



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

December 26, 2025

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On Christmas Day the CEP published a completely revised electoral calendar that abandons the December 22 candidate list deadline and December 26 campaign start while pushing the campaign period forward five months to May 19 2026. The revision formalizes a 365 day constitutional gap between the CPT mandate expiration on February 7 2026 and presidential inauguration on February 7 2027 with zero legal framework provided. The CEP also accused the CPT of making two unauthorized amendments to the Electoral Decree without consent exposing severe institutional conflict. December 26 saw zero security incidents while Haiti24 reported a PNH drone strike killing dozens at a gang celebration in Minoterie.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CEP published revised electoral calendar December 25 erasing all December 2025 electoral activities and pushing campaign start to May 19 2026

365 day constitutional gap formalized between CPT mandate expiration February 7 2026 and inauguration February 7 2027 with no governance framework

CEP publicly accuses CPT of unauthorized Electoral Decree amendments including UN sanctions language and departmental tabulation office references

PNH drone strike kills dozens at gang celebration in Minoterie continuing asymmetric warfare strategy

43 days remain until CPT mandate expires February 7 2026

## DEVELOPMENT 1

### THE CHRISTMAS DAY REVISION ELECTORAL TIMELINE OVERHAULED CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS FORMALIZED

The CEP Christmas Day publication of a completely revised electoral calendar represents the formal acknowledgment that the original November 15 timeline was operationally impossible. By silently erasing all December 2025 electoral activities from the official record without explanation the CEP has effectively admitted that the December 1 to 15 candidate registration period and December 16 to 19 contestation period either yielded insufficient results or were never operationally executed. The revised calendar makes no mention whatsoever of the December 22 candidate list publication deadline that appeared in the original November 15 calendar effectively deleting this milestone from institutional memory.

The new timeline pushes the campaign period forward five months from December 26 2025 through January 31 2026 to May 19 through August 28 2026. The first round date of August 30 2026 remains unchanged as does the second round date of December 6 2026. However the inauguration date is now scheduled for February 7 2027 exactly one year after the CPT mandate

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expires on February 7 2026. This creates a 365 day constitutional gap during which Haiti will have no constitutionally legitimate government. The CEP offers zero legal framework for how the country will be governed during this year long period raising the question of whether the CPT will simply extend its own mandate extra constitutionally or whether a new transitional mechanism will be created through international negotiation.

The calendar includes two critical prerequisites that function as conditions for cancellation rather than guarantees of success. First the CEP requires an acceptable security environment noting that 23 communes spread across West 12 Artibonite 8 Center 3 and Northwest 1 are currently under armed gang control with major implications for electoral logistics. Second the CEP requires financial resources to manage activities and unforeseen events. Neither prerequisite appears achievable by the May 19 2026 campaign start date given current security trajectories and funding gaps.

The timing of the publication on Christmas Day December 25 suggests the CEP sought to minimize immediate political reaction by releasing the calendar during a holiday period when government offices were closed and media attention was reduced. This tactical choice indicates the CEP anticipated severe pushback from political actors who were expecting December 2025 electoral activity to proceed as originally scheduled.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The original electoral calendar published November 15 2025 established December 1 to 15 as the candidate registration period December 16 to 19 as the contestation period and December 22 as the candidate list publication deadline with the campaign period beginning December 26 2025.

### TALKING POINTS

CEP Christmas Day calendar revision confirms December 2025 electoral timeline was never operationally viable

365 day constitutional gap between February 7 2026 CPT expiration and February 7 2027 inauguration formalizes governance crisis

No legal framework provided for how Haiti will be governed during 365 day gap

Campaign period pushed forward five months to May 19 through August 28 2026

Calendar contingent on security improvements in 23 gang controlled communes and full funding both unlikely by May 2026

Christmas Day publication timing suggests CEP anticipated severe political pushback

