



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

February 24, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A kidnapping network operating with police uniforms and government vehicles engaged PNH units in a firefight in downtown Port-au-Prince on February 23, with unconfirmed reports of four fatalities. The incident compounds an active U.S. Embassy security alert warning of surging ransom kidnappings in Delmas, where assailants have systematically impersonated law enforcement at fake checkpoints. The dual threat of internal police infiltration and organized impersonation represents the sharpest operational constraint for NGOs and businesses since the Delmas 30 interdictions earlier this week. The CPT transitional government produced no new decrees in the reporting window. The CEP electoral calendar remains in effect without confirmed amendment.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

A downtown Port-au-Prince gunfight between PNH and suspected kidnapers in police uniforms produced provisional reports of four deaths.

The U.S. Embassy has issued an active security alert on kidnapping for ransom concentrated in Delmas; Level 4 Do Not Travel remains in force.

Fake police checkpoints are an active and documented tactic targeting drivers across the metropolitan zone.

No CPT decrees, no CEP calendar changes, and no new GSF or MSS deployment figures were confirmed in the February 23-24 cycle.

ONI has launched a new CIN identification card distribution phase for Gressier residents beginning February 24 under the Kat Ou La operation.

DEVELOPMENT 1: POLICE IMPERSONATION KIDNAPPING NETWORK ENGAGES PNH IN DOWNTOWN FIREFIGHT

On February 23, 2026, Haitian National Police units exchanged gunfire with suspected kidnapers in the downtown Port-au-Prince corridor. Witness accounts sourced by the Associated Press reported that the suspects were wearing police uniforms and operating from a vehicle consistent with government fleet markings. Provisional reporting cited two police officers and two suspected kidnapers killed, though this casualty figure was explicitly characterized as unconfirmed at time of publication, pending official communication from PNH's Direction Centrale de la Police Judiciaire.

The use of authentic-appearing police uniforms and government vehicles introduces a structural

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ambiguity that directly degrades PNH operational credibility in the metropolitan zone. If the suspects were in fact active-duty officers, the incident would represent internal infiltration of the security apparatus by criminal networks, a pattern documented but not previously confirmed at this operational visibility level. If the uniforms and vehicle were diverted or stolen, it indicates a level of logistical sophistication within the kidnapping economy that extends beyond improvised criminal activity.

This incident is analytically continuous with the Delmas fake-checkpoint pattern flagged by the U.S. Embassy security notice published this week. The geographic proximity of these incidents, spanning Delmas to downtown Port-au-Prince, suggests either a coordinated network or a replication of tactics across multiple criminal cells exploiting the same vulnerability: public inability to distinguish legitimate from impersonating law enforcement.

Until PNH or DICOP releases an official incident report with unit identification, casualty confirmation, and suspect status, all operational decisions relying on police presence as a safety indicator must be treated with elevated caution. The evidentiary threshold for confirming infiltration versus impersonation has not yet been met, but the operational consequence for NGOs and businesses is identical in either case.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Gang and criminal networks have historically exploited the Haitian National Police's resource constraints and uniform management gaps to conduct impersonation operations. The pattern of fake-checkpoint kidnapping became a documented operational risk category in the post-2021 security deterioration cycle and has escalated in frequency with the broader collapse of territorial security in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area.

TALKING POINTS

An armed confrontation between PNH and uniformed suspects using a government vehicle occurred in downtown Port-au-Prince on February 23.

Casualty figures of two police and two suspects killed remain unconfirmed pending official PNH communication.

Suspects reportedly wore police uniforms and used government-marked vehicles consistent with active impersonation or infiltration operations.

This incident is operationally linked to the active U.S. Embassy alert on Delmas kidnapping networks using law enforcement impersonation.

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No official PNH after-action statement has been confirmed in this reporting cycle.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Suspend non-essential vehicle movement through downtown Port-au-Prince until PNH releases an official incident report clarifying unit involvement.

Require all staff to verify law enforcement identity through secondary channels before complying with any checkpoint stop.

Elevate internal security protocols to reflect that government vehicles and police uniforms are not reliable indicators of legitimate authority.

Request confirmation from PNH liaison contacts on whether the involved units were uniformed officers or external impersonators.

Flag all active Delmas-area operations for immediate risk reassessment in light of the confirmed pattern connecting Delmas and downtown incidents.



CONFIDENCE



Low confidence due to limited or conflicting reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: U.S. EMBASSY ACTIVE SECURITY ALERT ON KIDNAPPING SURGE IN DELMAS

The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince issued a security notice, reported by USA Today on February 19 and remaining operationally active through the current reporting window, warning American citizens and organizational personnel of a confirmed increase in kidnapping for ransom incidents concentrated in the Delmas commune. The alert specifically identified assailants posing as law enforcement as the dominant operational method and reiterated Haiti's Level 4 Do Not Travel designation. The State Department's travel advisory page confirms this classification remains in effect without modification.

