Daily Elections Bulletin

The CEP's formal postponement of the 13 December 2026 first round announced 7 October 2026 and attributed to gang violence, operational failures, and critically underperformed voter registration has reset Haiti's electoral clock to a revised first round of 18 July 2027. That date carries no guarantee: the CEP's own language conditions the 2027 schedule on "an acceptable security climate" that does not presently exist in the Ouest and Artibonite departments. With fewer than 889,000 voters newly registered against an eligible pool of approximately 5.8 million valid CIN holders, any election held on the revised calendar will face a severe representational deficit before a single ballot is cast. The single actionable insight for missions: begin planning now for a third postponement scenario and do not anchor programming assumptions to a mid-2027 transition.

The CEP published a revised electoral calendar on 28 October 2026 setting the first round for 18 July 2027 and the second round, combined with local elections, for 4 October 2027. No domestic legal decree codifying these new dates has been confirmed in sources reviewed as of 7 November 2026, leaving the revised calendar institutionally exposed. Ten presidential candidates are registered on the CEP's electronic platform, led in public visibility by former acting Prime Minister Claude Joseph of EDE and Wilson Jeudy of Vision-Action-Réalisation, though no declared candidate has yet demonstrated national poll-tested dominance. The Viktwa coalition of 52 parties, launched in Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026, is the most visible organized down-ballot force outside Port-au-Prince and merits close monitoring as a potential kingmaker in northern departments. The key figure to watch is PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, who carries sole institutional accountability for electoral delivery since the CPT's dissolution on 7 February 2026 and whose mandate horizon grows more uncertain with each calendar revision. The central risk is that security conditions in gang-controlled communes particularly in the Ouest and Artibonite remain structurally incompatible with credible electoral operations, making a third postponement the most plausible scenario if no material security gains are registered before April 2027.

The CEP's revised calendar of 28 October 2026, reported by France 24 and RFI, sets the presidential and legislative first round for 18 July 2027, the second round combined with local elections for 4 October 2027, and final results for 23 October 2027. This calendar represents the third major revision of the electoral timeline within a single cycle: the CEP's earliest iteration targeted August 2026, the June 2026 electoral decree formalized 13 December 2026 as the first round, and the 7 October 2026 postponement announcement eliminated that date entirely. The 13 December 2026 date should be understood solely as the abandoned former target and carries no operative significance. The 18 July 2027 date derives from the CEP's 28 October 2026 revised calendar, not from the original 6 October 2026 electoral decree framework. The postponement announcement cited three overlapping failure categories: gang violence preventing deployment of registration and voting infrastructure; operational and technical deficiencies in CEP field capacity; and critically underperformed voter registration. The CEP's own candidate-registration dashboard records presidential, senate, and deputy registration as open through 15 November 2026, and mayoral, CASEC, and ASEC registration as open through 30 November 2026. No source reviewed confirms the registration window closed on 31 October 2026; that date is superseded and must not be treated as operative. The CEP conducted November 07, 2026 voter outreach operations in the Sud department as late as 16 to 19 October 2026, per CEP social media posts archived by researchers, suggesting registration operations continued past the nominal 13 October closure in at least some areas. The voter registration outcome is the most acute credibility problem for the revised calendar. The ONI database holds approximately 6.5 million Haitian identities, of whom approximately 5.8 million hold a valid CIN. As of the Haiti Policy House Election Tracker, 888,797 citizens were newly registered approximately 15 percent of valid CIN holders. Approximately 630,000 citizens face CIN renewal difficulties per ONI data, compounding the access gap. Gang control of territory eliminated functional registration centers from large portions of the Ouest, Artibonite, and other departments. The CEP's operational map and the security map were irreconcilable during the registration window, and no source reviewed suggests the security map will materially improve before the January 2027 period when renewed registration operations would need to begin. The absence of a confirmed domestic legal instrument codifying the 18 July 2027 date is an immediate institutional vulnerability. The CEP announced the revised calendar; whether that announcement is backed by a formal decree with the force of law has not been confirmed in sources reviewed as of 7 November 2026. The UN Security Council, at its October 2026 session, was warned by the UN's own mission that "setting new dates without a realistic assessment of feasibility will only erode public confidence," per news.un.org reporting. CARICOM acknowledged at the same session that 13 December 2026 would not be met. The international community's posture has shifted from unconditional endorsement of the electoral process to a conditional alignment in which credibility of execution is now the operative threshold. The CEP's October 9 modification dropping the requirement that candidates demonstrate freedom from foreign-country sanctions reported by the Washington Post is the structural regulatory change with the longest tail. UN Security Council sanctions remain a legal bar to candidacy. U.S. OFAC and Canadian designations, however, no longer disqualify a candidate under the revised CEP rule. Former Senate President Joseph Lambert and former Senate President Youri Latortue hold U.S. OFAC and Canadian designations under gang-enabling allegations, according to home.treasury.gov and canada.ca records. Whether either figure is simultaneously on a UN Security Council sanctions list requires legal verification not conclusively resolved in sources reviewed. The CEP framed the modification as procedural. Haitian civil society actors reviewed by this brief characterized it as political accommodation. No currently registered presidential candidate has been confirmed as carrying active U.S., Canadian, or UN sanctions in sources reviewed as of brief date.

