



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

December 30, 2025

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's statistical institute published 2025 economic data showing negative 2.7 percent GDP growth marking the seventh consecutive year of economic contraction and confirming that security operations alone cannot reverse collapse without political stability. Gang violence remained suspended for the tenth consecutive day since December 21 representing the longest operational pause in months and suggesting strategic repositioning ahead of 2026 escalation as the February 7 2026 constitutional deadline approaches. The OAS Roadmap includes an institutional continuity provision committing international actors to work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum if the Transitional Presidential Council expires without successor but the mechanism remains deliberately vague with 39 days remaining.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Haitian Institute of Statistics published negative 2.7 percent GDP contraction for 2025 on December 30.

Ten day gang operational pause continues with zero major incidents reported .

OAS Roadmap institutional continuity clause represents only existing framework for post February 7 scenario but lacks specificity.

39 days remain until Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires February 7 2026.

DEVELOPMENT 1

Economic Collapse Validated - Haiti Records Seventh Consecutive Year of GDP Contraction

The Haitian Institute of Statistics and Informatics published Haiti's 2025 Economic Accounts on December 30 revealing negative 2.7 percent GDP growth and marking the nation's seventh consecutive year of economic decline since 2019. The data confirms Haiti is experiencing its worst sustained economic performance since the 2010 earthquake despite recent security assistance including 7500 Gang Suppression Force troop pledges announced December 19 and 25 US armored vehicles donated to the Haitian National Police on December 27. The economic contraction validates repeated warnings from international organizations that security operations alone cannot reverse Haiti's downward trajectory without addressing the underlying political crisis blocking

constitutional succession and electoral processes.



The negative 2.7 percent figure exposes the fundamental disconnect between government rhetoric and ground reality. Prime Minister Alix Fils-Aime announced a general mobilization strategy on December 28 emphasizing a no negotiations doctrine with criminal gangs yet the economic data demonstrates that gang control of 80 percent of Port-au-Prince has destroyed business confidence paralyzed trade networks and eliminated investment flows. The revised electoral calendar published December 25 creates a 365 day constitutional gap between the February 7 2026 expiration of the Transitional Presidential Council mandate and the scheduled February 7 2027 presidential inauguration meaning Haiti faces an entire lost year with no legitimate government and no pathway to economic recovery.

The timing of the statistical release carries strategic significance. Publishing comprehensive economic data during the final days of 2025 forces stakeholders to confront the reality that two years of transitional governance since Prime Minister Ariel Henry's March 2024 resignation have failed to stabilize either security or economic fundamentals. International partners including CARICOM the United Nations and the United States have provided substantial security assistance but refused to condition aid on concrete political transition benchmarks creating a situation where the Fils-Aime government can maintain the appearance of authority while presiding over accelerating collapse. The 4.2 million Haitians classified as vulnerable representing 37 percent of the population cannot survive another year of negative growth without massive humanitarian intervention.



The economic data contradicts the government's December 28 victory narrative following drone strikes on gang positions. While security operations can temporarily disrupt criminal networks the negative 2.7 percent GDP figure proves that sustained economic activity requires political legitimacy functional governance institutions and investor confidence in constitutional continuity none of which exist under the current transitional framework expiring in 39 days.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti experienced continuous economic growth from 2004 to 2018 following the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide but entered sustained contraction beginning in 2019 coinciding with anti-corruption protests against President Jovenel Moïse. The current seven year decline represents the longest sustained economic regression since the 1991 to 1994 embargo period under military rule.

TALKING POINTS

Seventh consecutive year of negative GDP growth confirms security alone cannot fix Haiti.

Negative 2.7 percent contraction occurred despite December 19 announcement of 7500 GSF troops and December 27 donation of 25 armored vehicles.

Revised electoral calendar creates 365 day constitutional gap between February 7 2026 CPT expiration and February 7 2027 inauguration.

4.2 million vulnerable Haitians representing 37 percent of population cannot survive lost year 2026 without massive intervention.

International security assistance provided without conditioning aid on political transition benchmarks enables governance failure.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community - Condition January 2026 security funding on concrete political transition roadmap addressing February 7 deadline.

Private Sector - Suspend new investment commitments until constitutional succession mechanism finalized.

Haitian Government - Convene emergency consultations with OAS CARICOM and UN before January 15 to operationalize institutional continuity clause.

