



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

December 19, 2025

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that the United States secured pledges for 7,500 Gang Suppression Force troops representing a 37 percent increase from the 5,500 ceiling announced ten days prior marking the third upward revision in two weeks. AmeriJet International suspended cargo flights to Port-au-Prince following an undisclosed tarmac incident this week creating humanitarian logistics disruptions for medical supplies and food aid delivery. The contestation period ended with no official CEP updates on challenges filed or resolved leaving the December 22 final candidate list publication as the definitive moment for electoral viability assessment. The government convened its Fourth Conference of Ambassadors calling for proactive diplomacy three days before the critical candidate list deadline.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

US secured pledges for 7,500 GSF troops up 37 percent from 5,500 ceiling announced December 12 with January deployment of first 1,000 personnel confirmed.

AmeriJet suspended cargo flights after tarmac incident at Toussaint Louverture Airport forcing reliance on slower sea cargo routes vulnerable to gang extortion.

Contestation period ended December 19 with zero public information from CEP about challenges creating continued electoral opacity pattern.

Final candidate list publication December 22 remains definitive checkpoint determining whether August 30 elections proceed or constitutional crisis emerges.

Relief Web confirmed Verette attack occurred December 16 not December 15 with six killed and residents fleeing to Liancourt fearing hospital attack.

DEVELOPMENT 1: UNITED STATES SECURES 7,500 TROOP PLEDGES FOR GANG SUPPRESSION FORCE

Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced December 19 that the United States has received pledges of up to 7,500 security personnel for the Gang Suppression Force in Haiti representing a 37 percent increase from the 5,500 troop ceiling announced at the December 12 Force Generation Conference follow-up. This marks the third upward revision of GSF force commitments in two weeks with December 9 confirming seven contributing countries, December 12 announcing eighteen countries committed with 5,500 personnel, and December 19 establishing the new operational ceiling at 7,500 troops. The accelerated diplomatic timeline suggests intensive United States engagement to secure additional commitments during the ten-day period between the Force Generation Conference and Rubio's announcement with strategic timing three days before the critical December 22 candidate list publication potentially designed to demonstrate security capacity exists to support electoral processes.

The force structure transformation from 5,500 to 7,500 troops fundamentally alters operational possibilities for the Gang Suppression Force shifting the mission profile from territorial containment operations to potential reconquest capabilities across gang-controlled zones in metropolitan Port-au-Prince and Artibonite region.

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Previous planning assumptions based on 5,500 personnel constrained GSF operations to defensive perimeter establishment around critical infrastructure including port facilities, airport operations, and government buildings with limited capacity for offensive territorial recovery. The additional 2,000 troops creates battalion-level force packages sufficient for simultaneous operations across multiple gang-controlled neighborhoods enabling coordinated offensive operations rather than sequential clearing actions. However critical operational questions remain unanswered including which specific countries pledged the additional 2,000 troops beyond the eighteen announced December 12, whether January deployment schedules remain at 1,000 personnel or will scale proportionally to the new ceiling, and how the expanded force will be sustained financially through the United Nations Multi-Donor Trust Fund mechanism.



The timing of Rubio's announcement three days before the December 22 candidate list publication creates strategic linkage between security commitments and electoral legitimacy requiring coordination between military deployment timelines and political process benchmarks. If the December 22 candidate list demonstrates robust opposition participation including major political figures and civil society leaders the 7,500 troop commitment provides security foundation necessary to protect electoral processes through the August 30 2026 voting date. However if the candidate list reveals widespread boycott or contains only government-aligned figures the expanded GSF force becomes a security apparatus supporting an illegitimate transitional government operating beyond its February 7 2027 constitutional mandate expiration without democratic successors. The diplomatic investment required to secure 7,500 troop pledges suggests United States confidence that electoral processes will proceed despite ongoing security governance and transparency crises documented in previous intelligence assessments.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Gang Suppression Force deployment authorization emerged from October 2024 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2699 establishing international support for Haitian security operations after the February 2024 gang uprising collapsed state territorial control across metropolitan Port-au-Prince and Artibonite region.