The 2015 electoral cycle established the template now repeating: a first round held on 25 October 2015 under thin observation produced immediate fraud allegations, protest, an annulled re-run, and ultimately a contested transfer of power rather than a settled democratic transition. When elections lapse entirely as occurred when Parliament dissolved in January 2015 and President Martelly governed by decree the executive governs without a legislature and appoints its own electoral council, inheriting the same legitimacy deficit that PM Fils-Aimé now carries into the promised 2027 vote. Three calendar revisions in one cycle has no modern Haitian precedent, but the structural conditions producing each revision gang control of territory, institutional incapacity, and international pressure applied faster than domestic conditions allow are consistent with the 2004 and 2015 crises. November 07, 2026

The 18 July 2027 first round is a planning date, not a delivery commitment; the CEP's own conditional language and the absence of a codifying decree preserve postponement as the default scenario if security does not improve materially by April 2027. Voter registration at 15 percent of eligible CIN holders means any election held on the current timeline will produce a legislature and president with thin popular mandate, compounding post-election legitimacy challenges regardless of process quality. The CEP sanctions rule modification of 9 October creates a legally complex environment for candidate eligibility; missions and observers should maintain current UN sanctions list monitoring separately from OFAC and Canadian list monitoring, as the operative bars are now legally divergent. The absence of a domestic legal instrument codifying the revised 2027 calendar is not a technical footnote; it is a vulnerability that opposition actors and spoilers can exploit to challenge the CEP's authority to proceed without additional executive action. The UN Security Council credibility warning issued at its October session represents a qualitative shift in international tone that missions should factor into public statements aligned with that body's position. Viktwa's organizational launch in Cap-Haïtien and the northern departmental political activity it represents may produce a legitimacy-generating electoral dynamic in the North even if Ouest and Artibonite remain inaccessible, raising the prospect of a geographically fragmented vote.

Missions and observer organizations should formally scenario-plan a third postponement alongside the current 18 July 2027 planning scenario and establish decision thresholds specifically, security benchmarks in Ouest and Artibonite that would trigger a formal reassessment. Embassies engaged with the CEP should seek confirmation of whether a domestic legal decree codifying the 18 July 2027 / 4 October 2027 dates has been issued and, if not, formally communicate to the CEP secretariat that the absence of a legal instrument is noted. Observer organizations should begin mapping the gap between registered voters and the eligible CIN-holding population by department, since any election held with current registration figures will require downstream legitimacy management. Missions tracking sanctions-related eligibility should maintain dual monitoring: UN Security Council list status determines legal candidacy eligibility; OFAC and Canadian list status is now a political rather than legal disqualifier under the revised CEP rule. Journalists and researchers covering candidate registration should request the CEP's departmental candidate list data for Senate and Deputy races before the 15 November 2026 presidential and legislative registration deadline, as this window closes imminently. November 07, 2026 CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

