



# **AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF**

February 28, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Haitian National Police launched a major anti-gang offensive in Tabarre on February 27, continuing a high-tempo operational pattern across Port-au-Prince's eastern zones with multiple gang members killed and a weapons cache destroyed. A France24 analysis published today consolidated expert assessments that cast serious doubt on electoral feasibility, directly contradicting official optimism from PM Fils-Aime and Secretary Rubio. The Dominican Republic deported 35,026 Haitians in January alone, exceeding domestic absorption capacity. France's confirmed EUR 40 million Haiti engagement and EUR 3.5 million GSF contribution provide financial clarity as the April deployment window approaches.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

PNH conducted a large-scale anti-gang operation in Tabarre on February 27; multiple gang members killed, fortified trenches filled, and a large Molotov cocktail cache destroyed. Dominican Republic deported 35,026 Haitians in January 2026 at a pace exceeding 1,000 persons per day into a country with 1.45 million internally displaced persons. France committed EUR 40 million total to Haiti in 2025 and EUR 3.5 million specifically to the GSF trust fund; April deployment projection of 6,000 police plus 5,500 soldiers now publicly confirmed. HOPE/HELP Senate Finance Committee markup remains unscheduled; 10,000-plus textile sector jobs remain in legislative limbo pending a must-pass vehicle. TPS termination for 350,000 Haitians took effect February 2, 2026; court challenge by prior litigation teams is ongoing.

### DEVELOPMENT 1: PNH TABARRE OFFENSIVE: HIGH-TEMPO OPERATIONS ACROSS EASTERN PORT-AU-PRINCE

The Haitian National Police launched a large-scale offensive against armed gangs in the commune of Tabarre at approximately 7:30 AM on February 27, 2026. Several gang members were killed in the opening engagements. Specialized PNH units filled trenches that criminal networks had excavated to obstruct armored vehicle movement. Searches of structures in the operational zone produced a significant cache of Molotov cocktails, which were destroyed on site. No PNH casualties were reported in initial dispatches from HaitiLibre and Le Nouvelliste.

This operation follows a January 31 Tabarre assault that killed eight gang members and cleared the Pont de Tabarre to Carrefour Marassa corridor using armored vehicles and engineering equipment. The recurring trench-filling requirement indicates that armed groups are systematically deploying anti-vehicular earthworks, forcing the PNH to conduct combined-arms operations rather than standard law enforcement actions. The tactical pattern has now appeared in at least two Tabarre engagements within thirty days.

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

The Tabarre operation must be read in conjunction with the February 20-21 Kenscoff operation that killed sixteen gang members using snipers and drones, and the February 23 Delmas kidnapping intervention that killed six kidnappers while losing two PNH officers. The PNH received new armored combat vehicles at Port-au-Prince customs on February 5, the first acquisition of this class for the institution. Across these four engagements, the PNH is now conducting near-daily operations across Tabarre, Kenscoff, Delmas, and Carrefour-Aeroport simultaneously.

Sustainability is the central operational risk. The February 23 Delmas action cost two PNH lives against six gang members killed, a ratio that signals lethal resistance rather than collapsing gang capacity. Without the Gang Suppression Force reinforcement projected for April, the current operational tempo places attrition pressure on a police corps already operating at institutional limits. The June-July rainy season will further complicate armored mobility in low-lying zones.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Tabarre has been a contested operational zone in the eastern Port-au-Prince metropolitan area for multiple years, sitting astride critical access routes to Toussaint Louverture International Airport. Prior international security missions, including MINUSTAH, documented the same pattern of gang territorial consolidation in peri-urban corridors that current PNH operations are now attempting to reverse through force.

### TALKING POINTS

PNH conducted at least four major offensive operations between February 20 and February 27 across geographically distinct zones.

The trench-filling tactic now appears as a standardized gang counter-mobility measure requiring engineering response.

