



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 05, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

saw major flooding in Cap-Haitien following heavy rains creating critical humanitarian disruption in Haiti's second-largest city. Radio Metropole broadcast Haiti on the brink of collapse what awaits us after February 7 2026 marking the first mainstream media program framing Feb 7 as basculement rather than routine transition. The Trump administration's February 3 TPS termination affecting 350,000 Haitians creates a compressed four-day timeline before CPT mandate expiration compounding institutional crisis with diaspora deportation crisis. Despite government operations resuming the 20-day gang operational pause continues with zero incidents suggesting strategic discipline as leverage for February 7 negotiations. 33 days until constitutional reckoning.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Cap-Haitien experiences major flooding creating critical situation in Nord Department disrupting humanitarian operations and port access.

Radio Metropole frames Feb 7 as basculement signaling mainstream media shift from routine transition to existential crisis narrative.

Washington Post calls Feb 3 TPS termination for 350,000 Haitians cruel creating compressed timeline with Feb 7 CPT expiration affecting remittance flows.

20-day gang operational pause extends beyond government resumption demonstrating strategic withholding of violence as Feb 7 leverage.

33 days remain until February 7 CPT mandate expiration with no public framework for institutional continuity or succession planning.

DEVELOPMENT 1

CAP-HAITIEN FLOODING COMPOUNDS MULTIDIMENSIONAL CRISIS

On January 5 2026 several neighborhoods of Cap-Haitien experienced severe flooding following heavy rains with AlterPresse and Juno7 reporting a critical situation in Haiti's second-largest city. The flooding represents the first major operational disruption in 2026 beyond gang violence potentially affecting humanitarian operations port access and internal displacement in the Nord Department. Cap-Haitien serves as a critical hub for aid delivery to northern regions and its port is Haiti's second-largest maritime facility making flood-related disruptions operationally significant for supply chains and humanitarian logistics.

The flooding underscores Haiti's compounding vulnerabilities demonstrating that even in areas relatively free from gang control natural disasters overwhelm weak infrastructure and governance capacity. With 33 days until February 7 and the CPT unable to coordinate effective disaster

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response the Cap-Haitien situation illustrates Haiti's multidimensional crisis extending beyond security and political challenges to encompass environmental and infrastructural collapse. The Nord Department has remained comparatively stable relative to Port-au-Prince's gang-controlled territories yet flooding demonstrates that governance deficits create universal vulnerability regardless of gang presence.

The timing coincides with government operations resuming January 5 following the extended holiday period yet neither the CPT nor relevant ministries issued coordinated disaster response statements as of evening. The absence of visible government coordination during an active humanitarian emergency in a major population center reinforces institutional weakness as the February 7 deadline approaches. Cap-Haitien flooding may displace residents adding to the 1.4 million internally displaced persons documented by UNICEF in December 2024 further straining humanitarian systems already operating beyond capacity.

The flooding occurs as international actors including CARICOM OAS and the UN have not convened emergency sessions to operationalize institutional continuity mechanisms ahead of February 7. The Cap-Haitien crisis demonstrates that Haiti's governance challenges extend beyond constitutional succession to encompass basic disaster response capacity with natural disasters exposing the same institutional deficits that enable gang territorial control. The CPT's inability to visibly coordinate flood response 33 days before its mandate expires reinforces concerns about post-February 7 governance viability regardless of constitutional frameworks.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Cap-Haitien has historically served as Haiti's second city and northern economic hub with its port functioning as a critical alternative to Port-au-Prince maritime facilities. Flooding in Cap-Haitien typically results from inadequate drainage infrastructure and deforestation in surrounding watersheds exacerbated by weak municipal governance and limited disaster preparedness capacity.

TALKING POINTS

Major flooding in Cap-Haitien on January 5 creates critical situation in Haiti's second-largest city disrupting humanitarian operations and port access.

Nord Department relatively free from gang control demonstrates that natural disasters exploit same governance deficits enabling security crisis.

CPT issued no coordinated disaster response as of evening reinforcing institutional weakness 33 days before mandate expiration.

Flooding may displace residents adding to 1.4 million IDPs straining humanitarian systems beyond capacity.

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Cap-Haitien crisis illustrates Haiti's multidimensional vulnerabilities extending beyond gang violence to environmental and infrastructural collapse.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International humanitarian actors should assess Cap-Haitien flooding impact on Nord Department operations and supply chain continuity for northern aid delivery.