Ten presidential candidates are listed on the CEP's electronic platform as of late September 2026, per Prensa Latina reporting of 30 September 2026, corroborated by the Haiti Policy House Election Tracker and a CEP platform registration video reviewed by this brief. Candidate registration for the presidency, senate, and deputy races remains open through 15 November 2026 per the CEP registration dashboard; the field may expand before that deadline. The ten registered or filing candidates identified in sources reviewed are: Claude Joseph of EDE (Engagés pour le Développement); Ricardo Jean-Pierre of Parti Nationaliste Haïtien, which received ballot number 71 per a CEP ballot-numbers video reviewed; Gary Bodeau of the Rekonsilye grouping; Wilson Jeudy of Vision-Action-Réalisation; Gandhy Dorfeuille of Ansanm Nou Fò; Daniest Adrien of PRC (Parti de la Restauration et du Changement); Deus Deronneth of DVNH (Démocrates Visionnaires pour la Nouvelle Haïti); Joseph Maxo of Réveil des Citoyens Haïtiens; a candidate presenting as JLV of Haïti Transformé; and a tenth candidate registered under Mobilisation pour le Progrès d'Haïti. The tenth candidate's full name is not confirmed in sources reviewed and is noted as incomplete. No additional candidacy beyond these ten has been confirmed by named sources as of brief date. Claude Joseph is the most internationally recognizable figure in the current field. Joseph served as acting Prime Minister from July to October 2021 following the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and was de facto foreign minister during the period when international negotiations over the transitional framework were conducted. His party, EDE, was photographed with Joseph's supporters registering at the CEP on 12 March 2026 per AP imagery. Joseph brings diplomatic name recognition and foreign-affairs experience, but his period as acting PM coincided with deteriorating security and his administration generated criticism from both domestic civil society and international partners for failing to consolidate a security response before leaving office. His geographic base is in the Port-au-Prince political establishment. Assessment: Joseph is the most internationally legible candidate but faces a domestic credibility challenge rooted in his 2021 tenure record. Wilson Jeudy served as mayor of Delmas, one of the most populous communes in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, giving him a local governance track record and an urban base that is functionally inaccessible in the current security environment. His party, Vision-Action-Réalisation, presents a civic-administrative rather than ideological platform. Gary Bodeau served as President of the Chamber of Deputies and brings legislative-institution experience; his Rekonsilye grouping signals a reconciliation-and-consensus positioning. Gandhy Dorfeuille's Ansanm Nou Fò presents an explicitly solidarity-based platform. Ricardo Jean-Pierre's Parti Nationaliste Haïtien received official ballot number 71, confirming CEP processing; Jean-Pierre's national profile as assessed by this brief is lower than Joseph's or Jeudy's based on available sourcing. The remaining five candidates Adrien, Deronneth, Maxo, JLV, and the Mobilisation pour le Progrès candidate do not appear in named-source analytical coverage reviewed for this brief and their organizational bases, geographic reach, and financial capacity are not assessable from available sourcing. No major political figure with an established national following such as former senators, ex-prime ministers November 07, 2026 outside of Joseph, or CPT-era principals has been confirmed as a declared presidential candidate in sources reviewed as of brief date. Fanmi Lavalas, which opposed the January 2026 CPT attempt to remove PM Fils-Aimé and retains organizational infrastructure from the Aristide era, has not confirmed a presidential candidacy in sources reviewed. Its electoral posture for 2027 is a significant open variable; a Fanmi Lavalas entry into the presidential race would materially reshape the coalition mathematics. Assessment: the current ten-candidate field is registration-stage rather than campaign-stage; organizational capacity, coalition-building, and name recognition at the departmental level have not yet been reported with sufficient specificity to rank viability. The opposition voice of Moïse Jean-Charles former senator and two-time presidential candidate represents the most significant non-registered political force in the field. Jean-Charles has publicly rejected Core Group legitimacy over the electoral process, per sources reviewed, and frames foreign-community involvement in Haitian elections as a sovereignty violation. His potential to mobilize street opposition, construct a boycott coalition, or disrupt campaign activities in areas where he retains a following is a material risk to the process. Jean-Charles is not confirmed as a registered presidential candidate in sources reviewed; his current posture is one of process rejection rather than electoral participation. The emergence of a Raoul Gérard-associated "Aba Eleksyon Malatyong" framing characterizing elections as a fraudulent exercise reinforces the existence of an organized anti-electoral political current that could grow if security and registration conditions do not visibly improve.

The 2015 first round produced a contested Jovenel Moïse plurality, protest, annulment, and a re-run before a transfer of power establishing the pattern in which a crowded field, thin observation, and legitimacy disputes interact to delay, not deliver, democratic transition. The current field of ten candidates, in a context of 282 approved parties and 105 ballot-numbered groupings, reflects the same fragmentation dynamic: a structurally atomized electoral landscape in which post-election coalition dealmaking is more probable than a mandate-generating first-round outcome.

