EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The CEP's revised first-round date of 18 July 2027 rests on five conditions improved Ouest
Department security, completed voter registration, secured electoral funding, resolved
sanctions-candidate screening, and durable political consensus none of which is presently met.
Michel Martelly's registration under the eleven-party DEBLOKE coalition has reshuffled the
presidential field and intensified pressure on the CEP to issue binding eligibility rulings on sanctioned
figures before December 2026. With online registration closing 15 November and physical document
submission closing 30 November, the next thirty days will determine whether the process commands
domestic and international credibility or fractures into a selective-disqualification crisis. Actionable
insight: the CEP's handling of the Martelly eligibility file and the sanctions-screening question is the
single most consequential institutional decision before year-end.
QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS
The CEP's revised electoral calendar sets a first round on 18 July 2027; online candidate registration
closes 15 November 2026 and physical document submission closes 30 November 2026. Michel
Martelly has formally registered for the presidency under the DEBLOKE coalition, the most
consequential presidential development since the registration window opened. In down-ballot races,
the Viktwa coalition launched in Cap-Haïtien in August 2026, claiming 52 affiliated parties and
signaling a potential northern counterweight to Port-au-Prince-centric party networks; competitive
mayoral fields have emerged in Gonaïves and Artibonite-area communes. The figure to watch before
30 November is CEP President and the council collectively, whose ruling on the décharge
requirement and sanctions-candidate screening will either validate or fracture the process. The
central risk to the vote occurring is the security exclusion of Ouest Department: with Port-au-Prince,
Carrefour, and Delmas largely inoperable as registration and future polling sites, an election held on
schedule would systematically disenfranchise the country's largest urban electorate.
DEVELOPMENT 1: ELECTORAL CALENDAR, CEP AND FEASIBILITY
Haiti's electoral calendar has undergone at least four major revisions since late 2025. The original
CEP proposal, reported in November 2025, targeted 30 August 2026 as the first round, conditional
on security and administrative prerequisites that were never met. A revised calendar designated 13
December 2026, which Le Monde reported on 11 October 2026 as abandoned sine die due to gang
violence. The CEP subsequently promulgated a revised electoral decree on 6 October 2026
amending its decrees of 2 June and 2 July 2026 and announced 18 July 2027 as the new first-round
date. Under the revised calendar, the second round, combined with local elections, is set for 4
October 2027, with final results on 23 October 2027.
Candidate registration, per the CEP registration dashboard, remains open through 15 November
2026 for presidential, senate, and deputy candidacies, and through 30 November 2026 for mayoral,
CASEC, and ASEC candidacies. As of 13 November, 588 candidacies across all offices had been
recorded, with 19 presidential candidacies formally filed. The CEP is simultaneously participating in
the XIXth Inter-American Meeting of Electoral Authorities in Santo Domingo from 11 to 13 November
November 13, 2026
2026, according to official scheduling. Following 30 November, the CEP must process physical
documentation for eligibility review including the contested décharge requirement and unresolved
sanctions screening before publishing provisional candidate lists, expected in December 2026.
The security picture is the decisive feasibility constraint. The Haïti Policy House Election Tracker
maps gang-influenced or controlled communes across the country, with Ouest Department home to
the country's largest urban electorate most severely affected. The CEP launched voter registration
on 20 July 2026 in nine of ten departments, explicitly excluding Ouest; a Pétion-Ville center opened
30 July but operates under severe constraints. As of mid-2026, Port-au-Prince itself had zero
operational registration or voting centers due to gang control, and Carrefour, with an estimated
340,878 voting-age residents, likewise had no operational centers, according to Haïti Policy House
data citing IHSI 2024 estimates. The UN Security Council, in its October 2026 briefing, heard that
gangs have adapted to the Multinational Security Support Mission crackdown, rendering MSS
progress insufficient for electoral operations in the Ouest. The council explicitly warned, according to
UN News in October 2026, that setting dates without a realistic feasibility assessment erodes
institutional credibility.
The broader humanitarian context compounds the feasibility deficit. The UN reported nearly 1.5
million internally displaced persons as of late 2026, including more than 740,000 children, with Haiti's
economy contracting for the seventh consecutive year and the 2026 humanitarian response plan
approximately fifty percent funded. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, addressing the UN General Assembly in
September 2026, stated that registration centers were open and citizens were registering to vote.
