Daily Elections Bulletin

The CEP's revised electoral calendar Round 1 on 13 December 2026, Round 2 and municipal elections on 21 February 2027 represents a minimum viable procedural framework rather than a credible operational plan. The single most consequential development as of 8 September 2026 is the unresolved eligibility status of multiple sanctioned political figures including ex-senators Youri Latortue and Joseph Lambert who have physically presented themselves at CEP offices to register parties without confirmed disqualification action. This omission is not procedural delay; it is the central legitimacy test of the entire process. If the CEP admits sanctioned figures as candidates, international financing and observer credibility collapse. If it disqualifies them, the political field fractures. The actionable insight: missions and observer groups should demand a published CEP eligibility ruling on sanctioned figures before committing operational resources to December planning.

CEP CALENDAR STATUS: Round 1 confirmed for 13 December 2026; candidate registration extended to 14 October 2026. No public contingency modality exists for gang-controlled zones covering roughly 90 percent of Port-au-Prince. CEP President Jacques Desrosiers has explicitly conditioned Round 1 on achieving "acceptable security conditions," a bar the ground situation has not met as of the briefing date. TOP PRESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT: No major declared presidential candidacy has been confirmed through named sourcing as of 8 September 2026. The presidential field remains formally undeclared. Candidate registration does not close until 14 October 2026, meaning the field is structurally open but operationally opaque. NOTABLE DOWN-BALLOT MOVE: Party EDE formally renewed criticism of the CEP's electoral timeline on 3 September 2026, as reported by Gazette Haiti. This represents the clearest organized political dissent against the December target and carries escalation potential into a broader opposition alignment against the calendar. KEY FIGURE TO WATCH: CEP President Jacques Desrosiers. His institution must issue eligibility rulings on sanctioned figures before the 14 October registration deadline. His decisions will set the legitimacy frame for the entire electoral cycle and will be the primary signal international partners use to determine continued financial and operational support. CENTRAL RISK: Gang control of approximately 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, per CEP's own acknowledgment, is the decisive operational constraint on the December date. Without a publicly detailed geographic modality for voting in controlled zones, the December calendar is an aspirational target rather than an executable plan.

September 08, 2026 The CEP officially published its revised 2026-2027 electoral calendar, moving Round 1 of the presidential and legislative elections from 30 August 2026 to 13 December 2026. Round 2 and territorial elections including municipal and local-level races are scheduled for 21 February 2027. The calendar, posted on cephaiti.ht, also confirms that the 13 December ballot will include a popular ratification vote on proposed constitutional amendments, a bundled referendum element that adds significant political complexity and has not been the subject of any reported public information campaign as of the briefing date. The CEP had extended the candidate registration deadline initially set for April 2026 and then postponed to 14 October 2026. The voter registration deadline for citizens is 13-14 October 2026. The CEP launched voter inscription operations in the West Department on 30 July 2026, starting with 10 Centers of Inscription and Vote (CIVs) in Pétion-ville, Delmas, and Tabarre, according to HaitiLibre. The August date slippage was driven primarily by security. CEP President Jacques Desrosiers, cited in reporting aggregated by the Haiti Policy House election tracker and regional wire services, stated explicitly that "the restoration of security is a prerequisite for the first round." That statement made while gangs control approximately 90 percent of Port-au-Prince per the CEP president's own framing creates an internal institutional contradiction that has not been resolved. The December date was set without a publicly announced mechanism for how voting will proceed in gang-controlled communes, including Cité Soleil, Martissant, and Croix-des-Bouquets. No contingency electoral modality phased geographic rollout, remote voting, or deferred local-round option has been publicly detailed by the CEP or the Fils-Aimé government as of the briefing date. The ONI (Office National d'Identification) database carries approximately 6 million Haitians of voting age in its CIN system, identified by NINU, according to Vant Bèf Info reporting from 22 July 2026. A valid CIN is required to vote. Analysts cited by Vant Bèf Info have flagged a structural tension: the CEP's parallel voter inscription layer duplicates rather than draws directly from the ONI database, creating both operational inefficiency and potential fraud vectors. A direct ONI data transfer was planned in 2021 but was not implemented. The West Department CIV rollout beginning in Pétion-ville, Delmas, and Tabarre has not yet been confirmed as extended into gang-controlled communes, meaning the registration footprint as of the briefing date is geographically constrained to relatively more secure zones. The 2026 Electoral Decree, signed 2 June 2026 and published on cephaiti.ht, governs candidate eligibility, party formation, and electoral procedures. The Haitian Times FR, reporting on 7 August 2026, noted the decree was shaped by the "exceptional" political and security circumstances and explicitly references international sanctions, corruption, and parliamentary discharge (décharge) as eligibility considerations. Of the 282 political parties approved by the CEP in March 2026, only 105 had received official ballot designations by August 2026, representing a 63 percent attrition rate from initial approvals. The causes of this attrition eligibility reviews, financing failures, organizational collapse, or deliberate withdrawal have not been publicly detailed by the CEP as of the briefing date. Party EDE formally renewed criticism of the CEP's electoral calendar on 3 September 2026, as reported by Gazette Haiti. Canada's chargé d'affaires Jacob Gateau met with the CEP on 21 April 2026, per Le Nouvelliste, to discuss calendar adjustments and the harmonization of the Electoral Decree with the Pacte pour la Gouvernabilité. BINUH's mandate has been extended through January 2027 specifically to support electoral good offices, per USUN's explanation of vote at the September 08, 2026 Security Council.