TALKING POINTS

Secretary of State Rubio announced United States secured pledges for 7,500 GSF troops representing 37 percent increase from 5,500 ceiling announced December 12.

This marks third upward revision in two weeks with December 9 confirming seven countries, December 12 announcing eighteen countries and 5,500 troops, December 19 establishing 7,500 ceiling.

Force expansion transforms GSF from containment mission to potential reconquest capability enabling simultaneous operations across multiple gang-controlled zones.

Critical questions remain regarding which countries pledged additional 2,000 troops and whether January deployment scales from 1,000 to proportional levels.

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Strategic timing three days before December 22 candidate list publication links security commitments to electoral legitimacy requirements.

Expanded force requires sustainable financing through UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund with unclear funding mechanisms for 37 percent personnel increase.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Identify which specific countries beyond December 12 eighteen committed additional 2,000 troops determining regional versus extra-regional force composition.

Assess whether January 2026 deployment remains 1,000 personnel or scales proportionally requiring revised operational timeline projections.

Evaluate UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund capacity to sustain 7,500 troops given previous funding shortfalls documented in Force Generation Conference.

Coordinate security deployment schedules with December 22 candidate list outcomes determining if electoral processes justify expanded military commitment.

Monitor force generation sustainability beyond April 2026 deployment milestone assessing long-term viability of 7,500 troop presence.

Prepare contingency assessments if December 22 candidate list shows boycott requiring reconsideration of security force mission in absence of legitimate electoral process.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: AMERIJET CARGO SUSPENSION CREATES HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS CRISIS

AmeriJet International suspended cargo flights to Port-au-Prince following an incident on the tarmac at Toussaint Louverture International Airport earlier this week creating immediate disruptions to humanitarian and commercial cargo delivery systems that depend on aviation logistics for medical supplies, food aid, and essential goods distribution. The suspension announcement December 19 provided no details regarding the nature timing or severity of the tarmac incident leaving critical information gaps about whether the disruption resulted from security threats, operational failures, or gang-related attacks on airport infrastructure. AmeriJet functions as a critical lifeline carrier for Haiti with specialized capabilities for refrigerated medical cargo, time-sensitive pharmaceutical deliveries, and bulk food aid shipments that cannot be efficiently transported through maritime routes requiring weeks rather than days for delivery cycles from United States distribution centers.

The operational impact of AmeriJet suspension forces humanitarian organizations and commercial importers to

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shift cargo routing to sea transport through Port-au-Prince seaport facilities which remain partially under gang territorial control or extortion influence creating additional security costs and delivery delays. Maritime cargo routes require seven to fourteen days minimum transit time compared to same-day aviation delivery creating pharmaceutical supply chain vulnerabilities for temperature-sensitive medications including vaccines, insulin, and emergency medical supplies that deteriorate rapidly without climate-controlled transport. The timing of the suspension during the week of December 16 through 19 coincides with documented Haitian National Police offensive operations in Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets south of the United States Embassy raising questions about whether the tarmac incident related to spillover effects from those combat operations including stray fire, mortar impacts, or gang countermeasures targeting airport operations.

The pattern of repeated cargo flight disruptions including similar suspensions following November 2024 airport attacks demonstrates persistent vulnerability of aviation logistics infrastructure to gang interference creating systemic humanitarian access constraints. If the incident involved gang weapons fire or deliberate targeting of aircraft operations the suspension may extend indefinitely until comprehensive airport perimeter security improvements can be implemented requiring either Haitian National Police force commitments or early deployment of Gang Suppression Force units specifically assigned to airport protection missions. The lack of official information about incident details from either Haitian government sources or AmeriJet corporate communications suggests deliberate information suppression to avoid public panic or acknowledgment of airport security failures that could trigger broader international carrier withdrawals from Toussaint Louverture operations. The suspension during the critical pre-electoral period when humanitarian organizations require maximum logistical capacity to pre-position emergency supplies creates operational timing challenges that could undermine both humanitarian response capabilities and electoral process support logistics.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

AmeriJet previously suspended Haiti operations following November 2024 gang attacks that included gunfire directed at commercial aircraft during landing approaches and mortar fire targeting airport facilities demonstrating persistent gang capabilities to disrupt aviation operations through asymmetric weapons employment.

