Daily Elections Bulletin

The CEP's December 13 first-round date remains the official electoral terminus of Haiti's prolonged transition, but the structural conditions for a credible nationwide vote do not currently exist. The Ouest Department, home to more than four million people and the country's largest voter concentration, has been excluded from voter registration since the July 20 launch due to gang territorial control estimated at ninety percent of Port-au-Prince. Haiti Policy House, an independent institutional monitor, assigns only a ten percent probability to elections proceeding on schedule, projecting a fallback to June 2027. The single highest-leverage action available to international actors remains advocacy for full deployment and UN Security Council mandate renewal of the Kenya-led Gang Suppression Force. Without tangible security gains in the Ouest in the next six to eight weeks, postponement is the probable outcome.

The CEP is operating on a December 13 first-round calendar with a second round on February 21, 2027. Voter registration runs through October 13 in nine of ten departments, with the Ouest Department excluded due to gang control. Seven presidential candidates are registered, including former President Michel Martelly running under a new banner after PHTK failed to appear on the CEP's list of participating parties. Jean-David Génesté's registered Senate candidacy in the Sud Department under the ten-plus party Ayiti Transfòme coalition illustrates emerging legislative coalition dynamics. Former Senator Moïse Jean-Charles is the key nationalist-sovereignist figure to watch, publicly challenging the legitimacy of the internationally-guided process. The central risk to the vote occurring is the combination of ninety-percent gang territorial control of Port-au-Prince, the resulting Ouest Department registration blackout, and unresolved GSF mandate renewal at the Security Council.

The CEP's official 2026 to 2027 electoral calendar designates December 13, 2026 as the first-round date for the presidential race, all Senate seats, all Chamber of Deputies seats, and a constitutional ratification referendum, with a second round on February 21, 2027. Municipal and local elections are also scheduled for February 21. This sequencing separates local from national contests by approximately ten weeks. The calendar was not the original one: Le Nouvelliste reported that the CEP's November 2025 planning had set August 30, 2026 as the first-round date. A June 2, 2026 electoral decree shifted the date to December 13. Le National has flagged that further modifications to the decree remain possible. The June 2 decree incorporates security preconditions the December 13 date is explicitly conditional on the establishment of what the decree describes as an acceptable security climate. The most operationally significant fact in the current electoral environment is the exclusion of the Ouest Department from voter registration. The CEP launched registration operations on July 20, 2026, in nine of Haiti's ten departments. The Ouest Department, which encompasses the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area and a population of more than four million the country's single largest demographic concentration was excluded from the launch due to gang territorial control. Haiti Policy House's updated tracker, as of September 29, confirms this exclusion is ongoing. The registration period closes October 13, twelve days from the date of this brief. No sourced material confirms that any Centres d'Inscription et de Vote became operational in the Ouest during the registration window. If the Ouest Department remains without registration operations through October 13, an October 01, 2026 estimated four million or more potential voters will be structurally excluded from the electorate before a single ballot is cast. Haiti Policy House assigns a ten percent probability to elections proceeding on December 13 and has revised its anticipated election date to June 2027. This assessment is described by the tracker as evidence-based and holistic rather than derived from formal statistical modeling. It represents the most specific independent institutional probability estimate available. The Rio Times Online characterized a credible nationwide vote as nearly impossible under current conditions and described the December second round as existing on paper only. These assessments stand in direct contrast to the official posture: Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé told the United Nations on September 24 that the transition must come to an end and that it will come to an end through elections. The CEP has described registration as successfully launched. Radio-Canada reported, however, that Fils-Aimé himself previously acknowledged Haiti was too unstable for a presidential election in August the original target date reflecting internal government awareness of the tension between declared timelines and ground reality. The Gang Suppression Force, the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support Mission, is identified by all parties Haitian government, UN, OAS, and CARICOM as the critical enabling condition for elections. Foreign Minister Raina Forbin called for full GSF deployment and Security Council mandate renewal at an OAS meeting covered by Reuters on September 3. PM Fils-Aimé repeated the same demand at the UN on September 24. The GSF mandate renewal is a live Security Council question concurrent with the electoral run-up. Haiti National Police Chief André Jonas Vladimir Paraison stated in February that a plan was underway for elections despite gang violence but acknowledged that Haiti has faced this situation for nearly twenty years. BINUH, the UN Integrated Office in Haiti, is providing operational support including digital voter registration system testing and election worker training, according to UN News reporting from September 24. Le National, in an October 2026 tribune piece, raised a further concern that has received insufficient international attention: even if elections are held, unresolved legal ambiguities in the June 2 electoral decree and in the constitutional ratification referendum's legal framework could trigger an unprecedented constitutional and political crisis over results. The decree was modified by the then-Transitional Presidential Council before publication, with the CPT introducing what the source describes as major additions. The resulting instrument's legal standing and the enforceability of its eligibility criteria remain contested.