January 2015 marked the dissolution of Haiti's parliament under President Michel Martelly, who then governed by decree without legislative oversight for more than a year. That vacancy set the template repeated from 2020 through 2026: when elections lapse, the executive governs without a legislature and effectively controls its own electoral body. The CPT and PM Fils-Aimé carry precisely this legitimacy deficit into the promised 2026 vote. The October 2015 first-round presidential election conducted under a CEP widely perceived as non-independent produced immediate fraud allegations, protests, postponement, and eventual annulment and re-run, never producing a settled transfer of power within the originally intended cycle. TALKING POINTS: The CEP has moved the election date once already; absent security gains, a second slippage to Q1 2027 is a credible near-term scenario. The constitutional ratification component bundled into the December ballot is underreported and underplanned; civil society and opposition reactions to the constitutional text represent a discrete legitimacy variable independent of participation rates. The 63 percent attrition from approved parties to ballot designations signals significant organizational weakness in the political party ecosystem the pool of viable candidates is structurally thinner than the headline party approval numbers suggest. Canada's direct engagement with the CEP on calendar harmonization with the Pacte pour la Gouvernabilité is the most operationally consequential bilateral relationship in the current electoral preparation phase. No geographic modality for voting in gang-controlled Port-au-Prince zones has been published; planning that assumes December elections in those zones is not grounded in available institutional documentation. The parallel CEP inscription layer over the ONI database is a known fraud risk that has not been publicly addressed by the CEP or international partners. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS: Missions and observer groups should formally request from the CEP a published geographic plan identifying which communes will and will not have operational CIVs on 13 December before committing observer deployment resources. Diplomatic missions should press the CEP, in writing, for a timeline on eligibility rulings for sanctioned figures, given that the 14 October registration deadline is six weeks away. International organizations should initiate contingency planning for a Round 1 date of February or March 2027, scoped within the BINUH mandate extension through January 2027. Observer missions should assess whether constitutional ratification bundled into the December ballot triggers a separate legal basis for observation mandates, given the distinct character of a referendum versus an election. Analysts and journalists covering the process should map voter registration CIV locations against September 08, 2026 Viv Ansanm and gang territorial control zones to establish a public baseline for gauging registration inclusivity. Governments contributing to the GSF or broader security effort should request a public quarterly assessment of territorial control changes as a condition of continued contribution. CONFIDENCE: Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

