Daily Elections Bulletin

With 94 days to the 13 December 2026 first round, Haiti's electoral process is nominally advancing on procedural milestones while structurally deteriorating on the conditions that make a credible vote possible. Voter enrollment stands at 506,953 roughly 12.7 percent of the stated four-million target with the extended deadline of 13 October approaching. The Ouest Department, home to an estimated 34 percent of Haiti's population, operates only 10 registration centers in gang-adjacent zones. The candidate registration deadline has been extended to 14 October, and the eligibility of sanctioned political figures remains formally unresolved by the CEP. The actionable insight: international actors publicly backing the December timeline have not specified how voting will function in gang-controlled territory. A voter enrollment figure below 1.5 million after 13 October will constitute a threshold crisis requiring mission-level contingency planning.

The CEP has revised its first-round date to 13 December 2026 following a March arrêté; voter enrollment is critically below target 32 days before the extended registration deadline. The presidential field is taking shape among 105 registered formations, but no major declared presidential candidacy has been publicly attributed to a named individual with CEP-confirmed registration as of this brief's date. The Viktwa coalition launched in Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026, claiming 52 affiliated parties and signaling an organized northern political bloc independent of Port-au-Prince dynamics. The figure to watch is CEP President or lead commissioner: any ruling on sanctioned-candidates eligibility in the coming two to four weeks will be the single most consequential institutional act before the October deadline. The central risk is not a single event but a compound failure: gang control of Port-au-Prince at up to 90 percent combined with 1.47 million internally displaced persons effectively guarantees that a significant portion of Haiti's population cannot access registration or polling centers under current conditions.

The CEP's original calendar, as reported by Le Nouvelliste in late 2025, targeted 30 August 2026 as the first-round election date for simultaneous municipal, legislative, and presidential races Haiti's first general election since 2016. A Council of Ministers arrêté dated 20 March 2026 modified the CEP's mandate, requiring alignment with Articles 12 and 14 of the National Stability Pact, which govern limited constitutional adjustments and electoral law parameters. The CEP announced delays in voter and candidate registration operations in April 2026, citing security and logistical constraints, and the revised calendar now targets 13 December 2026 for the first round. The CEP confirmed this calendar to Canada's chargé d'affaires Jacob Gateau at a 21 April meeting described by Le Nouvelliste as covering calendar adjustment and harmonization of the electoral decree with the governance pact. September 11, 2026 Voter registration launched 20 July 2026 in nine of ten departments, with Ouest explicitly excluded due to security constraints, according to CEP press releases reported by HaitiLibre and Juno7.ht. Registration in Ouest began in restricted form on 30 July 2026, operating from only 10 Centers for Registration and Voting in Pétion-ville, Delmas, and Tabarre three of Port-au-Prince's relatively more accessible communes. As of 6 September 2026, the CEP reports 506,953 registered voters. Rezo Nòdwès analysts publicly noted this figure against a four-million target represents a critically incomplete exercise. The extended registration deadline of 13 October gives approximately 32 days from the date of this brief to add roughly 3.5 million additional enrollments at the current pace a mathematical near-impossibility absent a rapid logistical expansion into areas currently inaccessible due to gang control. The candidate registration deadline has similarly been extended to 14 October 2026. The June 2 electoral decree, described by the Haitian Times on 7 August as reflecting the extraordinary circumstances of the decade-long electoral hiatus, adds administrative, financial, and integrity criteria for presidential candidates beyond constitutional minimums. The CEP registered 282 parties and platforms through a March 2026 process; a 14 August deadline required consolidation into coalitions to reduce ballot fragmentation; and 105 formations received official numbers for the December ballot, published around 20 August 2026. The CEP has publicly reaffirmed commitment to an inclusive, impartial, and transparent process, and PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé stated publicly that elections will happen and that their success is a historic and collective responsibility, as reported by multiple Haitian outlets. Security conditions constitute the dominant feasibility variable. IOM estimates 1.47 million internally displaced persons in Haiti as of May 2026, with Port-au-Prince as the primary origin zone. Gang control is estimated at up to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince metro, per the Haiti Policy House Tracker. Gang expansion into Artibonite and Centre departments has further complicated logistics. The Gang Suppression Force, operating under MSS authorization, deployed Sri Lankan personnel to Gonaïves by sea in August 2026, and a Bangladeshi naval unit has been authorized to patrol the Bay of Port-au-Prince with vessel boarding authority, per Caribbean National Weekly and UN Security Council records. The UN Secretary-General's report to the Security Council, document S/2026/574, filed by BINUH under Carlos Ruiz Massieu, simultaneously acknowledges persistent insecurity, acute humanitarian needs, and institutional challenges. No international actor has publicly specified operational plans for voting in gang-controlled zones. Civil society grouping EDE renewed criticism of the CEP calendar on 3 September 2026, per Gazette Haïti, arguing the timeline is structurally unrealistic. Political scientist Joseph Harold Pierre expressed skepticism publicly about elections occurring before year-end 2026. The Rio Times assessment characterizes the December second round as existing on paper only. The Canning House assessment concludes that even if a president is elected, effective governance may remain elusive unless gangs are weakened materially.

