Daily Elections Bulletin

The CEP's October 29 revised calendar sets July 18, 2027 as the new first-round date, but structural conditions make even that timeline precarious. With only approximately 889,000 Haitians newly enrolled against an estimated six million eligible voters, the electoral roll covers roughly fifteen percent of the eligible population a democratic legitimacy deficit that no amount of institutional calendar-setting can paper over. Gang control of up to ninety percent of Port-au-Prince continues to block voter registration in the most populous department; sixteen presidential candidates have registered but sanctions-eligibility disputes remain unresolved and the CEP has announced no formal vetting mechanism. The single actionable insight for stakeholders: the January 11, 2027 approved candidate list publication is the first hard deadline that will reveal whether this process has institutional coherence or is drifting toward a third postponement.

The CEP published a revised electoral calendar on October 29, 2026 setting the presidential and legislative first round for July 18, 2027 and the second round, combined with local elections, for October 4, 2027. Candidate registration for presidential, senate, and deputy races remains open through November 15, 2026, and through November 30, 2026 for mayoral, CASEC, and ASEC positions. Michel Martelly registered as a presidential candidate on October 16, 2026, drawing immediate domestic and international attention and reshaping opposition coalition calculations. Down-ballot, 68 Senate candidates and over 205 Chamber of Deputies candidates have registered, representing more than 300 political parties in a highly fragmented field. The figure to watch now is CEP institutional leadership: whether it publishes a credible candidate vetting protocol against international sanctions lists before January 11, 2027 will determine international financial and political backing for the process. The central risk to the vote occurring is the security environment: gang territorial control in Port-au-Prince and expanding influence in Artibonite and Centre departments will prevent logistically viable elections unless the Gang Suppression Force and Salvadoran troop presence produce measurable change in the next four to six months.

Haiti's electoral calendar has collapsed and been rebuilt three times since late 2025. The CEP initially proposed an August 30, 2026 first-round date submitted to government in November 2025. A revised calendar published July 23, 2026 moved the first round to December 13, 2026, with a second round on February 21, 2027. On October 6-7, 2026 the CEP issued a decree formally postponing the December 13 date sine die, citing what it described as untenable security conditions and logistical delays. On October 28-29, 2026 the CEP published a further revised calendar establishing July 18, 2027 as the first round for presidential and legislative elections, October 4, 2027 as the second round combined with local authority elections across Haiti's 146 communes, and October 23, 2027 as the date for final certified results. Under the revised calendar voter registration has been extended to May 20, 2027. The October 6 decree also amended prior decrees issued June 2 and July 2, 2026, and extended candidate registration, which remains open through November 15, 2026 for presidential, senate, and deputy races, and through November 30, 2026 for mayoral, CASEC, and ASEC positions. Reports of a registration deadline of October 31, 2026 reflect the superseded calendar and are no longer operative. Sources: Le National (issues 8193, 8494, 8588); Le Nouvelliste (270025, 272950); CEP Haiti official calendar; Haitian Times (October 29, 2026). November 04, 2026 The scope of seats at stake under the July 2027 round includes all 30 Senate seats three per each of Haiti's ten departments as listed on the CEP registration dashboard and all 119 seats of the Chamber of Deputies. Haiti has operated without a functioning legislature since January 2020, when the terms of two-thirds of senators expired without replacement elections having been organized. That six-year parliamentary vacuum is the institutional backdrop against which the current legislative registration is being conducted. Executive authority is currently held by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, who took office when the Transitional Presidential Council formally dissolved and transferred power on February 7, 2026. PM Fils-Aimé registered to vote on August 4, 2026, according to Haitian Times. A February 7, 2026 arrêté appointed an interim management commission Yves Andrel Salomon, Dorothé Ignace Morel, and Esther Cinéas to administer the Port-au-Prince municipality pending elections. Haiti currently operates without an elected president, an elected parliament, or a functioning transitional council, governed by decree at all levels. Sources: Le Monde (February 7, 2026); France Diplomatie; Gazette Haiti. Voter registration is the most concretely documented feasibility failure. The CEP launched registration on July 20, 2026 in nine of ten departments, explicitly excluding Ouest Haiti's most populous department due to security conditions. Registration in Ouest began July 30, 2026, ten days later. Registration was designed to run through October 13, 2026 under the original calendar. As of mid-October, approximately 889,797 Haitians had newly enrolled. The ONI database holds approximately 6.5 million Haitians, with 5.8 million holding valid national identification cards, the prerequisite for registration. Enrollment of approximately 889,000 against an eligible base of approximately six million represents roughly fifteen percent coverage a figure the CEP has not publicly acknowledged as a legitimacy deficit. Under the revised calendar, voter registration has been extended to May 20, 2027, providing eight additional months. Sources: Haiti Policy House Election Tracker; Le Nouvelliste (270025); pamelection.org; CEP Haiti official site. Registration centers remain absent from gang-controlled zones; coverage depth in Ouest and gang-held Artibonite communes is unverified as of this brief's date. A constitutional referendum on a revised constitution is bundled with the electoral package, adding procedural complexity and a potential legitimacy flashpoint. Political actors who reject the constitutional revision process may use the referendum as grounds to challenge the credibility of the entire electoral exercise. This dimension has not been fully adjudicated in any public CEP communiqué reviewed for this brief. Sources: Research intelligence handoff memo; Haiti Policy House Election Tracker.