TALKING POINTS

AmeriJet suspended cargo flights to Port-au-Prince after undisclosed tarmac incident at Toussaint Louverture Airport creating humanitarian logistics disruption.

Suspension forces humanitarian organizations to shift cargo to sea transport requiring seven to fourteen days versus same-day aviation delivery.

Medical supply chains face vulnerability for temperature-sensitive pharmaceuticals including vaccines and insulin requiring climate-controlled aviation transport.

Timing during December 16 through 19 coincides with PNH offensive operations south of US Embassy raising questions about incident causation.

Pattern of repeated cargo disruptions demonstrates persistent gang capabilities to target aviation infrastructure

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through weapons fire or mortar attacks.

Lack of official details about incident nature suggests government information suppression to avoid acknowledging airport security failures.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Obtain detailed incident reporting from Haitian Civil Aviation Authority or US Embassy security officials determining whether suspension relates to security threats.

Assess humanitarian supply chain impacts focusing on medical cargo vulnerabilities requiring immediate alternative aviation routing through Dominican Republic.

Coordinate with UN humanitarian logistics cluster regarding maritime cargo alternatives and associated delivery timeline extensions.

Evaluate airport perimeter security requirements determining if early GSF deployment to Toussaint Louverture becomes priority mission.

Monitor international carrier responses assessing whether AmeriJet suspension triggers broader aviation withdrawals from Haiti operations.

Prepare contingency logistics planning for extended suspension scenarios requiring establishment of Dominican Republic land corridor for emergency supplies.



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DEVELOPMENT 3: CONTESTATION PERIOD ENDS WITH ELECTORAL OPACITY CONTINUING

The contestation period for candidate registrations officially ended December 19 with the Provisional Electoral Council providing zero public information regarding the number of challenges filed, the nature of eligibility disputes raised, or the resolution status of any contestations submitted during the authorized timeframe. This continued pattern of electoral opacity extends the information void established during the December 1 through 15 candidate registration period when the CEP conducted entirely private registration processes without public announcements of major political figures submitting candidacy documentation. The absence of contestation period transparency prevents independent assessment of whether the challenge mechanism functioned as a legitimate legal pathway for addressing candidate eligibility concerns or whether political actors deliberately avoided filing disputes to maintain artificial consensus around a flawed electoral process.

The December 22 final candidate list publication now carries absolute determinative weight for electoral process viability since the list will either validate or invalidate three weeks of opaque registration and contestation

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procedures through the concrete revelation of which political actors actually registered to compete in August 30 2026 elections. If the candidate list includes major opposition figures, prominent civil society leaders, or internationally recognized political personalities the list provides retrospective legitimacy to the private registration system by demonstrating credible competition exists despite procedural opacity. However if the December 22 list reveals only government-aligned candidates, unknown political newcomers, or a participant pool lacking opposition representation the resulting legitimacy crisis exposes the entire electoral process as a controlled exercise designed to provide democratic veneer to continued transitional government authority beyond the February 7 2027 constitutional mandate expiration.