As of 8 September 2026, no major declared presidential candidacy has been confirmed through named sourcing in Haitian local media. The candidate registration deadline is 14 October 2026 a window of approximately six weeks from the briefing date meaning the presidential field remains formally open and the absence of publicly declared candidates at this stage is not structurally abnormal for Haiti's electoral cycle, given that party registration runs through 14 October and candidates typically declare in close coordination with or after party formation is finalized. What is abnormal is the active presence of multiple sanctioned figures in the registration process. Ex-senators Youri Latortue (former Senate President, Artibonite department) and Joseph Lambert (former Senate President, Sud-Est department) both under active U.S. OFAC and Canadian sanctions have been reported at CEP offices registering their respective political formations, according to Vant Bèf Info. Youri Latortue has publicly maintained his intent to participate in elections despite sanctions, as reported by Vant Bèf Info in its August 2026 coverage of what it termed "the polemical return of sanctioned politicians." The U.S. Treasury's press release designating Lambert and Latortue cited in the OFAC SDN list, most recently updated 28 August 2026 in connection with a separate Fednel Monchery entry established the legal basis for their sanctions designations, which remain active. Ex-senators Wilo Joseph and Gracia Delva, and ex-deputy Arnel Belizaire, were also reported among those presenting at CEP offices, per Vant Bèf Info. All five carry active U.S. or Canadian sanctions designations. Belizaire's presence is notable given his past profile as a left-leaning political figure, suggesting the sanctioned-politician category spans the ideological spectrum. The 2026 Electoral Decree, per The Haitian Times FR reporting of 7 August 2026, references international sanctions and corruption as eligibility concerns. The Haitian Times FR framed the question of presidential eligibility under the headline "Who can be President of Haiti?" analyzing the decree's citizenship, residency, age, and integrity provisions. However, no confirmed CEP disqualification decision against any sanctioned figure has been reported as of the briefing date. This gap between a decree that references sanctions as eligibility criteria and an institution that has taken no confirmed disqualification action is the single most acute credibility risk to the process. AYITI INTEL assessment: the CEP's failure to act on sanctioned-figure eligibility before the 14 October deadline is likely to become the defining international legitimacy question for the 2026 electoral cycle. Party RASANBLE formally denied electoral alliance rumors on 12 August 2026, asserting its full September 08, 2026 independence, according to Vant Bèf Info. RASANBLE is one of the more organized formations in the current cycle and its independence declaration made publicly and emphatically signals a calculated positioning. AYITI INTEL assessment: RASANBLE's independence posture is more plausibly explained as preparation for post-election coalition bargaining in a fragmented legislative environment than as genuine organizational isolation. A pre-election formal alliance would bind RASANBLE to partners of uncertain viability; independence preserves maximum post-election leverage. The "Coalition des Regroupements Politiques pour l'Avancement de la Démocratie," allied with "Partis Émergents et Alliés," presented resolutions from consultations on draft constitutional text on 27 June 2026 and announced a forthcoming consensual alternative constitutional framework, per Radio Télé Caraïbes YouTube coverage from 20 August 2026. This coalition's engagement with constitutional text separate from the CEP's referendum bundling suggests a parallel civil-political process with presidential race implications that have not yet fully surfaced in reporting. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, who assumed executive authority on 7 February 2026 following CPT dissolution, per Le Monde, has publicly committed to holding elections, framing it as "a historical and collective responsibility." Fils-Aimé is not reported as a declared or potential presidential candidate. His institutional role as the authority organizing the elections while governing without parliamentary oversight places him in the structurally ambiguous position occupied by every Haitian premier who has managed an electoral process from within the executive a position that has historically produced conflicts of interest regardless of individual intent.

The October 2015 first-round presidential election which produced immediate fraud allegations against CEP-favored candidate Jovenel Moïse and multiple opposition parties is the direct precedent for what a contested first round under thin observation produces in Haiti: protest, postponement, re-run, and no settled transfer of power within the original cycle. Any presidential field that includes sanctioned figures admitted by a non-independent CEP replicates the structural conditions of 2015, regardless of how individual candidates perform on election day. TALKING POINTS: The presidential field is operationally open until 14 October 2026; any assessment of frontrunners before that date is premature without confirmed declarations from named candidates through Haitian local media sourcing. The participation of sanctioned figures is not merely a legal question; it is the primary signal international partners will use to assess whether to maintain electoral financing and observer deployment. RASANBLE's independence declaration is a significant political data point; the party's post-election posture will depend heavily on the legislative seat distribution produced by a fragmented field. The constitutional ratification component of the December ballot will force presidential-level political figures to publicly position on constitutional changes, creating a secondary campaign dynamic that may be more contentious than the candidate race itself. The absence of parliamentary oversight over the Fils-Aimé government means that any electoral decree or regulatory action taken between now and the vote carries elevated legitimacy risk in the September 08, 2026 eyes of organized opposition. The 63 percent attrition from approved parties to ballot designations implies that the effective presidential field will be narrower than the party landscape suggests but until declarations are made, the exact contours are unknown. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS: Diplomatic missions should formally communicate to the CEP that sanctioned-figure participation will affect their governments' electoral financing decisions, with a written deadline tied to the 14 October registration closure. Journalists and researchers should establish a running public register of declared presidential candidates sourced exclusively to named declarations in Haitian local outlets given the risk of unverified candidacy claims circulating in diaspora media. Observer missions should designate a specific monitoring stream for the constitutional ratification element of the December ballot, distinct from the presidential and legislative observation framework. International partners engaged with RASANBLE and other major formations should assess whether post-election coalition scenarios require pre-election diplomatic engagement to prevent an ungovernable legislative fragmentation outcome. The Fils-Aimé government should be pressed, through CARICOM and OAS channels, to publicly establish and publish a conflict-of-interest protocol governing executive-CEP interaction during the campaign period. Missions should plan for a presidential race briefing refresh after the 14 October registration deadline, when the actual candidate field will be documentable. CONFIDENCE: Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

