Daily Elections Bulletin

Haiti's candidate filing window closes today, 22 September 2026, marking the most consequential procedural milestone since the CEP revised the first-round date to 13 December 2026 following the missed 30 August target. As of 21 September, at least 3 presidential candidates, 68 Senate candidates, and 205 deputy candidates had filed figures that will rise with today's final submissions. The central implication for feasibility is not the candidate count but the CEP's imminent eligibility review: any decision to admit or exclude figures linked to sanctions lists will trigger legal challenges, potential street mobilization, and acute international pressure. The actionable insight for diplomatic and observer missions is this the eligibility publication window in late September represents a higher flashpoint risk than election day itself.

The CEP's revised electoral calendar sets R1 for 13 December 2026 and R2 for 21 February 2027. Candidate filing closes today; CEP eligibility review and publication of approved candidate lists is the immediate next high-risk event, expected late September to early October. On the presidential field, three candidates had formally filed as of 21 September; the Viktwa coalition claiming 52 affiliated parties and launched 29 August in Cap-Haïtien has not yet announced its presidential standard-bearer, making that declaration the most anticipated political development of the coming weeks. On the down-ballot level, former deputy Jean-David Génesté confirmed his candidacy for a Sud Department Senate seat under the Ayiti Transfòme platform on 21 September; filing patterns in the Ouest Department remain constrained by security conditions affecting BEC accessibility. The key figure to watch is CEP President or designated spokesperson announcing the eligible candidate lists every decision to admit or reject a filed candidacy will function as a Rorschach test for the process's credibility, particularly regarding sanctioned individuals flagged by OAS on 15 September. The central risk to the vote occurring on schedule is the compound exposure in the Ouest Department: gang territorial control, 1.47 million internally displaced persons with compromised CIN access, and compressed logistics time between the 13 October registration close and a 13 December polling date leave insufficient margin if any single element deteriorates.

Haiti's electoral calendar has undergone one confirmed major revision and carries structural fragility into its final pre-campaign phase. The original calendar, submitted to the CPT on 17 November 2025 and reported by Le Nouvelliste, set the first presidential round for 30 August 2026. That date passed without a vote. The CEP published a revised calendar on cephaiti.ht on 27 July 2026, with R1 now set for 13 December 2026 and R2 for 21 February 2027. The revision was triggered in part by the 20 March 2026 Council of Ministers arrêté directing the CEP to apply Articles 12 and 14 of the Pacte National, which incorporate provisions on limited constitutional amendments a mandate modification that forced a reconfiguration of the entire planning sequence. The Haitian September 22, 2026 Times reported on the revised calendar on 4 August 2026. A proposed constitutional referendum has also been referenced alongside the R1 date, adding procedural complexity to an already compressed schedule. The candidate filing window 13 through 22 September 2026, administered through Departmental Electoral Offices for Senate candidates and Communal Electoral Offices for deputies and local candidates represents the most significant procedural milestone completed to date. As of 21 September, Karibinfo and Rezo Nòdwès reported that 3 presidential candidates, 68 Senate candidates, and 205 deputy candidates had filed, with final figures to emerge following today's deadline. Filing locations were adjusted in some areas due to security constraints, according to the Haiti Policy House tracker. The CEP's capacity to collect, process, and review these filings on a compressed timeline and publish eligible candidate lists before the campaign period is the immediate operational test. The OAS Secretary General Luis Almagro's successor, Albert Ramdin, stated on 3 September that preparations needed to accelerate, a signal that international monitors assess the timeline as tight rather than comfortable. Voter registration opened 20 July 2026 in nine of ten departments, with the Ouest Department explicitly excluded at launch due to gang violence, as confirmed by Haiti Policy House. The Ouest home to approximately 34 percent of Haiti's national population received a partial extension; at least one Centre d'Inscription et de Vote was confirmed operational at SONAPI to serve Cité-Soleil residents per a CEP notice dated 1 September 2026. The CEP reported 628,755 newly registered voters as of 21 September, with registration continuing through 13 October. The ONI database holds 6.5 million registered Haitians, but the interaction between the 1.47 million internally displaced persons reported by IOM as of May 2026 and the CIN requirement for voting eligibility under Article 59.1 of the electoral decree remains an unresolved access problem. The 13 October registration close leaves fewer than 70 days to the 13 December polling date a span that must absorb CEP eligibility reviews, official candidate list publication, campaign period launch, logistics deployment, polling station confirmation in insecure zones, and ballot printing. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé holds sole executive authority following the CPT's dissolution on approximately 7 February 2026. His mandate is formally constrained to organizing elections and maintaining security. The March 2026 arrêté aligning CEP operations with Pacte National provisions was issued by the Council of Ministers under his authority the same instrument that triggered the calendar revision. PM Fils-Aimé has publicly committed to elections by year-end. BINUH, operating under Carlos Ruiz Massieu with a mandate running through January 2027, provides the primary multilateral accountability framework. Canada's engagement with the CEP documented through Chargé d'affaires Jacob Gateau's 21 April 2026 meeting focused on calendar adjustments and alignment with the Pacte pour la Gouvernabilité. The CARICOM Eminent Persons Group held separate engagements with the CEP on electoral oversight, as confirmed by cephaiti.ht.