Ground reporting confirms this claim was not accurate for Port-au-Prince itself, which is a material
contradiction between official government messaging and verifiable conditions on the ground.
The CEP is simultaneously attending the Santo Domingo inter-American meeting a signal of
institutional engagement with multilateral electoral networks while facing acute domestic credibility
challenges. The five-part test for 18 July 2027 to be achievable, as assessed by this brief, is:
adequate Ouest Department security for center operations; completion of voter registration gaps;
secured funding for CEP logistics; legal resolution of the sanctions-candidate question; and durable
political consensus. As of 13 November 2026, none of these conditions is met.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Haiti's electoral calendar has collapsed repeatedly without producing a credible vote: the 2015 first
round produced fraud allegations and an annulment cycle that set the template for protest,
postponement, and re-run rather than a settled transfer of power, per Le Nouvelliste's
contemporaneous reporting on the 25 October 2015 vote. The pattern of executive decree-rule during
electoral voids established when President Martelly ruled by decree from January 2015 after
parliament dissolved has been reproduced in the 2020-to-2026 cycle, with PM Fils-Aimé now
governing without any elected body at any level, repeating the same legitimacy deficit the 2015 cycle
exposed.
TALKING POINTS:
November 13, 2026
The 18 July 2027 date is a planning target, not a confirmed operational milestone; institutional and
security prerequisites remain unmet as of 13 November 2026.
The exclusion of Ouest Department from fully operational registration centers means that an election
held on schedule would disenfranchise the country's largest urban population, undermining any claim
to national representativeness.
The CEP's December 2026 provisional candidate list publication specifically its handling of décharge
and sanctions-screening decisions is the nearest-term determinative event for process credibility.
PM Fils-Aimé's government has been without an elected mandate since 7 February 2026; the UN
Security Council's feasibility warning and CARICOM's insistence on credible conditions create a
multilateral ceiling on rubber-stamping further calendar extensions.
Le Nouvelliste's characterization of the décharge requirement as the greatest legal lie of Haitian
democracy, cited in 2026 reporting, signals that selective enforcement of eligibility rules will be
treated as politically motivated by significant domestic audiences.
ONI's structural enrollment gap 700,000 Haitians holding valid database records but lacking CIN
cards, plus thousands more unable to obtain CINs due to administrative backlogs, per Le Nouvelliste
of 5 November 2026 means voter registration totals do not reflect full eligible participation.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
Embassies and multilateral missions should formally request from the CEP, before 30 November
2026, its written procedure for screening candidates against OFAC and Canadian sanctions lists, and
the legal basis for any disqualification or non-disqualification decision.
Election observer missions should map commune-by-commune voting center counts in Ouest
Department monthly from December 2026 onward, treating the opening of centers in Port-au-Prince,
Carrefour, and Cité Soleil as the primary tangible indicator of electoral feasibility.
Donor governments should condition electoral logistics funding tranches on a verifiable CEP
feasibility assessment for Ouest Department operations, not on calendar dates alone.
Journalists should obtain the CEP's official voter registration totals by department, disaggregated, to
independently verify whether Ouest registration has occurred at scale; ground reporting to date
suggests it has not.
Investor advisories should assume a greater than fifty percent probability of further calendar slippage
beyond July 2027, and should not base governance-stability projections on a first-round vote before
Q4 2027 at the earliest.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.
November 13, 2026
DEVELOPMENT 2: PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS AND COALITIONS
As of late October 2026, 19 presidential candidacies have been formally registered with the CEP,
according to the Haïti Policy House Election Tracker and reporting by the Haitian Times of 16 October
2026. The field spans the ideological spectrum but is dominated by legacy political figures. The most
consequential single development in the presidential race is Michel Martelly's formal registration
under the DEBLOKE coalition, which the Haitian Times of 16 October 2026 and Haïti Policy House
reporting confirm comprised eleven parties, predominantly former PHTK-aligned lawmakers. PHTK
itself, the party structure that anchored the Martelly and Jovenel Moïse presidencies from 2011 to
2021, is not listed among the 17 formally approved political groupings published by the CEP, per the
CEP official site and Haïti Policy House data. Martelly's decision to build DEBLOKE as a new
coalition vehicle rather than reconstitute PHTK reflects both the party's legal and reputational
exposure and a strategic attempt to aggregate former PHTK networks under a fresh electoral label.