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

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International stakeholders must convene emergency consultations before January 15 2026 to negotiate CPT mandate extension framework or new transitional mechanism  
CARICOM and OAS should publicly demand CEP clarification on governance framework for 365 day constitutional gap by January 5 2026  
Donors should condition electoral funding on CEP publication of detailed security assessment for 23 gang controlled communes by February 1 2026  
Private sector actors should prepare contingency plans for extended constitutional uncertainty through February 2027  
Diaspora organizations should engage CARICOM representatives to advocate for transparent transitional governance negotiations



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

#### DEVELOPMENT 2

#### THE UNAUTHORIZED AMENDMENTS CPT CEP INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT ESCALATES

The CEP public accusation that the CPT made two major amendments to the Electoral Decree without CEP consent or approval exposes a severe institutional conflict at the heart of Haiti transitional governance. The first unauthorized amendment added language to Articles 52 53 74 84 and 98 specifying that a person cannot be a candidate for elected office if they are subject to UN sanctions. This amendment is politically charged because several potential candidates including business elites and former officials are under UN sanctions for alleged gang financing and human rights violations. By adding this language unilaterally the CPT has effectively disqualified candidates without the CEP input violating the electoral body constitutional independence.

The second unauthorized amendment added references to 10 Departmental Vote Tabulation Offices BTVD in Articles 30 27.2 253 and 255. This structural change suggests the CPT is attempting to control electoral infrastructure and vote counting mechanisms at the departmental level. The CEP objection to this amendment indicates concern that the CPT is positioning itself to influence electoral outcomes through control of tabulation processes. The CEP statement that these amendments were made without consent constitutes a direct accusation of institutional overreach and potentially unconstitutional behavior by the transitional executive authority.

This CPT CEP conflict raises a fundamental question about institutional boundaries during the transition period. If the CPT is willing to unilaterally amend the Electoral Decree can it also

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unilaterally extend its own February 7 2026 mandate. The CEP public denunciation suggests the electoral body will resist CPT overreach but the CEP has no enforcement mechanism beyond public statements and appeals to international legitimacy. The conflict also exposes the absence of effective checks and balances in Haiti current transitional governance structure where the CPT operates without legislative oversight or judicial review.

The timing of this public accusation immediately following the Christmas Day calendar revision suggests the CEP is strategically asserting its institutional independence after being forced to accommodate CPT pressure on electoral timelines. By publicly denouncing the unauthorized amendments the CEP is drawing a red line against further CPT interference in electoral processes even as it acknowledges through the revised calendar that the December 2025 timeline was unachievable.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Electoral Decree was published in Le Moniteur on December 1 2025 establishing the legal framework for the 2026 electoral process under CPT transitional authority and CEP operational independence.

### TALKING POINTS

CEP accuses CPT of adding UN sanctions candidacy restrictions without electoral body consent  
CPT unilaterally added 10 Departmental Vote Tabulation Offices to Electoral Decree infrastructure  
First amendment effectively disqualifies UN sanctioned business elites and former officials from candidacy

Second amendment suggests CPT attempting to control departmental vote counting mechanisms  
CEP has no enforcement mechanism beyond public denunciation and appeals to international legitimacy

Conflict exposes fundamental question whether CPT can unilaterally extend February 7 2026 mandate

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International observers should publicly demand CPT respect for CEP constitutional independence by January 3 2026

CARICOM should convene emergency session to clarify institutional boundaries between CPT and CEP before February 7 2026

Diplomatic missions should privately engage CPT leadership to discourage further unilateral Electoral Decree amendments

Electoral monitoring organizations should establish real time tracking of CEP CPT institutional

conflicts through February 2027

Legal experts should prepare analysis of constitutional implications of CPT self extension scenarios



## CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 3

#### THE DRONE STRIKE ESCALATION PNH ASYMMETRIC WARFARE CONTINUES

Haiti24 reported that PNH conducted a drone strike killing dozens at a gang celebration in Minoterie in the days leading up to Christmas December 25. The report states that explosive drones were used to target heavily armed bandits during a celebration organized in an area long dominated by gangs. This strike confirms the continuation of the PNH asymmetric warfare strategy that Crisis Group reported has killed over 200 people since its launch in recent weeks. The timing around Christmas and the target of a gang celebration suggest the PNH is exploiting gang operational pauses during holiday periods to conduct strikes when gang members are concentrated and potentially less vigilant.