Claude Joseph is the most internationally recognizable presidential registrant but carries domestic liabilities from his 2021 acting-PM tenure; missions should not equate international name recognition with demonstrated Haitian electoral viability. The candidate field may expand before the 15 November 2026 presidential registration deadline; any assessment of the field's composition should be treated as preliminary until that window closes. Fanmi Lavalas's electoral posture for 2027 is unconfirmed in sources reviewed and represents the single most consequential undeclared variable in the presidential field given its organizational infrastructure and historical voter base. Moïse Jean-Charles's anti-Core Group mobilization, if it coalesces into a formal boycott movement, could delegitimize turnout figures independent of security conditions, particularly in northern and artisanal urban constituencies where his following is concentrated. The CEP sanctions rule modification of 9 October has expanded the theoretical eligibility pool; missions should November 07, 2026 monitor whether OFAC or Canadian-designated figures formally enter the race before the 15 November deadline and prepare public-statement frameworks for that scenario. No registered presidential candidate as of brief date has been identified as carrying active U.S., Canadian, or UN Security Council sanctions; this finding is sourcing-limited and requires continuous monitoring.

Missions and multilateral organizations should not formally characterize the presidential field as final until the 15 November 2026 candidate registration deadline passes and the CEP publishes a confirmed list. Embassy political sections should request biographical and organizational base data on the five lesser-known registered candidates Adrien, Deronneth, Maxo, JLV, and the Mobilisation pour le Progrès candidate through local civil society and party contacts, as sourced coverage is currently insufficient for viability assessment. Observer organizations preparing candidate vetting protocols should establish dual-track sanctions screening: UN Security Council list (legally operative) and OFAC-Canada list (politically operative but no longer a legal bar under the revised CEP rule). Journalists covering the presidential field should seek CEP confirmation of the full registered candidate roster, including the tenth candidate's full name and party affiliation, before 15 November. Missions tracking political-opposition risks should monitor Moïse Jean-Charles's public statements and event schedule over November and December 2026 for signals of a formal boycott coalition or protest mobilization calendar targeting the 2027 election. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

The combined election scheduled for 18 July 2027 encompasses all 30 Senate seats three seats in each of Haiti's ten departments as listed in the CEP registration dashboard and all 119 seats of the Chamber of Deputies, in addition to the presidential contest. Mayoral races for the 149 communes, including the main-city races tracked by this brief, are scheduled for the second round of 4 October 2027 per the revised calendar. The CEP registered "hundreds" of parliamentary candidates during the August 20 to October 2 filing window, per the Haitian Times of 23 September 2026, though a departmental breakdown of Senate and Deputy candidates has not been published in sources reviewed. The Espas.ht municipal tracker records 2,008 mayoral candidacies from 35 political structures for the 149 communes as of the tracker's last read date of 3 November 2026, indicating substantial down-ballot organizational activity even under security constraints. The Viktwa coalition is the most significant organized political formation identified in sources reviewed outside of the individual presidential candidacies. Presenting 52 parties and structures, Viktwa launched publicly in November 07, 2026 Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026, per an Instagram post from the account velipost_ reviewed by this brief. The Cap-Haïtien launch is analytically significant for two reasons: it demonstrates that organized multi-party electoral activity is proceeding in the North even as Port-au-Prince remains paralyzed by gang violence, and it positions Viktwa as the dominant coalition vehicle for northern departmental Senate and Deputy races. The North and Nord-Est departments which include Cap-Haïtien, Fort-Liberté, and their surrounding municipalities have experienced comparatively lower gang-control penetration than the Ouest and Artibonite, making them potential anchor zones for a credible electoral process even if the capital region is inaccessible. Assessment: Viktwa's organizational discipline in Cap-Haïtien gives it a structural advantage in Nord department Senate and Deputy races that no Port-au-Prince-centric formation currently matches in sourced reporting. For main-city mayoral races, the Espas.ht data confirms candidacy filings across the 149-commune perimeter, but source-attributed candidate identification for specific races is not available for Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, and Miragoâne at a level sufficient for named-candidate analysis as of brief date. Port-au-Prince's mayoral race is structurally compromised by the security environment: gang control of Cité Soleil, Martissant, Carrefour, and surrounding communes makes campaign activities, voter contact, and ultimately polling operations operationally precarious. Wilson Jeudy's experience as mayor of Delmas is relevant context for understanding the Port-au-Prince metropolitan political landscape, though his declared candidacy is at the presidential level and his mayoral successor in Delmas is not identified in sources reviewed. The Artibonite capital Gonaïves carries special historical weight it was the site of the February 2004 armed uprising that triggered President Aristide's departure and the Artibonite Valley remains among the most gang-contested territories in the country, making Gonaïves mayoral race viability contingent on security conditions the MSS has not yet produced. The non-candidate power-broker landscape is shaped by three structural forces. First, the PM Fils-Aimé government holds the administrative and budgetary levers that determine whether the CEP has operational capacity; Fils-Aimé's political survival and electoral delivery are now the same variable. Second, former senators Joseph Lambert and Youri Latortue both carrying OFAC and Canadian designations under allegations of gang-enabling activity, per home.treasury.gov and canada.ca are significant political actors whose eligibility status under the revised CEP sanctions rule is unresolved and whose potential formal entry into the race would reshape coalition dynamics in Artibonite (Lambert's traditional base) and Artibonite-Nord (Latortue's traditional base in Saint-Marc and surrounding areas). The designations against Lambert and Latortue are allegations attributed to the U.S. Treasury and Canadian government respectively; this brief presents them as such, not as established fact. Third, Fanmi Lavalas's party infrastructure which spans multiple departments and was sufficiently organized to oppose the January 2026 CPT removal attempt against Fils-Aimé represents a latent electoral mobilization capacity whose 2027 alignment is undetermined.

