



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

February 17, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The PNH received 10 Canadian armored vehicles on February 16, bringing its total fleet to 35 units as Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime publicly framed criminal gangs as seeking to overthrow the interim government -- the most aggressive rhetorical posture since he assumed sole executive authority. The Ministry of Defense simultaneously issued a statement criminalizing union activity within the Armed Forces of Haiti, signaling internal military tensions during a critical institutional buildup period. An 18-state attorney general coalition filed an amicus brief opposing TPS termination in the D.C. Circuit, where a ruling is expected this week. The OAS Permanent Council convenes February 18 to assess Haiti's post-CPT governance trajectory. Carnival concluded without major security incidents -- a limited positive signal.



### QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Haiti's PNH armored fleet reaches 35 units following Canada's February 16 delivery.  
PM Fils-Aime publicly defines gang suppression as existential precondition for elections.  
Ministry of Defense issues criminal warning against FAd'H union organizing.  
18-state AG coalition strengthens TPS legal defense in D.C. Circuit.  
OAS Permanent Council convenes February 18 -- first major Haiti session since CPT expiration.

### DEVELOPMENT 1: PNH ARMORED FLEET EXPANSION AND FILS-AIME GOVERNANCE ESCALATION

The PNH received 10 Canadian-donated armored vehicles on February 16 at a ceremony at PNH General Directorate headquarters in Clercine, Port-au-Prince. Canadian Ambassador Andre Francois Giroux presented the vehicles through UNOPS, reaffirming Canada's unwavering support for Haiti's security restoration. The delivery brings the PNH's total armored vehicle inventory to 35 units, including 3 South Korean tracked fighting vehicles received February 5 and 22 previously delivered vehicles from various donors. PM Alix Didier Fils-Aime attended in his capacity as Coordinator of the Superior Council of the National Police (CSPN).

Fils-Aime used the occasion to deliver his most significant public address since assuming sole executive authority. He declared that there can be no political stability, economic recovery, or social cohesion without the full and complete restoration of republican order, and called on the population to support security forces battling criminal gangs bent on overthrowing the interim government. This represents a deliberate rhetorical escalation -- framing gangs not merely as a security challenge but as an existential threat to constitutional governance itself.

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Fils-Aime explicitly linked PNH armament to electoral prerequisites, stating that security strengthening is part of a comprehensive plan to create the necessary conditions for holding free, inclusive, transparent, and democratic elections. This formulation subordinates the August 30 electoral target to Gang Suppression Force deployment success, reinforcing the government's conditional electoral timeline and providing political cover for any delay should the GSF arrive late or underperform following its April deployment.

The cumulative armored fleet expansion carries operational significance. South Korean tracked vehicles offer mobility on unpaved terrain where gang forces control road access, while Canadian vehicles augment PNH rapid response capability. Imminent deployment to strategic locations was announced for the South Korean contingent. Against a backdrop of Viv Ansanm controlling approximately 85 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince, the 35-vehicle fleet remains quantitatively insufficient for full territorial recovery but signals sustained international material commitment to the Fils-Aime government during the pre-GSF security gap.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's PNH has historically operated with minimal armored support, relying on light vehicles vulnerable to gang ambushes. The current multilateral vehicle transfer program spanning Canada, South Korea, and prior donors represents the largest coordinated armored equipment delivery to the PNH since the force's reconstitution in the 1990s. Fils-Aime's existential threat framing echoes governance language from the 2004 collapse period when institutional rhetoric shifted from crime management to state survival.

### TALKING POINTS

PNH armored fleet stands at 35 vehicles following the February 16 Canadian delivery. Fils-Aime has publicly defined gang suppression as a precondition for elections. Electoral calendar target of August 30 is now explicitly conditioned on prior security gains. Canadian and South Korean material support demonstrates sustained multilateral backing. GSF April deployment remains the critical gap in operational security capacity. Carnival period concluded without major incident -- a limited positive security signal.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should use the February 18 OAS meeting to press for accelerated

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GSF force generation commitments beyond current April estimates.

NGOs and businesses should update route security assessments following planned South Korean armored vehicle deployments to strategic locations.

Diplomatic missions should note Fils-Aime's conditional electoral framing as a potential precursor to timeline revision requests at multilateral forums.

Donors should coordinate vehicle maintenance and logistics support packages alongside equipment donations to preserve operational longevity.

Analysts should track deployment locations for the 35-vehicle fleet as an indicator of PNH operational priorities and territorial ambitions.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 2: FAD'H INTERNAL DISCIPLINE CRISIS -- MINISTRY OF DEFENSE UNION WARNING

The Ministry of Defense issued a forceful institutional statement on February 16 declaring that no union exists within the Ministry or the Armed Forces of Haiti and that none ever will. The statement warned that any individual or collective attempt to falsely claim union affiliation, mislead public opinion, or disrupt the functioning of national defense institutions would be treated as a criminal act subject to severe disciplinary sanctions and legal prosecution without prior warning. The aggressive tone and preemptive legal language indicate the Ministry was responding to an active organizing attempt rather than issuing a theoretical policy position.

