Daily Elections Bulletin

The definitive electoral development of this cycle is the CEP's formal abandonment of the 13 December 2026 first round and its replacement with an 18 July 2027 target date a date that the UN, independent analysts, and the security trajectory itself cast as aspirational rather than operational. Michel Martelly's registration under the 11-party Debloke coalition on 16 October 2026 has simultaneously injected high-name-recognition energy and deep legitimacy risk into a presidential field already exceeding 16 declared contenders. The central implication: Haiti's institutions are building an elaborate electoral scaffolding over a security void that gang territorial control estimated at 90 percent of Port-au-Prince has not permitted to be filled. The actionable insight for missions and observers is to decouple planning from the 18 July date and begin structured contingency assessment for a further postponement before the first quarter of 2027.

The CEP's revised calendar sets 18 July 2027 as the presidential and legislative first round, with a second round and municipal elections on 4 October 2027; candidate registration for president, senate, and deputy remains open through 15 November 2026, and for mayor, CASEC, and ASEC through 30 November 2026. Michel Martelly, Haiti's former president, formally registered as a presidential candidate on 16 October 2026 under the Debloke coalition of 11 parties, becoming the most recognizable figure in a field of at least 16 declared contenders; his eligibility review by the CEP is pending and unresolved. At the down-ballot level, 2,008 mayoral slate candidacies have been registered across 149 communes from 35 political structures, while the legislative field shows 68 declared senate candidates and at least 205 deputy candidates as of late September 2026, with numbers rising through the extended registration window. The figure to watch most closely is CEP President and institutional leadership: the council's forthcoming provisional candidate list expected late November to December 2026 will determine whether sanctioned or internationally contested figures, including Martelly, are permitted to stand, and that ruling will define whether Core Group partners sustain or begin distancing from the process. The central risk to elections happening is the security environment: gang control of an estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, expanding gang activity in Artibonite and Centre departments, 1.5 million internally displaced persons, and fewer than 889,000 newly registered voters against an eligible universe of approximately 6 million constitute a convergence of conditions that make a credible nationwide vote on 18 July 2027 more improbable than probable under the current trajectory.

The core institutional fact of this reporting period is the CEP's 6 October 2026 sine die postponement of the 13 December 2026 first round, followed on the same date by promulgation of a revised electoral decree establishing 18 July 2027 as the new first round date for presidential and legislative elections. The second round, combined with municipal elections, is scheduled for 4 October 2027, with final results projected for 23 October 2027. The CEP stated that the revised calendar resulted from consultations with security forces, political actors, civil society, the private sector, and government. Le National reported the new dates on 29 October 2026. This is the third revision of the electoral calendar since February 2026, when the original target was set at 30 August 2026. The 13 December date should be understood only as the abandoned former target; it carries no current institutional standing. November 06, 2026 Candidate registration, per the CEP registration dashboard, remains open through 15 November 2026 for presidential, senate, and deputy candidates, and through 30 November 2026 for mayoral, CASEC, and ASEC candidacies. The registration window was extended at least twice during the presidential-decree revision process, a pattern that Haitian Times (11 October 2026) described as reflecting CEP operational strain. The CEP has approved 282 of 320 registered political parties as of 26 March 2026. Of those, 105 political groups have received official ballot numbers, confirming extreme fragmentation across the candidate field. Voter registration is the starkest feasibility indicator available. The initial registration phase ran from 20 July to 13 October 2026 at CEP registration and voting centres. The Ouest department Haiti's most populous, containing Port-au-Prince and roughly one-third of the national population was excluded from the 20 July launch due to security conditions; a later extension was added for Ouest. As of the extended registration close, approximately 888,797 voters had been newly registered against an eligible universe of approximately 5.8 million valid CIN holders and 6.5 million in the ONI database. This represents at most 15 percent coverage of potential voters. Holding a valid CIN is mandatory to vote under the electoral decree. The diaspora voter registration formula remained unresolved as of 5 November 2026, per the Haiti Policy House Election Tracker. The security dimension renders all calendar projections provisional. Gang formations control an estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, per the operational data reported by France 24 and RFI on 29 October 2026. The UN reported at least 5,700 killed or wounded in Haiti in 2026 through early October, with more than 1,000 women and girls subjected to sexual violence. Gang expansion into Artibonite and Centre departments is documented, with attacks shifting from urban to rural zones in the third quarter of 2026. Total internal displacement stands at approximately 1.5 million persons. Multiple communes lack functioning registration centres due to armed group presence. Road closures by gangs disrupt logistics corridors critical to election operations. BINUH publicly cautioned the UN Security Council against setting election dates that cannot be met given security conditions, per Anadolu Agency reporting. The Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission mandate was extended six months by the Security Council in September 2026 but has not demonstrably degraded gang territorial control since deployment. A constitutional referendum on a new draft constitution has been bundled with the presidential and legislative first round under the revised electoral decree. This adds logistical and political complexity to an already strained operation and creates a potential legal flashpoint: political actors opposing the referendum's legitimacy could challenge the entire first-round process, destabilizing operations even if baseline security conditions improve.