Haiti's 2015 first-round election was followed by fraud allegations, a contested annulment process, and a re-run demonstrating that a procedurally thin first round under inadequate observation produces protest and postponement rather than settled transfer of power, a pattern directly relevant to any December vote conducted under enrollment figures below credible thresholds. Parliament was dissolved in January 2015 when Martelly governed by decree, establishing the template that executive authorities governing without a legislature hand-pick their own electoral council the same legitimacy deficit the Fils-Aimé government and its CEP carry into September 11, 2026 2026. Haiti has not held a general election since 2016, meaning that every institutional and logistical capacity required to execute a national vote must be rebuilt from a decade of atrophy.

Voter enrollment at 12.7 percent of target 32 days before the extended deadline is not a gap that can be closed through administrative adjustment alone it requires secure physical access to registration centers that does not currently exist in most of Port-au-Prince. The 10-center restriction in Ouest Department means that Haiti's most populous department containing the capital and approximately 34 percent of the national population is operating electoral infrastructure adequate for a municipal election in a mid-sized provincial town, not a national vote. The CEP's procedural compliance with its own revised calendar 105 formations registered, candidate deadline extended provides a legitimate narrative of institutional progress that obscures the divergence between process compliance and substantive electoral viability. The GSF's deployment to Gonaïves is a logistically relevant but quantitatively insufficient security response: Artibonite Department's population exceeds 1.7 million, and gang displacement of populations continues across that department. International actors' unanimous public support for the December date without publicly specified operational plans for gang-controlled zones creates a credibility gap that will become acute if enrollment does not materially improve by 13 October. PHTK's absence from the 105 registered formations removes the party that dominated Haitian electoral politics from 2011 to 2021, meaning the political field for 2026 is structurally unlike any prior Haitian election in the modern period.

Missions should establish an internal threshold: if voter enrollment does not reach a minimum of 1.5 million registered voters by 13 October 2026, treat the December timeline as a scenario requiring a formal contingency review rather than a default operational plan. Election observer missions should conduct a security-access mapping exercise before end of September to identify which communes in each of Haiti's 10 departments can realistically receive and protect polling stations this assessment should be shared with CEP and GSF command. BINUH and OAS missions should formally request from the CEP a public projection of the number of functional polling stations it expects to operate on 13 December, disaggregated by department, so that coverage gaps can be assessed against enrollment data. Journalists and researchers should submit CEP information requests regarding the criteria and process by which the 105 approved formations were selected from 316 registrants, to assess whether exclusions were procedurally grounded or politically influenced. September 11, 2026 Investor-side analysts should treat any announcement of a CEP postponement after 15 November as a trigger for a Haiti political risk reassessment, given that postponement after that date makes a February 2027 inauguration mathematically impossible. Diaspora-focused organizations should confirm directly with the CEP whether overseas voting mechanisms exist for 2026, as the research data does not confirm this, and disseminate that information to diaspora communities before the candidate registration deadline. CONFIDENCE Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

