



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

December 21, 2025

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Provisional Electoral Council will publish the final candidate list tomorrow December 22 determining whether major opposition figures registered or boycotted the August 30 2026 electoral timeline after three weeks of total procedural opacity. December 21 saw zero reported security incidents suggesting either operational lull following December 18 PNH-GSF offensive or strategic gang pause awaiting candidate list outcomes. AlterPresse announced launch of 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan targeting 4.2 million vulnerable people representing 37 percent of national population confirming humanitarian crisis scale. International community maintains diplomatic silence awaiting tomorrow's candidate list publication before issuing electoral viability assessments with 48 days remaining until February 7 2027 constitutional deadline.



### QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Final candidate list publication tomorrow December 22 represents definitive checkpoint determining August 30 2026 electoral timeline legitimacy after 15-day registration and 4-day contestation periods conducted in complete opacity.

Zero security incidents reported December 21 marking unusual operational pause potentially indicating PNH-GSF offensive impact or gang strategic positioning before candidate list.

Humanitarian Response Plan 2026 targets 4.2 million vulnerable people representing 37 percent of population underscoring disconnect between electoral processes and ground conditions.

International observers maintain silence awaiting candidate list outcomes before assessing electoral viability or constitutional crisis scenarios.

Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires February 7 2027 in 48 days with no extension mechanism creating absolute timeline pressure.

### DEVELOPMENT 1: CANDIDATE LIST PUBLICATION TOMORROW DETERMINES ELECTORAL LEGITIMACY

The Provisional Electoral Council is scheduled to publish the final candidate list for August 30 2026 elections tomorrow December 22 following completion of the December 1 through 15 registration period and December 16 through 19 contestation period both conducted without any public updates regarding participation levels, party breakdowns, or dispute resolutions. As of evening December 21 no CEP statement has previewed the number of candidates, opposition figure participation, or procedural outcomes maintaining the total information opacity pattern established throughout the registration and contestation phases. The CEP website shows recent activity focused on launching three-day training for online media journalists suggesting institutional preparation for electoral communication infrastructure but providing no substantive content regarding tomorrow's candidate list composition or anticipated political reactions.

Tomorrow's publication represents the definitive moment resolving three weeks of analytical uncertainty about whether Haiti's electoral timeline retains political legitimacy or exposes a government-controlled process lacking credible democratic competition. Three primary scenarios exist with fundamentally different implications for constitutional succession. First scenario involves major opposition participation where the list includes prominent

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figures such as former Prime Minister Claude Joseph, civil society leaders, or other nationally recognized political actors confirming the process achieved political buy-in despite security chaos and procedural opacity creating retrospective legitimacy for the private registration system. Second scenario involves government-dominated list where publication reveals only pro-Transitional Presidential Council figures, unknown political newcomers, or minimal opposition representation exposing the electoral process as legitimacy theater designed to provide democratic veneer for continued transitional authority beyond February 7 2027 constitutional mandate expiration. Third scenario involves coordinated opposition boycott declaration where major political parties use the list publication moment to jointly denounce the process as illegitimate collapsing the August 30 timeline entirely and forcing immediate constitutional crisis management.

The timing coordination between Secretary Rubio's December 19 announcement of 7,500 Gang Suppression Force troop pledges and tomorrow's December 22 candidate list deadline demonstrates United States diplomatic strategy linking security commitments to electoral legitimacy requirements. If tomorrow's list shows robust opposition participation the GSF's 7,500 troop commitment and January 2026 deployment of first 1,000 personnel creates plausible though difficult roadmap supporting August 30 electoral operations despite gang territorial control challenges. However if the list confirms boycott patterns or reveals government domination the expanded Gang Suppression Force becomes a security apparatus protecting an illegitimate transitional government operating beyond constitutional authority creating international donor credibility challenges for continued financial support. The 48-day countdown to February 7 2027 constitutional deadline means tomorrow's candidate list determines whether Haiti proceeds toward democratic restoration or descends into constitutional limbo requiring either emergency mandate extension mechanisms or acceptance that the transition failed to produce legitimate successors within authorized timeframes.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous Haitian electoral cycles including 1990, 2010, and 2015 demonstrated how candidate list publications frequently triggered immediate political crises when opposition figures either appeared unexpectedly validating controversial processes or remained absent confirming boycott strategies that delegitimized subsequent voting operations regardless of technical electoral administration quality.

