EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The CEP's fourth calendar revision in twelve months fixing Round 1 for 18 July 2027 and Round 2 for 4 October
2027 has stabilized the institutional timeline on paper while ground conditions continue to deteriorate. The most
consequential development is Michel Martelly's registration under the DEBLOKE coalition concurrent with a
revision to the electoral decree that reportedly removed provisions barring internationally sanctioned individuals
from ballot eligibility. This combination a contested former president exploiting a modified legal framework
concentrates the credibility risk of the entire electoral process in a single candidacy that international partners
have not yet formally challenged. The actionable insight for missions: the window to contest Martelly's eligibility
formally, or to demand reinstatement of the exclusion clause, is the preliminary candidate list period expected in
late November to December 2026.
QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS
The operative electoral calendar sets Round 1 on 18 July 2027 and Round 2 on 4 October 2027 under the CEP's
revised decree of 6 October 2026. Candidate registration for presidential, senate, and deputy races remains open
until 15 November 2026; mayoral and local registration continues until 30 November 2026.
Michel Martelly has registered as a presidential candidate under the DEBLOKE coalition, a grouping of
approximately 11 parties drawn largely from demobilized PHTK-era structures, generating active opposition from
civil society and diaspora networks.
The Viktwa coalition, launched at Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026 and claiming affiliation of 52 parties, represents
the most significant northern-based political formation to emerge this cycle and warrants monitoring as a potential
counterweight to Port-au-Prince-centered slates.
The figure to watch in the immediate term is CEP President the institutional actor whose preliminary eligibility
rulings on the presidential dossiers, expected late November, will determine whether Martelly's candidacy
survives first-stage vetting and whether the decree revision generates a formal international response.
The central risk to the vote is the security environment: Carrefour, Haiti's second most populous commune with
340,878 voting-age residents, has zero operational registration or voting centers, and gang control of territory has
not been reversed by the Gang Suppression Force.
DEVELOPMENT 1: ELECTORAL CALENDAR, CEP AND FEASIBILITY
Haiti's electoral calendar has been revised four times since November 2025, each revision driven primarily by
security conditions and their administrative consequences rather than by institutional administrative failure alone.
The November 2025 CEP submission to the CPT proposed 30 August 2026 as a first-round target. A decree of 2
June 2026 set 13 December 2026 as the operative date. That date was subject to further modification on 2 July
2026 and then fundamentally superseded by the revised decree of 6 October 2026, which established the current
operative calendar: Round 1 on 18 July 2027 for presidential and legislative races; Round 2 on 4 October 2027
combining second-round presidential and legislative contests with local elections; and final results certified by 23
October 2027. The CEP cited consultations with security forces, political actors, civil society, the private sector,
and the transitional government as the basis for the new calendar, per Le National reporting across the July
through November 2026 period.
The formal abandonment of the 13 December 2026 first round followed two extensions of the candidate
November 12, 2026
registration deadline first to 9 October, then to 31 October which rendered the operational preparation timeline
for a December vote impossible. A further, updated registration deadline applicable to the July 2027 calendar now
extends presidential, senate, and deputy registration to 15 November 2026, and mayoral, CASEC, and ASEC
registration to 30 November 2026, per the CEP registration dashboard. Missions and observers should note that
any reference to 31 October 2026 as a registration close date refers to a superseded deadline and is not
operative.
The Council of Ministers session of 5 October 2026 introduced amendments to the electoral decree, which the
CEP incorporated into the revised 6 October decree. Among the modifications confirmed by Global Initiative
Against Transnational Organized Crime analysis is the removal of a provision that had barred internationally
sanctioned individuals from ballot eligibility a modification of significant consequence given the composition of the
current candidate field. The direct causal linkage between this modification and any specific candidacy has not
been confirmed in available sources and must be treated as an allegation pending formal investigation, but the
temporal coincidence of the decree revision and Martelly's registration on or around 16 October 2026 is a matter
of sourced record.