As of 11 September 2026, no major declared presidential candidacy has been publicly attributed to a named individual with confirmed CEP registration in the sourced research data available to this brief. The candidate registration deadline has been extended to 14 October 2026, meaning the formal presidential field is not yet closed or fully visible. What the research data establishes is the party and coalition landscape within which presidential candidates will emerge, declared intentions where credibly reported, and the structural factors shaping who can credibly compete. The 105 formations receiving official numbers for the December ballot, as published by the CEP around 20 August 2026 and confirmed by the Haiti Policy House Tracker and Wikipedia's 2026 Haitian general election tracker, include several notable political formations. OPL, the Organisation du Peuple en Lutte, is among participating formations and is associated with Edgard Leblanc Fils, who served as CPT chair and represents the transitional establishment wing of Haitian politics. Fanmi Lavalas, the party historically associated with Jean-Bertrand Aristide, is represented by Maryse Narcisse, who ran as the party's presidential candidate in 2015 and 2016 and represents the Lavalas constituency. Haiti in Action, associated with the AAA platform and former Senate president Youri Latortue of Artibonite, is listed as a participating formation. Inite-LAPEH, associated with Fritz Jean, a former central bank governor and presidential contender in prior cycles, is also listed. These attributions come from the Wikipedia tracker and Haiti Policy House Tracker and should be treated as credibly reported party affiliations, not confirmed presidential candidacies. The most significant structural development in the presidential field is the absence of PHTK, the Haitian Tèt Kale Party associated with Michel Martelly and the late Jovenel Moïse. The Haiti Policy House Tracker confirms PHTK is absent from participating parties and groupings. PHTK dominated Haitian electoral politics from 2011 through Moïse's assassination in July 2021, and its constituency is historically estimated at 20 to 25 percent of the active electorate. That bloc is currently unattached and represents the largest available political constituency for 2026 contenders. Whether any registered formation is actively courting PHTK-aligned voters, and whether any PHTK-affiliated figure is operating inside another registered coalition, is not confirmed in available sourced data and warrants monitoring. The Viktwa coalition launched publicly in Cap-Haïtien on 29 August 2026, claiming 52 affiliated parties and September 11, 2026 structures, as reported by Juno7.ht and referenced in the Haiti Policy House Tracker. The northern launch location is analytically significant: it signals that Viktwa is positioning itself explicitly as a northern political consolidation rather than a Port-au-Prince-centered formation. The North and Northeast historically produce competitive electoral dynamics distinct from metropolitan politics, and a coalition credibly claiming 52 affiliates in that region would represent a meaningful organizational base. Viktwa's presidential candidate, if one is formally declared before 14 October, would enter the race with a potentially differentiated northern geography and multiparty organizational structure. The research data does not identify a named presidential candidate for Viktwa as of this brief's date. The unresolved sanctioned-candidates eligibility question is the most consequential pending decision affecting the presidential field. RFI reported on 6 August 2026 that whether candidates under international sanctions US OFAC, Canadian, and EU may participate remains formally undecided by the CEP. The Haitian Times confirmed on 7 August that the electoral decree reflects extraordinary circumstances including international sanctions against several political and economic figures. The Baker McKenzie sanctions blog and the Canadian government consolidated list, updated 12 June 2026, confirm that former Senate president Youri Latortue is listed on both US OFAC and Canadian sanctions lists under Executive Order 14059 on narcotics trafficking. Joseph Lambert is similarly listed. The EU renewed its Haiti sanctions regime on 29 June 2026, extending through 31 July 2027. A CEP ruling excluding sanctioned candidates would directly affect the Haiti in Action formation associated with Latortue and potentially others. A ruling permitting participation would generate political reactions from international partners, given that the same partners are publicly financing the electoral process. AYITI INTEL ASSESSMENT: The presidential field will not be analytically legible until the CEP publishes provisional candidate lists, expected in late October 2026. Until that point, the sanctioned-candidates ruling is the single highest-stakes decision shaping who competes. If the CEP excludes Latortue and other sanctioned figures, the coalition math for northern and Artibonite-based formations shifts significantly. If the CEP permits participation, expect formal diplomatic protests from the United States, Canada, and the European Union that will complicate international funding for the electoral operation itself. Neither outcome is without severe consequence for the political process. This assessment is AYITI INTEL's own analytical read, distinct from sourced fact.

Haiti's 2015 election produced fraud allegations centered on a contested first round under thin international observation, followed by a re-run that still failed to produce a broadly legitimate transfer of power a pattern that becomes more likely, not less, when the candidate field contains figures with unresolved legal and sanctions controversies. The January 2015 dissolution of parliament, which left Martelly governing by decree with an appointed CEP, established that Haitian executive authorities governing without elected oversight select their own electoral referees the same structural legitimacy deficit the Fils-Aimé government carries into its management of the CEP relationship.