The 30 August 2026 date passed without a vote in an exact structural repetition of prior cycles: Haiti has not completed a first-round presidential election on its originally announced date in any cycle since 2010. The closest precedent is October 2015, when the first round proceeded but produced a contested result that required a full re-run in 2016 a cycle that consumed over 14 months from R1 to inauguration. The January 2015 precedent, when President Martelly's failure to hold elections dissolved parliament and enabled decree-rule, is the institutional template the current PM Fils-Aimé government structurally replicates: executive authority without a functioning legislature, appointing its own electoral council, carrying the same legitimacy deficit that has historically produced contested outcomes.

The 13 December R1 date is operationally plausible but depends on zero further slippage in the eligibility review, September 22, 2026 campaign period launch, and GSF security corridor establishment a chain with multiple potential break points. The Ouest Department's partial inclusion in voter registration does not resolve the access problem; the 13 October registration close will reveal whether meaningful registration occurred for Port-au-Prince's displaced population. The constitutional referendum attached to the R1 date adds procedural load to an already compressed calendar and has received insufficient public explanation from the CEP or the executive. The 628,755 new registrants figure, while meaningful, must be evaluated against the Ouest population exclusion; a final registration total that under-represents the metropolitan area will be cited by opposition figures as a structural delegitimization argument. BINUH mandate expiration in January 2027 creates a perverse incentive structure: if elections occur, however imperfect, mandate renewal is likely; if they are delayed, political pressure on the mission and the transition government escalates sharply. CEP's adjustment of filing locations due to security constraints is a documented precedent for similar adjustments on polling day which could affect result legitimacy if applied unevenly.

Diplomatic missions should immediately request from the CEP a written timeline for eligibility review, candidate list publication, and campaign period commencement and treat any vagueness as an early warning indicator of further calendar compression. Observer organizations should begin mapping BED and BEC filing accessibility by department against known gang-controlled or IDP-concentrated zones to establish an independent baseline for polling station accessibility analysis. BINUH should formally document, in its reporting to the Security Council, the voter registration gap in the Ouest Department and its proportional relationship to the national electorate establishing an accountability record before election day. International partners providing logistical support to the GSF should request, by 1 October, a specific security corridor plan for Ouest Department polling stations on 13 December, with contingency protocols if gang control of key precincts has not been reduced. Missions and media should track the CEP's official candidate list publication date as a hard indicator of whether the 13 December date remains credible; publication delayed past mid-October effectively compresses the campaign period below minimum viability. Investor and business risk desks should model a scenario in which R1 occurs in January or February 2027 rather than December, given the historical pattern of late calendar revision and current operational constraints. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting. September 22, 2026