The January 2015 dissolution of parliament and Martelly's subsequent rule by decree established the template that repeated through 2020 to 2026: when elections lapse, the executive governs without a legislature and shapes its own electoral council, carrying a legitimacy deficit into any promised vote. The October 25, 2015 first-round presidential election produced fraud allegations, protest, postponement, and eventual re-run rather than a settled transfer of power the direct procedural precedent for what a contested December 13 result could trigger in 2026.

The Ouest Department registration exclusion is not a logistical irregularity it is a structural disqualification of Haiti's largest voter bloc from the electoral roll, and its resolution before October 13 is functionally impossible under current security conditions. October 01, 2026 A ten percent probability of elections proceeding on schedule, assigned by Haiti Policy House, should be treated as the baseline planning figure for international mission contingency work, not as a minority contrarian view. The GSF mandate renewal at the Security Council is the single most consequential external decision variable for whether December 13 remains viable or collapses to a June 2027 fallback. The June 2 decree's conditionality clause requiring an acceptable security climate gives the CEP and government a legal mechanism to postpone without formally announcing failure, making the November security assessment a critical decision node to monitor. Legal ambiguities in the decree and constitutional referendum framework, flagged by Le National, are underappreciated risks that could convert a logistically successful vote into a post-election crisis. The twelve days remaining before the October 13 registration deadline compress the timeline for any last-minute Ouest Department registration push to effectively zero.

International missions and observer bodies should immediately formalize dual-track planning: a primary scenario of postponement to June 2027 and a secondary scenario of a partial December 13 election with legitimate-representation deficits, rather than treating December 13 as the operative planning assumption. UN Security Council member states should treat GSF mandate renewal as an electoral-process decision, not merely a security-sector decision, and expedite renewal before November with full-deployment requirements attached. Election observation missions should begin pre-positioning in the nine accessible departments now while maintaining flexible deployment timelines that account for postponement, and should formally document the Ouest Department exclusion as a benchmark against which post-election legitimacy claims will be assessed. The CEP and BINUH should be pressed to publish a formal security assessment timeline specifically, the date by which a determination on the acceptable security climate threshold will be made so that international actors, candidates, and civil society have a defined decision window. Diaspora voting modalities, discussed in CEP meetings with Canadian officials on August 31 and with Global Affairs Canada, must be finalized before October 13 or diaspora Haitians in Canada and elsewhere will be foreclosed from registration, further narrowing the electorate's representational base. Legal advisers to international missions should analyze the constitutional and decree ambiguities flagged by Le National and provide governments with a risk assessment of the post-election dispute scenario before December 13. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting. October 01, 2026