Haiti's 2015 electoral cycle offers the most direct institutional precedent: the October 2015 first round was held under thin international observation, generated immediate fraud allegations, and produced a protest-postponement-rerun sequence rather than a settled transfer of power, per the documented historical record. The pattern of executive governance by decree which began when parliament dissolved in January 2015 under Michel Martelly and the CEP failed to organize timely elections established the template repeated in the 2020 to 2026 period: elections lapse, the executive governs without a legislature, and hand-picks its own electoral council, carrying the same legitimacy deficit forward. PM Fils-Aimé and the CEP inherit that deficit directly.

The 18 July 2027 date is an institutional planning target, not an operational commitment; the gap between the revised calendar and ground conditions is wider today than it was when the December 2026 date was set. Voter registration coverage of approximately 15 percent of the eligible electorate, with the most populous November 06, 2026 department initially excluded, is structurally insufficient to produce a result with majority-population legitimacy. Three successive calendar revisions in less than nine months signal that the CEP is responding to events rather than managing toward a defined operational readiness threshold. The bundled constitutional referendum expands political attack surfaces and creates a mechanism by which any significant political actor can challenge the legality of the entire first round without directly opposing elections as such. The MSSM mandate expiry in approximately March 2027 falls four months before the first-round date, making a Security Council renewal decision a direct dependency of electoral feasibility. Diaspora registration remaining unresolved as of this date affects both the participation rights of an estimated Haitian diaspora of several million and the legitimacy claims of any eventual winner.

Missions and multilateral offices should commission an internal feasibility reassessment tied to the MSSM mandate review in approximately March 2027 rather than waiting for the CEP to announce another postponement. Election observation bodies should not begin pre-deployment planning based on the 18 July 2027 date until at least two feasibility indicators voter registration coverage and gang territorial control in Ouest show measurable improvement from current baselines. International financial contributors to the electoral process should build contractual contingency clauses permitting reallocation of funds if a third postponement is announced, rather than front-loading disbursements against the current calendar. Journalists covering the voter registration story should obtain the full CEP registration dashboard data and cross-reference it against ONI population data by department to establish a district-level coverage map, avoiding reliance on CEP aggregate figures that obscure departmental disparities. Security analysts embedded with missions should treat the Cap-Haïtien to Port-au-Prince logistics corridor as the leading indicator of electoral operational viability; any gang expansion that disrupts that corridor would functionally render a national vote impossible within the current timeframe. Researchers assessing institutional legitimacy should track whether the constitutional referendum challenge materializes in formal legal filings, as this is the most likely mechanism for a court-driven disruption of the first round. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