Gonaïves's role in the 2004 political crisis when the Cannibal Army's seizure of the city on 5 February 2004 triggered the collapse of the Aristide government is a standing reminder that provincial political violence can determine national political outcomes faster than Port-au-Prince-centric electoral planning anticipates. The 2024 Viv Ansanm offensive replicated this pattern at scale, demonstrating that coordinated armed action timed to executive vulnerability can install transitional bodies without electoral process. Down-ballot organizational activity in the North, independent of the capital's crisis, also has a 2015 precedent: the northern departments consistently produced higher participation rates than the West in past elections precisely because access conditions were more favorable. November 07, 2026

The 2,008 mayoral candidacies recorded by Espas.ht across 35 political structures demonstrate that down-ballot political organization is proceeding at scale despite the presidential-level credibility crisis; observer missions should not conflate the CEP calendar difficulties with an absence of candidate activity. Viktwa's 52-party coalition launched in Cap-Haïtien represents the most organized multi-party formation in sourced reporting and may hold decisive influence in Nord department Senate and Deputy races regardless of how the presidential contest resolves. Port-au-Prince mayoral race viability is functionally dependent on MSS security gains in Cité Soleil, Martissant, and Carrefour that have not been demonstrated in sources reviewed; planning for a capital-region mayoral race should carry a higher uncertainty weight than planning for northern-department races. The eligibility status of Lambert and Latortue under the revised CEP sanctions rule is unresolved and legally consequential; their potential formal entry into Senate or other races would generate international reaction that missions should prepare for regardless of the legal conclusion. Fanmi Lavalas's undeclared 2027 electoral posture is the single most consequential organizational unknown in the down-ballot field, given its multi-department infrastructure. The separation of the second round and local elections to 4 October 2027 creates a two-stage political calendar in which mayoral race dynamics will be shaped by and may in turn shape the presidential second-round environment, requiring observer and mission planning for a prolonged six-month campaign window between rounds.

Observer organizations should establish departmental monitoring cells in Cap-Haïtien and other northern-department capitals to track Viktwa coalition Senate and Deputy candidate filings before the 15 November 2026 registration deadline, as this is the zone of highest near-term electoral information value. Missions tracking Lambert and Latortue should formally verify their UN Security Council sanctions list status not only OFAC and Canadian designations and prepare a legal analysis of their CEP eligibility under the revised 9 October rule before the registration window closes. Journalists covering down-ballot races should file departmental candidate data requests directly with the CEP secretariat and cross-reference with Espas.ht's municipal tracker to build a source-attributed candidate inventory for the main-city mayoral races before 30 November 2026. Embassy political sections should seek Fanmi Lavalas's public statement on its 2027 electoral posture as a priority engagement task, given the party's organizational reach and the significance of its alignment or non-participation for overall turnout projections. Investors and businesses with operations in Artibonite should explicitly factor Gonaïves and Saint-Marc November 07, 2026 political-security dynamics into 2027 operating risk assessments, given both the historical precedent of provincial armed action producing national political rupture and the current gang-contest conditions in the valley. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