As of the close of the 21 September filing day, Karibinfo and Rezo Nòdwès confirmed that three presidential candidates had formally filed documents with CEP offices. The names and party affiliations of all three filed presidential candidates had not been fully confirmed across primary Haitian outlets available at the time of this brief's production. AYITI INTEL does not name specific candidates as filed presidential contenders beyond what primary sources have confirmed. What is confirmed is that the number is unusually low for Haiti's historically crowded presidential fields the 2015 and 2016 cycles featured over 50 declared candidates at equivalent stages and reflects the effect of the CEP's party consolidation requirement, which reduced participating entities from 316 to 105, setting a 30,000-member documentation threshold for independent participation. The final presidential candidate count will be known following today's filing close and the CEP's subsequent eligibility review. The most consequential unresolved question in the presidential field is the Viktwa coalition's candidate selection. Viktwa was formally presented in Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026, claiming affiliation of 52 parties and political structures, representing the largest declared political coalition in the current cycle. Its launch in Cap-Haïtien Haiti's second city and a historically significant political staging ground rather than Port-au-Prince signals a deliberate geographic positioning away from the insecurity-dominated capital. As of 21 September, Viktwa had not announced its presidential standard-bearer, according to available sourcing. Instagram posts from the Viktwa launch and reporting by Zantray News on 29 August document the coalition's formation but do not confirm a presidential name. The announcement of Viktwa's candidate will be the single most significant event in the presidential field in the coming weeks, as it will define whether the coalition's 52-entity claim translates into a credible electoral vehicle or dissolves under the pressures of candidate selection. RASANBLE, operating under Dr. Franche Lawson, declared independent participation on 29 August 2026 explicitly rejecting coalition membership. This positioning is confirmed by Zantray News. RASANBLE's decision to run independently rather than join Viktwa or any of the other documented groupings the Coalition des Regroupements Politiques pour l'Avancement de la Démocratie and the Partis Emergents et Allies grouping are also on record reflects either a calculation that coalition deals would dilute the party's positioning, or a substantive ideological or personal dispute with coalition leadership. The Haiti Policy House tracker confirms that PHTK, the dominant political machine of the 20102021 era under Michel Martelly, is not among the 105 registered political entities. This structural absence removes the best-organized patronage network from formal competition but does not eliminate the influence of Martelly-aligned financiers, organizers, or local power-brokers who may support other candidacies informally. The sanctions eligibility controversy is the highest-stakes overlay on the presidential field. The OAS formally urged Haitian authorities on 15 September 2026 to address concerns about candidates with possible links to illicit activities, transparently and in accordance with Haitian law and international electoral standards, as reported by the Haitian Times. RFI on 6 August reported the question of sanctioned individuals' participation as a major electoral stakes issue. The 2026 electoral decree incorporates additional eligibility requirements beyond constitutional minimums. The OFAC SDN list, last updated 18 September 2026, continues to designate Haitian nationals including Fednel Monchery under the Global Magnitsky sanctions authority. The EU renewed its Haiti sanctions regime on 29 June 2026, running through 31 July 2027. Canada's Federal Court rejected Raymond Deeb's removal from the Haiti sanctions list in December 2025. The CEP's eligibility review of filed presidential candidates will be the proximate test: if a sanctioned figure's candidacy is approved, the OAS, US, and Canada will face immediate pressure to respond; if rejected, the figure and their network become a potential spoiler operating outside the formal process. The nationalist-opposition current distinct from any single candidacy is represented in public discourse by figures September 22, 2026 including Moïse Jean-Charles, whose dismissal of Core Group declarations signals anti-international-community sentiment that could become an organizing narrative in the campaign period. Commentary published 17 September on Rezo Nòdwès by Raoul Gérard, under the headline Aba Eleksyon Malatyong Down with Rotten Elections articulates a minority but vocal position that conditions for legitimate elections do not yet exist. AYITI INTEL assesses this view is likely held more widely among political actors than formal participation choices reveal; it represents latent delegitimization risk that could be activated if the eligibility review produces controversial outcomes.

Haiti's 2015 first-round presidential election held 25 October under a CEP widely viewed as aligned with the incumbent produced immediate fraud allegations from opposition parties and led to a full annulment and re-run in 2016. The current cycle replicates the structural preconditions of 2015: a government-adjacent CEP, a compressed timeline, thin international observation, and multiple candidates with incentives to contest results. The candidacy field in 2015 ultimately exceeded 50 names; the current field of three filed presidential candidates as of 21 September reflects consolidation constraints but does not guarantee a cleaner competitive dynamic.