The strategic calculation underlying electoral opacity may reflect deliberate CEP risk management to prevent premature opposition mobilization against the electoral process by delaying public confirmation of candidate participation until all registration and contestation mechanisms closed. This approach minimizes opportunities for last-minute opposition coordination to pressure registered candidates into withdrawal or to organize boycott campaigns during active registration periods. However the opacity strategy creates massive credibility vulnerabilities if the December 22 list disappoints stakeholder expectations since the lack of transparency throughout registration and contestation phases prevents the CEP from demonstrating procedural integrity when challenged by skeptical opposition groups, international observers, or civil society organizations questioning the legitimacy of published results. The December 22 deadline represents the final checkpoint before constitutional timeline pressures become insurmountable with fourteen months remaining to complete electoral campaigning, voting operations, potential runoff elections, result certification, and power transfer to elected authorities before the Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti electoral contestation mechanisms have historically been manipulated for political purposes with frivolous challenges used to delay candidate list publications or eliminate viable opposition competitors through technical disqualifications creating credibility crises in previous electoral cycles including 1990 and 2010 periods.

TALKING POINTS

Contestation period ended December 19 with zero CEP public information about challenges filed, disputed candidacies, or resolution outcomes.

Electoral opacity pattern continues from December 1 through 15 private registration period preventing independent verification of major candidate participation.

December 22 candidate list publication carries absolute determinative weight for electoral process legitimacy revealing actual opposition participation levels.

If list includes major opposition figures it provides retrospective legitimacy to private registration system despite procedural opacity concerns.

If list reveals only government-aligned candidates or unknowns it exposes electoral process as controlled exercise lacking credible competition.

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Opacity strategy may reflect CEP risk management to prevent premature opposition mobilization but creates massive credibility vulnerabilities if list disappoints.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Prepare multiple scenario assessments based on December 22 candidate list outcomes ranging from robust opposition participation to complete boycott.

Coordinate with international observer missions regarding expectations for candidate list composition determining acceptable versus unacceptable legitimacy thresholds.

Assess legal grounds for opposition challenges to electoral process based on registration and contestation opacity violating transparency requirements.

Monitor civil society reactions to December 22 publication determining if list composition triggers protest mobilization or acceptance.

Evaluate constitutional timeline viability if candidate list shows boycott requiring reconsideration of August 30 2026 electoral date feasibility.

Prepare contingency analysis for transitional government mandate extension scenarios if electoral processes fail to produce legitimate successors before February 7 2027.



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DEVELOPMENT 4: GOVERNMENT CONVENES FOURTH AMBASSADORS CONFERENCE BEFORE CANDIDATE LIST DEADLINE



Prime Minister Garry Conille Fils-Aime and Transitional Presidential Council President Laurent Saint-Cyr convened the Fourth Conference of Ambassadors December 19 calling on Haitian diplomatic representatives to fully embody missions entrusted to them and defend Haiti's image on the international stage despite security humanitarian and political challenges facing the transitional government. CPT President Saint-Cyr emphasized that Haitian diplomats must defend national interests with determination through strong alliances, spirit of sacrifice, and sense of responsibility stating the country does not need spectator ambassadors but rather committed individuals united and focused on restoring confidence and dignity of the Haitian people. Foreign Minister Jean-Victor Harvel emphasized the need for coherent and proactive diplomacy aligned with national priorities while insisting on strengthening mission management, improving national image projection, and consolidating Haiti's diplomatic presence internationally.

The strategic timing of the ambassadors conference occurring on the final day of the contestation period and three days before the critical December 22 candidate list publication suggests the transitional government is preparing for intensified international engagement to defend electoral process legitimacy regardless of candidate list composition outcomes. If the December 22 list demonstrates robust opposition participation the diplomatic corps will be tasked with promoting electoral success narratives to international partners, securing continued financial support for electoral operations, and countering skeptical assessments from opposition figures questioning process credibility. However if the candidate list reveals boycott or minimal opposition participation the diplomatic mission transforms into damage control operations requiring ambassadors to explain procedural opacity, defend government intentions regarding democratic restoration, and maintain international community support despite electoral legitimacy deficits that could trigger donor withdrawal or recognition challenges.

