



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

February 26, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's post-CPT governance framework solidified on February 26 as Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime secured US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's endorsement of the National Pact for Stability and Elections at the 50th CARICOM summit in Basseterre. The Pact, signed by over 200 political parties and civil society organizations on February 21-22, establishes the legal foundation for the interim period through the February 7, 2027 presidential inauguration target. Security forces recaptured the strategic Carrefour-Aeroport junction in Port-au-Prince, the first significant territorial recovery in the capital. A 10-year \$542 million border security contract received judicial approval. The GSF deployment timeline targeting April 2026 remains the decisive variable for the August 30 first-round election.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

PM Fils-Aime received direct US endorsement of the National Pact from Secretary Rubio at the CARICOM summit, consolidating international legitimacy for the post-CPT interim government.

Haitian security forces recaptured Carrefour-Aeroport from Viv Ansanm gang control, the first tangible territorial recovery in Port-au-Prince after months of sustained operations.

The \$542 million border security contract with the Evergreen-Alex Stewart consortium received CSCCA judicial approval, committing Haiti to a 10-year border modernization program.

GSF deployment is on track for April 2026, with up to 7,500 pledged personnel from six countries, but force generation pace remains uncertain against the August 30 electoral deadline.

Haiti's humanitarian situation remains critical with 1.45 million displaced, 5.7 million food insecure, and a February 20 BINUH-OHCHR report documenting systematic gang trafficking of children.

DEVELOPMENT 1: FILS-AIME SECURES US ENDORSEMENT AT CARICOM SUMMIT

Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime met with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio on February 25 on the margins of the 50th CARICOM Heads of Government Conference in Basseterre, St. Kitts and Nevis. Rubio characterized the National Pact as a strong signal of hope and collective responsibility essential for restoring national and international trust. Discussions covered the security situation, GSF deployment support including specialized personnel and logistics, and the conditions necessary for credible elections. The bilateral meeting represents the highest-level US-Haiti diplomatic engagement since the CPT's dissolution.

The National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections was officially presented on February 23 at the Villa d'Accueil in Port-au-Prince, drawing ambassadors from the US, Mexico, Canada, and France alongside the BINUH Special Representative, over 200 political parties, the private sector, and civil society. The 30-article document establishes the legal framework for the post-CPT interim period from February 7, 2026, through the installation of elected officials. Key provisions vest

executive power in the Council of Ministers under PM leadership per the May 23, 2024 decree, mandate a non-partisan technical cabinet, bar government members from using public resources for partisan purposes, and explicitly prohibit Fils-Aime from running as a candidate.

Critics have characterized the February 7 transfer of full executive authority to Fils-Aime as a soft coup, with HaitiLibre noting the Pact grants the Prime Minister and his government full powers without a clearly defined term limit. The Pact is Haiti's fourth power-sharing agreement since President Moise's 2021 assassination. Its durability rests on sustained international backing, security progress, and voluntary compliance by over 200 signatories who have signed without an enforcement mechanism. The EU, France, and Canada have each endorsed Fils-Aime's continued tenure, providing the multilateral legitimacy buffer that insulates the arrangement from domestic opposition.



At CARICOM, Fils-Aime outlined a three-phase security strategy: combined PNH, FAd'H, and GSF operations against gangs; arrests and judicial prosecution; and youth reinsertion programs with UNICEF support. He expressed confidence that elections would be held by year-end and cited the Carrefour-Aeroport recapture as evidence that state authority can be restored. Finland pledged over \$2 million specifically for Haiti's humanitarian response, and discussions were reported as underway with the UAE on security and investment partnerships.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has operated without an elected parliament since January 2020 and without a president since President Jovenel Moise's assassination in July 2021. The CPT itself was established in April 2024 as a provisional structure following a prior power-sharing agreement, completing its mandate on February 7, 2026, exactly as scheduled. No elections have been held in Haiti since 2016.

TALKING POINTS

The Rubio bilateral endorsement represents the strongest explicit US backing for Fils-Aime since the CPT's dissolution and reduces the risk of a US policy reversal that could destabilize the interim arrangement.

The National Pact's prohibition on Fils-Aime running for office is the Pact's most important credibility mechanism and its most visible point of vulnerability if political pressure mounts in the pre-election period.

Over 200 signatories creates broad nominal legitimacy but also distributes compliance risk across actors with divergent interests who face no penalty for withdrawal.

The Advisory Committee of political, union, private sector, and civil society representatives remains unformed and its operationalization will be the first institutional test of Pact implementation.

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International recognition from the US, France, EU, Canada, and CARICOM insulates Fils-Aime against attempts by sanctioned CPT members or opposition actors to contest his authority.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should condition programming commitments on Advisory Committee formation as the earliest verifiable indicator of Pact implementation capacity.