The low presidential candidate count as of 21 September may reflect the consolidation threshold's effect, but the final post-deadline figure will be more diagnostic a field of fewer than ten credible candidates would be historically unprecedented for Haiti's presidential politics and warrants scrutiny of whether barriers to entry have been set at legitimacy-undermining levels. Viktwa's Cap-Haïtien launch and 52-party claim are politically significant signals, but coalition coherence at candidate selection is historically the moment when Haitian multi-party coalitions fracture; the Viktwa presidential announcement must be watched for whether it produces defections. RASANBLE's independent positioning under Dr. Franche Lawson creates a potential vote-splitting dynamic if the party holds meaningful support in geographic areas where Viktwa's candidate is also competitive. PHTK's formal absence from the registered party list does not neutralize Martelly-network influence; informal financial and organizational support to registered candidates is a monitoring priority for sanctions compliance officers. The OAS 15 September statement on candidate eligibility is the most specific multilateral signal to date that the international community views the CEP vetting process as the election's credibility chokepoint more so than voter registration or campaign logistics. The Raoul Gérard Aba Eleksyon Malatyong commentary represents a real-time barometer for civil society and grassroots delegitimization sentiment that could be mobilized by a losing candidate post-election.

Diplomatic missions should prepare two distinct response frameworks for the CEP's candidate eligibility publication: one for the scenario in which sanctioned figures are excluded and mount legal challenges, and one for the scenario in which they are included and trigger international condemnation. Observer organizations should document the full filed presidential candidate list as reported from the CEP's BED offices on 2223 September and independently verify affiliations with registered parties not relying solely on CEP September 22, 2026 official publication, which may be delayed. Journalists covering the presidential field should contact Viktwa coalition leadership directly for a named presidential candidate confirmation timeline; the coalition's organizational architecture 52 parties is documented but its decision-making process is not yet on public record. Sanctions compliance analysts at missions and international organizations should cross-reference the filed presidential and legislative candidate lists against OFAC, EU, and Canadian sanctions designations immediately upon CEP publication and flag discrepancies for legal review. Political advisors to candidate campaigns should counsel their principals that a transparent, proactive public disclosure of their eligibility documentation particularly regarding CIN status, tax compliance, and absence of criminal convictions reduces the CEP's scope for arbitrary or politically motivated rejection. Research organizations should commission independent legal analysis of whether the Pacte National's Articles 12 and 14 provisions, as applied through the March 2026 arrêté, introduce eligibility criteria not present in the formal electoral decree a potential basis for post-election legal challenges. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

The legislative and local candidate filing data available as of 21 September 68 Senate candidates and 205 deputy candidates represents a baseline figure that will grow with today's final filings and should be treated as preliminary. The geographic distribution of these filings across departments, and the party affiliations represented, will be the first diagnostic of whether the elections are shaping up as a genuinely national contest or whether security and logistical constraints are producing a functionally partial election concentrated in accessible departments. Rezo Nòdwès and Karibinfo confirmed the 21 September figures; no complete departmental breakdown of filed candidates was available across primary sources at the time of this brief's production. The most specifically documented down-ballot candidacy in this cycle is former deputy Jean-David Génesté, confirmed as a Senate candidate for a Sud Department seat under the Ayiti Transfòme platform on 21 September, sourced to Karibinfo and Rezo Nòdwès. Génesté's move from the Chamber of Deputies to a Senate bid is a documented step-up within the Ayiti Transfòme formation, which Haiti Policy House's September 2026 tracker identifies as a multi-party formation with more than ten affiliated structures. Sud Department's relative accessibility compared to the Ouest makes it a more logistically straightforward race to run, though the department has its own history of political violence and clientelist competition. Mayoral races in Haiti's main cities Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, and Miragoâne are structurally embedded in the current electoral cycle, as local elections are scheduled concurrent with or immediately adjacent to the legislative vote. However, as of 21 September, named mayoral candidacies at the BEC level had not been confirmed in the primary Haitian outlet sourcing available to this brief. AYITI INTEL does not name specific mayoral candidates beyond what primary sourcing establishes. What is confirmed is that the CEP's 13 September filing notice directed deputy and local candidates to BECs and that security constraints forced filing location adjustments in some areas, a detail that is September 22, 2026 operationally significant for assessing whether mayoral candidate filing in Port-au-Prince's most insecure communes is actually occurring. The most consequential non-candidate power-brokers shaping the electoral environment are operating at the coalition and financing level. The Viktwa coalition's leadership not yet identified by name in primary sourcing available to this brief will exercise effective gatekeeping authority over 52 affiliated parties' local candidate selections in an arrangement that, if it holds, concentrates significant downticket patronage in the hands of a small number of decision-makers. This is the structural characteristic of Haitian coalition politics that historically produces defections when local leaders find their preferred candidates blocked by national coalition managers. The Coalition des Regroupements Politiques pour l'Avancement de la Démocratie represents a second coalition axis whose downticket candidate selections are not yet documented in primary sourcing. PM Fils-Aimé, while formally constrained to an elections-and-security mandate, exercises executive authority over the CEP's operational environment and the GSF's security priorities a form of structural power over electoral conditions that is not candidacy but is not neutral either. In Cap-Haïtien, the Viktwa coalition's decision to launch there rather than Port-au-Prince has direct implications for the local political field: coalition leaders will be under pressure to deliver competitive downticket candidates in the Nord Department to demonstrate that the launch was substantive rather than symbolic. Gonaïves in the Artibonite where the GSF has deployed Sri Lankan MSS personnel, as confirmed by Caribbean National Weekly is the single most important security-electoral intersection for the legislative races. The Artibonite remains Haiti's political bellwether department historically; contested Senate and deputy races there will be closely watched by all parties as leading indicators of national competitive dynamics. Les Cayes in the Sud, Jacmel in the Sud-Est, and Jérémie in the Grand-Anse are all departments where elections are logistically more feasible than the Ouest, making their downticket races relatively more credible as exercises in competitive local democracy but they are also areas where local strongman networks and church-based political organizing are structurally influential in ways that national-level reporting routinely under-documents.