Voter registration data reported by Haïti Policy House records 888,797 or more new voters registered since the
July 2026 launch. The ONI holds approximately 6.5 million Haitians in its database, of whom approximately 5.8
million hold valid CINs the sole document permitting voting. Registration launched on 20 July 2026 in nine of ten
departments, with Ouest added under constrained conditions on 30 July 2026, using the Pétion-Ville Lycée
National as an initial launch site. Le Nouvelliste reported on 5 November 2026 that many Haitians still cannot
obtain CINs in time, citing administrative backlogs at the ONI. The CEP's claim of 1,306 operational voting centers
representing approximately 93 percent of the nationwide total, cited in PM Fils-Aimé's address to the UN General
Assembly in September 2026, is contradicted by ground reporting: Carrefour, with 340,878 voting-age residents, is
listed at zero operational centers, and multiple gang-controlled communes share that status. The stated 93
percent figure masks critical urban gaps in the Ouest Department, which contains the majority of Haiti's
population and the highest concentration of gang-controlled territory.
Security conditions constitute the binding feasibility constraint. UN figures cited across multiple sources record
5,700 or more killed or wounded between January and mid-September 2026, with more than 1,000 women and
girls raped in the same period. Approximately 1.5 million persons are internally displaced, including 740,000
children, per UN Security Council briefings. The Gang Suppression Force, whose mandate was extended six
months by the Security Council in September 2026, is operational but has not restored access to key urban
communes. The UN Special Representative explicitly cautioned the Security Council that setting new election
dates without realistic feasibility assessments risks eroding institutional credibility a direct counterpoint to the
CEP's calendar-forward posture.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The 2015 annulment and re-run cycle, which followed the contested first round of 25 October 2025 under a thinly
observed CEP process, established the direct precedent that a disputed first round in Haiti produces protest,
postponement, and re-run rather than a settled transfer of power. The 2015 experience also followed the January
2015 parliamentary dissolution that left Martelly ruling by decree the same legitimacy template repeated across
the 2020 to 2026 period in which elections lapsed and unelected bodies governed. The CPT and PM Fils-Aimé
carry this same structural legitimacy deficit into the promised July 2027 vote.
TALKING POINTS
The July 2027 calendar is institutionally operative but lacks a demonstrated security pathway to implementation in
the most populous department.
November 12, 2026
The CEP's 93 percent coverage figure is a national aggregate that obscures a critical population concentration
problem: the Ouest Department, particularly the Port-au-Prince metropolitan communes, is precisely where
coverage is most deficient and population density is highest.
The October 2026 decree revision removing the sanctioned-individual exclusion clause has not generated a
formal international legal challenge as of this date the absence of such a challenge is itself an operational signal.
The ONI's CIN backlog is a structural suppression risk that disproportionately affects urban displaced populations
and youth first-time registrants the demographics least served by the current registration infrastructure.
Haiti's economy is contracting for a seventh consecutive year, per UN Security Council briefings, eliminating any
resource-dividend scenario for electoral operations.
The four-revision calendar pattern signals that international actors should plan for a fifth revision contingency
while publicly supporting the July 2027 date.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
Missions should formally request from the CEP a commune-level breakdown of operational registration and voting
centers in the Ouest Department, cross-referenced against gang-controlled territory, before endorsing the 93
percent coverage figure in public communications.
Election observation missions should initiate deployment planning and security contingency protocols in the first
quarter of 2027, treating the April through June 2027 security corridor assessment period as the decisive
feasibility gate.
International partners with leverage on the electoral decree should assess whether formal engagement on
reinstating the sanctioned-individual exclusion clause is warranted before the preliminary candidate list is
published in late November 2026.
Missions engaged with ONI operations should commission an independent assessment of the CIN issuance
backlog and its projected impact on effective voter eligibility by February 2027.
Humanitarian planners should not assume improvement in Ouest Department access before the second quarter
of 2027 and should update program trigger dates accordingly given that the half-funded UN humanitarian plan
signals ongoing resource competition.