Diaspora - Redirect remittances through formal banking channels with documented paper trails to preserve economic data integrity.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2

Ten Day Operational Pause Suggests Gang Strategic Repositioning Before 2026

Gang violence remained suspended for the tenth consecutive day on December 30 with zero major security incidents reported by monitored sources marking the longest sustained operational pause since October 2025. The pattern began December 21 and continued through the Christmas period with only isolated incidents including a December 23 Coast Guard maritime engagement a December 24 drone strike on the Minoterie facility killing dozens and a foiled December 25 to 26 arson attack on Tabarre market. The sustained pause contrasts sharply with the November to early December period when gangs conducted coordinated attacks on aviation targets diplomatic facilities and critical infrastructure suggesting a deliberate strategic recalibration rather than security force deterrence.

Multiple factors explain the operational pause. The Christmas and New Year holiday period historically reduces gang activity as commanders allow fighters temporary leave to visit family networks and the December 24 Minoterie drone strike killing dozens of gang members likely disrupted command structures and forced temporary consolidation. However the pause also reflects strategic calculation by gang coalitions monitoring political developments including the December 29 MORN civil society sit-in with limited turnout Prime Minister Fils-Aime's December 28 no negotiations declaration and Canadian Ambassador Sebastien Giroux's statement that February 7 represents the unconditional end of the Transitional Presidential Council mandate regardless of electoral progress.

Gang leadership understands the February 7 2026 constitutional deadline creates leverage for negotiations. Crisis Group reporting from December 15 documented internal gang discussions about exploiting the mandate expiration to extract concessions including potential amnesty provisions territorial control recognition and participation in post transition security arrangements. The Prime Minister's December 28 no negotiations doctrine may prove unsustainable if the government lacks constitutional legitimacy after February 7 and requires gang acquiescence to maintain even minimal order during the 365 day gap until the scheduled February 7 2027 inauguration.

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The operational pause demonstrates gang capacity for strategic discipline and coordinated restraint across multiple factions controlling different Port-au-Prince zones. This coordination contradicts narratives portraying gangs as purely criminal opportunists and suggests sophisticated political calculation. The December 24 Minoterie drone strike and December 25 to 26 Tabarre market foiled attack reveal expanding operational domains including drone warfare capabilities and economic terrorism targeting commercial infrastructure. Stakeholders should expect violence to resume in early January 2026 as gangs test government resolve and exploit the approaching constitutional deadline.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous extended operational pauses occurred during August 2023 following the assassination of Senator Yvon Buissereth when gangs consolidated territorial control and during January 2024 surrounding the two year anniversary of the 2021 earthquake. Both pauses preceded escalation cycles suggesting current pause represents preparation not retreat.

TALKING POINTS

Ten consecutive days without major gang violence represents longest operational pause since October 2025.

Pattern began December 21 continuing through Christmas with only isolated December 23 to 26 incidents.

Pause reflects strategic calculation monitoring political developments and February 7 constitutional deadline rather than security deterrence.

Crisis Group December 15 reporting documented gang discussions about exploiting mandate expiration for amnesty negotiations.

December 24 drone strike and December 25 to 26 market attack demonstrate expanding operational domains including drone warfare.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Security Forces - Use operational pause to harden defenses around critical infrastructure anticipating January resumption.

International Partners - Deploy additional armored vehicles and communications

equipment before January 7 while pause holds.

Government - Convene gang liaison channels through religious and civil society intermediaries to establish red lines before violence resumes.

Humanitarian Organizations - Pre-position emergency supplies in Artibonite and southern departments before northern corridor attacks resume.



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Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3

OAS Institutional Continuity Clause Provides Vague Framework for Post February 7 Scenario

The Organization of American States Roadmap for Stability and Peace in Haiti Version 3 published November 5 includes an institutional continuity provision committing OAS CARICOM and the United Nations to work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum if the Transitional Presidential Council expires February 7 without legitimate successor. The clause represents the only existing international framework explicitly addressing the constitutional deadline now 39 days away but remains deliberately vague on mechanisms implementation timeline and definition of Haitian authorities. The provision emerged from member state requests during October 2025 consultations as international actors recognized the December 22 candidate list publication deadline would not be met and the February 7 expiration would occur without electoral progress.