### TALKING POINTS

Final candidate list publication tomorrow December 22 determines whether August 30 2026 electoral timeline retains political legitimacy or exposes government-controlled process.

Three weeks of complete procedural opacity during December 1 through 15 registration and December 16 through 19 contestation creates maximum uncertainty resolved tomorrow.

Three primary scenarios include major opposition participation validating process, government-dominated list exposing legitimacy theater, or coordinated boycott declaration collapsing timeline.

Timing coordination between Rubio December 19 announcement of 7,500 GSF troops and December 22 candidate list demonstrates US links security to electoral legitimacy.

48-day countdown to February 7 2027 constitutional deadline means tomorrow determines democratic

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restoration viability or constitutional crisis.

CEP maintains total silence providing no preview of candidate numbers, opposition participation, or anticipated political reactions before publication.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Establish rapid response assessment frameworks activating within hours of December 22 publication analyzing candidate list composition against legitimacy threshold criteria.

Prepare three-scenario contingency plans addressing major opposition participation, government domination, or coordinated boycott requiring fundamentally different strategic responses.

Coordinate with international observer missions evening December 21 finalizing evaluation criteria distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable candidate list outcomes.

Monitor opposition political networks through night and morning for preliminary positioning statements signaling acceptance versus rejection strategies.

Assess whether December 22 outcomes trigger immediate Gang Suppression Force deployment acceleration or funding reconsideration based on electoral legitimacy assessments.

Prepare constitutional crisis management protocols if boycott confirmed requiring February 7 2027 mandate extension negotiations or transitional authority collapse scenarios.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 2: SECURITY SILENCE SUGGESTS OPERATIONAL LULL OR GANG STRATEGIC PAUSE

December 21 saw zero reported security incidents with no major gang attacks, PNH operations, or violent clashes documented by Haiti Libre, Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, or international wire services marking an unusual operational pause given the pattern of daily violence throughout December including Bel-Air massacre December 8 through 13, Verette attack December 16, and Pernier-Torcel-Croix-des-Bouquets offensive December 18. The absence of security reporting creates analytical uncertainty about whether the December 18 PNH-GSF large-scale operation with helicopter support temporarily disrupted gang operational capacity creating breathing room for government forces or whether criminal organizations are strategically pausing before tomorrow's December 22 candidate list publication to assess whether electoral outcomes threaten their interests before determining tactical responses.

Three explanations exist for 's operational silence each with different implications for near-term security trajectory. First explanation involves tactical disruption where the December 18 joint PNH-GSF

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helicopter-supported offensive in Pernier, Torcel, and Croix-des-Bouquets successfully degraded gang command and control capabilities forcing criminal organizations into defensive postures while they reconstitute forces and reassess government offensive capacity demonstrated through aviation asset employment. Second explanation involves strategic gang positioning where criminal leadership is deliberately pausing operations before tomorrow's candidate list to evaluate whether electoral process outcomes threaten their February 7 2027 amnesty negotiation strategy as documented in Crisis Group December 15 assessment warning that gangs seek political influence and legal protections as part of transition settlement. Third explanation involves media effect where reduced staffing levels at Haitian news organizations delay incident reporting creating artificial operational silence that will resolve when full reporting capacity resumes.

The Crisis Group warning that Viv Ansanm gang coalition aims to leverage the February 7 2026 transition date to seek amnesty and political influence provides strategic context suggesting criminal organizations closely monitor electoral process developments since candidate list composition directly impacts their negotiating leverage with transitional authorities. If tomorrow's list demonstrates major opposition participation creating credible electoral competition the resulting political pluralism could strengthen civilian oversight mechanisms threatening gang impunity protections that current transitional government weakness enables. However if the list confirms government domination or opposition boycott the resulting political vacuum validates gang assessment that state weakness creates permissive operating environment where amnesty negotiations represent their best pathway to long-term security rather than risking territorial losses through continued combat operations against expanding Gang Suppression Force deployments. The silence may therefore represent calculated gang strategic pause awaiting tomorrow's political developments before committing to either escalation or negotiation postures.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous PNH offensive operations including the December 15 Albert Schweitzer Hospital defense demonstrated that even successful defensive actions rarely produce sustained territorial control without continuous force presence creating pattern where gangs temporarily withdraw during government operations then reoccupy positions after security forces redeploy to other priority zones.