The presidential field is structurally open: with candidate registration extended to 14 October and no major candidacy confirmed in sourced data, the race is not yet defined and significant late entries are possible. PHTK's absence is not merely a party subtraction it is a political market opening. The formation that captures PHTK-aligned voters, estimated at 20 to 25 percent of the historically active electorate, will have a structural September 11, 2026 advantage in any multi-candidate first round. Viktwa's northern launch is the most organizationally significant coalition move reported to date. A credible northern coalition capable of delivering votes in Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, and the Artibonite represents a potentially decisive geographic bloc in a fragmented field. The Fanmi Lavalas participation through Maryse Narcisse reconnects the 2026 race to Haiti's longest-running political cleavage the Lavalas versus anti-Lavalas dynamic that has structured competitive politics since Aristide's return in 1994. The sanctioned-candidates ruling is a binary that reshapes coalition dynamics regardless of which way it goes; there is no neutral outcome available to the CEP on this question. International financing of the electoral process creates a structural contradiction: the same governments whose sanctions lists may disqualify candidates are the governments funding the CEP's operations, making any pro-participation ruling by the CEP politically combustible.

Diplomatic missions should formally request a CEP briefing on the timeline for the sanctioned-candidates eligibility ruling before the 14 October deadline, and prepare demarche options for both inclusion and exclusion outcomes. Political analysts embedded in Haiti should be tasked immediately with mapping which registered formations are actively courting PHTK-aligned voters and whether any former PHTK official is operating within an approved coalition under a different party identity. Journalists covering the presidential field should treat the late October provisional candidate list publication as the primary reporting event of the pre-election period and prepare profiles of all formation heads with party affiliations, eligibility status, and geographic base. Observer missions should document the Viktwa coalition's organizational structure and claimed 52-party membership before the candidate deadline, requesting the CEP's records on Viktwa's registered affiliate parties. Investor analysts tracking political risk should model two scenarios through year-end: a fragmented multi-candidate first round with no majority winner, and a CEP-imposed candidate exclusion that produces a legitimacy dispute before voting begins. CONFIDENCE Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

September 11, 2026 The 13 December 2026 ballot is designed as a simultaneous multi-office election: presidential, all Senate seats, all Chamber of Deputies seats, and local and municipal offices including mayoral races in Haiti's major cities. This is an extraordinarily complex simultaneous ballot for an electoral infrastructure that has not been exercised since 2016 and is operating under the security and enrollment constraints documented above. Down-ballot races in Haiti have historically been as consequential as the presidential contest for distributing political patronage, local governance authority, and factional power. The absence of an elected legislature since 2020 means that all 30 Senate seats and all 119 Chamber of Deputies seats are simultaneously open, creating a legislative reconstitution rather than a standard midterm cycle. In terms of named political figures with confirmed party affiliations relevant to down-ballot dynamics, the research data identifies several power-brokers whose influence extends beyond any single race. Youri Latortue, former Senate president, represents Haiti in Action and the AAA platform with his political base in Saint-Marc and the Artibonite Department. His sanctions status listed on US OFAC and Canadian lists under Executive Order 14059 creates a dual dynamic: if he is eligible to compete, he brings established organizational capacity in a department where the GSF is currently operating; if he is excluded, his network remains politically active regardless of his formal participation. Le Nouvelliste has covered Latortue's political activities extensively across prior electoral cycles, and his Artibonite base is among the most durable regional political machines in Haiti. Fritz Jean, associated with Inite-LAPEH, brings a technocratic political profile as a former Banque de la République d'Haïti governor. His formation is listed among the 105 approved formations. Edgard Leblanc Fils, OPL's representative, carries the institutional credibility of having chaired the CPT through its dissolution in February 2026, giving his formation a direct link to the transitional authority narrative. Maryse Narcisse and Fanmi Lavalas bring the organizational reach of the Lavalas network into the down-ballot races, particularly in popular urban neighborhoods where Lavalas has historically maintained mobilization capacity despite years of political marginalization. On main-city mayoral races, the research data does not provide specific declared candidates for Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, Gonaïves, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Jérémie, Port-de-Paix, Fort-Liberté, Hinche, or Miragoâne as of this brief's date. Candidate registration does not close until 14 October 2026, and local candidacy declarations in Haiti are typically the last to be publicly confirmed. What the structural data establishes is that mayoral races in Cap-Haïtien and the northern departments will be shaped significantly by the Viktwa coalition's organizational mobilization following its 29 August launch. A coalition claiming 52 affiliated parties that launched in Cap-Haïtien should be assessed as the dominant organizational player in northern mayoral contests unless counter-coalition activity is documented before 14 October. The Port-au-Prince mayoral race presents the starkest feasibility question of any contest on the December ballot. Gang control of up to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince means that a majority of the municipality's geographic area and residential population is inaccessible for standard electoral operations. IOM's 1.47 million IDP estimate as of May 2026 reflects a city whose civic infrastructure has been structurally disrupted. Any candidate for mayor of Port-au-Prince who does not have explicit or implicit accommodation with armed group territorial authorities or who is not protected by an active security envelope is effectively unable to campaign in most of the city. The research data does not identify any named Port-au-Prince mayoral candidate, and AYITI INTEL assesses that the Port-au-Prince mayoral race may be the contest most likely to be suspended, restricted to a subset of accessible communes, or run with de facto candidate suppression through security conditions. This assessment is AYITI INTEL's own analytical read, distinct from sourced fact. September 11, 2026 The Gonaïves mayoral race carries additional salience because of the GSF's Sri Lankan component deployment to that city in August 2026. If GSF operations produce measurable security gains in Gonaïves before October, the mayoral race there may be among the more credibly executable local contests making it an early bellwether for whether the MSS mission can create the conditions it was mandated to produce. The Artibonite Department more broadly is the critical electoral test case for the GSF's operational relevance to the December vote.