The 2026-2027 electoral cycle includes legislative elections (Senate and Chamber of Deputies), municipal elections, and territorial body elections. The municipal and territorial votes are scheduled for the 21 February 2027 Round 2 date. This means that mayoral races in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, and Miragoâne are formally scheduled but are structurally secondary to the December legislative round in terms of immediate planning pressure. As of the briefing date, no named mayoral candidates in any of these cities have been confirmed through Haitian local media sourcing. The briefing will therefore assess the structural conditions shaping those races and the power-broker landscape rather than a candidate roster that does not yet exist in the sourced record. For legislative races, the most operationally significant development is the senate candidacy environment shaped by sanctioned ex-senators Youri Latortue (Artibonite) and Joseph Lambert (Sud-Est). If admitted, their senate candidacies separate from any presidential ambitions would directly contest seats in departments where they have established political bases. Latortue's Artibonite base has historically made him one of the most powerful provincial political figures in September 08, 2026 Haiti. His participation or disqualification will define the Artibonite legislative race. Lambert's Sud-Est base faces similar dynamics. Gracia Delva and Wilo Joseph, also reported at CEP offices per Vant Bèf Info, carry provincial political networks in their respective departments. Arnel Belizaire, a former deputy, represents a constituency-level rather than senatorial dynamic. No confirmed district-level candidacy declarations for any of these figures have been reported as of the briefing date. The party ecosystem shaping down-ballot races is thin. Of 282 initially approved parties, only 105 received ballot designations by August 2026 a structural constraint on the organizational infrastructure available to run viable deputy and senatorial campaigns simultaneously with a presidential race. The "Parti de la Diaspora Haïtienne pour Haïti," which received ballot designation number 25 per the CEP's registered groupings list, represents an attempt at diaspora electoral representation. No diaspora voting mechanism has been reported in the 2026 Electoral Decree or CEP calendar, meaning diaspora-based party representation would be limited to Haitian-based candidate deployment rather than diaspora-resident voting. This is a structural constraint on diaspora political agency that has not been publicly acknowledged by the CEP. For mayoral races, Gang Suppression Force (GSF) operational parameters in Port-au-Prince are the primary determinant of whether municipal elections in February 2027 are feasible in that city. The GSF, with 5,500 members as of 2026, has been the primary security response tool, but no confirmed territorial gains sufficient to enable free movement for candidates or voters in gang-controlled Port-au-Prince communes have been publicly documented. CARICOM's Eminent Persons Group participated in an OAS meeting reviewing GSF progress, per CARICOM's July 2026 reporting, but the output was engagement rather than a security certification. AYITI INTEL assessment: municipal races in Port-au-Prince and its gang-controlled communes including Cité Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, and Martissant cannot be responsibly planned for February 2027 absent a documented security modality that does not currently exist in the public record. Non-candidate power-brokers shaping the overall down-ballot environment include PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, who, through executive control of security deployment, infrastructure, and government patronage, holds indirect leverage over candidate viability in multiple departments. Dissolved CPT members including figures associated with major political formations across the Augustin, Gilles, Jean, Leblanc, Saint-Cyr, Vertilair, and Voltaire groupings retain organizational networks that will shape candidate selection and coalition formation at the deputy level. Their post-CPT political behavior has not been systematically tracked in available local media reporting as of the briefing date. The "Coalition des Regroupements Politiques pour l'Avancement de la Démocratie," reported by Radio Télé Caraïbes on 20 August 2026, represents a multi-party bloc actively engaging on constitutional text a bloc whose legislative agenda will translate into coordinated candidate lists if it maintains organizational coherence through October.