### TALKING POINTS

Zero security incidents reported December 21 marking unusual operational pause given daily violence pattern throughout December.

Three explanations include tactical disruption from December 18 PNH-GSF offensive, strategic gang pause before candidate list, or media staffing effects.

Crisis Group December 15 warning that gangs seek February 7 amnesty suggests criminal organizations monitor electoral developments affecting negotiation leverage.

Strong candidate list tomorrow could threaten gang impunity through political pluralism while weak list validates their negotiating position amid state weakness.

Bel-Air massacre remains unresolved at Day 14, Port-Sonde occupation at Day 22, Verette attack at Day 6 demonstrating ongoing crisis continuity.

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Pattern shows gangs temporarily withdraw during government operations then reoccupy territories after PNH forces redeploy to other zones.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor security incident reporting December 22 determining if silence represents genuine operational pause or delayed media coverage resolving with full staffing.

Assess gang tactical posture changes following candidate list publication identifying whether criminal organizations escalate, pause, or negotiate based on electoral outcomes.

Evaluate December 18 PNH-GSF offensive territorial control sustainability through weekend determining if government maintains presence in Pernier-Torcel-Croix-des-Bouquets.

Track Crisis Group amnesty negotiation indicators monitoring whether gang leadership initiates contact with transitional authorities following candidate list.

Prepare scenario assessments linking candidate list composition to anticipated gang responses ranging from escalation if threatened to negotiation if validated.

Coordinate with PNH command regarding operational tempo maintenance determining if December 18 offensive represents sustained campaign or isolated demonstration.



### CONFIDENCE



**Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 3: HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN TARGETS 4.2 MILLION VULNERABLE PEOPLE

AlterPresse announced December 21 the official launch of the 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan targeting 4.2 million vulnerable people representing 37 percent of Haiti's 11.4 million population confirming the humanitarian crisis scale documented by United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and World Food Programme assessments throughout 2025. The timing of this appeal one day before the critical December 22 candidate list publication underscores the parallel tracks Haiti faces where electoral processes proceed on paper through registration periods, contestation mechanisms, and candidate list publications while humanitarian conditions deteriorate with gang territorial control driving 1.4 million internally displaced persons, severe food insecurity affecting millions, and basic service collapse across metropolitan Port-au-Prince and Artibonite region.

The 4.2 million vulnerable population target demonstrates the massive disconnect between electoral timeline assumptions and ground operational realities since conducting credible August 30 2026 elections requires not only security conditions permitting voter access but also functional humanitarian logistics enabling population stability during campaign and voting periods. The Gang Suppression Force's 7,500 troop pledge announced

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December 19 and January 2026 deployment of first 1,000 personnel represent operationally significant security investments but the humanitarian scale with 37 percent of national population requiring emergency assistance dwarfs current international response capacity. Even if the GSF reaches full strength by mid-2026 as projected the force will prioritize territorial control operations in gang-held Port-au-Prince neighborhoods over humanitarian corridor security creating sustained access constraints for aid organizations attempting to reach vulnerable populations in contested zones.



**The humanitarian appeal launch timing one day before candidate list publication suggests international relief organizations are positioning for either scenario whether electoral legitimacy creates political foundation supporting sustained humanitarian operations or electoral crisis triggers donor fatigue and funding reductions as international community loses confidence in Haiti's transition viability. The Carnegie Endowment December 16 assessment noting Haiti's severe state capacity deficits with approximately 9,000 police for 11 million people applies equally to humanitarian response where institutional weakness prevents effective coordination of relief operations even when donor funding and supplies exist. If tomorrow's candidate list reveals electoral legitimacy deficits European donors may accelerate the aid redirection toward Dominican Republic land corridors documented in December 20 port standoff reporting creating scenarios where Haitian population centers face humanitarian access collapse independent of gang violence through bureaucratic and logistical failures.**



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has required sustained humanitarian assistance since the 2010 earthquake with international appeals consistently targeting millions of vulnerable people but chronic underfunding and access constraints prevented effective population coverage creating persistent gaps between humanitarian needs and actual relief delivery capacity across successive crisis cycles.