The alert's specificity regarding Delmas as the primary zone of active kidnapping risk is analytically significant. Delmas is a primary transit and residential corridor for NGO compounds, business operations, and diplomatic adjacent housing. The concentration of kidnapping activity in this zone is not incidental but strategic, targeting areas with the highest density of foreign national presence and operational infrastructure, where ransom economics are most favorable

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for criminal networks.

The OSAC field report in the source base corroborates the embassy warning with independent security assessment, lending institutional depth to the advisory. The convergence of the embassy alert, OSAC reporting, and the February 23 downtown incident creates a triangulated operational picture: kidnapping networks are active, expanding in tactical sophistication, and operating across a geographic band from Delmas through central Port-au-Prince.

For international organizations and businesses, the operational implication is not merely elevated caution but a structural reassessment of movement protocols, convoy requirements, and safe house redundancy in the Delmas corridor. The Level 4 designation combined with the fake-checkpoint tactic creates conditions where standard convoy procedures may be insufficient without active law enforcement escort verification.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The U.S. Embassy has maintained an active security alert posture on Haiti since the post-July 2021 crisis escalation. Kidnapping for ransom targeting foreign nationals and Haitian elites became a primary criminal economy driver following the collapse of the Moise government and has persisted through successive transitional administrations without resolution.

TALKING POINTS

The U.S. Embassy issued an active security alert warning of increased kidnapping for ransom in Delmas with law enforcement impersonation as the primary tactic.

Haiti's Level 4 Do Not Travel designation remains in effect with no modification in the current reporting cycle.

OSAC field assessment corroborates the embassy notice with independent institutional reporting.

The Delmas corridor represents the highest-density zone of NGO and business operational infrastructure in the metropolitan area.

The convergence of embassy, OSAC, and incident reporting creates a triangulated threat picture across the Delmas to downtown Port-au-Prince band.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Immediately review and update all organizational movement protocols for the Delmas corridor to

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reflect the confirmed fake-checkpoint threat.

Require minimum two-vehicle convoys for all Delmas-area movements until the alert status is downgraded by the embassy.

Establish direct communication protocols with U.S. Embassy security section for real-time alert updates affecting operational zones.

Brief all local and international staff on the law enforcement impersonation tactic and establish verification protocols before complying with any vehicle stop.

Conduct a 72-hour stand-down of non-critical Delmas movements pending internal risk reassessment.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3: GOVERNANCE STATIC: NO CPT DECREES NO CEP CALENDAR CHANGES IN FEBRUARY 23-24 WINDOW

The Transitional Presidential Council produced no new decrees, press conferences, or official communiqués in the February 23-24 reporting window. Public attention within Haitian political commentary continued to circulate around post-February 21 National Pact follow-on dynamics, but no authoritative governmental communication on implementation or next steps was captured in this cycle's source sweep. The CPT mandate, which runs to February 7, 2027, continues without confirmed modification or constitutional challenge in current reporting.

The absence of CPT output in this window is analytically notable given the National Pact backdrop. The February 21 agreement represented a significant political moment, and the silence in the days immediately following suggests either internal consolidation and deliberation before formal decree issuance, or an inability to translate political consensus into institutional action at the required pace. The distinction matters operationally: the first scenario suggests a brief delay before a governance output; the second suggests the Pact's implementation is encountering structural friction.

The CEP electoral calendar continues to circulate in its existing form without confirmed amendment. HaitiLibre's standing reference to the revised decree and electoral calendar download link remained active in the reporting window, indicating no formal suspension or

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replacement has been issued. The absence of a postponement announcement does not confirm operational readiness but maintains the existing planning horizon for electoral stakeholders.

The combination of governance silence and electoral calendar stasis creates a 48-72 hour window of particular analytical importance. If the CPT does not issue implementation instruments for the National Pact by end of week, the gap between political agreement and institutional follow-through will become a credibility variable for international partners monitoring the transition.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The CPT has operated under persistent institutional fragility since its formation in 2024, frequently experiencing gaps between political agreements and formal decree issuance. The pattern of National Pact-type agreements followed by delayed implementation has recurred across multiple transitional frameworks in the post-2004 period, with implementation gaps consistently exploited by spoiler actors.

TALKING POINTS

The CPT issued no new decrees or official communications in the February 23-24 reporting window.

Post-National Pact follow-on implementation remains unconfirmed in institutional form.

The CEP electoral calendar has not been amended or suspended in the current cycle.

The CPT mandate runs to February 7, 2027, with no confirmed modification to that timeline.

A 48-72 hour window without implementation instruments for the National Pact will constitute a credibility signal for international monitoring partners.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor CPT official channels on a twice-daily basis through end of February for decree issuance on National Pact implementation.

Brief stakeholders that the absence of CEP calendar amendment does not confirm electoral operational readiness.

Do not adjust planning timelines based on electoral calendar until CEP issues a formal operational readiness assessment.

