



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

December 22, 2025

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Provisional Electoral Council failed to publish the final candidate list on the scheduled date of December 22 raising critical questions about the viability of the August 30 2026 electoral timeline. Three scenarios explain the delay: technical finalization, insufficient candidate registrations, or unresolved contestation disputes. Haiti experienced its second consecutive day without reported security incidents suggesting either post-offensive disruption or gang strategic observation of the electoral process. With 47 days remaining until the February 7 2027 Transitional Presidential Council mandate expiration and no published candidate list the constitutional succession framework is now in jeopardy. The international community remained completely silent issuing no statements on the electoral crisis.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CEP failed to publish final candidate list on scheduled date of December 22 with zero explanation or revised timeline issued.

Second consecutive day December 21-22 with no reported security incidents represents unusual operational pause.

47 days remain until February 7 2027 CPT mandate expiration with no viable electoral succession plan.

Complete international diplomatic silence from CPT, CARICOM, OAS, UN, and bilateral partners on candidate list delay.

No new economic data or humanitarian updates released creating information vacuum across all sectors.

DEVELOPMENT 1: CEP CANDIDATE LIST PUBLICATION FAILURE THREATENS ELECTORAL TIMELINE

The Provisional Electoral Council failed to publish the final candidate list on the scheduled date of December 22 2025 as of 4:44 PM EST representing the most significant breakdown in Haiti's electoral transition process. The CEP website showed no announcement regarding candidate list publication with the most recent content focusing on media training programs for online journalists rather than electoral deliverables. The December 22 publication date was the culminating event following the 15-day candidate registration period from December 1-15 and the 4-day contestation period from December 16-19 making its absence a critical timeline disruption. The failure to publish occurred without any official CEP statement explaining the delay, revising the timeline, or providing stakeholders with transparency on the resolution

process.

Three distinct scenarios explain the publication failure. The first scenario involves technical delays where the CEP is finalizing contestation period resolutions and will publish within 24-48 hours though the absence of any explanatory statement makes this optimistic interpretation questionable. The second scenario centers on insufficient candidate registrations where the 15-day registration period yielded too few viable candidates or zero major opposition figures forcing the CEP to negotiate calendar extensions or process revisions with political actors. The third scenario involves a contestation crisis where the December 16-19 dispute period produced unresolved challenges to candidate eligibility or documentation failures that prevent the CEP from certifying the list without further adjudication. Each scenario carries distinct implications for the August 30 2026 election timeline with technical delays representing the least damaging outcome while registration or contestation crises suggest fundamental electoral process failures.

The cascading calendar impacts become severe if the list remains unpublished beyond December 24. The official electoral calendar designated December 26 as the campaign period start date which becomes operationally impossible without a published candidate list. If the December 26 campaign launch is missed the entire electoral calendar shifts forward potentially rendering the August 30 2026 election date unfeasible given the required campaign duration and logistical preparation timelines. The CEP's complete opacity compounds the crisis as stakeholders including political parties, international observers, and civil society organizations have no visibility into whether the delay represents hours, days, or weeks of additional waiting. The absence of transparency creates information vacuums that political actors and armed groups can exploit to advance alternative narratives about electoral legitimacy.

The publication failure intersects dangerously with gang strategic calculations particularly given the Crisis Group's December 15 assessment that armed groups are seeking amnesty as part of the February 7 transition negotiations. A weak or non-existent candidate list validates gang leverage by demonstrating that the formal political system cannot organize legitimate succession mechanisms while a strong list with credible opposition participation threatens gang negotiating positions by suggesting democratic alternatives remain viable. The two-day security silence from December 21-22 may represent gang actors strategically observing the candidate list outcome before determining their operational responses with publication or confirmed indefinite delay likely to trigger immediate reactions across Port-au-Prince and Artibonite gang territories.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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Haiti's previous electoral processes have experienced candidate list delays most notably during the 2015-2016 electoral crisis when the CEP postponed publication multiple times amid fraud allegations and political negotiations. The current delay occurs in a uniquely fragile context where gang territorial control exceeds 80 percent of Port-au-Prince and the Transitional Presidential Council faces constitutional mandate expiration in 47 days without a clear succession mechanism.

TALKING POINTS

The CEP candidate list publication failure on December 22 represents the most significant electoral timeline breakdown since the transition process began threatening the August 30 2026 election viability.