The Minoterie strike represents the latest phase in a PNH strategy that relies on drone delivered explosives and armored vehicle advances rather than traditional foot patrol territorial control. However Crisis Group warned on December 15 that this strategy risks higher civilian casualties and gang retaliation because drone strikes cannot distinguish between gang members and civilians in densely populated urban areas. There is no evidence from available reporting that the PNH has successfully reclaimed and held territory in areas where drone strikes have occurred. This suggests the strikes are primarily attrition focused rather than territorial control focused.

The four day security pause from December 23 through December 26 including the maritime attack repelled December 23 the General Hospital attack December 24 that killed multiple journalists and one police officer and zero incidents December 25 and 26 may indicate gangs are strategically absorbing PNH strikes before launching coordinated responses in early 2026. Gang coalitions have demonstrated capacity for operational pauses followed by synchronized multi commune attacks as seen in previous cycles. The Christmas New Year period may represent a temporary tactical pause rather than a sustained reduction in gang capability.

The PNH reliance on asymmetric warfare also raises questions about sustainability given equipment maintenance costs ammunition resupply requirements and pilot training needs. The

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Kenya led multinational security force has not publicly reported participating in drone operations suggesting the PNH is conducting these strikes independently. This independence could create coordination gaps if the multinational force eventually deploys additional personnel beyond the current Kenyan contingent.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Crisis Group reported December 15 that PNH asymmetric warfare strategy using drones and armored vehicles has killed over 200 people in recent weeks with risks of higher civilian casualties and gang retaliation.

### TALKING POINTS

Haiti24 reports PNH drone strike killed dozens at gang celebration in Minoterie before Christmas  
Strike continues asymmetric warfare strategy using explosive drones rather than territorial control operations

Timing exploits gang operational pause during holiday period when members concentrated at celebrations

Four day security pause December 23 through 26 may indicate gangs strategically absorbing strikes before early 2026 retaliation

No evidence PNH has reclaimed and held territory where drone strikes occurred

PNH conducting strikes independently without public Kenya led force participation

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International security partners should assess PNH drone strike civilian casualty risks by January 10 2026

Humanitarian organizations should prepare surge capacity for potential gang retaliation in early January 2026

Kenya led force should publicly clarify coordination protocols with PNH asymmetric warfare operations by January 5 2026

Donors should evaluate sustainability of PNH drone program including equipment maintenance and resupply requirements

Diplomatic missions should monitor gang response patterns during first two weeks of January 2026 for retaliation indicators



### CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 4

SECURITY PAUSE CONTINUES ZERO INCIDENTS DECEMBER 26

December 26 marks the second consecutive day with zero reported security incidents following the Christmas Day pause. This extends a pattern of intermittent operational pauses punctuated by high impact attacks including the December 24 General Hospital assault that killed multiple journalists and one police officer and the December 23 maritime attack that was repelled by Coast Guard forces. The absence of incidents on December 25 and 26 suggests gang coalitions are observing a tactical pause during the Christmas holiday period consistent with previous behavioral patterns during major holidays when civilian movement is reduced and international attention is focused elsewhere.

However this pause should not be interpreted as evidence of gang capability degradation or strategic retreat. Gang coalitions have repeatedly demonstrated capacity to absorb security force pressure through tactical withdrawals followed by synchronized multi commune attacks when conditions are favorable. The December 24 General Hospital attack which specifically targeted journalists demonstrates continued gang operational capability and willingness to conduct high visibility strikes against symbolic targets even during periods of intensified PNH operations.

The timing of the pause coinciding with the CEP Christmas Day calendar revision and the PNH Minoterie drone strike suggests multiple actors are using the holiday period for strategic repositioning. Gangs may be using the pause to assess PNH drone strike patterns and prepare countermeasures while the CEP used the reduced political attention period to publish a controversial calendar revision. This convergence of tactical pauses institutional announcements and asymmetric warfare strikes indicates the first week of January 2026 will likely see a resumption of violence as actors emerge from holiday operational pauses.