As of the extended registration period, at least 16 candidates had formally registered on the CEP electronic platform for the presidency. The most consequential registration in this cycle is that of former President Michel November 06, 2026 Martelly, who registered on 16 October 2026 under the Debloke coalition an alliance of 11 political parties per reporting by the Haitian Times on 16 October 2026. Martelly served as president from 2011 to 2016 and is the most nationally and internationally recognized figure in the current field. His registration generated immediate criticism. The Haitian Times noted concerns about his record and his potential to crowd out competition given his name recognition and organizational resources. Spain's Ambassador Marco Antonio Peñín Toledano publicly stated, on 12 October 2026 per Le Nouvelliste, that Haiti's future president must be "honorable, dignified, and respectable" a statement widely interpreted by political observers as a signal directed at Martelly and potentially other figures in the field. The ambassador's intervention was an unusual public diplomatic move that reflects Core Group concern about the composition of the candidate pool. The eligibility question surrounding Martelly is the single most consequential unresolved procedural issue in the presidential race. RFI raised explicitly on 6 August 2026 the question of whether candidates under US, Canadian, UK, or EU sanctions would be permitted to stand. Based on sources reviewed for this brief, no confirmed international sanctions against Martelly specifically have been identified in publicly available sources; however, the CEP has not published a disqualification list as of the briefing date, and its vetting process remains opaque. Canada's consolidated sanctions list was last updated 22 September 2026 and includes Haitian political elites; eight individuals are listed. The UK published Haiti-specific sanctions guidance in January 2026. Former senators Youri Latortue and Rony Célestin Lambert have previously been named as sanctioned figures in prior reporting periods; their candidacy status in this cycle was not confirmed in sources reviewed. Any CEP ruling disqualifying Martelly or other sanctioned figures would reshape the presidential field and trigger both political backlash from Debloke and potential diplomatic endorsement from Core Group partners. A ruling permitting their participation would risk Core Group distancing from the entire process. Among the other declared presidential candidates, the following have been confirmed by sourced reporting. Claude Joseph, who served as acting prime minister during the July 2021 crisis following President Moïse's assassination, registered under the EDE party, per the Haiti Policy House Election Tracker updated November 2026. Ricardo Jean-Pierre registered under the Parti Nationaliste Haïtien. Gandhy Dorfeuille registered under Ansanm Nou Fò, also identified by its acronym ANF. All three were among early registrants as of 23 September 2026, per Karibinfo. The remaining candidates, bringing the total to at least 16, were identified by the Haiti Policy House tracker but were not individually named with party affiliations in the sources reviewed for this brief; this bulletin does not assign candidacies to unnamed figures. The coalition landscape is fragmented to a degree that makes legislative majority-building speculative at this stage. Debloke's 11-party structure gives Martelly the largest declared coalition. Viktwa, a grouping of 52 parties and structures, was formally presented in Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026 per Instagram reporting from Velipost, but its presidential candidate, if any, was not named in sources reviewed. ANF and EDE operate as single-party or small-coalition formations. No coalition commands a credible legislative majority pathway given the 105 ballot-number-holding groups contesting Chamber of Deputies and Senate seats simultaneously. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé registered as a voter not as a presidential candidate on 4 August 2026, per the Haiti Policy House tracker, formally reserving his role as transitional executive rather than electoral contender. A vocal minority within political and civil society circles has begun framing the entire process as "eleksyon malatyong" a sham election per Rezonodwes reporting of 1 November 2026. Prominent among those contesting the process's legitimacy framing is Moïse Jean-Charles, who has publicly rejected Core Group declarations on the electoral process, signaling that nationalist opposition voices will contest international legitimacy framing regardless of whether voting occurs. This framing, if it gains traction, could suppress turnout and delegitimize results independently of security conditions.

November 06, 2026 Martelly's 2015 to 2016 period in office ended with the January 2016 electoral crisis: a contested October 2015 first round produced fraud allegations, opposition protests, a provisional government, and a re-run that ultimately seated Jovenel Moïse in 2017 after a prolonged process the direct precedent for the scenario in which a contested first round produces not a transfer of power but a cycle of protest, postponement, and institutional decay. Martelly governed by decree from January 2015 after parliament dissolved, establishing the template of executive unilateralism that subsequent governments repeated through 2026.

Martelly's registration is the dominant presidential story not because he is a certain frontrunner but because his candidacy concentrates political, diplomatic, and security risk into a single unresolved eligibility question that will define the character of the entire first round. The diplomatic signal from Spain's ambassador articulated publicly and in terms that apply beyond any single candidate represents collective Core Group anxiety about whether a credible candidate pool can be assembled under current vetting procedures; missions should interpret it as a collective rather than bilateral position. A field of 16 or more candidates with no dominant coalition ensures a first-round outcome dependent on runoff dynamics, historically the moment in Haitian electoral cycles when alliances shift fastest and fraud allegations concentrate. The "eleksyon malatyong" framing by civil society voices is a leading indicator of delegitimization risk that is independent of the security variable; it must be tracked as a separate dimension of feasibility. The absence of a published CEP disqualification list as of this date is itself an intelligence gap: the list's contents, when published, will be more revealing of institutional independence than any public statement the CEP has made. AYITI INTEL ASSESSMENT: Martelly's organizational capacity, name recognition, and 11-party coalition give him a structural first-round advantage in a fragmented field, but his legitimacy deficit both domestically among urban civil society and internationally among Core Group members creates a scenario in which a Martelly first-round plurality could trigger the same protest-postponement-rerun dynamic documented in 2015. This is an analytical assessment, not established fact.