Haiti's January 2015 parliamentary dissolution, which left Michel Martelly ruling by decree until the February 2016 transitional government, established the template of executive decree-governance filling legislative vacuums that has now repeated continuously since January 2020. The October 25, 2015 first-round presidential election produced fraud allegations, annulment, and an extended re-run cycle rather than a settled transfer of power the direct precedent for how a contested or logistically deficient 2027 first round is likely to develop. The 2015 fraud-and-annulment cycle consumed over a year and required international mediation to resolve. TALKING POINTS: The July 18, 2027 first-round date is sourced from the CEP's October 28-29, 2026 revised calendar, not from the October 6 postponement decree, which only established the sine die cancellation of the December 13 date. November 04, 2026 An electoral roll of 889,000 against an eligible population of approximately six million represents roughly fifteen percent coverage and falls well below any recognized threshold for democratic representativeness. The absence of a CEP-announced vetting mechanism for candidates facing international sanctions designations is the most immediate procedural risk to international financial support for the process. Haiti has operated without an elected parliament since January 2020 and without an elected president since the July 2021 assassination of Jovenel Moïse; the July 2027 elections would constitute the first attempt to restore elected governance at any level in seven years. The Gang Suppression Force and Salvadoran troop presence patrolling near Port-au-Prince's Toussaint Louverture Airport as of October 20, 2026, represent the first externally verifiable security improvement, but independent assessments as of late October 2026 continue to place gang influence at up to ninety percent of Port-au-Prince. The bundled constitutional referendum introduces a legitimacy variable that could be weaponized by political actors opposed to either the constitutional text or the transitional governance framework.

Missions providing electoral technical assistance should revise programming timelines to treat July 18, 2027 as the working assumption while building in a ninety-day contingency buffer for a potential third postponement. Embassies and multilateral missions should formally request from the CEP, before November 30, 2026, a written explanation of its candidate vetting protocol against OFAC, Canadian, and UK sanctions lists, and should communicate that the January 11, 2027 approved candidate list publication is the first credible test of institutional integrity. Voter registration support programming should be scaled up immediately; a threshold of two to three million enrolled voters by February 2027 should be established as a minimum legitimacy benchmark for evaluating whether the July 2027 date is viable. Journalists and researchers should distinguish carefully between the October 6, 2026 postponement decree and the October 28-29, 2026 revised calendar when sourcing the July 18, 2027 date. Observer missions should begin logistical pre-positioning assessments for Artibonite and Centre departments given documented gang expansion into those regions, which were not previously categorized as high-risk electoral zones. Investors and businesses should assume no electoral normalization dividend before mid-to-late 2027 at earliest and should factor an eighteen-month uncertainty corridor into contract and project timelines. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting. November 04, 2026