Two PNH officers killed on February 23 confirm gangs are maintaining lethal resistance capacity despite sustained pressure.

New armored vehicles received February 5 are enabling operations that were previously not feasible for the PNH.

GSF reinforcement in April remains the critical variable for sustaining current operational tempo past mid-year.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should update security perimeter assessments for Tabarre, Delmas, and Kenscoff zones given active but not resolved operational status.

Business security managers should note that operations indicate contested rather than cleared

status; convoy routing through eastern Port-au-Prince requires current intelligence. Donor governments should accelerate GSF financial commitment finalization before the February 2026 deadline closes with gaps unresolved. Political actors should calibrate public communications regarding security improvement with the caveat that PNH attrition rates are not yet sustainable without reinforcement. NGO logistics planners should prepare contingency routing protocols if Tabarre operations temporarily close the Pont de Tabarre corridor.



## CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 2: ELECTORAL FEASIBILITY CRISIS: EXPERT ANALYSIS CONTRADICTS OFFICIAL POSTURE

A France24 analysis published February 28, 2026, consolidated assessments from three independent academic experts that collectively challenge the viability of Haiti's electoral calendar. Alex Dupuy of Wesleyan University assessed that the Haitian National Police lack the firepower and resources for military-scale operations, and characterized the Kenyan-led multinational mission as having achieved limited pacification with personnel who lack Haitian context and language capacity. Eduardo Gamarra of Florida International University identified the absence of a trustworthy electoral registry, a non-operational political party system, and no genuine organizational capability to conduct a vote. Gamarra also identified a growing sense of donor fatigue toward Haiti among contributing governments.



**This expert consensus stands in direct contradiction with official public postures. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aime stated on February 26 that he is confident elections will be held by year-end. Secretary Rubio, at the CARICOM meeting, endorsed progress on the anti-gang force. Neither statement engaged the structural prerequisites that experts identify as absent. The gap between official confidence and expert assessment is not a matter of interpretation; it reflects the difference between political messaging and operational ground conditions.**



**The Provisional Electoral Council has itself acknowledged that twenty-three communes remain under gang control and that security is a prerequisite for the August 30 target vote date. This internal CEP acknowledgment aligns with the expert critique rather than with PM Fils-Aime's public confidence. The National Pact's Article 12, which envisions constitutional modifications through an electoral mechanism the CEP considers outside its legal authority, adds a procedural dimension to the operational and security concerns already documented.**

Gamarra identified two structural pathways: sustained military action sufficient to dismantle gang territorial control, or negotiated political integration of armed faction leadership. Neither pathway has a defined timeline consistent with an August 30 vote. The France24 analysis noted that the National Pact does not specify a clear timeline for the Prime Minister's departure, leaving the end-state of the current governance arrangement formally undefined.



## **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Haiti has not held a contested national election since 2016, and prior international efforts including MINUSTAH's fourteen-year presence failed to produce durable security conditions for democratic consolidation. The 2015-2016 electoral cycle was annulled under fraud allegations, establishing a precedent for disputed processes that current governance actors must actively counteract.

## **TALKING POINTS**

Three independent academic experts with Haiti specialization have published coordinated skepticism about electoral feasibility under current conditions. The CEP itself acknowledges twenty-three gang-controlled communes as a security prerequisite challenge, internally validating expert concerns.



**PM Fils-Aime's year-end confidence statement and expert structural assessments describe incompatible ground conditions.**

The National Pact's undefined timeline for PM departure creates legitimacy exposure as unaffiliated political actors monitor the mandate's open-ended structure.

Article 12 constitutional modification procedures face a legal authority challenge from the CEP that remains unresolved.

## **RECOMMENDED DECISIONS**

International organizations should request the CEP's specific security threshold metrics for the August 30 vote date to calibrate contingency planning.

Diplomatic missions should distinguish between public electoral support language and private operational planning assumptions in internal reporting.