The broader security trajectory remains unchanged by the December 25 to 26 pause. ACLED reporting through mid December documented sustained gang territorial control in Port au Prince metropolitan area and expansion into Artibonite communes. The Kenya led multinational security force has not published operational updates since early December suggesting deployment remains limited to initial Kenyan contingent without additional pledged personnel from other contributing countries.



**HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

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December 24 General Hospital attack killed multiple journalists and one police officer while December 23 Coast Guard repelled maritime gang attack before December 25 to 26 zero incident pause.

### TALKING POINTS

December 26 marks second consecutive day with zero reported security incidents  
Pause follows December 24 General Hospital attack targeting journalists and December 23 maritime attack  
Pattern consistent with gang tactical pauses during major holidays before resuming operations  
Should not be interpreted as gang capability degradation or strategic retreat  
First week of January 2026 likely to see violence resumption as actors emerge from holiday pauses  
Kenya led multinational force has not published operational updates since early December

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Security analysts should monitor first week of January 2026 for gang operational resumption indicators  
Humanitarian organizations should maintain high alert posture through January 10 2026 despite current pause  
Diplomatic missions should use pause period to accelerate multinational force deployment negotiations  
International media should prepare coverage capacity for potential violence spike in early January 2026  
Private sector should avoid interpreting current pause as sustained security improvement



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

#### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Will the CPT issue a public statement acknowledging the CEP revised calendar and addressing the February 7 2026 mandate expiration or will institutional silence continue. Trigger is end of Christmas holiday period December 27. Direction of travel is CPT likely to remain silent creating

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additional uncertainty. Risk is that silence confirms CPT planning unilateral mandate extension without legal basis.

Will gangs resume violence after the Christmas operational pause potentially in retaliation for the Minoterie drone strike or will the security pause extend through New Year. Trigger is December 27 to 28 weekend period when civilian movement increases. Direction of travel is likely resumption of attacks in early January 2026. Risk is coordinated multi commune strikes targeting PNH positions or symbolic infrastructure.

### THIS WEEK

Will CARICOM or OAS convene emergency sessions to address the 365 day constitutional gap between February 7 2026 CPT expiration and February 7 2027 inauguration or will international community delay response. Trigger is first business week after Christmas December 30 to January 3. Direction of travel is international stakeholders likely to delay until mid January. Risk is that delay allows CPT to establish facts on ground through unilateral mandate extension.

Will the Kenya led multinational security force publish operational updates or deployment timelines for additional pledged personnel beyond current Kenyan contingent. Trigger is end of 2025 calendar year. Direction of travel is force likely to remain silent on deployment challenges. Risk is that silence confirms deployment stalled indefinitely.

### STRATEGIC HORIZON

Will the CPT attempt to unilaterally extend its mandate beyond February 7 2026 or will it negotiate a new transitional framework with CARICOM and OAS before the expiration date. Trigger is January 15 to February 1 2026 period when political actors must position for post February 7 scenarios. Direction of travel is CPT likely to attempt self extension citing security conditions and electoral delays. Risk is constitutional crisis with competing claims to legitimacy.

Will the CEP May 19 2026 campaign start date prove operationally achievable given security conditions in 23 gang controlled communes and funding gaps or will further calendar revisions be required. Trigger is February to March 2026 period when CEP must finalize candidate lists and logistical preparations. Direction of travel is highly likely further delays given current security trajectory. Risk is complete electoral process collapse and indefinite transitional governance.

Will gang coalitions escalate attacks in early 2026 in retaliation for PNH drone strikes or will asymmetric warfare strategy achieve sustainable territorial gains. Trigger is first two weeks of January 2026 when gangs emerge from holiday operational pause. Direction of travel is likely gang escalation with coordinated multi commune attacks. Risk is humanitarian catastrophe if attacks target population centers or aid distribution networks.

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### PRIMARY SOURCES

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