Sixteen presidential candidates had registered with the CEP's online platform as of late October 2026, up from nine as of September 24, 2026, according to the Haiti Policy House Election Tracker. The most consequential registration in the current period was that of former President Michel Martelly on October 16, 2026, reported by the Haitian Times. Martelly, who governed Haiti from 2011 to 2016, is associated with the PHTK political network. His registration drew immediate critical commentary on his governance record, including the January 2015 parliamentary dissolution that left Haiti without a legislature and the 2015 electoral fraud allegations that produced a re-run cycle. No formal party affiliation for Martelly's current candidacy has been confirmed in sources reviewed. His registration has drawn scrutiny regarding prior allegations which must be treated as allegations attributed to critics and opposition figures, not established fact including governance failures and ties to political networks that have faced international concern. The Haiti Policy House Election Tracker notes no sanctions designation identified for Martelly in sources reviewed, but this requires ongoing monitoring as the CEP's vetting process, if one is formalized, would constitute the dispositive institutional determination. Sources: Haitian Times (October 16, 2026); Haiti Policy House Election Tracker. Among other registered candidates, Claude Joseph of the EDE party has declared an independent candidacy with no coalition participation, a position EDE stated publicly on August 1, 2026, according to RHINEWS. Joseph served as acting Prime Minister following the July 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and subsequently as Foreign Minister. His candidacy is broadly positioned in the technocratic-nationalist register, drawing on his international exposure during the post-Moïse crisis period. EDE's rejection of coalition participation reflects a strategic calculation that the fragmented field rewards brand differentiation, but analysis suggests independent candidacies in a sixteen-candidate field carry significant first-round attrition risk absent coalition amplification. Sources: RHINEWS (August 1, 2026). Gandhy Dorfeuille is registered under Ansanm Nou Fò. No further detail on Dorfeuille's geographic base, political lineage, or prior public office has been confirmed in sources reviewed; this candidacy requires further verification before substantive assessment can be offered. Deus Deronneth is registered under Les Démocrates Visionnaires pour la Nouvelle Haïti (DVNH). Similarly, Daniest Adrien is registered under the Parti de la Restauration et du Changement (PRC). Neither Deronneth's nor Adrien's geographic base, prior electoral record, or coalition position has been confirmed in sources reviewed. Sources: Haiti Policy House Election Tracker; KARIBINFO (October 31, 2026). RASANBLE, now led by Dr. Franche Lawson following internal leadership changes, has twice publicly denied alliance rumors on August 12 and August 29, 2026 according to Vantbef Info and Zantray News. RASANBLE is positioning as an independent candidacy. The repeated public denials suggest either internal party discipline concerns or external coalition pressure that RASANBLE's leadership is resisting. The significance of RASANBLE in the current field lies in its potential to draw urban middle-class and civil society-adjacent voters who are skeptical of both the PHTK network and the established opposition. Sources: Vantbef Info (August 12, 2026); Zantray News (August 29, 2026). Moïse Jean-Charles, the former senator from Milot and leader of the Pitit Dessalines movement, has not been confirmed as a registered presidential candidate in sources reviewed for this brief, and his candidacy must be described as potential and unconfirmed. He has, however, publicly rejected Core Group declarations on November 04, 2026 elections, according to Juno7, signaling a sovereigntist-nationalist counter-narrative that may gain traction if the electoral process is perceived as internationally managed or externally imposed. Moïse Jean-Charles has historically drawn support in the North department and among rural and working-class constituencies skeptical of elite-managed transitions. His positioning whether inside or outside the formal race will function as a pressure variable on the entire field. Sources: Juno7. Coalition dynamics remain highly fluid. Ayiti Transfòme is actively building a multi-party coalition structure, absorbing MAPOU party in a formal ceremony at Exagone Building, Pétion-Ville, according to Vantbef Info. En Avant pour Haïti, a seventeen-party bloc, has concluded a formal alliance protocol with Génération de la Rupture et du Réveil (GRR), with a focus on northern Haiti, according to NetAlkole Media. 105 political groups have received official ballot numbers. With 300 or more parties registered and minimal consolidation achieved to date, the probability of a decisive first-round presidential outcome is low; a runoff between the top two candidates is the most plausible electoral scenario if the process reaches July 2027. Sources: Vantbef Info; NetAlkole Media; YouTube (ballot number ceremony).