Martelly's candidacy carries a significant unresolved eligibility question. RFI reporting of 6 August
2026 raised explicitly whether candidates under international sanctions would be permitted to
register and compete; no definitive CEP ruling has been issued as of 13 November 2026. The
electoral decree does not contain explicit provisions cross-referencing OFAC or Canadian sanctions
lists as disqualifying criteria, per the research intelligence. The CEP's silence on sanctions screening
creates a structural gap between international accountability frameworks and domestic electoral law.
If the CEP publishes its provisional candidate list in December 2026 with Martelly's candidacy
validated, it will face immediate pressure from the international community; if it disqualifies him, it will
face domestic political crisis from DEBLOKE's eleven affiliated parties and the constituency Martelly
commands, particularly in provincial urban areas and among networks of former elected officials.
Former provisional President Jocelerme Privert has also registered, per Haïti Policy House and
Wikipedia sourcing on the 2027 Haitian general election. Privert served as provisional president from
February to February 2017 following the 2015-2016 electoral crisis and brings an institutional
legitimacy claim as a former head of state who organized elections, though his tenure was itself
contested by opposition parties. Former senator Paul Denis of OPL the Organisation du Peuple en
Lutte, one of Haiti's older social-democratic formations has declared, per available sourcing, adding
an ideologically distinct voice to the field. At least two women have registered: a candidate under Pati
Vizyon Dayiti, identified in the Haïti Policy House tracker as candidate number 35, and Marie-Anne
Savannah Hadid Savary under the HAMAD coalition; their platforms and geographic bases have not
been detailed in available primary sourcing and this brief will not speculate beyond what sources
confirm.
Moïse Jean-Charles, former senator and founding figure of Pitit Dessalines, represents a significant
political current whose registration status is described in available sourcing as unclear. Jean-Charles
has been the most vocal domestic critic of Core Group framing of the electoral process, publicly
rejecting Core Group election statements as reported by Juno7, and signaling a nationalist and
anti-internationalist electoral posture. Whether he has formally filed candidacy papers as of 13
November 2026 is not confirmed in primary sourcing, and this brief does not assert a candidacy that
November 13, 2026
sources do not confirm. His mobilization capacity particularly in the north and among rural
constituencies skeptical of Port-au-Prince and international actor dominance makes him a figure to
watch regardless of his formal electoral status.
Coalition dynamics remain fluid. AYITI INTEL assesses, as analysis distinct from sourced fact, that
the DEBLOKE registration will trigger a consolidation response among candidates and party
groupings who define themselves against the Martelly network. The 15 November online registration
deadline may produce additional candidacy declarations intended to position figures as
anti-DEBLOKE alternatives. Coalition talks in the remaining registration window are likely, though no
sourced coalition agreement among non-DEBLOKE presidential candidates has been confirmed as
of this writing.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The 2015 first-round fraud allegations in which Jovenel Moïse of PHTK was initially declared the
winner before the entire result was annulled established the template for a Martelly-network
candidacy producing a contested result, organized opposition, and institutional crisis. The parallel is
not identical, as PHTK is not the vehicle in 2026-2027, but the political dynamics of a
Martelly-aligned candidacy dominating one faction of the field while generating organized opposition
from the other are consistent with the 2015-2016 pattern documented by Le Nouvelliste and
international observers.
TALKING POINTS:
Martelly's DEBLOKE registration is the dominant fact in the presidential field; the CEP's eligibility
ruling on his candidacy, expected in December 2026, is the single most consequential institutional
decision in this electoral cycle.
The absence of PHTK as an approved party grouping while Martelly runs under a new eleven-party
coalition is a legal and strategic maneuver that multilateral observers and journalists should probe:
specifically, which of the eleven DEBLOKE parties has the organizational infrastructure to run a
national campaign.
Privert's candidacy offers an institutional legitimacy counter-narrative to Martelly, but his ability to
consolidate opposition support depends on whether anti-DEBLOKE candidates fragment or
coalesce, which has not been determined as of 13 November.