CARICOM and OAS should reference Cap-Haitien disaster response gaps as evidence requiring immediate institutional continuity planning ahead of February 7.

Diaspora networks should mobilize emergency relief for Cap-Haitien residents while monitoring displacement patterns that may affect family connections.

UN agencies should document CPT disaster response capacity or lack thereof as baseline for post-February 7 governance assessments.

Private sector actors with Cap-Haitien port dependencies should develop contingency plans for maritime logistics disruption.



CONFIDENCE



Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2

MAINSTREAM MEDIA FRAMES FEBRUARY 7 AS BASCULEMENT NOT TRANSITION

Radio Metropole Haiti's leading radio station broadcast a program on January 5 titled Haiti on the brink of collapse what awaits us after February 7 2026 representing a critical shift in mainstream media framing. The basculement language indicates that establishment media now views February 7 as a collapse or tipping point rather than routine political transition. This framing aligns with MOPAL's January 4 warning about a new institutional void and Jerry Tardieu's December 7 analysis that Article 6.1 prohibits CPT mandate extension requiring a replacement formula by February 7 at midnight.

Radio Television Caraibes concurrently broadcast What transition for Haiti in 2026 featuring Victor Benoit prominent political analyst suggesting Haiti's political class is actively debating post-February 7 frameworks without reaching consensus. The fact that two major media outlets dedicated prime programming to February 7 scenarios on the first business day of 2026 signals that the deadline has moved from background concern to immediate crisis in public discourse. Benoit's participation as respected analyst indicates that even establishment figures recognize the

constitutional deadline as operationally critical rather than theoretical.



The shift to basculement framing carries operational implications for stakeholder expectations and behavioral patterns. When mainstream media presents February 7 as potential collapse rather than managed transition it influences diaspora remittance decisions investor confidence humanitarian actor positioning and gang strategic calculations. The Crisis Group's December 15 assessment that gangs seek amnesty as part of February 7 negotiations becomes more salient when public discourse frames the deadline as leverage opportunity rather than routine institutional event.

With 33 days remaining the convergence of mainstream media crisis framing and continued CPT silence on mandate extension mechanisms creates a legitimacy vacuum. CPT President Saint-Cyr's January 1 call to avoid any drift as February 7 approaches provided no explanation of post-February 7 governance suggesting either internal disagreement on succession planning or deliberate ambiguity to maintain negotiating flexibility. The media's basculement language indicates that public patience for ambiguity is exhausting as the constitutional deadline approaches.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haitian media has historically oscillated between crisis and normalcy framing with establishment outlets like Radio Metropole typically adopting cautious editorial positions during political transitions. The explicit use of basculement language represents departure from traditional diplomatic framing suggesting that even cautious institutional voices now view February 7 as existential rather than procedural.

TALKING POINTS

Radio Metropole's January 5 broadcast titled Haiti on the brink of collapse frames February 7 as basculement not routine transition.

Concurrent Radio Television Caraïbes program featuring Victor Benoit indicates political class actively debates post-February 7 frameworks without consensus.

Basculement framing on first business day of 2026 signals deadline moved from background concern to immediate crisis in public discourse.



Mainstream media crisis language influences stakeholder expectations including diaspora remittances investor confidence and gang strategic positioning.

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CPT maintains silence on mandate extension mechanisms 33 days before expiration creating legitimacy vacuum as media adopts collapse narrative.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International observers should monitor Haitian media framing shifts as early indicators of public expectations and potential destabilization triggers.

Diaspora organizations should prepare crisis communications addressing February 7 scenarios based on mainstream media basculement framing.

Humanitarian actors should assess how collapse narratives affect operational security and staff positioning decisions for post-February 7 period.

CARICOM and OAS should recognize that public discourse has shifted to crisis mode requiring visible institutional continuity planning.