Michel Martelly's candidacy directly reprises his entry into the 2010-2011 election cycle, when he ran as an outsider entertainer with minimal prior political experience and reached the second round through a combination of personal charisma, Haitian diaspora financial support, and a fragmented opposition. His subsequent 2015 governance crisis the parliamentary dissolution, decree rule, and electoral fraud allegations ended his term without a successor having been chosen for three months. AYITI INTEL assessment: a Martelly return generates a structural polarization in the field that tends historically to consolidate opposition around an anti-PHTK candidate rather than producing a broad-based coalition. TALKING POINTS: Sixteen registered presidential candidates with no dominant frontrunner and no major coalition consolidation as of early November 2026 makes a runoff the near-certain electoral format if the first round is held. Michel Martelly's registration is the single most consequential presidential development since the revised calendar was published; it reshapes opposition coalition incentive structures and will test CEP institutional independence if vetting challenges are filed. EDE's explicit rejection of coalition participation, RASANBLE's repeated denial of alliance talks, and Moïse Jean-Charles's sovereigntist positioning represent three distinct opposition strategies independent, independent, and potentially extra-systemic that collectively fragment the anti-PHTK vote. No candidate has yet demonstrated a credible national ground organization capable of mobilizing voters in a country where 85 percent of eligible citizens have not registered and gang control blocks access to the most populated district. The extended registration window through November 15, 2026 for presidential candidates may bring additional entrants who reshape coalition calculus before the January 11, 2027 approved list is published. Sanctions-eligibility disputes, while not confirmed as applying to any currently registered presidential candidate, November 04, 2026 remain a live variable that could disqualify a registered figure or deter a potentially significant late entrant.

Embassies and observer missions should cross-reference all registered presidential candidates against OFAC, Canadian, and UK sanctions lists as a standard due-diligence step before the January 11, 2027 candidate list publication. Journalists covering the presidential field should distinguish between confirmed registered candidacies, credibly reported potential candidacies, and speculated entries attributing each category explicitly to its source. Missions and observers should monitor RASANBLE and EDE's independent positioning: if either reverses course and enters coalition negotiations after November 15, 2026, it will signal a significant realignment of the field. Political risk analysts should model a scenario in which Martelly's candidacy produces an anti-PHTK consolidation effort producing a single opposition candidate before the January 2027 list this is the most consequential coalition scenario for first-round outcomes. Investor-focused analysts should note that the presidential field's fragmentation, combined with an absence of any candidate with a confirmed national security or economic reform agenda backed by an organized party machine, reduces the probability of a governance-dividend from elections even in a best-case electoral outcome. Researchers should treat Wikipedia entries on the 2027 Haitian general election as a starting reference only and not as primary sourcing for operational decisions; Le Nouvelliste, Le National, and the Haiti Policy House Election Tracker are higher-reliability primary sources. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

The legislative field as of late October 2026 includes 68 registered Senate candidates and more than 205 registered Chamber of Deputies candidates, according to KARIBINFO. By September 23, 2026, the Haitian Times reported 162 candidates for parliamentary positions registered alongside seven presidential candidates at that stage. All 30 Senate seats three per department across Haiti's ten departments are at stake, as listed on the CEP registration dashboard. All 119 Chamber of Deputies seats are also being contested. No incumbent senators or deputies are in office; Haiti has operated without a legislature since January 2020, meaning the entire legislative branch will be reconstituted from scratch. The significance of this structural fact for the down-ballot races cannot be overstated: there are no incumbency advantages, no committee chairmanships to defend, and no existing legislative caucuses around which campaigns can organize. Every seat is effectively an open seat. Sources: KARIBINFO; Haitian Times (September 23, 2026). No individual Senate or Chamber of Deputies candidates have been identified by name in sources reviewed for November 04, 2026 this brief. The legislative field, while numerically substantial at 68 Senate and 205-plus deputy candidates, has not generated the level of sourced, named-candidate reporting that would support individual candidate assessments at this stage of the registration period. AYITI INTEL will develop named candidate tracking as the registration period closes and the CEP publishes approved candidate lists. What can be assessed structurally is that the 300-plus party fragmentation of the political field will produce an extremely competitive legislative environment in which geographic and community networks not national party machines are the decisive organizational variable. Sources: KARIBINFO; Rio Times Online. For main-city mayoral races, candidate registration through the November 30, 2026 deadline means no confirmed mayoral candidate roster is yet available for Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, or Miragoâne. The Port-au-Prince mayoral race is structurally unique: the city is currently administered by the interim commission Yves Andrel Salomon, Dorothé Ignace Morel, and Esther Cinéas appointed by PM Fils-Aimé's February 7, 2026 arrêté. The commission's incumbency as administrators does not necessarily translate into electoral advantage; the interim appointment was not a democratic mandate and may become a liability if the Port-au-Prince security situation remains unresolved. Sources: Gazette Haiti; France Diplomatie. Non-candidate power-brokers shaping electoral outcomes deserve attention at this stage. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé holds decree power and governs without elected oversight; his decisions on CEP resourcing, security force deployments, and diplomatic engagement are the principal institutional variables enabling or disabling the electoral calendar. Former CPT members Smith Augustin, Louis Gérald Gilles, Fritz Alphonse Jean, Edgard Leblanc Fils, Laurent Saint-Cyr, Emmanuel Vertilair, and Leslie Voltaire retain party and factional networks that will shape coalition negotiations and legislative slating even without formal institutional roles. Among internationally designated figures, Joseph Lambert (former Senate President, OFAC-designated, E.O. 14059) and Youri Latortue (former Senator, OFAC-designated, E.O. 14059 for alleged narcotics-related activities these are allegations attributed to the US Treasury) retain political networks in Artibonite and Grand-Anse respectively; both designations are allegations and must be presented as such. Fednel Monchery (designated October 15, 2026 under GLOMAG) is a third figure whose political network's relationship to down-ballot races requires monitoring. Sources: Treasury press release JY1137 (Lambert, Latortue); OFAC SDN List (Monchery entry, October 15, 2026); Baker McKenzie Sanctions Blog (Canada); GOV.UK Haiti sanctions guidance. The En Avant pour Haïti bloc of seventeen parties, allied with Génération de la Rupture et du Réveil (GRR), is explicitly focused on northern Haiti Cap-Haïtien and surrounding Nord department constituencies suggesting an organized down-ballot slate strategy in the North that has not been replicated by other blocs in sources reviewed. Ayiti Transfòme's absorption of MAPOU signals a Pétion-Ville and metropolitan-area organizational base. These two coalition structures represent the most organized down-ballot efforts identified in research to date. Sources: NetAlkole Media; Vantbef Info.