Business community should note that electoral uncertainty extending past August 30 represents a baseline planning scenario, not a worst case.

Political actors engaged in the Pact should move to define a clear PM departure timeline before legitimacy challenges from excluded actors intensify.

Donor governments funding electoral preparation should condition disbursements on measurable security benchmarks in gang-controlled communes.



## CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 3: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC DEPORTATION SURGE: 35,026 IN JANUARY ALONE

The Dominican Republic General Directorate of Migration reported that 35,026 Haitians were deported in January 2026 alone, with 38,392 individuals apprehended during the same period. Deportations were processed through the border crossings of Dajabón, Elias Piña, Jimaní, and Pedernales. The gap between apprehensions and deportations suggests a processing backlog that will sustain elevated return flows into February and March.

For full-year 2025, the Dominican Republic deported 379,553 Haitians through 6,535 migration control operations coordinated by the Dominican Armed Forces and National Police. IOM data covering all deportation sources showed 270,214 total returns to Haiti in 2025, a thirty-six percent increase over 2024, with the Dominican Republic accounting for ninety-eight percent of all forced returns globally. The January 2026 rate of 35,026 in one month, if sustained, would project to over 420,000 annual returns, exceeding even the 2025 record.

Haiti is absorbing these returns against a baseline of 1.45 million internally displaced persons, 5.7 million food-insecure individuals, and gang control over most of the capital. The majority of returnees are processed through border departments that have limited municipal reception capacity and no formal reintegration infrastructure at scale. Border communities in the Northwest, Artibonite, and Sud-Est departments are absorbing secondary displacement pressure from returnees who cannot access their areas of origin due to gang territorial control or flood damage.

The operational implication for humanitarian actors is a compounding displacement cascade. Forced returnees entering a country where internal movement is restricted by gang checkpoints, where 1.45 million people are already displaced, and where food insecurity affects forty-eight

percent of the population creates a humanitarian pressure multiplier with no visible absorption mechanism. IOM reception points at key border crossings represent the primary documented support infrastructure.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Dominican-Haitian migration relations have been structurally asymmetric since the 2013 Constitutional Tribunal ruling that retroactively stripped citizenship from Dominicans of Haitian descent, triggering mass statelessness and accelerating return migration. The 2025-2026 deportation acceleration represents a quantitative escalation of a pattern that has been operationally significant since 2015.

## TALKING POINTS

35,026 Haitians deported in January 2026 represents a pace of over 1,000 forced returns per day. The Dominican Republic accounted for ninety-eight percent of all global forced returns to Haiti in 2025 per IOM data.

Haiti's existing displacement baseline of 1.45 million IDPs has no capacity to absorb additional large-scale forced return flows.

Border departments lack formal reintegration infrastructure at the scale required by current return volumes.

The thirty-six percent year-over-year increase in 2025 suggests structural escalation rather than temporary enforcement surge.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian organizations should expand border reception capacity at Dajabón, Jimaní, and Malpasse crossings ahead of projected continued high return volumes.

International organizations should commission formal absorption capacity assessments for border departments with current IDP and food security data overlaid.

Diplomatic missions in Santo Domingo should seek DGM clarity on whether the January volume reflects a policy acceleration or seasonal enforcement pattern.

Business community with supply chain exposure in Artibonite and border departments should assess labor market disruption from forced returnee concentrations.

Political actors engaged with the diaspora should address the DR deportation trajectory directly in community communications given the volume's visibility in diaspora media.



## CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 4: GSF FINANCING, GOVERNANCE TRANSITION, AND DIASPORA:  
CONSOLIDATED UPDATE

French Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot's February 18 address to the French Senate provided the most detailed public accounting of an international contributor's Haiti engagement. France committed approximately EUR 40 million total in 2025 across security, humanitarian, and development categories: EUR 17 million in humanitarian aid including school canteens, EUR 17 million in AFD development projects covering health, education, governance, and agriculture, EUR 4 million in support to the Forces Armees d'Haiti and security forces, and a new EUR 3.5 million contribution to the GSF trust fund. Barrot projected progressive GSF deployment of 6,000 police officers and 5,500 soldiers across April and September 2026 windows, the most concrete public timeline available from any contributing government.