The CEP's failure to issue a binding mechanism for sanctions screening confirmed by RFI reporting
means that OFAC and Canadian government designees face no formal domestic legal barrier to
candidacy, a gap that creates post-election legitimacy risk regardless of which candidates win.
The décharge requirement, described by Le Nouvelliste as the greatest legal lie of Haitian
democracy, creates a tool for selective disqualification that could be wielded against politically
inconvenient candidacies; international observers should monitor whether its application is consistent
or targeted.
November 13, 2026
Women's representation in the declared field at minimum two registered female presidential
candidates is a data point requiring further sourcing before conclusions on gender-inclusivity of the
process can be drawn.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
Embassies should formally seek from the CEP, before 15 November 2026, the legal memorandum or
administrative procedure governing how the décharge requirement will be applied to the 19 declared
presidential candidacies, and whether any candidate has received a waiver or conditional clearance.
Election observer missions should commission independent legal analysis of whether Haiti's current
electoral decree provides a domestic legal basis for sanctions-related disqualification, before the
December 2026 provisional list publication.
Journalists should file information requests with the CEP for the complete registered presidential
candidate list with party affiliations, as the publicly available sourcing as of 13 November 2026 is
partial and the full list of 19 candidates has not been comprehensively reported in primary Haitian
outlets.
Multilateral missions should initiate direct diplomatic engagement with the CEP on the
sanctions-screening gap before December 2026; waiting for the provisional list to trigger a crisis is a
less effective posture than proactive technical assistance on eligibility procedures now.
Political analysts and investor advisors should model a scenario in which Martelly's candidacy is
disqualified in January 2027 and DEBLOKE's eleven parties fracture this is a plausible scenario with
significant down-ballot consequences for coalition-dependent legislative candidacies.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.
DEVELOPMENT 3: DOWN-BALLOT, MAIN-CITY RACES AND POWER-BROKERS
The CEP registration framework covers all 30 Senate seats three seats in each of the ten
departments, as listed on the CEP registration dashboard and all 119 seats in the Chamber of
Deputies, as well as mayoral, CASEC, and ASEC races. Total registered candidacies across all
offices stood at 588 as of late October 2026, per Haïti Policy House tracking. The 2,008 mayoral
candidacies recorded by Espas.ht data signal competitive local races in multiple communes, with
Gonaïves leading among tracked cities with 37 candidacies from 14 structures, and Anse-Rouge
recording 31 candidacies.
The Viktwa coalition's 29 August 2026 launch in Cap-Haïtien claiming 52 affiliated parties and
structures, per Instagram reporting of the launch event is the most significant organizational
November 13, 2026
development in the down-ballot landscape. Cap-Haïtien is Haiti's second city and the administrative
center of the Nord Department; a northern coalition with that breadth of claimed affiliation, if it holds
together, would represent a potential counterweight to Port-au-Prince-centric party networks in both
Senate and deputy races across the Nord, Nord-Est, and Nord-Ouest departments. AYITI INTEL
assesses, as analysis distinct from sourced fact, that Viktwa's legislative slate in the northern
departments bears monitoring as a potential spoiler or kingmaker dynamic, particularly if the
presidential race produces a fragmented first round. No sourced information on Viktwa's specific
Senate or deputy candidates is available in current primary reporting; this brief will not name
candidates not confirmed in sources.
Senatorial races carry particular institutional weight because Haiti has had no functioning parliament
since January 2020, when the terms of two-thirds of senators expired without replacement elections.
The 30 Senate seats at stake in the 2027 election represent the first opportunity to constitute a
legislative chamber in more than seven years. The political significance of Senate races extends
beyond policy: the Senate has constitutional functions in validating electoral outcomes and in certain
executive appointments, meaning the composition of the incoming Senate will shape the
post-election governance environment. Major party groupings the 17 approved groupings
representing 228 parties, per CEP official documentation are each positioning Senate candidates,
but primary sourcing on specific named Senate candidates by department is limited in the current
research corpus.
The Eno Zéphyrin case flagged in a Facebook post reported by this research corpus illustrates a
structural conflict-of-interest concern in the down-ballot field. Zéphyrin, identified as commissaire du
gouvernement (state attorney) in Cap-Haïtien, reportedly registered as a senatorial candidate, raising
questions about whether active judicial officials can simultaneously hold prosecutorial authority and
seek elected office. The concern has been raised publicly but no CEP ruling on the matter has been
reported in primary sourcing.
