



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

February 25, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A downtown Port-au-Prince shootout involving suspected kidnapers reportedly wearing police uniforms and operating a government vehicle marks a critical escalation in Haiti's security environment. The incident, which left an unconfirmed toll of two police officers and two alleged kidnapers dead, converges with a U.S. Embassy security alert warning of rising kidnappings for ransom in Delmas involving law enforcement impersonators. On the governance front, no new CPT decrees emerged in the February 23-24 window, and the CEP electoral calendar remains unchanged. The dominant operational risk for the near term is the use of fake checkpoints to target civilian and commercial movement, which directly threatens humanitarian corridors and business continuity across the metropolitan area.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

A downtown Port-au-Prince armed confrontation involving suspected police impostors signals possible infiltration or uniform diversion within security forces.

The U.S. Embassy has issued an active security alert specifically naming Delmas as a high-risk kidnapping zone with law enforcement impersonation tactics in use.

No new CPT governance actions or CEP electoral calendar changes were recorded in the February 23-24 reporting cycle.

ONI launched a new national ID card distribution phase targeting Gressier residents under the Kat Ou La operation, beginning February 24, 2026.

No confirmed BRH exchange rate data or fuel pricing update was retrieved; security-driven supply chain disruption remains the primary economic risk indicator.

DEVELOPMENT 1: POLICE IMPOSTOR NETWORK OPERATES IN DOWNTOWN PORT-AU-PRINCE

Port-au-Prince witnessed a live-fire engagement on between PNH officers and a suspected kidnapping cell operating in broad daylight in the downtown corridor. Witnesses reported to AP that the suspects were wearing police uniforms and had access to a government-registered vehicle, indicating either active infiltration of the PNH or a systematic diversion of state uniforms and equipment to criminal networks. The provisional casualty count stands at two police officers

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and two alleged kidnappers killed, though PNH and DICOP have not issued formal confirmation.

The operational profile of this cell is consistent with a broader pattern documented across the metropolitan area: the establishment of fake checkpoints on urban arterial routes to intercept vehicles, with drivers and passengers taken for ransom. This tactic has been documented in Delmas, and its appearance in the downtown core represents a geographic expansion of the threat. The use of state symbols -- uniforms and vehicles -- as cover complicates the PNH's ability to signal legitimate authority to civilian populations, which degrades compliance with security force instructions and increases the risk of misidentification in contested zones.

The convergence of this incident with the existing U.S. Embassy security alert underscores that the kidnapping ecosystem is not a localized phenomenon but an organized, multi-vector operation with deliberate mimicry of state functions. Whether the implicated individuals were serving officers acting criminally, former officers, or civilians who acquired state equipment through illicit channels has direct implications for the PNH's institutional integrity. Each scenario demands a different remediation response from PNH leadership and the MSS mission.

The failure to obtain official PNH or DICOP confirmation within 24 hours of a downtown incident of this magnitude is itself an indicator. It points either to institutional reluctance to acknowledge force infiltration or to a communications breakdown within the security apparatus at a moment when operational transparency is essential for civilian compliance and international mission coordination.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The PNH has faced documented infiltration by criminal networks since at least 2019, with multiple high-profile cases of officers identified as gang affiliates or active participants in kidnapping operations. The Delmas corridor has historically been among the most active kidnapping zones in the metropolitan area, predating the post-2021 political instability.

TALKING POINTS

A government vehicle and police uniforms were used by suspected kidnappers in a downtown Port-au-Prince armed engagement on .

Provisional casualty count is two police officers and two suspected kidnappers killed; PNH has not confirmed.

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The fake checkpoint tactic has migrated from Delmas into the downtown core, marking a geographic escalation.

Institutional integrity of the PNH cannot be assessed without official clarification on whether implicated individuals were serving officers.

MSS mission coordination must account for civilian inability to distinguish legitimate from counterfeit law enforcement presence.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations and NGO security focal points must immediately update movement protocols to treat all checkpoint encounters -- including those staffed by uniformed personnel -- as requiring verification before compliance.

PNH leadership should issue a public statement within 48 hours confirming or denying officer involvement; silence on this point accelerates institutional credibility erosion.

MSS mission commanders should request a joint PNH-MSS review of uniform and equipment inventory controls to assess the diversion risk vector.

Diplomatic missions should factor the fake law enforcement tactic into updated travel advisories and internal staff movement guidelines.



