2026-09-25 · Daily
2026-09-24 · Daily
2026-09-24 · Daily
2026-09-25 — DAILY INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
AYITI INTEL Daily — 2026-09-25
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Haiti's transition government under PM Alix Didier Fils-Aimé enters its most consequential 90-day
window as three compounding crises converge: the Gang Suppression Force remains critically
under-deployed at roughly 18 percent of authorized strength while gangs expand beyond
Port-au-Prince into agricultural zones; the electoral calendar is under logistical stress with voter
registration closing October 13 and candidate filing already requiring extension; and the August 4
TPS termination removes legal status from approximately 350,000 diaspora Haitians whose
remittances sustain the domestic economy. The actionable insight for all stakeholders is that
Cap-Haïtien remains the only viable operational entry point into Haiti through at least March 2027.
QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS
GSF at 18 percent of authorized strength is the single most dangerous variable before December 13
elections.
Voter registration closes October 13; low uptake in gang-controlled zones directly threatens electoral
legitimacy.
TPS termination is final as of August 4; 350,000 Haitians have lost legal status and EADs expired
July 27.
FAA flight ban over Port-au-Prince runs through March 2, 2027; Cap-Haïtien is the only viable air
entry point.
HOPE/HELP extended through approximately 2028 but Section 122 surcharges create
irreconcilable planning signals for garment sector investors.
DEVELOPMENT 1: GSF DEPLOYMENT CRISIS AND THE SECURITY GAP BEFORE ELECTIONS ANALYTICAL BODY
The Gang Suppression Force, authorized by UNSCR 2793 on September 30, 2025, with a ceiling of
5,550 police and military officers, remains operational at approximately 1,000 personnel as of the
current reporting period. That figure represents roughly 18 percent of authorized strength. The
Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission completed its final withdrawal on April 27, 2026,
following the Bahamas Royal Bahamas Defence Force third contingent departure on March 13,
2026. The MSS-to-GSF transition was doctrinal as well as structural: where the MSS was mandated
primarily to support and t
2026-09-24 — DAILY INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
AYITI INTEL Daily — 2026-09-24
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Haiti's Provisional Electoral Council has set 13 December 2026 as the first-round date for the
country's first general elections in over a decade, with 7 presidential candidacies, approximately 162
Senate filings, and 205 deputy filings recorded as of 21 September. The physical candidate filing
window closed 22 September, triggering the CEP's eligibility review the single most consequential
near-term decision point. Voter registration is running well below Haiti's known electoral population,
the Ouest Department remains only partially integrated, and the CEP has explicitly conditioned the
calendar on security and financing not yet confirmed as secured. The actionable insight: the October
candidate validation window will determine whether the December date survives or generates a
legitimacy crisis that forces postponement.
QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS
CEP CALENDAR AND STATUS: Round 1 set for 13 December 2026; Round 2 21 February 2027.
Calendar officially conditioned on security and financing. 105 political groupings hold ballot numbers.
Voter registration runs through 13 October.
TOP PRESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT: Seven presidential candidacies formally registered as of 21
September, with identities not yet fully published by the CEP. The sanctioned-candidate eligibility
question, flagged explicitly by the OAS Secretary General, is unresolved.
NOTABLE DOWN-BALLOT MOVE: The Viktwa coalition, launched 29 August in Cap-Haïtien with
claims of 52 affiliated parties and structures, is attempting to consolidate northern Haiti as a distinct
political bloc ahead of Senate and deputy races.
KEY FIGURE TO WATCH: CEP institutional authority over candidate vetting. Early October
publication of validated and rejected candidate lists will either stabilize the field or ignite legal
challenges and street mobilization.
CENTRAL RISK TO THE VOTE HAPPENING: Convergence of an unresolved financing gap, partial
voter registration in the country's most populous department, and security conditionality that
remains formally unmet any one of which the CEP can invoke to justify postponement.
DEVELOPMENT 1: ELECTORAL CALENDAR, CEP AND FEASIBILITY ANALYTICAL BODY
The CEP published its official electoral calendar on 27 July 2026 on cephaiti.ht, establishing 13
December 2026 as the first-round date for simultaneous presidential, legislative, and local elections,
with a second round on 21 February 2027. This calendar superseded an earlier version transmitted
to the Transitional Presidential Council in November 2025 that had proposed 30 August 2026 as
Round 1 a date abandoned due to security and logistical realities that the CEP did not publicly
September 24, 2026
explain in detail. The operative calendar sets party registration through 14 August, online
2026-09-24 — DAILY INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
AYITI INTEL Daily — 2026-09-24
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Haiti's economy in late Q3 2026 presents a paradox of surface stability masking structural deterioration. The
gourde holds near 130.9 HTG/USD a three-year improvement from the April 2023 crisis low yet fuel price
increases of 29 to 37 percent enacted in April 2026 have driven transport costs up more than 50 percent on
critical distribution routes, pushing food insecurity toward famine-adjacent conditions in vulnerable zones. Inflation
at 22.1 percent remains severely elevated. World Bank and IDB capital commitments total more than $364
million, but net FDI remains negative. Actionable insight: Diaspora investors should use MonCash-integrated
transfer channels now to capture favorable exchange rates before Q4 volatility risk materializes.
QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS
Currency movement: The gourde is effectively stable at 130.88 HTG/USD, holding within a tight 90-day band of
130.55 to 130.88. Favorable for remittance value preservation relative to the 2022 to 2023 crisis period.
Top business development: The HOPE/HELP trade preference expiration in September 2025 remains unresolved
under the current U.S. administration, creating legal ambiguity for Haiti's garment manufacturing sector and
threatening the primary formal employment base.
Investment signal: World Bank $320 million Country Partnership Framework and IDB $44 million youth
employment grant represent the dominant near-term capital deployment channels. Private FDI remains negative.
Entry risk remains high for productive sector investments without a 5 to 10 year horizon.
Remittance and diaspora impact: Mobile wallet transfers via MonCash integrated platforms carry the lowest fee
structure available at 1.1 percent plus $2.99 via Remitly. Current exchange rate conditions represent the best
transfer value diaspora senders have seen since 2022. Title insecurity in real estate remains a primary risk for
property investment.
Risk factor: A second round of fuel price increases before year-end 2026, triggered by continued Middle
East-linked oil price pressure, would accelerate food security deterioration and further erode household
purchasing power beyond already crisis-level conditions.
DEVELOPMENT 1: CURRENCY, FINANCIAL POLICY AND REMITTANCES THE GOURDE STABILIZATION PARADOX: MONETARY MANAGEMENT VERSUS HOUSEHOLD REALITY ANALYTICAL BODY
The Haitian gourde is trading at 130.88 HTG/USD as of September 24, 2026. The 30-day movement reflects a
weakening of only 0.05 percent, and the 12-month change registers at negative 0.03 percent effectively flat by
any operational measure. The 90-day trading band of 130.55 to 130.88 indicates an unusually tight range for a
currency operating in Haiti's macroeconomic environment, strongly suggesting active management by the
Banque de la Republique d'Haiti. For budget planning purposes, a working rate of 130 to 131 HTG/USD is
operationally reliable for Q4 2026 absent an external shock of signi