### TALKING POINTS

2026 Humanitarian Response Plan targets 4.2 million vulnerable people representing 37 percent of national population confirming crisis scale.

Timing one day before December 22 candidate list publication underscores parallel tracks between electoral paper processes and humanitarian deterioration.

GSF 7,500 troop commitment operationally significant but humanitarian scale with 37 percent population in need dwarfs security footprint.



**Electoral legitimacy affects humanitarian funding sustainability with donor confidence dependent on transition viability demonstrated through candidate list outcomes.**

Carnegie assessment noting 9,000 police for 11 million people applies to humanitarian response where state

weakness prevents effective coordination.



**European donors may redirect aid through Dominican Republic corridors if electoral crisis triggers confidence collapse independent of security conditions.**

#### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Assess humanitarian funding commitments following December 22 candidate list determining if electoral outcomes affect donor willingness to sustain 2026 response plan.

Coordinate with UN humanitarian logistics cluster regarding population access scenarios under different Gang Suppression Force deployment timelines and territorial control outcomes.

Evaluate whether 4.2 million vulnerable population target includes gang-controlled zone residents or only government-accessible areas affecting coverage estimates.

Monitor European donor positioning post-candidate list determining if electoral legitimacy deficits accelerate Dominican Republic corridor redirection documented in port standoff.

Prepare contingency assessments if donor fatigue following electoral crisis reduces humanitarian funding below 2026 response plan requirements.

Track internally displaced person flows following candidate list publication identifying whether political developments trigger additional displacement or stabilization.



#### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

#### DEVELOPMENT 4: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AWAITS CANDIDATE LIST BEFORE VIABILITY ASSESSMENTS

The international community maintained complete diplomatic silence December 21 with no new statements issued by Organization of American States, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti, Caribbean Community, United States State Department, or Canadian government regarding Haiti's electoral process, security conditions, or transitional timeline viability. This coordinated silence demonstrates that international observers, donor governments, and multilateral organizations are awaiting tomorrow's December 22 candidate list publication before issuing formal assessments of whether Haiti's August 30 2026 electoral timeline retains credibility or requires reconsideration given security constraints, procedural opacity, and potential opposition boycott scenarios. The diplomatic pause creates strategic space for the Provisional Electoral Council to publish candidate list outcomes without preemptive international pressure that could influence last-minute political

calculations by opposition figures or transitional government leadership.



**The Fourth Conference of Ambassadors convened December 19 with Prime Minister Fils-Aime and Transitional Presidential Council President Saint-Cyr calling on Haitian diplomatic representatives to defend national image and interests on the international stage suggests the transitional government recognizes that tomorrow's candidate list outcomes will determine whether diplomatic missions promote electoral success narratives or conduct damage control operations managing constitutional crisis fallout. If tomorrow's list demonstrates robust opposition participation Haitian ambassadors will be tasked with securing continued international financial support for electoral operations, countering skeptical assessments questioning process legitimacy despite procedural opacity, and maintaining donor confidence through February 7 2027 constitutional transition deadline. However if the list reveals boycott or government domination the diplomatic mission transforms into crisis management requiring ambassadors to explain electoral failures, defend transitional government democratic intentions, and prevent international recognition challenges or funding withdrawals that could accelerate state collapse.**



**The 48-day countdown to February 7 2027 Transitional Presidential Council mandate expiration creates absolute timeline pressure since no constitutional mechanism exists for mandate extension beyond this date without either successful electoral succession producing legitimate government or extraordinary political settlement requiring opposition buy-in that current procedural opacity undermines. International community silence reflects assessment that premature statements before candidate list publication could either validate flawed process by expressing confidence prematurely or trigger transitional government defensive reactions by expressing skepticism before concrete evidence exists. Tomorrow's list publication resolves this diplomatic calculation by providing objective data regarding opposition participation levels enabling international actors to issue evidence-based assessments without appearing to predetermine outcomes through political pressure applied during registration or contestation periods.**



## **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

International community interventions in previous Haitian electoral crises including 2010 and 2015 demonstrated that premature statements either validating or questioning electoral processes before candidate list publications frequently backfired by hardening political positions and reducing diplomatic flexibility for crisis management when actual results disappointed stakeholder expectations.