CONFIDENCE



Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: U.S. EMBASSY SECURITY ALERT FORMALIZES KIDNAPPING RISK IN DELMAS CORRIDOR

The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince issued a security alert, referenced in USA Today reporting dated February 19, 2026, specifically warning American citizens and residents of an increase in kidnappings for ransom concentrated in the Delmas area. The alert explicitly identified the use of

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individuals posing as law enforcement as a key operational method, mirroring the profile of the downtown incident. Haiti's Level 4 "Do Not Travel" designation was reiterated. The State Department's country information page for Haiti was updated in parallel to reflect the current advisory status.

The formal issuance of a named-corridor security alert by the Embassy carries operational weight beyond its advisory function. It signals that U.S. intelligence and diplomatic assessment has moved from general country-level risk to specific geographic and tactical characterization. This level of specificity -- naming Delmas, naming the police impersonation tactic -- reflects confirmed pattern data rather than precautionary language, and aligns with the ground-level incident reported on .

For the business and NGO community, the Embassy alert functions as a force-majeure trigger in many organizational security protocols. Operations with standing requirements to suspend activities upon Embassy Level 4 alert issuance or upgrade must review whether the new alert language constitutes a qualifying event. Legal and compliance teams in international organizations with Haiti operations should be engaged immediately.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The U.S. Embassy has maintained a Level 4 "Do Not Travel" advisory for Haiti continuously since October 2022. Previous corridor-specific alerts have been issued for Martissant, the Route Nationale 2 corridor, and Cite Soleil, but Delmas-specific alerts with law enforcement impersonation language represent an escalation in tactical specificity.

TALKING POINTS

U.S. Embassy security alert specifically names Delmas and police impersonation as active kidnapping risk factors.

Level 4 "Do Not Travel" advisory remains in force and was reinforced by the February 19 alert.

The Embassy's tactical specificity -- naming location and method -- indicates confirmed pattern data rather than precautionary language.

Organizations with security protocols tied to Embassy advisory levels must assess whether current conditions constitute a qualifying suspension trigger.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

All international organizations and NGOs with Haiti operations should circulate the Embassy alert internally and confirm receipt by security focal points within 24 hours.

Operations using road vehicles in the Delmas corridor should require two-person teams and mandatory check-in protocols until the PNH confirms resolution of the identified network.

Organizations should review force-majeure and suspension clauses in Haiti programming contracts in light of the current advisory language.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3: GOVERNANCE CYCLE QUIET BUT ONI LAUNCHES KAT OU LA DISTRIBUTION IN GRESSIER

The February 23-24 reporting window produced no new CPT decrees, press conferences, or authoritative communiques related to post-February 21 National Pact follow-on activity. The CEP electoral calendar remains unchanged with no postponement or new compliance deadlines announced. While the absence of governance action during a 24-hour cycle is not itself a significant indicator, the sustained silence on National Pact implementation represents an emerging gap between the political momentum of the February 21 signing and any observable institutional follow-through.

The ONI launched a new distribution phase of the Carte d'Identification Nationale under its Kat Ou La operation, targeting Gressier residents beginning February 24, 2026. Distribution is conducted at the ONI office housed within the Leogane city hall, requiring presentation of a registration receipt and supporting identification documents. This operation represents a continuing effort to extend civil documentation coverage to peri-urban and rural populations that have historically been underserved by national ID infrastructure.

The operational significance of the ONI distribution goes beyond administrative routine. National

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ID card coverage is a structural prerequisite for voter registration and electoral participation. Expansion of CIN distribution into areas such as Gressier -- which lies in the Ouest department but outside the Port-au-Prince urban core -- reflects an attempt to build the civil registry infrastructure that any credible electoral process will require. The timing relative to the CEP's electoral calendar warrants tracking to assess whether documentation expansion is keeping pace with voter registration timelines.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's civil documentation system has been chronically underfunded and geographically uneven, with large portions of the rural and peri-urban population lacking valid CINs. This structural gap has historically suppressed voter registration rates and created access barriers in previous electoral cycles.

TALKING POINTS

No CPT decrees or press conferences were recorded in the February 23-24 cycle; National Pact implementation follow-through remains unverified.

CEP electoral calendar is unchanged; no postponement announced.

ONI launched CIN distribution in Gressier under Kat Ou La starting February 24, using the Leogane city hall as distribution point.

Civil documentation expansion is a prerequisite for voter registration; the pace of ONI operations relative to CEP timelines requires monitoring.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Analysts tracking the transition timeline should flag the absence of CPT post-National Pact implementation actions as a monitoring indicator; a second 24-48 hour cycle without communiques warrants escalation to a governance-stall assessment.