Journalists and researchers should file information requests or seek CEP confirmation of the specific text of the
modified eligibility provisions in the October 2026 decree and compare them with the December 2025 original.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.
DEVELOPMENT 2: PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS AND COALITIONS
As of late October 2026, Haïti Policy House tracking records 19 presidential candidacies registered with the CEP,
November 12, 2026
with the Espas.ht platform documenting 14 presidential-level political structures. These figures are subject to
revision pending CEP vetting, which is expected to produce preliminary lists in late November 2026. The
candidate field is diverse in geographic origin and ideological orientation but is dominated in international attention
by the registration of Michel Martelly.
Michel Martelly, president of Haiti from 2011 to 2016, registered as a presidential candidate on or around 16
October 2026 under DEBLOKE, a coalition of approximately 11 parties composed primarily of former legislators
and demobilized members of the Parti Haitien Tèt Kale (PHTK), per The Haitian Times reporting of 16 October
2026. PHTK as a standalone registered entity is notably absent from the CEP's list of approved political groupings
AYITI INTEL assesses this structural absence as a deliberate legal strategy to avoid registration barriers that
might apply to the PHTK brand, which carries both political liability and potential eligibility complications. Martelly's
candidacy has generated domestic and diaspora opposition centered on his governance record including the
security conditions prevailing at the conclusion of his administration and on the concurrent modification to the
electoral decree that reportedly removed the sanctioned-individual exclusion clause. The direct causal connection
between the decree modification and Martelly's registration is an allegation that has not been confirmed in
sourced reporting and must be so characterized. AYITI INTEL notes that the temporal coincidence, combined with
the fact that the Council of Ministers session on 5 October 2026 initiated the decree modifications and Martelly
registered approximately eleven days later, constitutes a pattern that merits formal scrutiny in the vetting process.
Former Senator Paul Denis, affiliated with the Organisation du Peuple en Lutte (OPL), was among the candidates
declared as of August 2026, per Haïti Policy House tracking. Denis brings a legal and legislative profile and has
historically represented a center-left reformist tendency within Haitian politics. His base is primarily urban
intellectual and professional, with limited mass mobilization capacity in the current security environment. His
candidacy represents continuity of organized party politics in contrast to Martelly's coalition-vehicle approach.
The CEP Ouest I rejected the presidential candidacy of Jean Ernest Muscadin of the Fòs Chanjman Nasyonal
(FCN) on 29 October 2026, citing an incomplete dossier specifically, a missing resignation letter and a second
unspecified document per Vantbefinfo reporting of that date. The inadmissibility ruling is the first confirmed
instance of a presidential candidacy being rejected on procedural grounds in this cycle. Muscadin's disqualification
illustrates the operational relevance of the dossier-completion requirement and signals that the vetting process will
impose documentary discipline on at least some candidates. Whether similar rigor will be applied to higher-profile
registrations particularly those whose eligibility turns on the modified decree provisions rather than missing
documents remains the central unresolved question.
The Viktwa coalition, presented at a public event in Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026 and claiming affiliation of 52
parties and organizations, represents the most significant northern-based political formation to emerge this
electoral cycle. Its named leadership includes Wilner Joseph, Jean-Henry Céant, and Pascal Adrien, per
Facebook reporting from the Plaine du Nord post of 30 August 2026. Céant, a former prime minister with a legal
background and national name recognition, provides Viktwa with a credible anchor that distinguishes it from
coalition vehicles assembled solely for registration purposes. The coalition's Cap-Haïtien launch is analytically
significant: the North Department historically provides a swing constituency in fragmented first-round contests,
and a coalition with Artibonite representation could accumulate sufficient northern and central-plateau vote share
to force a runoff dynamic that disadvantages a Port-au-Prince-centered front-runner. AYITI INTEL assesses
Viktwa as the most consequential coalition formation to monitor outside of the Martelly candidacy.
