



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

February 22, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime secured his first major governance achievement on February 21 when dozens of political parties and civil society organizations signed the National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections in Petion-Ville. Legal analysts immediately challenged the document, arguing it eliminates the 90-to-120-day constitutional limit on Fils-Aime's mandate and replaces binding oversight with an advisory body possessing no enforcement authority. In parallel, two Natcom telecommunications employees were killed in Kenscoff hours after a PNH operation neutralized 16 gang members, signaling that gangs are retaliating against civilian infrastructure workers in active combat zones. TPS litigation at the D.C. Circuit continues without ruling.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

The National Pact signed February 21 establishes the governance framework for the post-CPT transition but faces immediate constitutional legitimacy challenges that international actors must assess before committing electoral support.

Gang retaliation in Kenscoff killed two Natcom telecom workers within hours of a successful PNH tactical operation, confirming that infrastructure targeting escalates in proportion to security force activity in contested zones.

PNH intelligence operations in Delmas 30 foiled an active kidnapping and killed two suspects, demonstrating improved counter-kidnapping capability in the zone most affected by the recent surge.

The D.C. Circuit TPS ruling can arrive at any time and represents the most consequential near-term overhang for the Haitian diaspora community.

Exchange rate remains stable at approximately 131 HTG per USD, but a Le Nouvelliste economic analysis raises questions about whether BRH interventions are masking deeper domestic price distress.

### DEVELOPMENT 1: National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections Signed

Prime Minister Fils-Aime convened dozens of political parties and civil society organizations at the Ritz Hotel on Rue Panamericaine in Petion-Ville on February 21, where signatories endorsed the 30-article, 9-section National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections. The document establishes the governance framework for the post-CPT transition period, creating an institutional architecture that includes a Consultative Committee, provisions for constitutional amendments, and

a mandate framework conditioned on the organization of elections. The signing occurred in an orderly atmosphere inside the venue while uninvited militants protested outside, a detail Le Nouvelliste recorded as evidence of incomplete political consensus.

The Primature framed the Pact as an effort to re-establish dialogue fifteen days after the CPT mandate expired on February 7, positioning Fils-Aime as the architect of Haiti's path to elected governance. The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie issued a statement acknowledging the power transfer to the Council of Ministers under Fils-Aime's presidency and reaffirming its commitment to supporting the Gang Suppression Force and facilitating dialogue efforts. The Initiative de la Societe Civile issued a parallel call for a non-partisan governance accord, signaling that civil society expects additional safeguards beyond what the Pact currently provides.

However, legal analyst La Loi de Ma Bouche published a detailed constitutional critique on the day of signing, arguing the Pact systematically eliminates the mechanisms that would constrain executive power. The critique identifies five structural defects: the Pact omits the February 7 decree's reference to Article 149 of the amended Constitution, which limits transitional mandates to 90 to 120 days, effectively conditioning Fils-Aime's tenure on elections that he himself organizes; the Consultative Committee can support, give opinions, and accompany but possesses no power to block, constrain, or censure, making it institutional decor rather than a counter-power; Articles 13 through 16 allow the government to propose constitutional changes, determine modalities in consultation, and submit them to ratification in a first round of elections, a process the Constitution prohibits as referenda; Article 6 grants executive powers derived from both the Constitution and the Pact, creating an unprecedented dual-source authority framework; and Article 25 assigns sanction authority for violations to the Council of Ministers itself, creating self-enforcement.

For operational consumers, the Pact represents Fils-Aime's answer to the governance vacuum that opened February 7, but the immediate legal contestation and the presence of protesters outside the venue indicate the framework lacks the consensus required to function without continued challenge. International actors will need to determine whether the document provides sufficient legitimacy to justify electoral funding and programming before April's projected GSF deployment creates new operational dependencies on political stability.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's transitional governance mechanisms have repeatedly failed to establish durable legitimacy since the assassination of President Jovenel Moise in July 2021. Each successive authority, including the Ariel Henry government and the Transitional Presidential Council, operated under contested legitimacy frameworks that complicated both international engagement and domestic political buy-in.

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### TALKING POINTS

The National Pact eliminates the 90-to-120-day constitutional limit on Fils-Aime's mandate without replacing it with a binding alternative.

The Consultative Committee established by the Pact has no enforcement authority over the government it is designed to check.