Diplomatic missions should track the cabinet reshuffle timeline as the first concrete test of whether Fils-Aime will honor the Pact's non-partisan technical cabinet requirement.

Private sector stakeholders should note that Fils-Aime's ineligibility to run creates a structural incentive for him to deliver on electoral timelines to protect his post-office political legacy.

Political actors and diaspora organizations should seek representation in the Advisory Committee formation process before membership is finalized.

Intelligence watch should be maintained on any new US visa revocations or Treasury sanctions against political figures seeking to leverage the post-CPT moment for personal positioning.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: CARREFOUR-AEROPORT RECAPTURE AND GSF DEPLOYMENT TIMELINE

Haitian national police recaptured the Carrefour-Aéroport junction in central Port-au-Prince following a sustained offensive launched in December 2025, supported by a private security firm and Kenyan police officers from the UN-backed mission. The police substation burned by Viv Ansanm gang members in March 2024 was renovated and formally reopened on February 7. As of February 26, armored police vehicles and heavily armed officers patrol the area, and small businesses, street vendors, and tap-tap buses are returning to the junction. Romain Le Cour of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime described the recapture as probably one of the very first tangible messages that state forces can retake territory.

The recovery is significant in symbolic terms but must be contextualized against the broader security map. Gangs still control approximately 90% of Port-au-Prince. Surrounding areas of Carrefour-Aéroport remain devastated, with charred homes in ruins, businesses and schools shuttered, and residents expressing fear that the peace is temporary. The PNH has conducted intensified operations since late December 2025, including kamikaze drone strikes against gang positions. On January 17, a drone strike demolished the residence of Jimmy Cherizier, known as

Barbecue, head of the Viv Ansanm coalition.

The Gang Suppression Force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2793 on September 30, 2025, is transitioning from the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission. Authorized strength stands at 5,550 personnel with pledges of up to 7,500 from Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, and Bangladesh. First arrivals are expected in April 2026 with full deployment targeted by October 2026. Kenya's Godfrey Otunge remains Acting Commander. The current Kenyan contingent stands at approximately 1,000 officers following the fifth rotation, which arrived in December 2025. The United States is providing no troops but is funding a substantial portion of mission costs plus \$5 million in non-lethal assistance to the FAd'H, the first such assistance since the 1990s.

Three US warships, the USS Stockdale guided-missile destroyer, the USCGC Stone, and the USCGC Diligence, were deployed to the Bay of Port-au-Prince on February 3 under Operation Southern Spear directed by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. The deployment coincided with the final days of the CPT and served simultaneously as a counter-narcotics operation and a political signal backing Fils-Aime's consolidation. The naval presence has since become a persistent feature of the security environment and signals sustained US commitment to the transition.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Kenya-led MSS mission launched operations in June 2024 but was consistently hampered by funding gaps, force generation shortfalls, and gang adaptation to its tactics. The GSF replaces the MSS with a larger mandate, a formal UN command structure, and broader contributing country participation intended to overcome the MSS's chronic limitations.

TALKING POINTS

The Carrefour-Aeroport recapture is operationally modest but politically essential as the first visible evidence that the PNH-GSF combined strategy can produce territorial results.

The April 2026 GSF arrival target must be met to maintain the August 30 first-round election timeline; a three-month delay in GSF deployment would arithmetically foreclose the current electoral calendar.

The drone strike campaign against gang leadership represents a tactical evolution that is producing results but also escalating gang retaliatory pressure against civilian populations.

US naval presence in Port-au-Prince Bay is a coercive signal directed as much at Haitian political actors contemplating destabilization as at narcotrafficking networks.

The 90% gang territorial control figure in Port-au-Prince means all current security gains remain reversible and contingent on sustained operational tempo.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian organizations should plan operational timelines on the assumption that GSF April arrival is the optimistic scenario and build contingency capacity for a June-July effective deployment date.

Businesses operating in Port-au-Prince should treat Carrefour-Aeroport as an indicator zone: sustained commercial normalization there over 60 days would signal a durable shift; renewed gang pressure would signal continued vulnerability.

Security planners should assess whether the drone strike campaign against gang leadership is accelerating Viv Ansanm fragmentation or triggering internal consolidation under successor commanders.

International mission coordinators should press contributing countries for firm troop deployment schedules ahead of the April window to prevent last-minute force generation failures.



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Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3: BORDER SECURITY CONTRACT AND ELECTORAL CALENDAR STATUS

The Superior Court of Accounts and Administrative Disputes approved a 10-year \$542,634,238 border security contract between four Haitian government ministries and a consortium led by Evergreen Trading System Limited and Alex Stewart International. The contract covers satellite surveillance equipment, drones, scanners, and helicopters; cargo and container scanners at the maritime ports of Port-au-Prince, Cap-Haïtien, and Saint-Louis-du-Sud; vehicle scanners at the Malpasse, Belladere, and Ouanaminthe border crossings; and reconstruction of customs and migration infrastructure. PM Fils-Aime stated that controlling Haiti's border is the government's first responsibility and signaled openness to normalized relations with the Dominican Republic, noting that the two nations share an island and cannot remain estranged.