Embassies should formally request from the CEP, in writing and through appropriate diplomatic channels, the timeline and criteria for the provisional candidate list publication, establishing a paper trail that will be relevant if contested disqualification decisions are subsequently made. Multilateral election-support missions should conduct a structured scenario exercise distinguishing between three outcomes of the CEP vetting process: Martelly disqualified, Martelly permitted to stand, and Martelly withdraws under diplomatic or legal pressure with differentiated implications for each scenario's effect on coalition dynamics and international support. Journalists covering the presidential field should seek direct interviews with declared candidates beyond Martelly particularly Claude Joseph, Ricardo Jean-Pierre, and Gandhy Dorfeuille to document their platforms, bases, and positions on the constitutional referendum, filling a reporting gap that the Martelly story has obscured. Researchers tracking the "eleksyon malatyong" delegitimization narrative should monitor Rezonodwes, Radio November 06, 2026 Kiskeya, and AlterPresse daily for the spread or contraction of that framing among political party members, as opposed to civil society voices alone. Investor-facing analysts should note that a Martelly candidacy, whether he wins, loses, or is disqualified, will in each scenario generate a period of acute political uncertainty with direct implications for business confidence in Port-au-Prince and the northern economic corridor. Missions concerned about nationalist framing should engage directly with Moïse Jean-Charles and his network not to endorse his position but to understand the specific grievances driving Core Group rejection, as addressing those grievances communicatively may reduce but will not eliminate anti-process mobilization. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

The down-ballot landscape is defined by breadth of registered candidacies, extreme party fragmentation, and the absence of any dominant organizational force below the presidential level. As of 23 September 2026, 68 candidates had declared for Senate seats and 205 candidates had declared for Chamber of Deputies seats, per Karibinfo. These numbers were rising through the extended registration window. The CEP's revised calendar places all 30 Senate seats and all 119 Chamber of Deputies seats on the ballot for the 18 July 2027 first round. This bulletin notes that the 2017 to 2019 incomplete electoral cycles and the January 2020 expiry of two-thirds of senators' terms left Haiti without a functioning legislature for more than six years; the 2027 vote is the reconstitution of the entire legislative branch, not a partial renewal. No single party commands a projected legislative majority in any source reviewed. The 105 political groups holding official ballot numbers are contesting seats across all departments simultaneously, ensuring coalition fragmentation in both chambers. The Viktwa coalition of 52 parties and structures, presented in Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026, is the largest declared multi-party legislative grouping by number of constituent members, but its candidate slate, legislative strategy, and leadership were not detailed in sources reviewed. Debloke's 11-party structure provides Martelly a legislative coattail operation, but its specific Senate and deputy candidates were not named in sources reviewed; this bulletin does not assign legislative candidacies without named-source attribution. The municipal field is the most numerically dense: 2,008 mayoral slate candidacies have been registered across all 149 communes from 35 political structures, per the Espas.ht database read on 3 November 2026. Municipal elections are scheduled for 4 October 2027 as part of the second round. The 149-commune field encompasses the 10 main cities tracked by this bulletin: Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, and Miragoâne. As of this briefing date, no specific named mayoral candidates for these cities have been attributed to named local sources in the research data reviewed; this bulletin does not list mayoral candidates by city without source attribution. The CEP's Espas.ht platform is the authoritative registry and should be queried directly for city-level candidate identification. The most significant non-candidate power-brokers shaping the electoral environment are the following. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé holds full executive authority following the CPT's dissolution on 7 February 2026 and has framed elections as the singular legitimating endpoint of his mandate, per Anadolu Agency reporting of 26 September 2026. His political durability is not guaranteed: the January 2026 CPT dismissal attempt in which five of seven November 06, 2026 CPT voting members moved to remove him before being blocked by CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr, the United States, Fanmi Lavalas, and Compromis Historique demonstrated the fragility of his institutional position. Former CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr played a decisive role in preserving Fils-Aimé's authority and remains an influential backstage actor. The CEP's institutional leadership, as the body controlling candidate vetting, ballot design, and the constitutional referendum, is the single most consequential non-candidate actor in this cycle; its composition and independence from executive influence are analytical variables that sources reviewed do not resolve fully. Gang formations primarily the Viv Ansanm federation function as de facto territorial governors over electoral logistics in Port-au-Prince and are expanding their control in Artibonite. Their presence is not a political candidacy but a structural veto on the feasibility of polling in affected zones. The 2024 Viv Ansanm offensive that forced PM Ariel Henry's departure and triggered the CPT's creation is the most recent demonstration of non-state actors determining Haiti's political transition timeline; that dynamic has not changed in 2026.