The CEP reported seven registered presidential candidacies as of September 23, 2026, according to the Haitian Times. Named declared candidates in sourced material are limited. The most prominently reported is Michel Martelly, former president of Haiti from 2011 to 2016. According to a Facebook report via Island TV Network cited by Haiti Policy House, Martelly has entered the 2026 race under a political banner separate from PHTK, his original party. PHTK is notably absent from the CEP's list of participating parties and groupings published March 26, 2026, which confirmed 282 of 320 registered parties. Haiti Policy House's tracker confirms PHTK's absence. The mechanism by which Martelly registered independently of PHTK and whether a new party vehicle was formally registered with the CEP or whether he filed under an existing grouping is not resolved in available sourced material. This creates a documented ambiguity about the legal and institutional structure of his candidacy. Martelly's candidacy is a significant variable for multiple reasons beyond his personal profile. He governed Haiti from 2011 to 2016 under PHTK, a period that ended without holding scheduled legislative elections, contributing directly to the parliamentary vacuum that characterized subsequent years. His re-entry into presidential competition in 2026 carries the accumulated political baggage of that tenure, including the 2015 fraud allegations that shadowed the elections held under his presidency. Whether the CEP's eligibility criteria under the June 2 decree which the Haitian Times described on August 7 as going beyond constitutional minimums to include administrative, financial, and integrity requirements will produce a challenge to Martelly's candidacy is not confirmed in available sourced material. No CEP disqualification ruling against Martelly has been reported as of the brief date. The six remaining registered presidential candidates are not named in the sourced material available as of October 1, 2026. AYITI INTEL does not speculate on or infer their identities. The Haitian Times reported the seven-candidate total on September 23; no subsequent update in sourced material has indicated disqualifications or additional registrations, though the candidate registration period was extended by a CEP notice dated September 2 and the extended deadline is not confirmed as having passed. The sanctions question is an unresolved eligibility flashpoint across the field. RFI reported on August 6 that internationally sanctioned figures may be attempting to participate as candidates. The June 2 electoral decree introduces integrity requirements, but RFI's reporting explicitly notes the absence of a clear automatic disqualification mechanism for individuals on the OFAC Specially Designated Nationals list, Canada's consolidated autonomous sanctions list, or the EU's Haiti sanctions regime. The EU renewed its Haiti sanctions under Regulation 2022/2309 through July 31, 2027, on June 29, 2026. The OFAC SDN list was updated September 18, 2026, and continues to include Haitian nationals including Fednel Monchery under GLOMAG and narcotics designations. Previously designated figures include Joseph Lambert and Youri Latorture. Whether any of the seven registered presidential candidates are on any of these lists is not confirmed in available sourced material. The absence of a clear disqualification mechanism means that sanctioned candidates could potentially appear on the ballot unless the CEP acts proactively under the decree's integrity criteria. Moïse Jean-Charles, former senator and leader of the Pitit Dessalines party, is a critical political figure to track. Juno7 reported that Jean-Charles publicly rejected Core Group declarations regarding the electoral process, October 01, 2026 positioning himself as a nationalist-sovereignist critic of the internationally-guided transition framework. His public statement is consistent with a broader current within Haitian politics that views the internationally framed electoral process driven by what critics call Core Group direction as lacking national legitimacy. Whether Jean-Charles has registered as a presidential candidate with the CEP is not confirmed in available sourced material. He is treated here as a declared political actor and potential contender whose formal electoral status requires confirmation. Raoul Gérard, reported by Rezo Nòdwès on September 30, is a vocal proponent of the Aba Eleksyon Malatyong position opposition to what he characterizes as sham elections under current conditions. This represents a minority but organized civil society posture that could affect voter mobilization and post-election legitimacy claims. The 2026 electoral decree's introduction of eligibility criteria beyond constitutional minimums is historically significant. The Haitian Times noted on August 7 that these criteria reflect corruption concerns and the decade-long electoral hiatus. The practical enforcement of these criteria across all seven presidential candidates is a critical CEP vetting function that has not yet produced publicly reported decisions as of the brief date.

The October 2015 first-round election, held under Martelly's presidency, produced allegations of systematic fraud, protest-driven postponement, and an eventual annulled result a direct procedural and legitimacy precedent for 2026. The January 2015 dissolution of parliament, which left Martelly governing by decree, established that when elections fail, executive authority expands without legislative counterweight, a structural pattern directly relevant to any 2026 postponement scenario.

Seven registered presidential candidates as of September 23 is a factual baseline; the identities of six of the seven are not confirmed in available sourced material and should not be assumed until CEP publication of the validated candidate list. Martelly's candidacy under a new banner, with PHTK absent from the party registry, creates an institutional ambiguity his base of support may follow him personally, but his organizational infrastructure and legal vehicle for the race remain incompletely documented in sourced reporting. The absence of a clear sanctions-based disqualification mechanism in the electoral decree is a pre-programmed legitimacy flashpoint: if a sanctioned individual appears on the ballot and votes, international donor governments face a direct policy contradiction between supporting the electoral process and enforcing their own sanctions regimes. Moïse Jean-Charles's rejection of the Core Group framework, reported by Juno7, signals that the nationalist-sovereignist political space will contest the electoral process's legitimacy from outside rather than within the registered field a pattern that historically amplifies post-election dispute dynamics. The Aba Eleksyon Malatyong civil society current, though a minority position, is organized and vocal, and its messaging that a vote under current conditions lacks legitimacy could reduce turnout among populations already skeptical of transitional institutions. October 01, 2026 The extended candidate registration period and the seven-candidate total as of September 23 suggest the field may not be final; international actors should not treat the current lineup as closed until the CEP formally publishes its validated ballot list.