The institutional continuity clause states that if the Presidential Transitional Council were to expire without legitimate successor the three international organizations would work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum but provides no specificity on critical operational questions. Who constitutes Haitian authorities if the Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires and Prime Minister Fils-Aime's government derives legitimacy solely from the now expired Council? What form would international work take including possibility of new transitional council technical government or enhanced international administration? How does the provision reconcile with Canadian Ambassador Giroux's December statement that February 7 represents the

unconditional end of the mandate regardless of circumstances?

The vagueness reflects genuine disagreement among international partners about post February 7 arrangements. CARICOM has traditionally supported extended transitional periods prioritizing stability over constitutional deadlines while Canada and the United States have emphasized the February 7 date as firm boundary to pressure electoral progress. The United Nations faces Security Council constraints with China and Russia blocking enhanced mandate provisions for the Multinational Security Support mission beyond current June 2026 authorization. The OAS institutional continuity clause represents compromise language allowing emergency coordination without committing to specific successor mechanism before consultations occur.

The negative 2.7 percent GDP contraction published December 30 underscores urgency of finalizing post February 7 arrangements. Every month without legitimate government deepens economic collapse erodes remaining institutional capacity and strengthens gang positioning for territorial consolidation. The revised electoral calendar creating 365 day gap until February 7 2027 inauguration means any interim arrangement must maintain functionality for entire year an unprecedented challenge given current transitional government struggled to maintain authority for ten months. Emergency coordination meetings among OAS CARICOM and UN representatives must occur in early January to operationalize the institutional continuity clause before the February 7 deadline.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's 1987 Constitution does not provide for transitional councils or mandate extensions creating legal vacuum when constitutional succession fails. Previous transitions in 2004 and 2016 relied on ad hoc international frameworks negotiated under crisis conditions with mixed legitimacy and limited effectiveness beyond maintaining minimal order.

TALKING POINTS

OAS Roadmap Version 3 published November 5 includes institutional continuity clause for post February 7 scenario.

Provision commits OAS CARICOM and UN to work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum but lacks mechanism specificity.

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Only existing international framework addressing February 7 deadline now 39 days away.

Vagueness reflects genuine disagreement among partners about extended transitions versus constitutional deadline enforcement.

365 day gap until February 7 2027 inauguration requires unprecedented year long interim arrangement.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

OAS CARICOM UN - Convene emergency trilateral coordination meeting before January 15 to draft specific institutional continuity mechanism.

International Community - Establish technical working group to define Haitian authorities and successor legitimacy criteria before February 7.

Haitian Civil Society - Organize stakeholder consultations to provide input on post February 7 governance arrangements and legitimacy requirements.

Media - Investigate which international actors support extended transition versus constitutional deadline adherence to clarify February positions.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Gang operational pause continuation or resumption. If violence resumes after New Year holiday the ten day pause ends confirming strategic temporary restraint. Continued suspension beyond January 2 suggests deeper coordination and February 7 leverage strategy.

THIS WEEK

OAS CARICOM or UN announcements regarding emergency coordination meetings. Any scheduling of January trilateral consultations signals operationalizing institutional

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continuity clause. Silence suggests unresolved disagreements about post February 7 framework.

Transitional Presidential Council or Prime Minister Fils-Aime statement on February 7 mandate expiration. Government acknowledgment of deadline would represent first official recognition of constitutional crisis. Continued silence indicates avoidance strategy betting on international rescue.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Early January gang violence resumption testing government resolve and exploiting constitutional deadline approach. Expect coordinated attacks on economic infrastructure to demonstrate capacity and force negotiations despite December 28 no negotiations doctrine.

Mid January emergency international consultations if OAS institutional continuity clause operationalized. Outcome determines whether February 7 produces power vacuum new transitional arrangement or contested parallel authorities.

Late January candidate list publication if Provisional Electoral Council attempts salvage operation. Any list released after December 22 missed deadline faces legal challenges and opposition boycott threats requiring international mediation.

PRIMARY SOURCES

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15. International Crisis Group - Haiti political transition analysis - December 2025
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6. Haiti Libre - Countries pledge up to 7500 troops to Gang Suppression Force - December 19 2025
7. Haiti Libre - Provisional Electoral Council publishes revised electoral calendar in Le Moniteur - December 25 2025