The 17 approved political groupings representing 228 political parties, with 105 receiving ballot numbers, reflect a
politically fragmented landscape. Coalition proliferation in this environment historically produces first-round results
in which no candidate approaches a majority, increasing the probability of a contested runoff and the
accompanying period of political volatility.
November 12, 2026
The décharge requirement the financial clearance certificate required for former officials who managed public
funds remains a politicizable eligibility constraint applicable to candidates with prior ministerial or senatorial
service. Haïti Policy House notes that this requirement can be weaponized to exclude opponents or deployed
selectively in the vetting process. Any candidate who served in a ministerial or legislative capacity since 2011 and
has not obtained décharge is potentially vulnerable to disqualification at the preliminary or appeal stage.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The 2015 electoral cycle produced a first round widely characterized by fraud allegations that ultimately led to the
annulment of the entire process and a re-run, with Jovenel Moïse eventually taking office in 2017 after a
prolonged dispute. The 2015 experience confirms that a fragmented first round under thin observation, combined
with a contested candidate field, historically generates protest, postponement, and re-run rather than a settled
transfer of power a pattern that the current field's composition and the security-constrained observation
environment make structurally likely to repeat. Martelly's return to the ballot also recalls the January 2015 to
February 2016 period in which he governed by decree without a legislature, a direct predecessor to the current
transitional authority structure under PM Fils-Aimé.
TALKING POINTS
Martelly's registration under DEBLOKE rather than PHTK is a legally deliberate rebranding maneuver the
absence of PHTK from the approved groupings list is not incidental but structurally consequential for eligibility
strategy.
The inadmissibility of Muscadin's candidacy on procedural grounds establishes that the CEP is applying
documentary requirements; the question is whether equivalent rigor will be applied to eligibility provisions that
depend on the modified decree language.
Céant's presence in the Viktwa coalition's leadership gives that formation a level of political credibility that 52-party
coalition claims alone would not establish.
The proliferation of 19 or more presidential candidacies in a fragmented field with constrained observation
capacity creates a structural predisposition toward a disputed first round.
The décharge requirement is a live legal vulnerability for multiple candidates and should be treated as a vetting
trigger rather than a settled administrative formality.
International actors who endorsed the original December 2025 decree framework which included the
sanctioned-individual exclusion clause now face a choice between formal objection and implicit endorsement of
the modified framework through continued engagement without protest.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
Missions should seek legal analysis of whether Martelly's specific eligibility status under the modified October
2026 decree is consistent with the OFAC and State Department sanctions framework applicable to associated
figures, and whether the U.S. government has a formal position on his candidacy.
Election observers should document the full roster of 19 or more declared presidential candidates,
cross-reference each against the décharge requirement and sanctions records, and prepare a dossier for
submission to the CEP's vetting commission before the preliminary list is published.
November 12, 2026
Journalists should file specific inquiries with the CEP regarding the criteria applied in the Muscadin inadmissibility
ruling and whether identical criteria are being applied uniformly across all 19 or more presidential dossiers.
Political analysts tracking coalition dynamics should assess whether any other candidate with PHTK-era liability is
replicating the DEBLOKE structural model registration under a new coalition vehicle to avoid brand-linked
registration barriers.
Researchers should document the Viktwa coalition's specific party composition and geographic distribution,
testing the 52-party claim against CEP-approved groupings records to assess whether the coalition's size is as
stated or inflated for political signaling purposes.
Missions engaged with Paul Denis and OPL should assess whether OPL is pursuing coalition partnerships with
any of the 17 approved groupings to consolidate center-left vote share in a fragmented first round.
CONFIDENCE
Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.
DEVELOPMENT 3: DOWN-BALLOT, MAIN-CITY RACES AND POWER-BROKERS
The legislative and municipal dimension of the July 2027 electoral cycle encompasses all 30 Senate seats three
seats in each of Haiti's ten departments and all 119 seats of the Chamber of Deputies, alongside mayoral,
CASEC, and ASEC elections in the Round 2 contest of 4 October 2027. Total registered candidacies across
presidential, senatorial, and deputy races stand at 588 per Haïti Policy House tracking, with Espas.ht recording
2,008 mayoral slates nationwide. These figures reflect the registration period still in progress as of this brief date,
with presidential, senate, and deputy registration open until 15 November 2026 and mayoral registration until 30
November 2026.