Port-au-Prince mayoral races are structurally compromised by the security situation. No sourced
information on declared Port-au-Prince mayoral candidates is available in current primary reporting,
and the registration process in the Ouest Department has been severely constrained. This brief does
not project mayoral race dynamics in Port-au-Prince beyond the structural observation that gang
control of significant portions of the metropolitan area renders a competitive, inclusive local election
in that commune operationally doubtful under current conditions. Among other main cities,
Cap-Haïtien benefits from the Viktwa mobilization and from relatively greater security stability;
Gonaïves, with 37 documented candidacies, shows active civic competition; and Les Cayes, Jacmel,
Jérémie, Hinche, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, and Miragoâne have not generated sourced candidacy
reporting available in the current corpus.
Non-candidate power-brokers shaping the electoral environment include the members of the former
Transitional Presidential Council, whose political networks remain active even after the CPT's formal
dissolution on 7 February 2026. Former CPT members Edgard Leblanc Fils and Leslie Voltaire,
identified in Le Monde and France 24 reporting, retain institutional relationships and party network
links that will influence coalition formation in legislative races. PM Fils-Aimé himself is a
non-candidate power-broker: his government controls administrative resources relevant to electoral
logistics, and his decisions on security force deployment and resource allocation to the CEP are
November 13, 2026
consequential for the process's operational viability. The 30,000-affiliation requirement for party
registration, flagged as controversial by the Haitian Times of 12 May 2026, has effectively barred
newer political formations from the ballot, concentrating the competitive field among legacy networks
a structural advantage for established party groupings with pre-existing organizational infrastructure.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The seizure of Gonaïves by armed groups in February 2004, when the Cannibal Army under Buteur
Métayer effectively made the Artibonite capital ungovernable and contributed to President Aristide's
departure, established the precedent for armed actors determining electoral geography by denying
access to key urban centers. The pattern has repeated in 2024-to-2026, with gang control of Ouest
Department communes creating an effective veto over Port-au-Prince area electoral operations a
structural dynamic, not an isolated incident.
TALKING POINTS:
The Viktwa coalition's claim of 52 affiliated parties is the most significant organizational development
in the northern electoral landscape; its Senate and deputy slates in Nord, Nord-Est, and Nord-Ouest
will be a key indicator of whether it represents genuine organizational capacity or a paper coalition.
The 30 Senate seats at stake represent the first legislative election in more than seven years; the
political and constitutional stakes of those races extend far beyond individual senators to the
reconstitution of a parliament capable of exercising oversight and validation functions.
Gonaïves' competitive mayoral field 37 candidacies from 14 structures reflects genuine political
competition in Artibonite, a department whose electoral dynamics have historically been decisive in
presidential and legislative outcomes.
The structural exclusion of Port-au-Prince mayoral competition from functional electoral operations
due to gang geography is not a marginal problem: it concerns the mayoralty of the country's capital
and largest city, whose absence from the ballot or whose election under conditions of exclusion
would compromise the legitimacy of the entire local governance tier.
The 30,000-affiliation party registration requirement effectively favors legacy political networks over
new entrants, narrowing the field in ways that reinforce existing power structures rather than opening
the process to emerging political movements.
The Zéphyrin conflict-of-interest allegation, if unaddressed by the CEP, signals a broader pattern of
institutional double standards in eligibility enforcement that domestic civil society and international
observers are already flagging.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
Election observer missions should deploy researcher capacity to Cap-Haïtien and the northern
departments within the next 30 days to assess Viktwa's actual organizational infrastructure,
November 13, 2026
candidate slate, and financial backing the coalition's claims require ground-truth verification before it
can be assessed as a genuine electoral force.
Multilateral observers should formally ask the CEP to publish, before 15 December 2026, its legal
ruling on whether active judicial officials holding prosecutorial authority may simultaneously seek
Senate candidacy, using the Zéphyrin case as the reference point.
Journalists covering the down-ballot should seek CEP department-level candidate registration data
for all 10 departments to map which districts have competitive fields and which have thin candidacy
pools this information is relevant to assessing whether the election, if held, would produce
representative legislative outcomes.