Three scenarios explain the delay: technical finalization requiring 24-48 hours, insufficient candidate registrations forcing calendar revision, or unresolved contestation disputes preventing certification.

The December 26 campaign period start date becomes impossible without immediate list publication cascading the entire electoral calendar forward and raising questions about August 30 feasibility.

Gang strategic calculations are directly tied to candidate list strength with weak participation validating gang leverage while strong opposition presence threatens their February 7 amnesty negotiating position.

International community silence suggests diplomatic actors are waiting for CEP resolution before intervening but emergency mandate extension negotiations must begin immediately if delay extends beyond December 24.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor CEP website and official channels continuously through December 24 for candidate list publication or explanatory statement with any publication triggering immediate stakeholder analysis of candidate diversity and opposition strength.

Prepare scenario-based contingency planning for December 26 campaign period cancellation including revised electoral calendar modeling and August 30 election feasibility assessments if list remains unpublished beyond December 24.

Initiate diplomatic engagement with CARICOM and OAS representatives this week regarding February 7 2027 CPT mandate extension frameworks given the 47-day timeline and current electoral process breakdown.

Activate enhanced security monitoring protocols for 24-48 hours following candidate list publication or confirmed indefinite delay anticipating gang operational responses to electoral

developments.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: TWO-DAY SECURITY SILENCE SUGGESTS GANG STRATEGIC PAUSE

Haiti experienced its second consecutive day without reported major security incidents on December 22 following a similar pattern on December 21 representing an unusual operational pause given December's violence trajectory. No gang attacks, PNH operations, or armed confrontations were reported by Haiti Libre, Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, or international wire services throughout creating a 48-hour information vacuum in security reporting. The silence follows the December 18 PNH offensive operations in Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets which represented the most significant police action since the Bel-Air massacre began on December 8. The absence of incidents contrasts sharply with the December operational tempo which included the Bel-Air massacre producing 60-plus fatalities from December 8-13, the Verette hospital attack on December 16 killing six civilians, and continuous gang territorial expansion across Port-au-Prince and Artibonite departments.



Two primary explanations account for the operational pause. The first centers on post-offensive gang disruption where the December 18 PNH operations successfully degraded gang command structures or logistical capabilities in the Pernier-Torcel-Croix-des-Bouquets corridor creating temporary breathing room for security forces and civilian populations. This interpretation suggests the PNH achieved tactical success in disrupting gang coordination mechanisms though the absence of official police statements about operational outcomes or arrested gang leaders limits confidence in this assessment. The second explanation involves gang strategic observation of the electoral process where armed groups are deliberately pausing operations while monitoring the candidate list publication or non-publication before determining their next moves. This interpretation aligns with the Crisis Group's December 15 warning that gangs are seeking amnesty as part of the February 7 transition negotiations suggesting they view electoral developments as directly relevant to their strategic positioning.

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The strategic observation hypothesis carries significant implications for immediate-term security trajectories. If gangs are deliberately pausing operations to assess candidate list strength a weak or non-existent list publication would validate their leverage by demonstrating that formal political institutions cannot organize legitimate succession mechanisms strengthening gang negotiating positions for February 7 amnesty deals. Conversely a strong candidate list with credible opposition participation would threaten gang strategic calculations by suggesting democratic alternatives remain viable potentially triggering violent responses designed to disrupt the electoral process and reassert gang territorial dominance. The two-day silence may therefore represent the calm before a significant escalation with gang operational tempo resuming within 24-48 hours of candidate list publication or confirmed indefinite delay.

The Christmas week timing adds complexity to the operational pause assessment as both security forces and armed groups typically reduce activity levels during the December 24-26 holiday period for logistical and cultural reasons. Historical patterns from previous Haitian Decembers show decreased violence during the immediate Christmas period followed by operational resumption in late December or early January. However the current context differs fundamentally from previous years given the unprecedented gang territorial control exceeding 80 percent of Port-au-Prince, the ongoing humanitarian crises in Bel-Air and Port-Sonde, and the February 7 constitutional deadline creating time pressure for all actors. The Christmas week effect may extend the operational pause through December 26 but gang strategic imperatives linked to the electoral process and February 7 negotiations suggest violence will resume regardless of holiday timing once key political decisions become clear.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous December operational patterns in Haiti have shown reduced gang activity during the Christmas week period followed by resumption in late December or early January. However the current context differs fundamentally with gang territorial control exceeding 80 percent of Port-au-Prince and the February 7 2027 constitutional deadline creating strategic imperatives that override traditional holiday pause patterns.