Flag for partners that the governance silence in the post-Pact window is itself an analytical data point requiring interpretation.

Prepare contingency analysis for the scenario in which no implementation decree is issued before March 1.



CONFIDENCE



Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 4: ONI LAUNCHES KAT OU LA IDENTIFICATION OPERATION FOR GRESSIER RESIDENTS

The Office National d'Identification announced a new phase of national identification card distribution targeting residents of Gressier, beginning February 24, 2026. The operation, branded as Kat Ou La, is being conducted from the ONI office housed in the Leogane city hall. Residents with outstanding CIN applications are required to present their original registration receipt and supporting justificatives to collect their cards. No appointment system was confirmed; access appears to be walk-in with documentation.

The operational significance of this initiative extends beyond routine civil registration. In the context of electoral preparation, the expansion of CIN card distribution to underserved municipal zones like Gressier directly affects the eligible voter base. Gressier, located in the Ouest department southwest of Port-au-Prince, contains a population that has historically faced geographic and administrative barriers to civil registration. ONI's deployment to a municipal hall in Leogane, rather than a dedicated urban office, reflects a field-forward approach consistent with pre-electoral civil registration drives.

The Kat Ou La framing, a Kreyol phrase meaning Your Card Is There, signals a public communication strategy designed to reduce passive non-collection among registered applicants who have not claimed completed documents. This approach targets a specific gap in Haitian civil registration pipelines: the completion of the administrative process without physical card delivery to the citizen. If successful, it converts registered applicants into fully documented citizens eligible for electoral participation.

The timing of this operation, launching February 24 with the current electoral calendar still formally active, places it within the pre-electoral civic infrastructure phase. Its analytical value is as a leading indicator of institutional preparation for electoral participation rather than a

standalone administrative event.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's civil registration system has suffered sustained institutional damage from the 2010 earthquake, political instability, and chronic funding gaps. ONI has conducted periodic distribution campaigns in previous transitional periods, though geographic reach to peripheral communes has remained inconsistent. The Kat Ou La branding approach mirrors similar civic mobilization campaigns conducted in the 2010-2011 electoral preparation cycle.

TALKING POINTS

ONI launched the Kat Ou La CIN distribution operation for Gressier residents beginning February 24, operating from Leogane city hall.

Applicants must present their original registration receipt and justificatives to collect completed cards.

The initiative targets a documented gap in the civil registration pipeline: completed cards not yet physically collected by registered applicants.

The geographic targeting of Gressier reflects a field-forward approach to pre-electoral civil registration expansion.

The operation is a leading indicator of institutional preparation for electoral participation rather than a standalone administrative event.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Track ONI Kat Ou La operation uptake data as a proxy indicator for civil registration progress in Ouest department peripheral communes.

Incorporate CIN distribution campaign scope and reach into electoral readiness assessments for international monitoring partners.

Flag the operation to diaspora-connected stakeholders interested in family member registration status in Gressier and surrounding areas.

Request ONI reporting on distribution volumes to assess whether the campaign is achieving substantive reach or marginal uptake.

Monitor for expansion of the Kat Ou La model to additional underserved communes as a signal of broadening pre-electoral preparation.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

PNH or DICOP official statement on the February 23 downtown shootout: trigger is any official communique confirming or denying officer involvement, unit identity, and casualty count; direction of travel is either toward confirmed infiltration, which would be a structural crisis indicator, or confirmed external impersonation, which maintains the existing threat framework at elevated intensity; risk is that absence of official communication itself becomes an operational ambiguity sustaining maximum caution posture.

U.S. Embassy security alert status update: trigger is any new embassy notice modifying the Delmas kidnapping warning; direction is either escalation with specific area restrictions or downgrade if interdictions produce confirmed network disruption; risk is operational planning paralysis if no update is issued and organizations must act on unresolved alert conditions.

THIS WEEK

CPT decree issuance on National Pact implementation: trigger is any formal decree from the CPT encoding the February 21 agreement into institutional instruments; direction of travel is either toward confirmed governance momentum or toward a credibility gap that will be flagged by BINUH and international partners; risk is that the absence of implementation instruments by end of week signals the Pact is political optics rather than a functional transition mechanism.

CEP electoral calendar confirmation or modification: trigger is any formal CEP communication on calendar status, operational readiness, or party compliance deadlines; risk is that continued calendar stasis in the context of active security alerts creates planning uncertainty for all electoral stakeholders.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

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Kidnapping network disruption or expansion: the convergence of Delmas and downtown Port-au-Prince incidents signals either a network expanding its geographic footprint or multiple cells replicating a successful tactic; if interdictions do not disrupt the command and logistics layer of these operations within two to three weeks, the fake-checkpoint model will likely spread to additional transit corridors including the RN1 and RN2 arteries, which would constitute a qualitative escalation in operational risk for the humanitarian and business community.

PRIMARY SOURCES

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