The Cannibal Army's February 2004 seizure of Gonaïves a coordinated assault on a government at a moment of maximum vulnerability established the precedent repeated in the February 2024 Viv Ansanm offensive: coordinated multi-city armed action timed to executive weakness can determine political outcomes more decisively than any electoral process. The functional equivalence between the 2024 outcome an unelected transitional body replacing a departing executive and a coup in its structural effects is the governing security precedent for assessing whether the 2027 electoral calendar will be allowed to proceed by armed actors who gain from continued transition.

The 2,008 registered mayoral candidacies across 149 communes represent a genuine organizational mobilization from below that deserves attention beyond the presidential race; it may be the most accurate indicator of which parties have real local organizational capacity. The absence of a dominant legislative coalition means that whoever wins the presidency will face an immediately fragmented legislature requiring coalition management from day one a structural invitation to executive unilateralism of the type documented in 2015. PM Fils-Aimé's executive durability is a direct electoral feasibility variable: any renewed challenge to his authority before the July 2027 vote would trigger a political crisis with no institutional resolution mechanism currently available. The Viktwa coalition's Cap-Haïtien base is geographically significant: the north is the most electorally accessible region given Port-au-Prince's security conditions, and candidates with northern organizational strength may outperform their national poll numbers on election day if Port-au-Prince polling is disrupted. The CEP's vetting of 2,008 mayoral slates simultaneously with presidential and legislative candidacies represents an administrative burden that combined with the constitutional referendum exceeds the institutional capacity demonstrated by the CEP's own operational history. AYITI INTEL ASSESSMENT: The down-ballot race is the least-analyzed but potentially most consequential dimension of this cycle. Control of municipal governments and legislative seats determines implementation of post-election governance far more immediately than the presidency alone. Investors and missions should not treat the down-ballot races as secondary noise. November 06, 2026

Missions should task local staff or analytical contractors to systematically query the Espas.ht database by commune for the 10 main cities and produce city-level candidate profiles ahead of the campaign season opening. Election observation organizations should allocate pre-observation capacity to the Cap-Haïtien and northern department races as early operational test cases, given that those zones are more likely to hold credible polling than Port-au-Prince under current security projections. Investors with operations in Gonaïves should monitor Artibonite-specific gang activity reports from AlterPresse and Rezonodwes as the leading local indicator of whether that city's municipal election will be operationally feasible. Journalists covering the legislative races should seek party-by-party breakdowns from Espas.ht and Karibinfo of which coalitions are contesting how many seats in which departments, as this structural data is not being reported by international wire services. Multilateral missions concerned with post-election governance should begin now to assess which party groupings particularly Viktwa with its 52-structure northern base are likely to command significant legislative blocs, and open informal dialogue accordingly. Security analysts should formally designate the Artibonite corridor and the Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haïtien road link as a monitored logistics variable for electoral operations, with defined threshold conditions that would trigger a formal feasibility downgrade. CONFIDENCE Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

Monitor the CEP registration dashboard and official communications for any announcement regarding the closure or further extension of the presidential, senate, and deputy registration window, which is currently set to close 15 November 2026. Watch Radio Kiskeya, AlterPresse, and Le Nouvelliste for any CEP statement on the provisional candidate list timeline, which is the next decisive institutional output expected from the council. Track whether any new presidential candidacy declarations are filed in the final days of the registration window; late filings by high-profile figures have occurred in prior Haitian electoral cycles without advance notice. Monitor Radio Métropole and Gazette Haïti for any new gang-related security incident in Artibonite that would affect the Cap-Haïtien logistics corridor.