Embassy political sections and multilateral missions should formally request the CEP's published validated presidential candidate list once vetting is complete and cross-reference all candidates against current OFAC, Canadian, and EU sanctions lists, flagging any overlap for urgent legal and policy review. Governments whose nationals or foreign policy interests are affected by the sanctions-eligibility gap should communicate directly and formally to the CEP that the presence of sanctioned individuals on the ballot is incompatible with continued electoral process support funding. Journalists and researchers seeking to map the full seven-candidate presidential field should direct requests to the CEP's official publications portal and the Haitian Times, which has reported on the candidate registration period most consistently in available sourced material. Election observers planning their presidential race monitoring framework should build in scenario analysis for a contested result under the October 2015 precedent, including documentation protocols for first-round fraud allegations. Political actors advising the Fils-Aimé government should address the constitutional ambiguities flagged by Le National before candidate vetting is concluded, not after resolving decree interpretation disputes pre-election is operationally achievable; resolving them in a post-election court environment with no functioning judiciary is not. Moïse Jean-Charles and the nationalist-sovereignist space should be engaged directly by international missions seeking inclusive process buy-in their exclusion from the electoral framework, whether self-imposed or institutionally structured, will be cited as a legitimacy deficit regardless of results. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

The 2026 elections represent Haiti's first full general election since 2016, contesting all Senate seats, all Chamber of Deputies seats, and all local and municipal offices simultaneously with the presidential race. The Haitian parliament has been non-functional since January 2020, when the last remaining senators' terms expired without replacements elected. This six-year vacancy means that the entire post-election institutional architecture parliamentary oversight, budget approval, treaty ratification depends on a clean legislative election in which results are accepted and new members seated without sustained legal challenge. The stakes of the down-ballot races are therefore not merely political; they are constitutional. October 01, 2026 The most specifically documented down-ballot candidacy in available sourced material is that of Jean-David Génesté, former deputy, who announced his candidacy for a Senate seat representing the Sud Department. Rezo Nòdwès reported on September 27 that Génesté is running under the Ayiti Transfòme platform, described as a coalition of more than ten political formations. His CEP registration has been confirmed. Génesté's candidacy illustrates the multi-party coalition dynamics that are emerging at the departmental level in the absence of dominant party infrastructure. No other individual legislative candidacy is named and sourced in the available research data. The 162 or more parliamentary candidacies reported by the Haitian Times as of September 23 represent a broad field, but individual candidate-level data for the majority of races is not available in sourced material as of the brief date. The 105 political groups that received ballot numbers for the December vote, reported by RTV Chaïti, and the CEP's accreditation of 282 of 320 registered parties on March 26, reflect a fragmented multi-party landscape in which no single formation appears capable of controlling either chamber without coalition agreements. PHTK's absence from the participating party list is significant not only for the presidential race but for legislative contests as well: Martelly-aligned parliamentary candidates who previously ran under PHTK will need alternative party vehicles, and the coherence of any Martelly-aligned legislative bloc is uncertain. Municipal elections are sequenced to the second-round date of February 21, 2027, not December 13. This sequencing means that mayoral races in Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, and Miragoâne are on a different operational timeline from the presidential and legislative votes. No specific mayoral candidate declarations for any of these cities are confirmed in available sourced material as of the brief date. AYITI INTEL does not infer or speculate on likely candidates in these races. The February 21 local election date is, however, even more operationally vulnerable than December 13: it follows a first round whose security and logistical outcomes are unknown, and it encompasses local government in areas where gang territorial control extends beyond Port-au-Prince into Artibonite and Centre departments. Non-candidate power-brokers shaping outcomes deserve explicit identification. The CPT, dissolved February 7, 2026, introduced major additions to the CEP's decree before its publication meaning former CPT members retain residual influence over the legal framework of the vote even after their formal dissolution. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, as transitional executive authority holder, controls the security and resource environment in which the CEP operates; his cooperation is a structural precondition for any election, and his stated commitment to elections as the non-negotiable terminus of the transition is the official posture that disciplines the institutional calendar. Raina Forbin, as Foreign Minister, is managing the international relations dimension of electoral support, including the GSF mandate renewal advocacy at the OAS and UN. André Jonas Vladimir Paraison, as HNP Chief, is the operational security counterpart to the GSF and his force's capacity in departments outside Port-au-Prince is a direct determinant of polling station access. At the party level, the fragmented 105-group field means that financiers and coalition brokers operating below the public-declaration threshold are shaping legislative lists in ways that sourced reporting has not yet captured. The gang control picture has electoral consequences beyond the Ouest Department. Haiti Policy House and Rio Times Online report gang expansion into Artibonite and Centre departments, creating displacement and instability that reduces the reachable electorate even in departments nominally open for registration. Artibonite, historically significant both as an agricultural hub and as the site of the 2004 Cannibal Army seizure of Gonaïves that triggered the Aristide government's collapse, is a department where the electoral environment is deteriorating rather than stabilizing. October 01, 2026