The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie issued a statement in early February expressing concern that persistent fragmentation of Haiti's national political class had not produced a sufficiently broad consensus. The OIF formally noted that power has been held since February 7, 2026, by the Council of Ministers under the Prime Minister following the expiration of the Transitional Presidential Council's original mandate. The OIF called on political leaders to prioritize national interest over partisan positioning. This multilateral acknowledgment of the governance gap is significant as it comes from a body with observer credibility distinct from direct bilateral partners.



**The HOPE/HELP trade preference extension passed the House 345-45 on January 12 but faces Senate stalling with no Finance Committee markup scheduled. The most viable vehicle for passage remains a must-pass government funding package, but Senate negotiations are blocked by DHS and immigration policy disputes unrelated to Haiti. Senator Warnock called for immediate Senate action; Representative Salazar emphasized the 10,000-plus Haitian jobs at stake and the program's role in reducing migration pressure. Without Senate passage, the retroactive extension from September 2025 provides legal cover but investor confidence in long-term textile sector viability remains structurally impaired.**

On diaspora developments, media personality Carel Pedre was released from Krome Service Processing Center in Florida on February 27 after more than two months in immigration detention. Criminal charges of misdemeanor domestic battery, which prompted his December 21, 2025, arrest, were subsequently dropped, and a Florida judge approved bail. His case drew sustained diaspora attention given his profile as host of the Chokarella platform. Separately, the DHS termination of Temporary Protected Status for Haitians, effective February 2, 2026, affects an estimated 350,000 Haitians. Court litigation by attorneys who previously defeated the prior TPS

termination attempt is ongoing with no ruling timeline confirmed.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

France's historical engagement with Haiti carries colonial legacy dimensions that make public financial disclosures politically sensitive in both countries. The HOPE/HELP program, first enacted in 2006 following the devastating 2004-2006 political crisis period, has been the primary US legislative mechanism for Haiti economic integration and has required periodic reauthorization through bipartisan coalition-building.

## TALKING POINTS

France's EUR 3.5 million GSF contribution and Barrot's 6,000-plus-5,500 deployment projection provide the clearest international commitment timeline now on public record.

OIF's formal acknowledgment of the Council of Ministers governance arrangement validates the post-CPT transition as an internationally recognized, if not ideally structured, governance framework.

HOPE/HELP Senate stalling in a must-pass vehicle scenario creates investor uncertainty in a sector employing more than 10,000 Haitian workers.

Carel Pedre's release resolves a high-profile diaspora case but illustrates the legal exposure facing prominent Haitians in the US immigration system.

TPS termination for 350,000 Haitians is the single largest unresolved diaspora policy threat with active litigation as the only near-term relief mechanism.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Donor governments should use France's public EUR 40 million breakdown as a transparency benchmark and publish comparable contribution accounting.

International organizations monitoring governance legitimacy should track OIF positioning as a leading indicator of multilateral consensus on Haiti's Council of Ministers arrangement.

Business community with Haiti textile sector exposure should scenario-plan for HOPE/HELP passage in a government funding vehicle versus a standalone bill on different timescales.

Diaspora legal services organizations should increase outreach to TPS-affected Haitians regarding court proceedings and status maintenance requirements during litigation.

Diplomatic missions should assess whether Bachelet UN SG candidacy engagement by Chile, Mexico, and Brazil creates a leverage window for Haiti in multilateral forums before year-end.



## CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor PNH communications for Tabarre operational follow-up. If PNH announces consolidation and permanent deployment in cleared zones, trajectory is toward sustained security gain; if silence follows, gang re-entrenchment is the risk. GSF financial commitment finalization, which the February 2026 window was targeting, should produce confirmatory statements or reveal contribution gaps in the immediate period.