Track the mayoral registration window, which runs through 30 November 2026; the final count of commune-level November 06, 2026 candidacies will be the first complete structural picture of which parties have genuine national organizational reach. Watch for any formal legal challenge to the constitutional referendum bundled with the first round; the filing of such a challenge with a Haitian court would immediately create an institutional collision between the judiciary and the CEP. Monitor Core Group member statements particularly from the United States, France, Canada, and the European Union for any adjustment in language around electoral support that signals reduced confidence in the 18 July 2027 date. Track the CEP's handling of diaspora voter registration: any announcement of a resolution or a confirmed failure to resolve the formula will have immediate legitimacy implications and diaspora community reactions measurable through Haitian diaspora media in Miami, Montreal, and Paris. Watch for any public statement by PM Fils-Aimé or his office regarding the January 2026 CPT dismissal attempt; renewed political pressure on his authority will manifest first in public statements from party leaders previously aligned with the five dissenting CPT members.

The MSSM mandate expiry in approximately March 2027 is the most critical structural inflection point before the 18 July first round. A Security Council vote on mandate renewal or expansion and the conditions attached to it will determine whether the international security pillar of electoral feasibility is sustained, strengthened, or allowed to lapse. Missions should begin pre-positioning diplomatic engagement at the Security Council level before year-end 2026. The CEP's provisional and final candidate lists expected in the late November to December 2026 timeframe based on the 2027 electoral decree framework will determine the character of the presidential race more definitively than any campaign event. The disqualification or inclusion of Martelly and any sanctioned figures will set the international legitimacy baseline for the entire process. The security trajectory in Artibonite and Centre departments is the leading indicator of whether a third postponement will be announced before mid-2027. If gang formations establish sustained control over the Artibonite river valley before January 2027, the operational case for 18 July becomes structurally untenable. AYITI INTEL assesses a further postponement as the more probable outcome than a credible first round on 18 July 2027 given current trajectory; this is an analytical assessment. The constitutional referendum bundling creates a downstream legitimacy question that will outlast the election itself: if the referendum ratification is contested by a significant political bloc, any new constitution's legal status will be disputed regardless of electoral outcome, creating a governance crisis before a new government can consolidate. Diaspora engagement with candidate campaigns will intensify through late 2026 and early 2027; monitor whether any candidate formally establishes a diaspora outreach structure, as this will indicate both organizational sophistication and the degree to which remittance-community political pressure is being mobilized.

Le National 18 juillet 2027 : la date retenue pour le premier tour des elections en Haiti. 29 October 2026. Available at lenational.org. November 06, 2026 Le Nouvelliste Que les armes cedent a la toge. November 2026. Available at lenouvelliste.com. Le Nouvelliste Candidats dignes, honorables et frequentables. October 2026. Available at lenouvelliste.com. Haitian Times Martelly enregistre en ligne sa candidature. 16 October 2026. Available at haitiantimes.com. Haitian Times Haiti lowers candidate registration fees for upcoming elections. 11 October 2026. Available at haitiantimes.com. Haiti Policy House Election Tracker Updated November 2026. Available at haitipolicyhouse.org. Karibinfo Haiti: trois candidats a la presidence, 68 au senat et 205 a la deputation. September 2026. Available at karibinfo.com. Espas.ht Mayoral candidate registry, data read 3 November 2026. Available at espas.ht. AlterPresse Ongoing security and electoral coverage. Available at alterpresse.org. Rezonodwes Civil society framing: eleksyon malatyong. 1 November 2026. Available at rezonodwes.com. Radio Kiskeya Electoral and security reporting, October to November 2026. Available at radiokiskeya.com. RFI En Haiti, des elections avec ou sans des candidats sous sanctions. 6 August 2026. Available at rfi.fr. France 24 Gang-plagued Haiti sets election dates for 2027. 29 October 2026. Available at france24.com. Anadolu Agency UN cautions against unrealistic voting dates in Haiti. Available at aa.com.tr. And: Haiti's transition will end with elections, prime minister says. 26 September 2026. Available at aa.com.tr. CEP Liste des partis politiques agrees. 26 March 2026. Available at cephaiti.ht. November 06, 2026