The February 2004 fall of Gonaïves to the Cannibal Army under Buteur Métayer, and the 2024 Viv Ansanm offensive that effectively forced PM Henry from power, share a structural dynamic: provincial armed actors using urban territorial control to determine the political viability of formal institutions. Gonaïves remains a city whose local politics are inseparable from armed-group September 08, 2026 dynamics. Any mayoral race in Gonaïves in February 2027 will occur in an environment where armed-actor positioning is as determinative as candidate platforms, a pattern consistent with two decades of electoral history in that city. TALKING POINTS: No confirmed named mayoral or deputy candidates have been sourced through Haitian local media as of the briefing date; the down-ballot field is as undeclared as the presidential race. The February 2027 municipal date for cities including Port-au-Prince is structurally contingent on security developments that are not currently on a trajectory to enable free candidate movement or voter access in gang-controlled zones. Sanctioned ex-senators Latortue and Lambert, if admitted to the race, will dominate their respective departmental senatorial contests by virtue of existing networks their eligibility ruling is therefore a down-ballot question as much as a presidential legitimacy question. The "Parti de la Diaspora Haïtienne pour Haïti" receiving ballot designation 25 is a notable signal of diaspora political ambition, but without a diaspora voting mechanism, its impact will be limited to mainland-based candidate deployment. The dissolution of the CPT has left a set of politically networked former members whose post-CPT organizational behavior is underreported and represents a significant intelligence gap for predicting deputy-level candidate lists. EDE's formal opposition to the CEP calendar, if it consolidates into a boycott call, could deprive multiple department-level races of organized competitive candidates, producing uncontested or thinly contested legislative seats. RECOMMENDED DECISIONS: Observer missions should establish a dedicated down-ballot tracking register by department, updated at each wave of candidate registration reporting from Haitian local outlets, to identify race-by-race competitiveness. Diplomatic missions should request from the GSF and the Fils-Aimé security apparatus a public or bilaterally shared map of zones where candidate campaigning is operationally feasible, as a prerequisite for evaluating municipal election viability. Journalists covering the process should specifically track the post-CPT organizational activity of former transitional council members, whose party-network behavior represents the most significant underreported variable in the legislative candidate landscape. International partners should assess whether the February 2027 municipal date for Port-au-Prince should be formally deferred to a separate subsequent vote, to avoid a scenario where a gang-controlled capital city produces no municipal election result while the rest of the country does. Observer missions should engage EDE directly to assess whether its CEP calendar criticism represents a negotiating posture or a firm boycott trajectory the distinction has significant implications for down-ballot race integrity. Analysts should produce a department-by-department assessment of which senate seats are up in the 2026 cycle versus which seats continue under staggered terms, as this will determine the specific legislative prize map for the December contest. September 08, 2026 CONFIDENCE: Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

The CARICOM delegation visit to Haiti, referenced in multiple 3 September 2026 sources including Gazette Haiti, is reported as imminent. Any public statement or communiqué from that delegation on electoral readiness or security conditions will be the first major international partner signal since the calendar revision. Watch for whether the delegation endorses, conditions, or defers its confidence in the December target. Monitor Haitian local outlets Le Nouvelliste, Juno7, Radio Kiskeya, AlterPresse for any CEP announcement on sanctioned-figure eligibility determinations, which could come at any time before the 14 October deadline and will be the most consequential single institutional decision of the current cycle. Watch for any EDE public statement escalating its 3 September calendar criticism. A call for other parties to join its opposition position, or a formal boycott declaration, would represent a step-change from dissent to organized opposition to the process itself.

The CEP's published agrément schedule placed the approval list publication on 8 August 2026 and grouping registration at 10-14 August 2026. Follow-on administrative steps for the October registration deadline including any CEP guidance on documentation requirements for sanctioned-figure eligibility review should be monitored in CEP official publications on cephaiti.ht. Track West Department CIV operations: whether voter registration sites have expanded beyond the initial Pétion-ville, Delmas, and Tabarre deployment into gang-contested communes. Expansion or non-expansion is the clearest operational indicator of whether the election has a realistic voter registration footprint in Haiti's most populous department. Monitor the "Coalition des Regroupements Politiques pour l'Avancement de la Démocratie" for publication of its promised consensual alternative constitutional framework, announced after its 27 June 2026 consultation per Radio Télé Caraïbes. This document will define the organized political opposition's position on the constitutional ratification element of the December ballot.