Protesters gathered outside the signing venue while the ceremony proceeded, indicating incomplete political consensus.

The OIF acknowledged the power transfer and reaffirmed GSF support without explicitly endorsing the Pact's constitutional framework.

The ISC called for non-partisan governance alongside the Pact, signaling civil society expects additional safeguards.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should commission immediate legal assessment of the Pact's constitutional standing before committing electoral funding or programming support.

Donor governments should communicate to Fils-Aime's government that binding oversight mechanisms are a precondition for sustained international legitimacy.

Political actors outside the Pact should engage the legal critique rather than the symbolism of the signing ceremony as the terrain for contestation.

NGO program managers should track Consultative Committee membership appointments as an early indicator of whether the body will carry substantive or purely ceremonial weight.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 2: Infrastructure Targeting Escalates in Kenscoff Following PNH Tactical Operation

PNH forces conducted an overnight operation in Kenscoff on February 20 to 21 using snipers and two drones, with Task Force and private military company support, killing 16 gang members. Weapons could not be immediately recovered due to operational distance. Kenscoff Mayor Massillon Jean confirmed on Magik9 radio on February 22 that two Natcom telecommunications employees were killed and a third wounded on February 21 as they traveled to Kenscoff in a company vehicle. The attacks occurred within hours of the security operation, establishing a direct temporal link between tactical successes and gang retaliation against civilian workers.

This incident fits a documented pattern of escalating infrastructure targeting in gang-contested

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areas. An EDH electrical cable was sabotaged in Petion-Ville on February 19, killing one person and injuring five. Gang actors severed telecom fiber optic cables in Port-au-Prince in August 2023. Armed groups attacked and destroyed EDH substations and the Varreux power plant in March 2024. The targeting has now shifted from infrastructure to the workers who maintain it, creating a deterrence effect against essential services crews in operational zones.

For telecommunications specifically, the killing of Natcom maintenance workers signals that Viettel-owned operations in contested zones face personnel security risks that infrastructure hardening alone cannot address. If telecommunications companies respond by halting maintenance operations in gang-adjacent areas, service degradation in zones that include humanitarian coordination infrastructure becomes an operational risk requiring immediate contingency planning by NGO operations managers.

The PNH's Kenscoff manhunt continues to fully secure the area, but the Natcom killings occurring hours after 16 gang members were neutralized confirm that tactical clearance operations do not produce immediate operational security for civilian workers in the same zone. The security threshold required to maintain essential services in gang-contested areas exceeds what current force levels can sustain.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Gang targeting of telecommunications infrastructure began in 2023 when fiber optic cables were severed in Port-au-Prince during a period of territorial expansion. The 2024 attacks on EDH electrical substations established that armed groups understand the leverage that infrastructure disruption provides. The February 2026 shift to killing maintenance workers represents an escalation in methodology.

### TALKING POINTS

Two Natcom employees were killed in Kenscoff on February 21 within hours of a PNH operation that killed 16 gang members in the same zone.

The killing of maintenance workers, not just infrastructure, signals gang intent to deter essential services in operational areas.

PNH intelligence operations in Delmas 30 foiled an active kidnapping and killed two suspects on February 21.

The FAd'H training pipeline continues to expand, with 25 soldiers departing for Martinique under the France-Haiti SABRE program as the 5th cohort.

PNH forces are conducting a continuing manhunt in Kenscoff to fully secure the area.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

NGO telecommunications coordinators should establish backup communication protocols for Kenscoff and adjacent zones pending resumption of Natcom maintenance operations.

Business security teams should assess whether Natcom service degradation in Kenscoff affects humanitarian and commercial operations before the gap becomes critical.

Telecom sector operators should evaluate personnel security frameworks for maintenance crews in gang-adjacent areas and consider suspension of routine work pending tactical clearance.

Security planners should track the Delmas 30 counter-kidnapping success as an indicator of PNH intelligence-led operational capability improvement.



## CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 3: PNH Institutional Reforms Signal Accountability Shift

The PNH Directorate issued new disciplinary measures on February 21, banning the wearing of balaclava masks and hoods outside designated special operations contexts and reinforcing regulatory compliance requirements across the force. The ban addresses a documented accountability problem: balaclava-wearing by individual officers has been associated with extrajudicial operations and has complicated the identification of officers implicated in abuses. A recent BINUH-OHCHR report found that some police officers have summarily executed children accused of gang association, making individual officer identification a human rights monitoring priority.