## **TALKING POINTS**

International community maintains complete diplomatic silence December 21 awaiting candidate list publication before issuing electoral viability assessments.

Coordinated pause by OAS, UN, CARICOM, US, Canada creates strategic space for CEP to publish outcomes without preemptive international pressure.

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Fourth Conference of Ambassadors December 19 suggests government recognizes tomorrow determines whether diplomatic missions promote success or manage crisis.

48-day countdown to February 7 2027 constitutional deadline creates absolute timeline pressure with no extension mechanism without electoral succession.

International silence reflects assessment that premature statements could validate flawed process or trigger defensive reactions before objective evidence exists.

Tomorrow's list provides concrete data enabling evidence-based international assessments without appearing to predetermine outcomes through political pressure.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor international statements following December 22 candidate list publication identifying whether major donors issue coordinated assessments or fragmented responses.

Assess United States diplomatic positioning determining if electoral legitimacy affects Gang Suppression Force funding commitments or deployment acceleration.

Evaluate whether international silence continues if candidate list disappoints or triggers immediate multilateral crisis consultations requiring emergency interventions.

Track European Union member state reactions separately from broader international community determining if electoral outcomes affect bilateral aid commitments.

Prepare scenarios linking candidate list composition to anticipated international responses ranging from validation statements to funding suspension warnings.

Coordinate with diplomatic sources regarding behind-scenes consultations occurring during December 21 silence period shaping post-publication response coordination.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS



**Provisional Electoral Council publishes final candidate list December 22 determining whether major opposition figures registered creating electoral legitimacy or boycotted triggering constitutional crisis scenarios. Political actors issue immediate reactions within hours of publication revealing acceptance strategies mobilizing campaign infrastructure or rejection declarations denouncing process illegitimacy. International observer missions evaluate list against threshold criteria for credible democratic competition issuing preliminary assessments influencing donor confidence. Security incident reporting resumes determining if silence represented operational lull or strategic gang pause resolved by candidate list outcomes.**

#### THIS WEEK

Opposition political networks mobilize campaign infrastructure if December 22 list shows robust participation or announce coordinated boycott declarations if government domination confirmed. Electoral campaign period officially begins December 26 per CEP calendar creating operational test whether candidates actually campaign in gang-controlled zones or conduct virtual operations. International community shifts from diplomatic silence to active positioning either promoting electoral success narratives or initiating constitutional crisis management consultations. Gang Suppression Force deployment preparations accelerate toward January 2026 timeline with force composition and rules of engagement clarifications emerging.

#### STRATEGIC HORIZON

Gang Suppression Force first 1,000 troops deploy January 2026 testing whether multinational command structures function effectively and initial operations achieve territorial control objectives in priority zones. Constitutional timeline pressures intensify through January with 30 days remaining until February 7 2027 mandate expiration forcing transitional government decisions whether emergency extension mechanisms exist or democratic restoration deadline failure requires acceptance. Humanitarian Response Plan 2026 implementation begins requiring donor funding commitments dependent on electoral process credibility established through December 22 candidate list outcomes. European donors finalize aid redirection decisions based on port infrastructure functionality and electoral legitimacy determining whether continued Haitian investment justified or Dominican Republic corridor alternatives become primary relief channels.

#### PRIMARY SOURCES

AlterPresse Haiti 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan Launch December 21 2025  
Haiti Libre CEP Official Calendar of Upcoming Elections December 2025  
CEP Haiti December 2025 Web Updates Media Training December 2025  
Crisis Group Undoing Haiti Deadly Gang Alliance Report December 2025  
United Nations Haiti Focus Topic December 2025  
US Embassy Haiti News Updates December 2025  
Carnegie Endowment Haiti Crisis State Capacity Assessment December 16 2025  
Le Nouvelliste Fourth Conference of Ambassadors Coverage December 19 2025  
Haiti24 Electoral Calendar Analysis Contestation Period December 2025  
Haiti Info Project Electoral Calendar Update December 2025  
Prensa Latina Haiti Advocates for Active Diplomacy December 19 2025  
Council on Foreign Relations Gang Suppression Force Relief Haiti December 2025