In the Artibonite Department, Gonaïves the country's fourth-largest city and historically a site of political
mobilization, including the February 2004 insurgency that ended the Aristide government shows 37 mayoral
candidacies from 14 political structures, per Espas.ht data, indicating a highly competitive local race in one of the
more security-accessible urban centers. Gonaïves' competitive field is analytically significant as a potential
indicator of organized political activity in the central corridor; the city's ability to hold a credible vote in Round 2 will
be a test of whether gang control of the Artibonite River valley has been sufficiently rolled back to permit electoral
operations in the department's interior.
Port-au-Prince's mayoral race represents the highest-stakes municipal contest but also the most operationally
uncertain, given the near-total collapse of registration infrastructure in gang-controlled communes of the
metropolitan area. The practical absence of registration centers in Carrefour 340,878 voting-age residents with
zero operational centers means that any Port-au-Prince area mayoral contest will, in its current form, exclude a
substantial portion of the electorate that would logically participate. No confirmed candidate names for
Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, or Miragoâne are
available from verified local sourcing in this cycle as of the reporting date. AYITI INTEL will not speculate on
candidacies in these cities absent sourced reporting.
For Cap-Haïtien Haiti's second city and the base from which Viktwa launched on 29 August 2026 the emergence
of that coalition's leadership, including Wilner Joseph and Pascal Adrien, as northern political organizers suggests
that the Cap-Haïtien senate and deputy races will feature Viktwa-affiliated candidates competing in an
November 12, 2026
environment where the northern corridor is relatively more accessible than the metropolitan south. The North
Department's three Senate seats and its deputy delegation represent a potential Viktwa stronghold if the
coalition's organizational claims are substantiated.
The gender incentive mechanism embedded in the December 2025 electoral decree Articles 163 and 188
provides a 25 percent public funding bonus to parties fielding 50 percent or more female candidates, at least 2
percent candidates with disabilities, and achieving 50 percent or more elected per IPU Parline data and
ReliefWeb electoral reporting. Uptake of this mechanism has not been reported in available sources as of this
brief. AYITI INTEL assesses that in a resource-constrained environment where candidates are navigating security
risks and administrative backlogs, the gender incentive mechanism is unlikely to significantly alter candidate
composition in this cycle unless actively promoted by the CEP with concrete operational support.
Non-candidate power-brokers shaping the legislative and local landscape include PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, whose
government introduced the October 2026 decree amendments that created the modified eligibility framework
under which the current candidate field is operating. Fils-Aimé's administration's two stated priorities security and
elections have produced a decree revision that, in the analysis of the Global Initiative Against Transnational
Organized Crime, weakened the electoral exclusion of figures connected to sanctioned networks. The Global
Initiative notes that the threat to electoral integrity comes not only from gang commanders but from politically
connected financiers and arms suppliers some under international sanctions whose electoral exclusion was
weakened by the October 2026 modifications. This is an allegation attributed to Global Initiative analysis and is not
stated here as fact, but it carries operational weight for missions assessing the integrity of the electoral framework.
Political actors formally denounced on 21 October 2026 delays by public institutions in delivering administrative
documents required for candidate registration a complaint that reflects structural institutional dysfunction affecting
down-ballot candidates, particularly those without the resources or connections to expedite document processing.
This barrier disproportionately affects independent and opposition candidates in legislative and local races,
potentially skewing the field toward candidates with access to institutional networks.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
The February 2004 seizure of Gonaïves by the Cannibal Army under Buteur Métayer, which triggered the
nationwide insurgency ending the Aristide government, established Gonaïves as a structurally significant political
pressure point. Viv Ansanm's 29 February 2024 Port-au-Prince offensive operationally superior and
simultaneously targeting the airport, prisons, and police stations represents the direct modern parallel, confirming
that coordinated armed action timed to executive vulnerability moments remains the primary security threat to
electoral administration. Any expansion of gang territory in the Artibonite corridor between now and July 2027
would directly threaten the viability of Gonaïves-area and Central Department electoral operations.