The 2004 Cannibal Army seizure of Gonaïves, led by Buteur Métayer, established the precedent that Artibonite armed groups use elections and transitional moments as leverage points a pattern that Viv Ansanm replicated at a far larger scale with its February 2024 Port-au-Prince offensive. The structural dynamic armed groups disrupting electoral operations in Artibonite and the capital to extract political concessions is not new to 2026; it is a generational pattern. Down-ballot races in Artibonite have historically been among the most contested and most fraud-affected in Haitian electoral history, reflecting the department's strategic importance as Haiti's agricultural heartland and the Route Nationale 1 corridor's role as the national logistics spine.

The simultaneous reconstitution of a full legislature plus presidential plus municipal ballot is without recent precedent in terms of logistical scale; Haiti's last general election was a decade ago and institutional electoral memory has been severely degraded. The Viktwa coalition's 52-party claim in the North positions it as a potential northern political hegemon in both legislative and mayoral contests, but that claim requires verification against CEP registration records before it can be treated as an operational organizational fact. Artibonite's down-ballot races are the geographic intersection of the most active GSF security operation and the most politically entrenched regional power broker in Youri Latortue making that department the single most consequential sub-national political theater in the 2026 cycle. Port-au-Prince mayoral viability is inseparable from security conditions: a mayor elected through a vote accessible to only the fraction of the population in gang-adjacent rather than gang-controlled zones carries a structural legitimacy deficit before taking office. Lavalas's participation through Fanmi Lavalas brings the movement's popular urban base into legislative and local races where neighborhood-level mobilization rather than national campaign infrastructure is the competitive asset, partially insulating Lavalas candidates from the capital's physical inaccessibility. The absence of any elected legislature since 2020 means that every one of the 149 legislative seats on the December ballot is simultaneously a patronage opening and a governance stake, making the legislative races not just the presidential race the central prize for established political networks.

Observer missions should prioritize staffing for Artibonite Department legislative and mayoral races as the highest-risk, highest-significance down-ballot theater, given the intersection of GSF operations, gang September 11, 2026 displacement, and sanctioned-figure political networks. Journalists should request from the CEP the full list of approved formations and their designated geographic footprint to map which parties are competing in which departments, and cross-reference that against IDP displacement patterns to assess representational gaps. Missions engaged with GSF command should formally request an operational milestone assessment for Gonaïves and Artibonite security normalization before 1 November 2026 the date by which polling station logistics must begin in earnest. Haiti-based civil society organizations with access to gang-adjacent communities should be engaged as the primary sources of on-the-ground intelligence on whether local candidates are operating, campaigning, or being intimidated in their areas of operation. Investors with Artibonite agricultural or logistics exposure should monitor whether GSF operations on Route Nationale 1 produce gang retaliation activity in October and November, as that corridor is both the primary northern logistics artery and the primary theater of GSF-gang contact. Political researchers should begin constructing a baseline mapping of the 30 Senate districts and 119 deputy constituencies against the current IDP displacement map to identify which electoral districts have populations geographically separated from their registered voting locations a condition that will affect both turnout and result legitimacy. CONFIDENCE Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