The CEP's revised electoral calendar, published in Le Moniteur in December 2025, establishes the following timeline: campaign period opens May 19, 2026; electoral lists published July 31, 2026; first-round elections for legislative and presidential offices August 30, 2026; first-round results October 3, 2026; second round December 6, 2026; and presidential inauguration February 7, 2027. The CEP has identified 23 communes under armed gang control across the West, Artibonite, Centre, and Northwest departments, which presents major implications for electoral logistics. No elections have been held in Haiti since 2016. The total cost of the electoral process is estimated at \$120 million.

An institutional friction point exists in the electoral framework. Two major additions were made to the electoral decree published in Le Moniteur on December 1, 2025, without the CEP's consent or approval. This unilateral modification of the electoral legal framework creates a basis for legal challenges and signals that the interim government has not fully delineated its authority from the CEP's technical independence. The CEP must also still publish diaspora voting procedures, a commitment reflected in the National Pact but without a published implementation timeline.



The HOPE/HELP textile trade preference program represents the most immediate economic stabilization lever. The US House of Representatives passed HR 6504 on January 12, 2026, by a bipartisan vote of 345 to 45, extending duty-free treatment for Haitian textiles retroactively from September 2025 through December 2026 with potential extension to December 2028 pending Senate action. The program accounts for approximately 90% of Haiti's exports. The Association of Industries of Haiti has called for a 10-year extension to generate the investment confidence that a single-year renewal cannot provide.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's last electoral cycle in 2015-2016 was marred by fraud allegations that led to the annulment of the first round and the eventual election of Jovenel Moïse in 2017. The subsequent collapse of the parliament in January 2020 left Moïse governing by decree until his assassination, eliminating the institutional infrastructure that any credible 2026 election must reconstruct from near-zero capacity.

TALKING POINTS

The \$542 million border contract signals government intent to formalize trade flows and assert territorial sovereignty, but the feasibility of implementation over a 10-year period in the current security environment requires independent assessment.

The August 30 first-round target requires that the CEP establish operational capacity in all 23 gang-controlled communes before the May 19 campaign opening, a three-month window that is operationally compressed.

The unauthorized modification of the electoral decree without CEP consent is a structural vulnerability that opposition actors or disqualified parties could use to challenge electoral results post-election.

Senate inaction on HOPE/HELP would remove duty-free status for Haiti's dominant export sector, triggering immediate plant closure risk in an industry employing tens of thousands of the most vulnerable workers.

Fils-Aimé's framing of DR border relations as a shared responsibility rather than a bilateral grievance represents a measurable shift from the CPT-era posture and opens a diplomatic window that was

previously closed.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Textile sector investors should model both scenarios for Senate HOPE/HELP action and request specific Senate timeline clarity from their Washington representatives before making capital allocation decisions.

CEP-monitoring stakeholders should treat the May 19 campaign opening date as the first hard deadline that will reveal whether electoral preparations are on track or sliding.

Trade policy analysts should assess the new maritime-only import routing requirement for goods transshipped through the DR, which creates immediate cost and logistics burdens for US agricultural exporters and Haitian consumers alike.

International observers planning August 30 election monitoring missions should begin contingency planning for scenarios in which the vote is postponed to the December 6 slot or deferred beyond 2026.



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Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 4: HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY: CHILD TRAFFICKING REPORT AND DISPLACEMENT CRISIS

A joint BINUH-OHCHR report released February 20 documented systematic trafficking of children by Haitian gangs. Most of the 26 gangs operating in Port-au-Prince and surrounding areas maintain child recruitment schemes ranging from errand running and extortion collection to kidnappings, targeted killings, and sexual violence against girls. Over 500,000 children were estimated to live in gang-controlled areas in 2024. Between January 2022 and December 2025, at least 806 children, including 536 boys and 270 girls, were among the 26,188 people killed or injured. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk stated that children in Haiti are being robbed of their childhoods and their futures.

The displacement situation has reached 1,450,254 internally displaced persons according to the latest IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix, distributed across 272 displacement sites including 149 in provincial departments and 97 in Port-au-Prince. The food security picture is equally severe: 5.7 million people, approximately 50% of Haiti's population, are food insecure according to WFP. FEWS NET projects 3.49 million people will require food assistance between October 2025 and May 2026, with peak needs in the February-May lean season that is now underway. Inflation stands at 31.9% overall with food inflation exceeding 35%, and food commodity prices run 30 to 77% above the Latin

America and Caribbean regional average. An estimated 277,000 children are in acute malnutrition.