TALKING POINTS
The 2,008 mayoral slates registered nationwide signal significant political mobilization at the local level, but their
geographic distribution almost certainly reflects security access rather than uniform civic engagement slates in
gang-controlled communes are either absent or uncompetitive.
Gonaïves' 37-candidacy mayoral field is the most specific indicator available of competitive down-ballot politics in
a security-accessible provincial center; its pre-election trajectory should be treated as a feasibility bellwether for
Artibonite Department elections broadly.
The document delivery delays denounced on 21 October 2026 are a structural fairness issue in the down-ballot
field that disadvantages independent and resource-constrained candidates relative to those with institutional
November 12, 2026
access.
Viktwa's northern organizational base positions it to contest North Department Senate and deputy seats from an
advantaged position if its coalition cohesion is maintained through the registration period.
The gender incentive mechanism is a formally embedded structural reform that lacks reported implementation
momentum in the current cycle missions focused on gender balance in elected bodies should assess whether the
CEP is actively promoting the mechanism or treating it as a nominal provision.
The absence of confirmed mayoral candidate names from verified local sources for most main cities as of this
reporting date reflects either a genuine organizational lag or a gap in available open-source reporting missions
should solicit candidate information directly from local civil society partners.
RECOMMENDED DECISIONS
Missions focused on legislative elections should develop a department-by-department security access map
cross-referencing confirmed candidate density with gang-controlled territory to identify which senatorial and
deputy races are genuinely contestable under current conditions.
Observers and journalists covering the Artibonite Department should monitor Gonaïves closely as the most
competitive and security-accessible municipal race available as an indicator of broader down-ballot dynamics.
Missions with gender-equality mandates should engage the CEP directly to determine what operational steps, if
any, are being taken to promote uptake of the Articles 163 and 188 gender incentive mechanism before
registration closes on 30 November 2026.
Researchers should file data requests with Espas.ht and Haïti Policy House for commune-level breakdowns of
mayoral slate registrations to map the geographic distribution of candidate density against security access data.
Journalists covering the northern departments should seek interview access to Wilner Joseph, Jean-Henry Céant,
and Pascal Adrien of the Viktwa coalition to assess organizational depth, specific legislative candidate
recruitment, and coalition coherence beyond the Cap-Haïtien launch event.
Missions tracking non-candidate power-brokers should commission a mapping exercise identifying the network of
politically connected financiers and logisticians referenced in Global Initiative reporting the electoral threat from
this layer is structural and not addressed by candidate eligibility rules alone.
CONFIDENCE
Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.
NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS
Monitor CEP communications at cephaiti.ht for any announcement regarding the preliminary candidate list
publication schedule, which will establish the formal timeline for vetting and eligibility rulings on the full 19-plus
presidential registrations including Martelly under DEBLOKE.
Track Le Nouvelliste, Le National, AlterPresse, and Radio Kiskeya for reporting on the final days of presidential,
November 12, 2026
senate, and deputy registration the 15 November 2026 deadline is four days from this brief date, and any
last-minute significant declarations or withdrawals will be published in real time by these outlets.
Watch for any formal statement from the U.S. State Department, OFAC, or UN Panel of Experts regarding the
October 2026 decree modification removing the sanctioned-individual exclusion clause a formal objection in this
window would escalate the Martelly candidacy issue from a domestic political dispute to a formal
international-domestic legal conflict.
THIS WEEK
The final registration push through 15 November 2026 for legislative races will determine the complete candidate
field before vetting begins. Missions should monitor whether candidate document delivery complaints of 21
October 2026 have been resolved or are generating formal CEP responses.