TALKING POINTS

December 21-22 represents two consecutive days without reported security incidents creating unusual operational pause following December 18 PNH offensive in Pernier-Torcel-Croix-des-Bouquets.

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Two explanations account for the silence: post-offensive gang disruption creating temporary breathing room or gang strategic observation of candidate list publication before determining next operational moves.

Gang strategic pause hypothesis aligns with Crisis Group December 15 assessment that armed groups seek amnesty as part of February 7 transition negotiations making electoral developments directly relevant to gang positioning.

Weak or non-existent candidate list validates gang leverage while strong opposition participation threatens gang negotiating position potentially triggering violent electoral disruption responses. Christmas week timing may extend operational pause through December 26 but gang strategic imperatives suggest violence resumption within 24-48 hours of candidate list publication regardless of holiday calendar.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Maintain enhanced security monitoring protocols through December 26 with particular focus on 24-48 hour period following candidate list publication or confirmed indefinite delay anticipating gang operational responses.

Analyze December 18 PNH offensive outcomes by seeking official police statements about operational successes, gang casualties, or territorial gains to assess whether post-offensive disruption explains current pause.

Prepare contingency assessments for multiple gang response scenarios including violent electoral disruption if strong candidate list threatens gang February 7 negotiating leverage or accelerated territorial expansion if weak list validates gang strategic positioning.



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Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3: 47-DAY CONSTITUTIONAL COUNTDOWN APPROACHES WITHOUT SUCCESSION FRAMEWORK

Haiti faces 47 days until the February 7 2027 Transitional Presidential Council mandate expiration without a viable constitutional succession mechanism in place as the electoral process breakdown threatens the August 30 2026 election timeline. The CPT was established with a constitutional mandate running from April 2025 through February 7 2027 based on the

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expectation that August 2026 elections would produce a legitimate government ready to assume power by the mandate expiration date. The candidate list publication failure on December 22 fundamentally undermines this succession framework by calling into question whether the August 30 election date remains operationally feasible given the cascading calendar delays. If the December 26 campaign period start is missed due to continued list non-publication the entire electoral calendar shifts forward potentially rendering August 30 2026 elections impossible within the available timeline.

The constitutional implications of a February 7 2027 CPT mandate expiration without elected government succession are severe and unprecedented in Haiti's modern political history. Three scenarios define the possible outcomes. The first scenario involves emergency mandate extension where CARICOM, OAS, UN, and bilateral partners negotiate a constitutional framework allowing the CPT to continue governing beyond February 7 until elections can be organized and completed though this requires rapid diplomatic consensus and Haitian political actor buy-in. The second scenario centers on interim government formation where the CPT voluntarily dissolves on February 7 and transfers power to a caretaker mechanism designed by international partners and domestic stakeholders to bridge the gap until elections though this creates questions about constitutional legitimacy and succession authority. The third scenario involves constitutional vacuum where the CPT mandate expires without any successor mechanism producing a legitimacy crisis that armed groups and political spoilers can exploit to advance alternative governance models or territorial control consolidation.

The international community's complete silence on the candidate list delay and February 7 deadline suggests diplomatic actors are waiting for the CEP to resolve the immediate crisis before engaging on mandate extension frameworks. No statements were issued on December 22 by the CPT, Prime Minister Fils-Aime, CARICOM, OAS, UN/BINUH, US State Department, or Canadian government regarding the electoral timeline breakdown or succession planning. This silence may reflect diplomatic coordination behind closed doors where partners are assessing scenarios and building consensus on intervention frameworks but the absence of public transparency creates dangerous information vacuums that political and armed actors can exploit. If the candidate list remains unpublished beyond December 24 international actors must issue public statements clarifying their positions on mandate extension and succession mechanisms to prevent rumor-driven instability.