The Ministry of Defense issued a parallel advisory warning the public that all FAd'H communications are disseminated exclusively through certified Ministry channels and that recruitment calls for applications will be issued only through High Command messages. The advisory attributes the caution to the current high level of attention surrounding recruitment, suggesting that the FAd'H's visible training activity and fifth SABRE cohort departure have generated unofficial recruitment interest that the institution cannot verify or control.

Taken together, the PNH balaclava ban and the MoD communications advisory indicate that both security institutions are managing the public-facing dimensions of reform. The balaclava ban, if enforced, directly addresses a visibility gap that OHCHR monitors have flagged as a structural obstacle to accountability. The MoD advisory signals institutional awareness that the FAd'H's rising public profile carries information environment risks that require active management.

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For international observers, the institutional reform signals matter because BINUH's refocused mandate emphasizes governance strengthening and human rights monitoring. The new BANUH mission and UNSOH standup both carry institutional interest in whether Haitian security forces are building accountable operational frameworks, not just tactical capacity. The balaclava ban gives BINUH a concrete reform measure to track in its monitoring reporting.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

PNH accountability has been a persistent concern in BINUH and OHCHR reporting since 2021, with documented cases of extrajudicial killings and excessive force in gang-contested areas. The 2024 UN report on gang child trafficking and the 2025 OHCHR findings on summary executions of children created sustained international pressure for visible accountability reforms within the force.

### TALKING POINTS

The PNH balaclava ban outside special operations directly addresses an accountability gap that BINUH-OHCHR monitoring has identified.

The FAd'H Ministry of Defense communications advisory reflects institutional awareness of information environment risks during the current high-profile recruitment period.

BINUH Chief Ruiz Massieu confirmed the mandate is refocused with certain priorities strengthened, with a transition to the renamed BANUH mission underway.

The balaclava ban provides BINUH with a concrete, measurable reform indicator for inclusion in forthcoming mandate reporting.

PNH discipline reforms occurring simultaneously with the National Pact signing may be coordinated elements of a broader Fils-Aime governance legitimacy strategy.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International human rights organizations should establish a monitoring protocol specifically tracking PNH balaclava ban enforcement at documented extrajudicial incident sites.

BINUH should formally record the balaclava ban in the next mandate report as a measurable accountability benchmark with a six-month enforcement review.

NGO legal teams should assess whether the MoD communications advisory creates additional due diligence requirements for FAd'H-adjacent programming.



### CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 4: Economic Distress Signal: Inflation Without Devaluation

Le Nouvelliste published an economic analysis on February 22 identifying three structural anomalies in Haiti's current macroeconomic condition: why inflation remains elevated when the gourde-dollar exchange rate is relatively stable at approximately 131 HTG per USD; what role the Banque de la Republique d'Haiti may be playing in sustaining this inflation through reserve interventions or monetary tightening; and why the exchange rate has not adjusted to reflect the purchasing power loss that 31.9 percent annual inflation implies. The analysis further notes that the FAO global food price index declined 2.1 percent between September 2025 and January 2026, but Haitian consumers have not experienced equivalent price relief.

The implicit critique of the BRH is significant. Exchange rate stability at current levels may be maintained through BRH interventions that consume foreign reserves while simultaneously suppressing the price signal that would otherwise attract import competition or trigger demand adjustment. If BRH reserves are being drawn down to maintain exchange rate optics, the sustainability horizon for current stability is finite and undisclosed. The Le Nouvelliste analysis does not provide reserve data, but the question it raises is the operationally relevant one for planning purposes.

For the Fils-Aime government, an inflationary environment that coexists with nominal exchange rate stability creates a political economy problem: the constituency that monitors the gourde rate sees stability, while the population that buys food and fuel experiences continued price pressure that no governance pact addresses. The FAO disconnect, in which global food prices are falling but Haitian prices are not, suggests structural supply chain fragmentation or market concentration that prevents global commodity price relief from reaching domestic consumers.

For operational consumers, the gourde's 131 HTG stability at the exchange window should not be read as macroeconomic normalization. The Le Nouvelliste analysis marks the first major economic investigative piece of the Fils-Aime era and signals that the Haitian business press is beginning to scrutinize the BRH's management choices with the same rigor that has been applied to political governance since February 7.



**HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Haiti's gourde has experienced sustained depreciation since 2018, losing more than two-thirds of its value against the dollar between 2018 and 2024. The BRH has periodically intervened to slow depreciation during politically sensitive periods, including the immediate post-Moise transition.

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Inflation rates above 30 percent have been documented since 2022, sustained by fuel price volatility, supply chain disruption, and import dependency across all major consumer categories.

### TALKING POINTS

Le Nouvelliste's inflation analysis raises the first major economic accountability question of the Fils-Aime era, targeting BRH management choices rather than political actors.

Gourde stability at 131 HTG per USD may mask reserve depletion rather than reflect genuine macroeconomic improvement.

The 31.9 percent inflation rate coexisting with a stable exchange rate is structurally anomalous and requires BRH clarification.

Global food prices fell 2.1 percent between September 2025 and January 2026 but did not produce equivalent consumer relief in Haiti.

The economic environment the National Pact does not address may be as destabilizing as the governance environment it attempts to structure.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Business executives should request updated BRH reserve position data before making investment or import financing decisions premised on continued exchange rate stability.

NGO budget planners should build inflation buffer assumptions into 2026 second-quarter programming budgets regardless of exchange rate optics.

International financial institutions with Haiti programming should assess whether BRH reserve management is sustainable for the duration of the electoral timeline.

Diaspora remittance senders should monitor the gap between exchange window rates and parallel market rates as an early warning indicator of reserve pressure.



### CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

#### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

The D.C. Circuit TPS ruling can arrive at any time. A ruling against TPS would trigger immediate deportation threat signals for more than 300,000 Haitian nationals and produce cascading diaspora and remittance implications within hours of publication. A ruling in favor would relieve near-term pressure but leave the underlying policy vulnerability intact. Direction of travel: binary outcome, high

consequence.

International reaction to the National Pact from BINUH, the United States, Canada, and the OAS will begin to crystallize within 48 hours. If key actors endorse the framework, Fils-Aime gains governance legitimacy. If they express constitutional concerns, the Pact's contestation becomes an international as well as a domestic problem. Direction of travel: watch for State Department and BINUH public statements. Risk: ambiguous international response that neither validates nor delegitimizes the framework, prolonging uncertainty.

Natcom service assessment in Kenscoff: whether the company halts maintenance operations in the zone following the killings of its workers will determine whether the infrastructure targeting deterrence effect is operating as gangs intend. Direction of travel: likely temporary service disruption; risk of extended outage if maintenance suspension persists.

#### THIS WEEK

The BRH has not yet responded to the Le Nouvelliste economic analysis. A BRH public statement on reserve management or inflation methodology would either clarify the anomaly or confirm institutional defensiveness. Direction of travel: silence or deflection is the more probable outcome, sustaining the analytical gap.

Consultative Committee formation under the National Pact will begin signaling whether the body is designed for substance or optics. Who is appointed and under what selection mechanism will determine whether civil society organizations treat it as a legitimate check or an institutional facade. Direction of travel: watch for composition announcement within the next 5 to 10 days.

The PNH balaclava ban enforcement will either produce documented compliance in the field or demonstrate that the directive is aspirational rather than operational. Direction of travel: field enforcement in Kenscoff and Delmas 30 within the next week will provide the first compliance data. Risk: documented violations that undermine the reform signal.

#### STRATEGIC HORIZON

The April GSF deployment timeline remains the structural organizing event for Haiti's security trajectory. Whether the National Pact provides sufficient governance legitimacy to sustain international political will for the GSF's operational mandate will be tested by the constitutional legitimacy debate now underway. A Pact that international actors cannot endorse without reservations creates a governance gap precisely at the moment when GSF deployment requires maximum political coherence. Direction of travel: the Pact's legitimacy trajectory over the next 30 days will directly condition the April deployment environment.

The February 7, 2027 CPT mandate expiration remains the authoritative institutional deadline for

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Haiti's transitional governance period. The National Pact's effective replacement of the 90-to-120-day Article 149 constitutional limit with a mandate conditioned on elections means that whether Fils-Aime reaches February 7, 2027, will depend on electoral progress he controls. Risk: absence of binding external timeline creates structural incentive for electoral delay. Expected outcome: international actors will increasingly attach timeline conditionality to electoral support commitments during the March to June window.

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