The Cannibal Army seizure of Gonaïves in February 2004, cited in the historical pattern record, is a direct antecedent to Artibonite's current instability, demonstrating that armed group control of provincial centers not only the capital is sufficient to disrupt national political processes. The October 2015 elections produced contested results that led to annulment, establishing that down-ballot fraud allegations in legislative races can cascade into presidential result disputes and full electoral cycle collapse.

The six-year parliamentary vacancy means legislative election outcomes carry institutional weight beyond normal down-ballot races; a disputed legislative result would not merely disrupt parliament but would leave Haiti without any legitimate legislative body and extend the constitutional crisis. Jean-David Génesté's Ayiti Transfòme coalition model aggregating ten or more formations under a single platform may be the organizational template for competitive legislative races across departments, given the fragmented party landscape and PHTK's absence from the registry. The sequencing of municipal elections to February 21 creates a two-stage operational requirement; observer and security planning that addresses only December 13 is incomplete, as local government races in gang-affected municipalities will require a separate security assessment at a later date. Artibonite Department's deteriorating security environment, under the gang-expansion trend reported by Haiti Policy House and Rio Times Online, represents a replication of the Gonaïves instability pattern documented since 2004, and should be treated as a second electoral vulnerability zone after the Ouest Department. The non-public influence of CPT former members over the decree's legal framework, and of financiers and coalition brokers over legislative lists, is an opacity risk that could produce post-election challenges to candidate eligibility and result authenticity that sourced reporting has not yet surfaced. No mayoral candidate data is available for any of the ten major cities as of October 1; missions and observers planning local-race monitoring frameworks should identify local-outlet monitoring priorities in Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, and Les Cayes as first-tier information gaps to close.

Observer missions should treat the 162-plus parliamentary candidates as an urgent mapping priority, directing requests to Le Nouvelliste, Juno7, and Rezo Nòdwès the local outlets most consistently covering departmental-level political developments to build a candidate database before CEP validation concludes. Missions with economic development mandates should assess the Artibonite security deterioration as an electoral and agricultural supply-chain dual risk, given the department's role in Haitian food production and the gang-expansion trend documented in available sourcing. Investors and businesses should not plan for operational normalcy in Port-au-Prince through the February 21 second round; the municipal election sequencing means elevated political uncertainty extends through at least October 01, 2026 Q1 2027. Journalists covering the down-ballot field should prioritize direct sourcing from Rezo Nòdwès and Radio Kiskeya for departmental-level reporting, and from AlterPresse for civil society and party-level coalition analysis, as these outlets have the deepest provincial networks in available sourced material. International missions engaged in election assistance should press the CEP to publish a department-by-department breakdown of registration enrollment figures on or immediately after October 13, as this data is essential for assessing the geographic representativeness of any December 13 vote before the security threshold determination is made. The February 21 municipal election date should be treated as a separate planning horizon from December 13 observer, security, and logistical support for local races will require reassessment after first-round outcomes are known, and should not be assumed to follow automatically from any December 13 operational framework. CONFIDENCE Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