Private sector actors should incorporate basculement scenarios into February risk modeling reflecting mainstream media assessments rather than optimistic projections.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3

FEBRUARY 3 TPS TERMINATION CREATES COMPRESSED CRISIS TIMELINE

The Trump administration's February 3 2026 Temporary Protected Status termination affecting 350,000 Haitians creates a compressed four-day timeline before the CPT's February 7 mandate expiration compounding Haiti's institutional crisis with diaspora deportation crisis. The Washington Post published an editorial on January 5 calling the TPS termination cruel given Haiti's security and humanitarian conditions. The timing suggests that early-to-mid February will see deportations of Haitians to a country with no functioning government if the CPT expires without successor while simultaneously disrupting remittance flows representing approximately 38 percent of Haiti's GDP.

The February 3-7 compressed timeline creates operational challenges for international actors attempting to manage both crises simultaneously. The OAS Roadmap Version 3's November 5 institutional continuity clause committing OAS CARICOM and UN to work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum becomes operationally critical by February 3-7 requiring international actors to either legitimize CPT extension or negotiate replacement formula before 350,000

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Haitians face deportation to an ungoverned state. The four-day window between TPS expiration and CPT expiration provides minimal buffer for coordinated crisis management.

The Washington Post editorial reflects growing recognition among US policy observers that TPS termination timing exacerbates rather than addresses Haiti's instability. Many TPS holders have US-born children creating family separation scenarios while others have established businesses and community networks over extended TPS periods dating to Haiti's 2010 earthquake. The convergence of deportation pressure and institutional vacuum in Haiti creates conditions for humanitarian crisis as deportees return to a country unable to provide basic services or security.

The diaspora implications extend beyond immediate deportation concerns to remittance disruption affecting household income for millions of Haitians. With gangs controlling approximately 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince according to MOPAL's January 4 assessment returnees face immediate security risks in addition to economic displacement. The February 3-7 timeline compresses decision-making for Haitian families in the United States weighing voluntary return against deportation while monitoring whether the CPT secures mandate extension or replacement framework by February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Temporary Protected Status for Haitians was initially granted following Haiti's 2010 earthquake and has been periodically renewed based on country conditions preventing safe return. TPS provides work authorization and deportation protection but does not create pathway to permanent residency leaving beneficiaries in extended temporary status vulnerable to policy shifts.

TALKING POINTS

Trump administration's February 3 TPS termination affecting 350,000 Haitians creates four-day window before CPT February 7 mandate expiration.

Washington Post editorial calls TPS termination cruel citing Haiti's security and humanitarian crisis creating deportation to ungoverned state scenario.

Compressed timeline affects remittance flows representing 38 percent of Haiti's GDP disrupting household income for millions.

OAS institutional continuity clause becomes operationally critical requiring CPT extension or replacement framework before February 3 deportations begin.

Returnees face security risks in gang-controlled territories and economic displacement in country unable to provide basic services.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

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US immigration attorneys should accelerate alternative legal status applications for TPS holders before February 3 deadline recognizing limited time for administrative relief.

Haitian diaspora organizations should mobilize advocacy campaigns highlighting compressed February 3-7 timeline and ungoverned state deportation risks.

International humanitarian actors should prepare reception capacity for potential returnees while documenting conditions preventing safe return.

CARICOM and OAS should explicitly reference TPS termination in institutional continuity negotiations as evidence requiring immediate CPT succession framework.

Haitian government officials if functional post-February 7 should coordinate with US authorities on deportation logistics and returnee services.



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High confidence based on official government reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 4

20-DAY GANG OPERATIONAL PAUSE EXTENDS BEYOND GOVERNMENT RESUMPTION

The 20-day gang operational pause from December 21 through January 5 continues with zero major incidents reported despite government operations resuming including US Embassy reopening and consular services restart. The continuation beyond the holiday period is unprecedented and raises critical questions about gang strategic calculations. The pause now extends past Christmas New Year Haitian Independence Day Ancestors Day and the extended weekend suggesting deliberate operational discipline rather than holiday-related reduction in violence.

The pause contradicts the Gang Suppression Force's December 31 claim of retaking territories under gang control since MOPAL's January 4 assessment confirms gangs control quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince Artibonite and Plateau Central. The 20-day period represents the longest sustained absence of major gang violence in 2025 indicating gangs possess operational capacity to suspend violence indefinitely when strategically advantageous. This capacity demonstrates sophisticated command and control structures capable of coordinating extended operational pauses across multiple gang formations and territories.

