements among anti-PHTK and anti-DEBLOKE parties responding to the Martelly registration. Monitor ONI for any public statement on CIN card delivery backlogs and processing timelines.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

The single most important variable for the credibility of the July 2027 first round is the GSF deployment trajectory. If the force does not approach a minimum operationally viable strength which independent analysts would place well above the current 1,500, though the specific threshold is not formally defined by Q1 2027, the CEP will face the same choice it has faced four times since November 2025: set a date, miss the security conditions, and revise again. The UNSC GSF mandate review expected in March 2027, based on the September 2026 six-month extension, will carry an explicit signal on international confidence in the timeline. A mandate renewal accompanied by an increase in authorized troop ceiling would be a positive signal; a renewal without enforcement pressure on troop contributions would suggest the security baseline will not materially improve before July. Simultaneously, the ONI identification backlog and the zero-infrastructure status of three major communes represent structural disenfranchisement problems that require months of advance work. Any assessment of whether the July 2027 vote is credible should use the March 2027 UNSC review, the Q1 2027 GSF deployment figures, and the CEP's published voting-center plan for gang-controlled communes as the three leading indicators.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Le National. Elections fixed for 18 July 2027. Approximately 29 October 2026. https://www.lenational.org/article/politique/8588/18-juillet-2027-la-date-retenue-pour-le-premier-tour-des-elections- Le National. Elections will not take place on 13 December. October 2026. https://www.lenational.org/article/politique/8494/les-elections-nauront-pas-lieu-le-13-decembre Le Nouvelliste. CEP fixes general elections for 30 August 2026. November 2025. https://lenouvelliste.com/article/261737/le-cep-fixe-les-elections-generales-en-haiti-au-30-aout-2026 Le Nouvelliste. Citizens still waiting for their national ID card to register on electoral lists. November 2026. https://lenouvelliste.com/article/273616/et-ces-citoyens-qui-attendent-encore-leur-carte-didentite-pour-sinscrire-sur CEP Haiti Official Site. Party enrollment and candidate registration data. November 2026. https://cephaiti.ht Outre-mer La 1ère. End of registration for presidential, senate and legislative candidates in Haiti. 16 November 2026. https://la1ere.franceinfo.fr/martinique/elections-en-haiti-fin-des-inscriptions-pour-les-candidats-a-la-presidentielle-a Haitian Times. Martelly registers online as presidential candidate in Haiti. 16 October 2026. November 19, 2026 https://haitiantimes.com/2026/10/16/martelly-registers-online-presidential-candidate-haiti Haiti Policy House. Haiti Election Tracker. Accessed November 2026. https://www.haitipolicyhouse.org/haiti-election-tracker France 24 and AFP. Gang-plagued Haiti sets election dates for 2027. 29 October 2026. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20261029-gang-plagued-haiti-sets-election-dates-for-2027 UN News. Security Council briefing on Haiti, October 2026. https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/10/1168626 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Who will protect the upcoming elections from criminal networks. 2026. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/who-will-protect-the-upcoming-elections-from-criminal-networks Andetay News. Haiti Transitional Presidential Council. July 2026. https://www.andetaynews.com/2026/07/haiti-le-conseil-presidentiel-de.html Radio-Canada. Haiti too unstable for August presidential election Fils-Aimé. 2026. https://ici.radio-canada.ca/rci/fr/nouvelle/2253231/haiti-instable-election-presidentielle-aout Genocide Watch. Haiti postpones elections indefinitely amid gang violence. 7 October 2026. https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/haiti-postpones-elections-indefinitely-amid-gang-violence Rezo Nòdwès. Raoul Gérard, Aba Eleksyon Malatyong. September 2026. November 19, 2026