The gourde exchange rate has remained broadly stable at approximately 131.1 HTG per USD as of February 26, representing a marginal depreciation of approximately 0.2% from January levels. The rate has not triggered a devaluation alert. This relative stability is significant given the governance transition and security uncertainty, but it coexists with structural inflation driven by supply chain disruption, import dependency, and fuel price pressures that no monetary stability can address alone. Remittances remain a critical economic lifeline, particularly as humanitarian needs peak during the current lean season.

The BINUH child trafficking report has immediate operational implications for international organizations. The seven-pillar strategy recommended by OHCHR prioritizes social protection, education as safe spaces, rehabilitation over criminalization of recruited children, and enforcement of the UN arms embargo. For security-focused donors and missions, the report creates advocacy pressure to ensure rights-compliant procedures in all anti-gang operations and to prevent child survivors of gang exploitation from being processed through punitive rather than rehabilitative channels. Sunrise Airways has suspended all flights to and from Port-au-Prince citing security concerns, further isolating the capital from regional aviation networks.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's child protection crisis predates the current gang expansion. BINUH has documented systematic killing, injury, and displacement of children since 2022, but the February 2026 report is the most comprehensive documentation to date and the first to quantify the scale of gang-organized child trafficking across all 26 major gang structures simultaneously.

TALKING POINTS

The BINUH-OHCHR child trafficking report shifts the international advocacy baseline: all security operations in Port-au-Prince must now be evaluated against a rights-compliance framework that explicitly addresses child survivors of gang recruitment.

1.45 million displaced persons represents a protection and logistics challenge that will intensify, not diminish, during the pre-election security operations required to open gang-controlled communes to the electoral process.

Inflation at 31.9% with food inflation above 35% means that nominal gourde stability provides no relief to the majority of the population whose purchasing power continues to erode in real terms.

The Sunrise Airways suspension of Port-au-Prince flights is a commercial signal that private aviation operators have reassessed the risk threshold, creating pressure on the FAA flight ban review scheduled for March 2026.

Finland's \$2 million Haiti humanitarian pledge and ongoing WFP pipeline represent positive but

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insufficient financing against a \$120 million electoral budget and a multi-year humanitarian gap.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

NGO protection clusters should immediately convene a working group to translate the OHCHR seven-pillar framework into operational SOPs for child protection during GSF-led anti-gang operations expected beginning April 2026.

Humanitarian funding managers should prioritize the February-May lean season window in current disbursement timelines, as this is the peak need period for the 3.49 million requiring food assistance.

Aviation stakeholders should monitor the FAA flight ban review in March 2026 as the key regulatory signal that will determine whether international airline reentry into Port-au-Prince becomes feasible before the August election cycle.

Private sector intelligence officers should incorporate the Sunrise Airways suspension as an indicator of the gap between official security assessments and commercial operator risk perception.

Diaspora organizations should mobilize remittance support specifically calibrated to the February-May lean season peak, coordinating with WFP and local distribution networks to maximize food access efficiency.



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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

The 50th CARICOM summit concludes on February 27. Monitor for a joint communique language on Haiti that either strengthens or qualifies the Fils-Aime endorsement; any softening of CARICOM language would signal regional diplomatic reservation not visible in bilateral meetings. Watch for CPT-era sanctioned officials to issue public statements attempting to contest the National Pact's legitimacy while international attention is focused on Basseterre. Monitor Port-au-Prince security incident reporting for any gang countermoves against Carrefour-Aeroport designed to test whether the recapture is defensible.

THIS WEEK

The Advisory Committee formation process under the National Pact should begin within days of Fils-Aime's return from Basseterre; failure to initiate that process within one week would be a

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significant implementation indicator to flag. The cabinet reshuffle timeline should become clearer as the PM returns and faces pressure to demonstrate the Pact's non-partisan technical cabinet requirement is being honored. The FAA flight ban review for Port-au-Prince, scheduled for March, is now within the immediate planning horizon. Monitor the HOPE/HELP Senate calendar for any scheduled committee action.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

GSF troop generation ahead of the April 2026 arrival window is the single most consequential variable in Haiti's near-term trajectory. If pledged forces from Burkina Faso, Burundi, Chad, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, and Bangladesh begin pre-deployment confirmation, the August 30 electoral timeline remains viable. If force generation stalls, the CEP will face an impossible logistics problem in 23 gang-controlled communes. The CEP's ability to establish operational presence in those communes before the May 19 campaign opening is the leading indicator of electoral feasibility. The Senate HOPE/HELP vote before the September 2025 retroactive cutoff becomes commercially critical for the textile sector. Dominican Republic diplomatic normalization, if Fils-Aime proceeds with the outreach he signaled at CARICOM, could materially shift border trade dynamics and bilateral security coordination within 60 to 90 days.

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