### THIS WEEK

Track whether the Senate Finance Committee schedules any action on HOPE/HELP in the context of government funding negotiations; any markup date or confirmed vehicle inclusion changes the textile sector risk calculus significantly. CEP response to the unresolved Article 12 constitutional authority question from February 25 reporting is a governance watchpoint. TPS litigation developments at the court level, including any emergency stay or scheduling order, will determine near-term status security for 350,000 Haitians. Cap-Haïtien flood and landslide impact should be monitored if seasonal rains continue; the December 2024 environmental emergency declaration indicates structural vulnerability.

### STRATEGIC HORIZON

The April GSF deployment window is the single most consequential near-term variable for electoral feasibility. If 6,000 police officers deploy as France's Barrot projected, the security prerequisites for expanding voter registration into currently gang-controlled communes become measurable. If deployment slips or falls below projected numbers, the August 30 vote date faces structural impossibility rather than operational challenge. The DR deportation trajectory at over 35,000 per month is unsustainable for Haitian domestic absorption and will require either diplomatic engagement or humanitarian emergency classification before mid-year. PM Fils-Aime's open-ended mandate under the National Pact will face increasing legitimacy pressure from excluded political actors as the electoral calendar uncertainty extends.

### PRIMARY SOURCES

2. Le Nouvelliste, Operation anti-gang de la PNH a Tabarre, February 27, 2026.  
<https://lenouvelliste.com/article/264672/operation-anti-gang-de-la-pnh-a-tabarre>
3. Le National, La PNH poursuit son offensive contre les gangs armes.  
[https://www.lenational.org/post\\_article.php?pol=7543](https://www.lenational.org/post_article.php?pol=7543)

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

7. Canada-Haiti, Inside Haiti's road to 2026 elections: CEP revises calendar, keeps August 30 vote date.

<https://canada-haiti.ca/content/inside-haitis-road-2026-elections-cep-revises-calendar-keeps-aug-30-vote-date>

9. ReliefWeb / IOM, Haiti: Key information on forced returns in Haiti in 2025.

<https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-key-information-forced-returns-haiti-2025>

10. Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, Haiti: l'OIF appelle a un consensus national en faveur de la stabilite, February 10, 2026.

<https://www.francophonie.org/haiti-loif-appelle-a-un-consensus-national-en-faveur-de-la-stabilite-et-de-la-tenue-d>

11. Vie-Publique, Discours de Jean-Noel Barrot, ministere de l'Europe et des affaires etrangeres, February 18, 2026.

<https://www.vie-publique.fr/discours/302165-jean-noel-barrot-18022026-france-haiti>

16. IJDH, DHS Redesignates Haiti for Temporary Protected Status.

<https://www.ijdh.org/our-work/immigration-and-asylum/temporary-protected-status/>

17. Le Nouvelliste, CEP Lacks Authority to Change the Constitution as Intended by the National Pact, February 25, 2026.

<https://lenouvelliste.com/en/article/264647/cep-lacks-authority-to-change-the-constitution-as-intended-by-the-nati>

1. HaitiLibre, Haiti News Zapping, February 27, 2026.

<https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46957-haiti-news-zapping.html>

5. HaitiLibre, Haiti Security: Kidnapping foiled, 8 dead including 2 police officers, February 23, 2026.

<https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46921-haiti-security-kidnapping-foiled-8-dead-including-2-police-officers.html>

15. Juno7, Update: Carel Pedre Released After Judge Approved Bail, February 27, 2026.

<https://www.juno7.ht/carel-pedre-release-bail-approved-florida/>

6. HaitiLibre, Haiti Kenscoff: Large-scale operation, at least 16 bandits killed, February 21, 2026.

<https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46905-haiti-kenscoff-large-scale-operation-at-least-16-bandits-killed.html>