The legislative vacuum since January 2020 has meant that no elected body has ratified budgets, authorized external debt, confirmed cabinet members, or exercised oversight of security forces during the most acute gang expansion period in Haiti's modern history. The return of an elected parliament in 2027 if the vote occurs would constitute the most consequential institutional reconstitution since the 1987 constitution's initial parliamentary elections. The 2015 parliamentary elections, the last legislative vote actually completed before the 2020 dissolution, were conducted under conditions of fraud allegations and low turnout, producing a legislature that November 04, 2026 itself lacked full public legitimacy from the outset. TALKING POINTS: All 30 Senate seats and all 119 Chamber of Deputies seats are open-seat contests with no incumbents; organizational and geographic networks, not incumbency, determine competitive advantage. The En Avant pour Haïti and GRR alliance's northern focus and Ayiti Transfòme's metropolitan Pétion-Ville base are the most concretely documented down-ballot organizational formations in the current period; all other parties' legislative slating strategies are unconfirmed. Joseph Lambert and Youri Latortue, both OFAC-designated under allegations of narcotics-related activities, retain political networks in Artibonite and Grand-Anse that could influence down-ballot outcomes even without direct participation the CEP's vetting mechanism will determine whether designated individuals or their proxies appear on the approved legislative candidate list. The Port-au-Prince interim commission appointed by PM Fils-Aimé holds municipal authority without a democratic mandate; the transition from interim commission to an elected mayor is structurally the highest-stakes local governance event in the 2027 electoral cycle. Security conditions in Artibonite where gang expansion has been documented beyond Port-au-Prince threaten the viability of legislative and local elections specifically in the departments most likely to produce competitive races outside the capital. The absence of named candidate reporting for most Senate and deputy races in local Haitian media reflects the early stage of the registration cycle and not a reporting gap; AYITI INTEL expects this to change substantially following the November 15 close of registration.