Coalition formation dynamics particularly any reported partnership talks between Viktwa and Artibonite-based
political structures, or between OPL and other center-left formations will shape the first-round fragmentation
picture and are likely to surface in Haitian local press this week.
Monitor Rezo Nodwès, Gazette Haïti, and Juno7 for northern and provincial political reporting that may identify
senatorial and deputy candidates not yet captured in Port-au-Prince-centered sourcing.
The 30 November 2026 mayoral registration deadline is now three weeks out. Watch for CEP announcements
regarding registration infrastructure expansion or lack thereof in Ouest Department communes.
STRATEGIC HORIZON
Late November through December 2026 is the decisive vetting period. The CEP's preliminary candidate list
publication will determine whether Martelly's candidacy survives first-stage review, whether the modified decree's
eligibility provisions are applied uniformly, and whether any international partner issues a formal objection that
creates a legal or political challenge to the vetting outcome.
December 2026 through January 2027 constitutes the appeal and final validation period. Challenges against
sanctioned-adjacent figures now potentially eligible under the revised framework are likely to be filed during this
window and will test the CEP's independence from the transitional government that introduced the modifications.
The formal campaign period opening in January to February 2027 is the first operational test of whether the Gang
Suppression Force can secure campaign activities in the Ouest Department and southern corridors. Any
expansion of gang territory in the Artibonite between now and February 2027 will trigger the fifth calendar revision
discussion.
The April through June 2027 security corridor assessment by the CEP and GSF is the decisive feasibility gate
before the July 18 vote. International observation mission deployment decisions in the March to April 2027 window
will function as a credibility threshold signal participation by OAS, CARICOM, EU, and Carter Center on their
standard terms implies a minimum security baseline that current conditions do not yet meet.
July 18, 2027 Round 1 is an operational stress test whose outcome will be determined primarily by turnout in the
Ouest Department, particularly the Carrefour, Cité Soleil, and Martissant corridors; incident reporting from
gang-adjacent polling stations; and whether civil society parallel vote tabulation is operationally viable under
security constraints. If none of these conditions are met, the precedent of the 2015 annulment cycle makes a
re-run scenario structurally more probable than a contested but accepted result.
November 12, 2026
PRIMARY SOURCES
CEP Haiti official site and registration dashboard operative calendar, approved groupings list, registration
deadlines. cephaiti.ht.
UN News and UN Security Council briefings October 2026 security figures, GSF mandate extension, Special
Representative caution on calendar feasibility, humanitarian plan funding status.
France24 29 October 2026 reporting on electoral calendar revision and security conditions. france24.com.
Vantbefinfo 29 October 2026 report on CEP Ouest I inadmissibility ruling against Jean Ernest Muscadin
candidacy. vantbefinfo.com.
OAS press release 3 September 2026 statement by Secretary General Ramdin on elections and security as
urgent priorities. oas.org.
CARICOM Eminent Persons Group September 2026 report on Haiti visit 2 through 9 September 2026, covering
meetings with political, civil society, business, youth, women's, and human rights actors and GSF leadership.
caricom.org.
Le Nouvelliste multiple articles July through November 2026, including 5 November 2026 report on CIN issuance
backlogs. Primary Haitian daily of record. haitilibre.com and lenouvellistehaiti.com.
Le National multiple articles July through November 2026 covering calendar revisions and political dynamics.
Haitian national daily. lenational.ht.
AlterPresse electoral and security reporting, 2026. Progressive Haitian news agency. alterpresse.org.
Haïti Policy House Election Tracker updated through November 2026, tracking presidential candidacies, coalition
registrations, and legislative candidacy totals. haitiph.org.
Espas.ht candidate platform recording presidential and mayoral candidacies, including 14 presidential structures
and 2,008 mayoral slates. espas.ht.
The Haitian Times 16 October 2026 and 4 August 2026 reporting on Martelly registration under DEBLOKE and
voter registration launch. haitiantimes.com.
November 12, 2026