Haiti's downticket races have historically been the primary arena for gang-affiliated candidate participation and for the conversion of armed group territorial control into electoral leverage. In the 2006 and 2010 cycles, local power-brokers with demonstrated capacity for voter mobilization including through coercion routinely outperformed nationally endorsed candidates at the communal level. The 2015 fraud allegations that annulled the first round were concentrated in local races rather than the presidential contest alone: ballot-stuffing, destruction of tally sheets, and armed voter intimidation were documented at the BEC level, not primarily at the national count. This structural history means that the credibility of the 2026 legislative and local races depends heavily on whether CEP and HNP have capacity to enforce regulations at the BEC level in insecure communes a capacity question that remains entirely unresolved.

The 205 deputy candidacies filed as of 21 September represent a meaningful pipeline for the legislative races, but the departmental distribution matters more than the aggregate number a field concentrated in five or six accessible departments is not a national legislative election. Jean-David Génesté's Senate bid under Ayiti Transfòme in the Sud is the most concretely documented downticket candidacy; it signals the platform is operationally active beyond a coalition branding exercise and has identifiable individuals staking their political futures on it. The Viktwa coalition's 52-party affiliation claim will be tested at the local level: whether those 52 entities produce September 22, 2026 competitive, locally rooted deputy and mayoral candidates in their home departments is the operational proof of the coalition's actual organizational depth. Gonaïves and the Artibonite downticket races operating under GSF security presence are the most observable test of whether security support translates into genuine electoral competition or simply shifts the location of armed influence. BEC-level filing location adjustments due to security constraints are a documented precedent for election-day polling station modifications; observer missions should map these adjustments now to track whether they systematically disadvantage specific communes or candidate bases. The absence of confirmed mayoral candidacies in primary sourcing for Port-au-Prince as of 21 September is itself a signal: it may reflect filing delays due to insecurity, deliberate late filing as a tactical choice, or under-reporting by national outlets under operational constraints.

Observer organizations should prioritize downticket and local race monitoring as a distinct operational domain from presidential observation staffing ratios and resource allocation should reflect that BEC-level fraud, not national tabulation, is the historically documented primary vector for result manipulation. Missions should request from the CEP a departmental breakdown of all filed candidacies by 25 September the aggregate figure obscures whether specific departments are effectively disenfranchised by the filing environment. Journalists should report directly from BECs in Port-au-Prince's gang-controlled communes Cité-Soleil, Martissant, Croix-des-Bouquets to establish whether deputy and mayoral candidate filing is actually occurring in those areas or whether insecurity has de facto excluded them from the legislative process. CARICOM EPG monitors engaged on electoral oversight should specifically request from the CEP the adjusted filing location data and the security rationale for each adjustment this documentation will be essential for any post-election observation report. Political analysts supporting international missions should begin constructing a downticket race tracking database by department, candidate name, party affiliation, and gang-proximity index for each commune this will be the primary tool for assessing whether local election results are plausible or require investigation. Investors with operations in regional cities Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes should assess the local political landscape for each city's mayoral race as an indicator of the post-election regulatory and security environment their operations will face in Q1 2027. CONFIDENCE Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