Monitor the CEP's official website and social media channels for any announcement of a domestic decree formally codifying the 18 July 2027 / 4 October 2027 electoral calendar, as the absence of such an instrument is the most immediate institutional vulnerability in the revised schedule. Watch for any new presidential or down-ballot candidacy declarations submitted to the CEP before the 15 November 2026 registration deadline, with particular attention to whether any OFAC or Canadian-designated figure formally files. Monitor Radio Kiskeya, Radio Métropole, and Magik9 for any CEP secretariat or PM Fils-Aimé government statement responding to international or civil society pressure on the credibility of the revised calendar.

Track Viktwa coalition public statements and Cap-Haïtien event schedule for signals of expanded departmental organizing or a formal alliance with any registered presidential candidate. Monitor Fanmi Lavalas's public communications for any statement on its 2027 electoral posture, including whether it will field a presidential candidate or concentrate on legislative races. Watch for any public statement by Moïse Jean-Charles on the revised 2027 calendar; a formal boycott declaration or anti-election mobilization announcement would be a material escalation of the process-rejection narrative. Track the CEP's candidate registration dashboard for updated totals before the 15 November presidential and legislative registration deadline; a significant increase in presidential registrants would signal expanded competition and potentially the entry of higher-profile figures. Monitor Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, and Gazette Haïti for civil society reactions to the CEP sanctions rule modification, particularly any announcement of legal challenges to candidate eligibility decisions.

The decision point for the 18 July 2027 first round will effectively arrive in April 2027. If the MSS has not produced measurable security gains in the Ouest and Artibonite by that point specifically, the reopening of blocked roads and the deployment of voter registration and campaign infrastructure in currently inaccessible communes a third November 07, 2026 postponement becomes the most probable outcome and potentially fatal to the transition framework's international credibility. The February 2027 period carries particular political risk: it is the original second-round date under the abandoned December 2026 calendar, and opposition actors including Moïse Jean-Charles's circle and the Aba Eleksyon Malatyong formation may use the milestone as a mobilization point to publicly declare that the Fils-Aimé government's mandate has expired without electoral delivery. The January 2027 renewal of voter registration operations will be the first concrete operational test of whether the security environment has improved sufficiently to close the gap between 889,000 registered voters and the 5.8 million valid CIN holders. If that operation cannot substantially expand the registration base, particularly in displaced-population zones, the representational legitimacy of any 2027 election will be irrecoverably compromised before campaigning begins. The MSS mandate review in March 2027 six months after the September 2026 extension is the international community's principal institutional lever for communicating escalating or reduced confidence in the security trajectory. Missions should track Security Council dynamics in the lead-up to that review as a leading indicator of international willingness to maintain electoral process endorsement. The May 2027 campaign window opening if the first round holds on 18 July will represent the first moment at which candidate organizational capacity, coalition strength, and geographic reach are tested in the field rather than on paper. Observer organization pre-positioning decisions must be made no later than March 2027 to allow for meaningful field presence by that point.

Le Nouvelliste lenouvelliste.com multiple articles on CEP calendar, postponement, candidate registration, 2026 Haïti Libre haitilibre.com electoral calendar and party activity coverage, 2026 CEP Official Website cephaiti.ht candidate registration dashboard, party approval list March 26 2026, voter outreach posts October 16 to 19 2026 CEP Registration Platform Video youtube.com candidate filing confirmation and ballot number assignments, reviewed November 2026 Washington Post washingtonpost.com CEP sanctions rule modification October 9 2026 News.un.org UN Security Council session reporting, Volker Türk humanitarian data, October 2026 OAS oas.org Secretary General Ramdin statements February 4 and September 3 2026, recognition of Fils-Aimé government France 24 france24.com revised 2027 calendar announcement October 29 2026, MSS mandate extension RFI rfi.fr revised 2027 calendar announcement October 29 2026, postponement coverage Haiti Policy House Election Tracker haitipolicyhouse.org voter registration figures, candidate platform data, read November 2026 Espas.ht Municipal Candidacy Tracker espas.ht 2,008 mayoral candidacies from 35 structures, 149 communes, read 3 November 2026 AlterPresse alterpresse.org civil society reactions and security-electoral viability analysis, 2026 November 07, 2026