The conference rhetoric emphasizing that Haiti does not need spectator ambassadors but rather committed individuals focused on national mission objectives signals the government recognizes diplomatic representation quality has been inadequate for current crisis management requirements. The call for proactive diplomacy aligned with national priorities rather than passive reporting suggests previous ambassador performance failed to advance transitional government interests effectively in bilateral relationships or multilateral forums. The emphasis on improving Haiti's international image occurs against the backdrop of Committee to Protect Journalists reporting documenting secret budget passage, United Nations warnings about drug trafficking hub status, and persistent gang territorial control creating reputational challenges that require sophisticated diplomatic communications strategies to maintain international support. The conference mobilization three days before the December 22 watershed moment indicates the government understands electoral process outcomes will determine whether diplomatic missions focus on promoting democratic transition success or managing constitutional crisis fallout from electoral failure.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's diplomatic corps has faced persistent capacity constraints including embassy closures, personnel shortages, and inadequate operational funding creating gaps in bilateral relationship management and multilateral forum participation that undermined national interests during previous political crises requiring international mediation or intervention.

TALKING POINTS

Fourth Conference of Ambassadors convened with Prime Minister and CPT President calling for proactive diplomacy defending national interests.

Strategic timing on contestation deadline day and three days before December 22 candidate list publication suggests preparation for intensified international engagement.



CPT President emphasized Haiti needs committed ambassadors not spectators focused on restoring national confidence and dignity.

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Foreign Minister called for coherent diplomacy aligned with national priorities while strengthening mission management and international presence consolidation.

Diplomatic mission will either promote electoral success narratives if December 22 list shows opposition participation or conduct damage control if boycott revealed.

Conference rhetoric acknowledging previous diplomatic inadequacy signals government recognition that ambassador performance failed to advance transitional interests effectively.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor diplomatic communications strategies following December 22 candidate list publication assessing government narrative development for international audiences.

Evaluate whether ambassadors receive specific talking points about electoral process legitimacy preparing coordinated responses to international skepticism.

Assess bilateral relationship impacts if December 22 list shows boycott determining which international partners may withdraw support or impose conditionality.

Track multilateral forum participation by Haitian diplomats measuring effectiveness of proactive diplomacy approach versus previous passive reporting.

Coordinate with UN missions and regional organizations regarding diplomatic messaging coherence ensuring consistent narrative across government representatives.

Prepare for potential diplomatic crisis management if electoral legitimacy challenges emerge requiring ambassadors to defend constitutional timeline extensions.



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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

AmeriJet announces resumption timeline or confirms indefinite suspension requiring humanitarian logistics contingency activation for alternative cargo routing through Dominican Republic land corridors. Civil society organizations begin preliminary positioning statements ahead of December 22 candidate list publication signaling anticipated reactions ranging from acceptance to rejection. International observer missions coordinate assessment frameworks for evaluating candidate list legitimacy determining threshold criteria for acceptable opposition participation levels versus boycott scenarios triggering process credibility challenges.

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THIS WEEK

Final candidate list publication December 22 represents single most important event for electoral process viability revealing whether major opposition figures registered or boycotted creating definitive assessment of August 30 2026 timeline feasibility. Government diplomatic communications shift to either promoting electoral success narratives if list shows robust participation or conducting damage control operations if boycott revealed requiring coordinated messaging across ambassador network. Humanitarian organizations assess cargo logistics alternatives if AmeriJet suspension extends requiring maritime routing establishment or Dominican Republic land corridor activation for medical supply chains.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Gang Suppression Force deployment accelerates in January 2026 with first 1,000 troops arriving creating initial test of operational effectiveness against gang territorial control in priority zones requiring assessment of whether 7,500 troop commitment materializes according to announced timelines. Constitutional timeline pressures compound if December 22 candidate list shows electoral legitimacy deficits forcing consideration of transitional government mandate extension beyond February 7 2027 expiration or acceptance that Haiti will miss democratic restoration deadline. Drug trafficking hub status documented by United Nations triggers regional counter-narcotics operation escalation potentially disrupting humanitarian access and complicating electoral security requirements throughout 2026 campaign period.

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