The 14 October 2026 candidate registration deadline is the last credible entry point for the electoral cycle. What happens after that date defines three near-term scenarios. Scenario One: a viable field is registered, sanctioned figures are disqualified, security operations demonstrate measurable gains, and the December date is maintained with reduced but present international observer support. This is the most optimistic scenario and, as of the briefing date, the least well-supported by ground September 08, 2026 conditions. Scenario Two: sanctioned figures are admitted or eligibility rulings are indefinitely deferred, registration produces a thin field, and security remains prohibitive triggering a second date slippage to Q1 2027. This is AYITI INTEL's current central scenario. Scenario Three: accumulated failures security collapse, legitimacy crisis over sanctioned figures, EDE-led boycott, and constitutional referendum controversy produce a process that completes formally but is rejected by major political actors and international partners, replicating the 2015 annulment dynamic under conditions of even greater institutional fragility. The constitutional ratification component of the December ballot is the longest-horizon strategic risk. Voter rejection of constitutional amendments even alongside a technically valid election could delegitimize the entire electoral output regardless of participation rates. No voter information campaign on the constitutional text has been reported. Civil society actors associated with Le Rubicon's analytical framing of legislative elections as "a moment of truth for the Haitian state" represent a minority intellectual current that could gain significant public traction if constitutional text controversies accelerate. The diaspora remittance economy Haiti's most stable macroeconomic stabilizer is not directly exposed to the electoral timeline but will be behaviorally sensitive to a scenario-three outcome. Missions with economic mandates should plan on the assumption that political stabilization, and therefore a reduced remittance-risk environment, is not achievable before Q2 2027 at the earliest.

1. CEP Haiti Official Published Electoral Calendar 2026-2027. cephaiti.ht/publication-officielle-du-calendrier-electoral-2026-2027 2. CEP Haiti Official Electoral Decree of 2 June 2026. cephaiti.ht/decret-electoral-du-2-juin-2026 4. Gazette Haiti, 3 September 2026 EDE renews criticism of CEP electoral timeline. gazettehaiti.com/node/13303 9. Le Nouvelliste, 21 April 2026 CEP-Canada exchanges on electoral process. lenouvelliste.com/article/266566/echanges-cep-canada-sur-le-processus-electoral 3. CEP Haiti Official List of Registered Political Groupings. cephaiti.ht/publication-de-la-liste-des-groupements-politiques-enregistres-dans-la-perspective-des-prochaines-ele 10. Le Nouvelliste, 17 November 2025 CEP sets general elections for 30 August 2026. lenouvelliste.com/article/261737/le-cep-fixe-les-elections-generales-en-haiti-au-30-aout-2026 11. The Haitian Times FR, 7 August 2026 Who can be President of Haiti? Analysis of Electoral Decree eligibility provisions. haitiantimes.com/fr/2026/08/07/Qui-peut-être-président-d'Haïti- 14. CARICOM, July 2026 CARICOM EPG participates in OAS meeting on Haiti. caricom.org/caricom-epg-participates-in-oas-meeting-on-haiti-and-other-engagements-in-washington-d-c 12. The Haitian Times FR, March 2026 282 political parties approved for upcoming elections. haitiantimes.com/fr/2026/03/28/282-partis-politiques-ont-été-approuvés-pour-les-prochaines-élections-en-Haïti 8. HaitiLibre, 30 July 2026 Launch of voter registration operations in the West Department. haitilibre.com/article-48100-haiti-flash-debut-des-operations-d-inscription-des-electeurs-dans-le-dept-de-l-ouest.ht 5. Vant Bèf Info, 12 August 2026 RASANBLE denies all alliance and reaffirms independence. vantbefinfo.com/haiti-elections-rasanble-dement-toute-alliance-et-reaffirme-son-independance 6. Vant Bèf Info Sanctioned politicians and electoral re-entry. vantbefinfo.com/haiti-le-retour-polemique-des-politiciens-sanctionnes September 08, 2026