The October 13 voter registration deadline is twelve days out. Any CEP announcement of emergency extension of registration in the Ouest Department, or any reversal of the Ouest exclusion, would be the most consequential immediate development and should be treated as a lead indicator to monitor through Le Nouvelliste, Haitian Times, and the CEP's official site. Absent such an announcement, the approaching deadline should be treated as a closing-window signal requiring immediate documentation of the Ouest exclusion as a structural feature of the electoral roll. Any new presidential candidacy declaration or CEP disqualification ruling in this window should be captured immediately, given the proximity to the registration close.

The CEP candidate vetting process specifically, eligibility rulings on the registered presidential and parliamentary candidates under the June 2 decree's administrative, financial, and integrity criteria is the most important institutional development to track between now and mid-October. Any ruling touching a sanctioned individual will generate immediate international attention. The UN Security Council's posture on GSF mandate renewal is approaching a decision-forcing moment; any indication of delay, opposition, or conditionality from Security Council members should be elevated to alert status for all missions tracking electoral feasibility. Coalition consolidation talks at the legislative level, particularly in departments like Sud, Artibonite, and Nord where competitive multi-formation alliances are forming, should be monitored through Rezo Nòdwès, Juno7, and Radio Métropole. Diaspora voting modality decisions whether the CEP will establish overseas Centres d'Inscription et de Vote before October 13 are a this-week decision that will either close or preserve diaspora participation.

October 01, 2026 The realistic path to a December 13 credible vote requires, at minimum, four conditions to be met between now and mid-November: full GSF mandate renewal with an operational deployment surge into Port-au-Prince neighborhoods sufficient to open polling stations; a formal security assessment by the CEP determining the acceptable climate threshold is met; resolution of the Ouest Department registration gap through a supplementary enrollment mechanism; and legal clarity on decree ambiguities before results are challenged in court. None of these four conditions are close to being met as of October 1. Haiti Policy House's June 2027 fallback scenario is the analytically better-supported trajectory. If postponement is announced, the critical variables will be: whether a new date is credibly resourced and internationally backed; whether the transitional executive authority under PM Fils-Aimé retains the legal and political legitimacy to govern through a further six-to-eight month delay; and whether sanctioned-candidate and constitutional-ambiguity disputes are resolved in the additional time or compound into a deeper pre-election crisis. The October 2015 precedent where a contested first round produced annulment and re-run rather than a settled transfer of power remains the most direct historical warning for the scenario in which elections are held but results are immediately challenged, an outcome Le National's October 2026 tribune explicitly identifies as a risk even in the event of a technically successful vote.

Le Nouvelliste (lenouvelliste.com) Electoral calendar reporting, November 2025 and subsequent; June 2 decree reporting CEP Haiti official site (cephaiti.ht) Electoral calendar; party registry published March 26, 2026; voter registration operations; candidate registration data; Canadian diaspora meeting notice, August 31, 2026 Reuters Foreign Minister Forbin OAS statement, September 3, 2026 UN News (news.un.org) PM Fils-Aimé UN speech, September 24, 2026; BINUH electoral support reporting OAS joint statement Advancing Security While Sustaining Preparations for Credible Elections, September 2026 RFI (rfi.fr) Sanctioned candidates eligibility reporting, August 6, 2026 Le National (lenational.ht) Voter registration coverage, July 2026; October 2026 tribune on constitutional crisis risk AlterPresse (alterpresse.org) Civil society and political process reporting Juno7 (juno7.ht) Moïse Jean-Charles rejection of Core Group declarations Rezo Nòdwès (rezondwès.com) Jean-David Génesté Senate candidacy, September 27, 2026; Raoul Gérard Aba Eleksyon Malatyong reporting, September 30, 2026 Haiti Policy House (haitipolicyhouse.org) Election Tracker, updated September 29, 2026; 10% probability assessment; Ouest exclusion confirmation; PHTK registry absence confirmation Haitian Times (haitiantimes.com) Seven presidential candidates report, September 23, 2026; electoral decree eligibility explainer, August 7, 2026; 162-plus parliamentary candidacies report, September 23, 2026 October 01, 2026