Embassies should track Gonaïves and Artibonite Department electoral dynamics as an independent
variable from Port-au-Prince: the Artibonite has historically been a swing region in presidential and
legislative outcomes, and its security conditions, while serious, are not identical to Ouest.
Investor advisors should note that the reconstitution of a parliament the first since 2020 is a
potential governance stabilization event whose probability and timeline are directly tied to the July
2027 first round; scenario planning should include both a parliament-reconstituted and a
parliament-absent governance track through 2028.
CONFIDENCE
Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.
NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS
The online candidate registration deadline of 15 November 2026 is the immediate signal
event. Watch for CEP announcements confirming the final online candidacy count across all
offices, and for any last-minute high-profile candidacy declarations or withdrawals before the
portal closes. Any CEP statement from the Santo Domingo inter-American meeting which
concludes 13 November on feasibility assessment or international electoral cooperation
should be reported and assessed for signals of shifting institutional confidence in the July
2027 timeline. Watch for Moïse Jean-Charles or Pitit Dessalines to issue a formal position on
registration before the 15 November deadline.
THIS WEEK
Monitor whether the CEP issues any preliminary guidance on décharge enforcement procedures or
sanctions screening, now that the online registration window is closing and the physical document
submission period of 16 to 30 November begins. Track reporting from Le Nouvelliste, Juno7, and
Radio Kiskeya on the volume and geographic distribution of physical document filings at CEP
centers, as access disparities between departments will reveal whether the structural enrollment gap
is narrowing. Watch for CARICOM post-postponement positioning: CARICOM's Eminent Persons
November 13, 2026
Group endorsed the December 2026 date before it was abandoned, and no post-postponement
CARICOM statement has been captured in available sourcing; a formal CARICOM statement on the
July 2027 date is anticipated and would carry significant multilateral weight. Monitor MSS Gang
Suppression Force reporting on commune-by-commune security conditions in Ouest, as any opening
of registration or administrative centers in Port-au-Prince, Carrefour, or Cité Soleil before 30
November would be a material feasibility signal.
STRATEGIC HORIZON
The realistic path to a credible 18 July 2027 first round requires sequential resolution of five blocking
conditions: Ouest Department security sufficient for center operations, completion of voter
registration for the disenfranchised Port-au-Prince electorate, secured CEP logistical funding, legally
defensible candidate eligibility rulings on décharge and sanctions, and political consensus among the
19 declared presidential candidates and their allied legislative slates that the process is legitimate.
AYITI INTEL assesses, as analysis distinct from sourced fact, that the probability of all five conditions
being met by July 2027 is low. The more likely scenario, consistent with Haiti's documented electoral
pattern since 2015, is a further calendar revision in the first quarter of 2027 triggered either by a
Martelly eligibility crisis in December 2026, by continued MSS failure to open Ouest centers, or by a
funding shortfall in CEP operations. The reconstitution of parliament the first since January 2020
remains the singular governance-stabilization prize that justifies continued international and domestic
investment in the process, even under conditions of repeated delay. The February 2027 one-year
mark of the Fils-Aimé government without an elected mandate will be a significant domestic
legitimacy pressure point that could either accelerate or further complicate the political consensus
required for the vote.
PRIMARY SOURCES
CEP Haiti official site, cephaiti.ht candidate registration dashboard, approved political groupings,
revised electoral calendar, October through November 2026
Le National electoral calendar chronology, constitutional crisis warnings, multiple dates 2026
UN News UN Security Council feasibility warning, October 2026
OAS Press Release E-019-26 recognition of Fils-Aimé authority, February 2026
CARICOM Eminent Persons Group visit statement, September 2026
Haïti Policy House Election Tracker candidate registration totals, security mapping, commune-level
center counts, throughout 2026
RFI sanctions and candidacy question reporting, 6 August 2026; gang suppression force update, 15
June 2026
Le Nouvelliste reporting on CIN access crisis, 5 November 2026, and décharge requirement
characterization, 2026
Juno7 reporting on INDDESC civil society warning, 7 August 2026; Moïse Jean-Charles rejection of
Core Group statements
Radio Kiskeya electoral process monitoring coverage, October through November 2026
AlterPresse transitional authority legitimacy reporting, 2026
Rezo Nòdwès Raoul Gérard commentary, September 2026
November 13, 2026