The strategic logic behind extending the pause beyond government resumption likely relates to February 7 positioning. The Crisis Group's December 15 warning that gangs seek amnesty as part of February 7 transition remains operationally relevant with gangs potentially withholding

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violence as leverage for negotiations despite Prime Minister Conille's December 28 no negotiations doctrine. The pause allows gangs to demonstrate their capacity to either enable or disrupt governance while positioning themselves as stakeholders in post-February 7 frameworks rather than security threats to be eliminated.

With 33 days until February 7 the operational pattern suggests violence resumption in late January between January 20-31 as gangs escalate pressure on the CPT to negotiate amnesty terms before the constitutional deadline. The pause demonstrates that gang violence in Haiti operates according to strategic calculations rather than random criminality with operational decisions tied to political timelines and negotiating leverage. The longer the pause extends the more it reveals gang organizational sophistication and the weaker the narrative of PNH or GSF military success becomes.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haitian gangs have historically demonstrated capacity for coordinated operations including the February 29 2024 coordinated attacks that closed Toussaint Louverture Airport and the November-December 2024 Artibonite offensive. Extended operational pauses are rare with the 20-day period representing the longest sustained reduction in major violence documented in 2025.

TALKING POINTS

20-day gang operational pause from December 21 through January 5 continues despite government operations resuming .

Pause extends beyond holiday period suggesting strategic discipline rather than seasonal violence reduction.

MOPAL January 4 assessment confirms gangs control quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince contradicting GSF claims of territorial retaking.

Pause demonstrates gang organizational capacity to suspend violence indefinitely when strategically advantageous for February 7 positioning.

Expect violence resumption in late January as gangs escalate pressure for amnesty negotiations before constitutional deadline.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Security analysts should model gang violence resumption scenarios for late January tied to February 7 deadline pressure rather than immediate post-holiday patterns.

Humanitarian actors should use operational pause to position critical supplies and assess evacuation routes before anticipated late January escalation.

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International observers should monitor gang public statements or proxy communications for February 7 negotiating positions during pause period.

CPT should clarify whether operational pause reflects PNH effectiveness or gang strategic positioning to avoid mischaracterizing security gains.

Diaspora families should complete urgent travel or document processing during pause window before anticipated late January violence resumption.



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Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor whether gangs resume violence on or January 6-7 ending the 20-day operational pause or whether strategic discipline extends through mid-January. Track CPT or ministerial statements regarding Cap-Haitien flooding response coordination as indicator of institutional capacity 33 days before mandate expiration. Watch for additional mainstream media programming on February 7 scenarios building on Radio Metropole's basculement framing from .

THIS WEEK

Observe whether CARICOM OAS or UN schedule emergency sessions week of January 6-10 to operationalize institutional continuity mechanisms ahead of February 3 TPS termination and February 7 CPT expiration. Monitor UN Security Council discussions on BINUH mandate renewal expiring January 31 for references to post-February 7 transition planning. Track diaspora advocacy responses to Washington Post TPS editorial and whether additional US media coverage amplifies compressed February 3-7 timeline concerns.

STRATEGIC HORIZON



Assess whether gangs resume violence in late January January 20-31 escalating pressure on CPT for amnesty negotiations before February 7 deadline. Monitor international actor positioning between legitimizing CPT mandate extension and negotiating replacement formula as February 3-7 compressed timeline approaches. Track whether mainstream media basculement framing influences diaspora remittance patterns investor confidence and humanitarian actor security postures creating self-fulfilling crisis dynamics.

PRIMARY SOURCES

AlterPresse report on Cap-Haitien flooding published January 5 2026

US State Department announcement on TPS termination effective February 3 2026

Crisis Group December 15 assessment on gang amnesty negotiations

OAS Roadmap Version 3 November 5 institutional continuity clause

Washington Post editorial Ending temporary protected status for Haitians is cruel published January 5 2026

Vant Bef Info analysis on Haiti's silence regarding Maduro arrest published January 4-5 2026

Haiti Libre monitoring for gang security incidents January 5 2026

MOPAL January 4 assessment on gang territorial control covering Port-au-Prince Artibonite Plateau Central

Jerry Tardieu December 7 analysis on Article 6.1 CPT mandate prohibition

Prime Minister Conille December 28 statement on no negotiations doctrine

CPT President Saint-Cyr January 1 statement on avoiding drift before February 7

UNICEF December 10 report on 1.4 million internally displaced persons