The close of the candidate filing window on 22 September today is the immediate trigger event. Watch for CEP September 22, 2026 official statements on the final presidential, Senate, and deputy candidate counts, and for any same-day announcement of candidacy rejections or administrative holds. Rejection of a high-profile candidacy on the filing deadline itself whether on eligibility grounds or procedural deficiencies would constitute the highest-immediate-risk development. Any Haitian outlet report of sanctioned figures being accepted or rejected at the BED or BEC level today should be flagged as priority intelligence for diplomatic and observer missions. Watch also for Viktwa coalition communications; the filing deadline may create pressure to announce a presidential candidate name in order to file on time, which would be the most significant political development of the week.

The period from 23 September through the end of the month is the CEP's eligibility review window the highest institutional flashpoint of the pre-campaign phase. Publication of the eligible candidate lists will be the defining event: watch for the OAS, BINUH, and Canada's diplomatic mission to issue statements within 24 to 48 hours of any list publication that includes or excludes controversial figures. Monitor Haitian civil society organizations including those represented in the Aba Eleksyon Malatyong commentary current for organized response to the eligible candidate list. Track whether Viktwa formally announces its presidential candidate this week; a delay beyond 26 September would suggest internal coalition management difficulties. Monitor GSF operational reporting from Gonaïves and the Bay of Port-au-Prince for any significant security incident in the week immediately following the filing close, as a deterioration at this moment would compound pressure on the electoral timeline.

The realistic path to a credible 13 December first round requires the sequential completion of at least five conditions between now and polling day: CEP publication of an eligible candidate list that withstands legal challenge; a campaign period of sufficient duration a minimum of six to eight weeks for candidates to reach voters across Haiti's ten departments; voter registration closing on 13 October with Ouest Department numbers that do not trigger a legitimacy crisis; GSF establishment of verifiable security corridors for polling stations in at minimum the major population centers of the Ouest; and a ballot printing and distribution logistics chain that is operational by late November. Any single failure in this sequence is sufficient to force a further calendar revision. AYITI INTEL assesses the probability of a clean 13 December R1 as plausible but not dominant the compound exposure in the Ouest Department and the compressed timeline between registration close and polling day represent structural constraints that have not been resolved by procedural milestones to date. The more likely scenario, based on Haiti's documented electoral history and the current security baseline, is a partial election: polling occurring in six to eight departments with functional access, Port-au-Prince coverage that is incomplete but sufficient for the CEP to declare a national vote, and results that are contested by losing candidates citing Ouest exclusion as a structural fraud. The January 2027 BINUH mandate renewal decision will be the international community's first formal reckoning with whether the outcome of this cycle meets the threshold of democratic legitimacy that the Security Council's contested language over free and fair elections was debating as recently as this year's renewal negotiations.

Le Nouvelliste CEP calendar reporting, November 2025 and March 2026 coverage; Council of Ministers arrêté coverage, 20 March 2026. cephaiti.ht Revised electoral calendar publication, 27 July 2026; CEP filing notices, 13 September 2026; CARICOM EPG meeting confirmation. Haïti Libre Voter registration and CEP notices, September 2026. Haitian Times Revised calendar reporting, 4 August 2026; OAS eligibility statement coverage, 15 September 2026. OAS Secretary General Ramdin statement on elections and security, 3 September 2026; 15 September 2026 September 22, 2026 eligibility concerns statement. UN Security Council Document S/2026/574 confirming persistent insecurity and humanitarian conditions; BINUH mandate renewal proceedings. IOM 1.47 million IDP figure, May 2026 reporting; displacement geographic distribution data. AlterPresse Transition government and political accord coverage, April 2026. RFI Sanctioned individuals participation reporting, 6 August 2026; CPT dissolution coverage, 6 February 2026. Rezo Nòdwès 21 September 2026 candidate filing confirmation; Raoul Gérard Aba Eleksyon Malatyong commentary, 17 September 2026. Karibinfo 21 September 2026 candidate count reporting: 3 presidential, 68 Senate, 205 deputy. Radio Kiskeya Security environment and HNP reporting, February through September 2026. September 22, 2026