The mandate expiration crisis intersects with gang strategic calculations regarding amnesty negotiations and territorial consolidation timelines. Armed groups view February 7 2027 as a critical negotiating checkpoint where they can leverage the constitutional vacuum to demand amnesty provisions or territorial recognition in exchange for supporting transition stability. The Crisis Group's December 15 assessment explicitly warned that gangs are positioning for

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February 7 negotiations suggesting they have developed sophisticated understanding of constitutional deadline implications. A weak or failed electoral process strengthens gang negotiating leverage by demonstrating that formal political institutions cannot organize legitimate succession while a strong electoral process with credible opposition participation threatens gang positions by offering democratic alternatives to violence-based governance models.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was established in April 2025 with a mandate running through February 7 2027 based on expectations that August 2026 elections would produce legitimate government succession. Previous Haitian transitions including the 2004-2006 and 2016-2017 periods experienced mandate extensions negotiated by international partners when electoral timelines collapsed creating precedent for emergency constitutional frameworks.

TALKING POINTS

Haiti faces 47 days until February 7 2027 CPT mandate expiration without viable succession mechanism as candidate list publication failure threatens August 30 2026 election timeline feasibility.

Three scenarios define possible outcomes: emergency mandate extension negotiated by international partners, interim caretaker government formation, or constitutional vacuum exploitable by armed groups and political spoilers.

International community maintained complete silence on December 22 with no statements from CPT, CARICOM, OAS, UN, or bilateral partners suggesting diplomatic coordination behind closed doors or strategic waiting for CEP resolution.

Gang strategic calculations view February 7 as critical negotiating checkpoint for amnesty provisions with weak electoral process strengthening gang leverage while strong process threatens their positioning.

Diplomatic actors must issue public statements on mandate extension frameworks by December 24 if candidate list remains unpublished to prevent dangerous information vacuums and rumor-driven instability.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Initiate confidential diplomatic engagement with CARICOM and OAS representatives this week regarding February 7 2027 CPT mandate extension frameworks including constitutional mechanisms and domestic stakeholder buy-in requirements.

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Develop scenario-based contingency planning for all three succession outcomes including mandate extension timelines, interim government formation structures, and constitutional vacuum crisis management protocols.

Monitor international diplomatic communications channels for behind-the-scenes coordination signals regarding mandate extension negotiations or succession planning consensus building among multilateral and bilateral partners.

Prepare public messaging frameworks clarifying international community positions on February 7 deadline and succession mechanisms to deploy if candidate list remains unpublished beyond December 24 preventing information vacuum exploitation.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor CEP website and official channels continuously for candidate list publication or explanatory statement with any publication triggering immediate analysis of candidate diversity and opposition strength. Track security incident reporting across Haiti Libre, Le Nouvelliste, and AlterPresse for signs of operational pause ending particularly in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite departments. Watch for any CPT, Prime Minister, or international partner statements regarding the candidate list delay or February 7 mandate extension frameworks.

THIS WEEK

December 24 represents critical threshold where continued candidate list non-publication confirms electoral timeline breakdown requiring international diplomatic intervention on succession mechanisms. December 26 campaign period start date will be missed if list remains unpublished forcing formal acknowledgment that August 30 2026 elections face feasibility questions. Christmas week operational patterns may mask gang strategic responses to electoral developments with violence resumption likely by December 27-28 regardless of holiday timing.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

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The February 7 2027 constitutional deadline drives all strategic calculations with 47 days remaining for electoral process completion or mandate extension negotiation. Gang strategic positioning for February 7 amnesty negotiations will intensify as the deadline approaches with armed groups calibrating operational tempo and territorial consolidation based on electoral process strength or weakness. International community must begin public diplomacy on succession frameworks by January 2026 if electoral timeline breakdown continues preventing constitutional vacuum scenarios.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Info Project Twitter: Electoral Timeline Update

Haiti Libre: CEP Official Calendar of Upcoming Elections

CEP Official Website (cephaiti.ht)

UN News: Haiti Focus Topic Coverage

US Embassy Haiti: News and Official Statements

Crisis Group: Undoing Haiti's Deadly Gang Alliance Report December 15

Human Rights Watch: Haiti Country Report 2025

Reuters: Kenyan Police Deployment December 9 Report

Le Nouvelliste: Security and Political Coverage December 21-22

AlterPresse: Haiti Humanitarian and Security Reporting December 22

Haiti Government Communications Portal

Council on Foreign Relations: Gang Suppression Force Analysis