Observer missions and journalists should file formal requests to the CEP for the official legislative candidate registration lists as soon as the November 15, 2026 deadline passes; named candidate data is the prerequisite for constituency-level assessment. Missions with field presence in Cap-Haïtien and the Nord department should monitor the En Avant pour Haïti and GRR alliance's candidate slate formation as the best-organized identifiable down-ballot coalition at present. Analysts covering power-broker networks should map the former CPT members' party affiliations and their relationships to legislative slating decisions in their respective departmental bases. The CEP's vetting of Senate and deputy candidates against sanctions lists is at minimum as important as presidential candidate vetting; missions should advocate for a consistent, public, written vetting protocol applying to all candidate categories. Investors and businesses operating in Artibonite should monitor whether gang expansion into that department's communes reaches the level of preventing the formation of local electoral committees a threshold that would November 04, 2026 formally classify Artibonite as an at-risk department for the October 2027 local elections. Journalists covering the Port-au-Prince mayoral race should establish contact with the interim commission Yves Andrel Salomon, Dorothé Ignace Morel, and Esther Cinéas now, before the mayoral candidate registration closes November 30, to assess whether commission members intend to seek elected mandates. CONFIDENCE Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

Monitor for CEP official announcements regarding registration totals as the November 15, 2026 deadline for presidential, senate, and deputy candidates approaches. Watch for any additional presidential candidacy declarations from significant political figures, particularly Moïse Jean-Charles, whose potential entry has not been confirmed but whose public statements on Core Group declarations suggest positioning for a decision. Monitor for CEP communiqués or PM Fils-Aimé decrees addressing the sanctions-vetting question, which Canada's October 31, 2026 statement has elevated to an active diplomatic demand. Watch for any court filings or formal eligibility challenges to registered presidential candidates, particularly in the context of Martelly's registration.

Track whether any existing registered presidential candidates withdraw or modify their candidacy in response to Martelly's entry, as the field reconfigures around the polarization his candidacy historically produces. Monitor coalition negotiations between Ayiti Transfòme, En Avant pour Haïti and GRR, EDE, and RASANBLE the period between now and the November 15 close of presidential registration is the peak window for formal alliance declarations or definitive rejections. Watch for the first operational assessments of Salvadoran troop and Gang Suppression Force impact on Port-au-Prince security conditions, which will begin to inform whether the security variable is trending toward improvement or stasis ahead of the July 2027 timeline. Track mayoral candidate registration activity in Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, and Les Cayes the three main cities outside the capital where security conditions are most likely to allow early organizational activity.

The January 11, 2027 publication of the approved presidential candidate list is the first hard institutional deadline under the revised October 29 calendar. Any slippage of this deadline beyond January 2027 would constitute a credible signal of systemic process failure and would increase the probability of a third postponement. The May 20, 2027 voter registration deadline is the second structural test: enrollment substantially below two to three million by February 2027 would indicate that the electoral roll cannot support a vote of democratic legitimacy. The March 2027 UN Security Council review of the multinational security mission mandate six months after the September 2026 extension will determine whether international security backing for the electoral environment continues or begins to erode. The CEP's decision on whether to enforce sanctions-based disqualification before the January 11 candidate list is published is the most consequential institutional integrity test of the pre-election November 04, 2026 period. If the CEP produces a credible approved list, enforces a transparent vetting protocol, and the security environment shows measurable improvement in the first quarter of 2027, the July 18, 2027 first round remains achievable. If any two of those three conditions fail, a third postponement is the most probable outcome. AYITI INTEL assessment: on current trajectory, the probability of a third postponement is higher than the probability of the July 2027 date holding without further slippage.

Le National (issues 8193, 8494, 8588) electoral calendar development and CEP decrees Le Nouvelliste (270025, 272950) voter registration data and CEP institutional reporting Vantbef Info (August 12, 2026) RASANBLE alliance denial; Ayiti Transfòme and MAPOU absorption OFAC SDN List (Monchery entry, October 15, 2026); Treasury press release JY1137 (Lambert, Latortue designations); GOV.UK Haiti sanctions guidance; Canadian government sanctions regulations designated individuals and sanctions landscape France 24 (October 29, 2026) security conditions assessment, gang territorial control RFI (October 29, 2026) security conditions and electoral viability assessment Haitian Times (October 16, 2026; September 23, 2026; August 4, 2026; October 29, 2026) presidential candidate registration, Martelly filing, legislative field, PM vote registration, revised calendar Haiti Policy House Election Tracker presidential candidate registry and sanctions status monitoring KARIBINFO (October 31, 2026) legislative candidate numbers, candidate registration overview, Canada sanctions statement Juno7 Moïse Jean-Charles statements on Core Group declarations Gazette Haiti CPT dissolution and PM Fils-Aimé executive authority transition RHINEWS (August 1, 2026) EDE party coalition rejection statement November 04, 2026