International organizations supporting electoral infrastructure should map ONI distribution coverage against CEP voter registration zones to identify documentation gaps that could suppress eligible voter participation.



CONFIDENCE



Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 4: ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE INDICATORS ABSENT; SECURITY RISK PROXIES DOMINATE

No BRH exchange rate bulletin, confirmed HTG/USD daily closing rate, or fuel pricing update was captured in the February 23-24 reporting cycle. The Haiti Libre front page reviewed for this cycle showed no new airport or port closure notices. The primary economic stress signal in this cycle is not a formal macroeconomic indicator but the operational security environment itself: fake checkpoints and kidnapping networks operating on urban arterial routes function as a de facto supply chain disruption mechanism, taxing the cost of movement for commercial and humanitarian actors alike even in the absence of formal infrastructure closure.

The inability to retrieve a BRH daily rate in a given cycle is itself a data-quality flag. In a context where the gourde has experienced periodic acute devaluation events, a missing closing price should not be treated as evidence of stability. Analysts and financial officers working in Haiti should maintain direct BRH channel subscriptions rather than relying on secondary source aggregation for exchange rate data.

The Toussaint Louverture International Airport and Port-au-Prince seaport showed no formal closure indicators, but the security perimeter conditions affecting ground transport to and from both facilities remain a persistent operational constraint. Fuel depot access, which has been disrupted in previous security escalations, must be monitored as the kidnapping network activity in the metropolitan zone increases.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's informal economy and remittance-dependent household sector are acutely sensitive to gourde fluctuation. The HTG/USD rate has depreciated from approximately 110 per dollar in 2021 to ranges exceeding 130 in recent periods, compressing purchasing power and elevating food insecurity among the urban poor.

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TALKING POINTS

No BRH exchange rate data was retrieved in this cycle; absence should not be read as stability confirmation.

Airport and seaport remain operational with no formal closure notices in the February 23-24 window.

Fake checkpoint activity on urban routes constitutes a de facto supply chain disruption even without formal infrastructure shutdown.

Fuel depot access requires monitoring as metropolitan security deterioration continues.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Financial officers in Haiti-based organizations should establish direct BRH bulletin subscriptions to avoid data gaps from secondary source failures.

Logistics planners should build route-risk premiums into supply chain cost modeling for the metropolitan area, accounting for the time and risk cost of fake checkpoint exposure.

Fuel stockpiling protocols should be reviewed in light of the escalating security environment and prior patterns of depot access disruption during PNH-gang engagement cycles.



CONFIDENCE



Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

PNH or DICOP official statement on the downtown shooting: trigger is any formal communique; direction of travel is confirmation or denial of officer involvement; risk is that continued silence hardens public perception of institutional compromise and degrades civilian cooperation with

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security forces.

U.S. Embassy follow-on advisory: trigger is any update to the February 19 alert; direction of travel is potential geographic expansion of named high-risk zones; risk is additional operational suspension triggers for international organizations.

CPT post-National Pact activity: trigger is any decree, press conference, or public statement; direction of travel is implementation momentum or stall; risk is that a second full cycle without action signals governance paralysis at a structurally critical moment.

THIS WEEK

CEP compliance deadlines: trigger is any party registration or documentation deadline passing; direction of travel is either compliance consolidation or disqualification proceedings; risk is that electoral calendar integrity is undermined before the process gains traction.

ONI Kat Ou La distribution continuity: trigger is any report of disruption to the Gressier operation; direction of travel is CIN coverage expansion or stall; risk is that insecurity prevents document pickup, creating a suppression effect on future voter registration.

MSS operational posture: trigger is any public update from the Kenya-led mission on deployment numbers or zone coverage; direction of travel is expanded metropolitan presence or continued holding pattern; risk is that PNH capacity erosion outpaces MSS deployment timelines.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

PNH institutional integrity assessment: the incident opens a structural question about uniform and equipment control that cannot be answered within a single news cycle. If PNH leadership does not address it formally, the credibility cost compounds over weeks and degrades both civilian compliance and international mission coordination trust.

Transition timeline pressure: the CPT mandate extends to February 7, 2027. The absence of visible National Pact follow-through in the immediate post-signing period is an early indicator of whether the February 21 agreement will produce durable institutional momentum or replicate prior patterns of political declaration without implementation.

Electoral infrastructure readiness: the gap between CEP calendar ambitions and the documented state of voter registration, civil documentation coverage, and security corridor

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access for electoral operations will determine whether any credible electoral process is achievable within the current transition framework.

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