Monitor for any CEP press release or formal communication regarding a preliminary ruling on sanctioned-candidates eligibility. RFI's 6 August reporting established this question as unresolved; any CEP movement on this question before the 14 October deadline will be signaled through CEP official releases and major Haitian outlets including Le Nouvelliste and Radio Métropole. Monitor Gazette Haïti and Juno7.ht for reporting on the CARICOM delegation visit referenced as imminent in the 3 September reporting its agenda and any outcome statement will be the clearest international signal of whether major partners are privately preparing a delay scenario. Monitor AlterPresse and Radio Kiskeya for civil society responses to the 6 September enrollment figure, as EDE's 3 September criticism of the CEP calendar is the leading indicator of organized civil society opposition to the timeline.

Track whether any major political formation announces a named presidential candidate ahead of the 14 October deadline. The window between 11 September and 14 October is the critical candidacy-declaration period, and any declaration by a nationally recognized figure will significantly reshape the political landscape documented in September 11, 2026 this brief. Monitor Rezo Nòdwès and Haïti Libre for updated voter enrollment data from the CEP any enrollment acceleration above 50,000 new registrants per day would be analytically significant as it would indicate a logistics breakthrough in Ouest or other restricted departments. Track GSF Artibonite operational reporting through Caribbean National Weekly and UN Security Council communications for any confirmed engagement with gang structures in the Gonaïves-Saint-Marc corridor that would bear on the Artibonite electoral access question.

The 13 October voter registration deadline is the first definitive feasibility signal. A final enrollment figure below 1.5 million should trigger immediate mission-level contingency planning for a post-December political vacuum. The 14 October candidate registration deadline closes the field; the late October provisional candidate list publication is the next major analytical event. If the CEP issues a sanctioned-candidates exclusion ruling in that window, expect legal challenges and potential coalition fractures within days. November 2026 is the realistic decision window for any international call for postponement after mid-November, postponing the first round past December makes a February 2027 inauguration impossible without compressing second-round and transition timelines to a degree that would itself generate a legitimacy crisis. The realistic path to a credible vote requires: voter enrollment reaching at minimum 1.5 to 2 million by 13 October, GSF producing measurable security gains in at least Gonaïves and northern Artibonite before 1 November, the sanctioned-candidates question resolved without fracturing the coalition landscape, and the CEP operating polling stations in a sufficient number of Ouest communes to give the capital's population meaningful access. Each of these conditions is currently unmet. Failure on more than two simultaneously makes a credible December vote implausible under any reasonable definition of electoral integrity.

Le Nouvelliste cep-haiti.org/elections coverage, multiple articles, March through September 2026, electoral calendar, candidate registration, CEP institutional reporting. Gazette Haïti civil society criticism of CEP calendar, 3 September 2026; CARICOM delegation reporting. Haiti Policy House Tracker party and coalition registration, PHTK absence confirmation, electoral calendar tracking. HaitiLibre voter registration operational coverage, July through August 2026; CEP press release reporting. CEP Haiti official site voter registration figures, party registration lists, August 2026 formation numbers publication. UN Press SC16417 and document S/2026/574 BINUH mission briefing, security conditions, institutional challenges. OAS Press Release E-016/26 2 February 2026 consultative meeting statement; 19 August 2026 High-Level Delegation statement. Le Monde and AFP CPT-to-Fils-Aimé authority transfer, 7 February 2026. RFI sanctioned-candidates eligibility reporting, 6 August 2026; CPT dissolution reporting, 6 February 2026. Juno7.ht voter registration enrollment figures, 6 September 2026; coalition formation coverage, August 2026. Rezo Nòdwès voter enrollment analysis, September 2026; regional political reporting. AlterPresse civil society and political analysis coverage, ongoing. September 11, 2026