The timing of this declaration is operationally significant. The FAd'H is currently receiving its most substantial international support in decades, including 5 million dollars in US non-lethal assistance authorized under the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2026, South Korean armored vehicles, and training agreements with France, Argentina, and South Korea. Internal discipline disputes during a critical institutional buildup period introduce governance friction at precisely the moment when command coherence is most required for GSF coordination and Operation San Kanpe support.

The statement's threat of criminal prosecution rather than administrative discipline suggests the Ministry views potential organizing activity as politically motivated rather than labor-related. This

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may reflect broader tensions within the 1,500-person FAd'H over pay, command structure, or the distribution of newly acquired equipment and international training opportunities. If organizing attempts were linked to political actors seeking leverage over the military during the post-CPT power transition, the implications extend beyond internal discipline.

No independent reporting has confirmed who attempted to organize or what grievances prompted the warning. The absence of corroborating sources limits full assessment of the internal dynamic. However, the public nature of the statement -- clearly intended as a deterrent addressed to the force as a whole -- indicates the Ministry judged that internal messaging alone was insufficient to suppress the activity.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The FAd'H was disbanded by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1995 following documented human rights abuses and was reconstituted by presidential decree in 2017 under President Jovenel Moïse. The reconstituted force has faced persistent questions about command loyalty and political neutrality since reactivation. Labor organizing within Haitian state security institutions is not permitted under military law.

### TALKING POINTS

Ministry of Defense has declared union activity in FAd'H a criminal offense subject to prosecution without warning.

Internal organizing attempts appear to have occurred despite the prohibition, prompting a public deterrence statement.

FAd'H is receiving unprecedented multilateral support including US funding, South Korean equipment, and French training.

Internal tensions during GSF standup period represent a governance vulnerability for the Fils-Aimé administration.

No independent confirmation of the identity or motivation of those who attempted to organize.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International military assistance providers should request Ministry of Defense briefings on internal command climate before proceeding with next disbursement tranches.

The OAS Haiti monitoring mandate should include FAd'H institutional stability indicators alongside PNH metrics.

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Diplomatic missions should assess whether the union warning reflects political faction activity within the military and report findings to capitals.

Fils-Aime government should consider transparent communication on pay and promotion structures to reduce conditions favorable to organizing.



### CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

#### DEVELOPMENT 3: TPS LEGAL BATTLE -- 18-STATE AG COALITION OPPOSES D.C. CIRCUIT STAY

An 18-state attorney general coalition filed an amicus brief in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals on February 16, opposing the Trump administration's motion to overturn Judge Reyes's stay blocking Temporary Protected Status termination for approximately 350,000 Haitians. The coalition was co-led by Massachusetts Attorney General Andrea Joy Campbell and Maryland Attorney General Anthony G. Brown and included California, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. The brief argues that TPS termination would separate families, damage state economies, deplete workforces, increase healthcare costs, and harm public health and safety.

The legal trajectory favors TPS holders as of the February 16 filing date. Judge Reyes issued the original stay on February 2, upheld it against a government challenge on February 12 despite reported threats against the judge, and the 18-state coalition now provides additional appellate weight. Separately, the Ninth Circuit ruled on January 28, 2026, that the Department of Homeland Security lacked statutory authority to vacate prior TPS designations for Haiti and Venezuela, characterizing the terminations as unlawful agency action that must be set aside nationwide. TPS holders currently benefit from two independent legal protections operating in parallel.

The economic stakes for Haiti are direct and substantial. Haitian TPS holders represent a major remittance pipeline to a country where 60 percent of the population survives on less than one dollar per day and where humanitarian funding has collapsed to 3.4 percent of required levels. Abrupt TPS termination affecting 350,000 holders would reduce remittance flows at a moment

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when no alternative economic support mechanism exists for the Haitian population. The D.C. Circuit ruling, expected this week, will determine whether the stay survives into the medium term.

The political dimension of the TPS battle intersects directly with Haiti governance interests. The Fils-Aime government has not made public statements on the US TPS litigation, but any mass return of Haitian nationals from the United States would compound the displacement crisis -- currently at 1.4 million internally displaced persons -- and strain humanitarian infrastructure already operating at minimal funding levels alongside ongoing gang territorial control of 85 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti received TPS designation following the 2010 earthquake and has maintained that status through successive renewals tied to ongoing insecurity and governance instability. The Trump administration moved to terminate Haiti's TPS in 2025 as part of a broader immigration enforcement posture. The 2025-2026 litigation cycle mirrors a similar legal battle during the first Trump administration when TPS terminations were blocked in federal courts before policy reversals.

### TALKING POINTS

18 state AGs filed amicus brief on February 16 opposing Trump administration TPS termination effort.

D.C. Circuit ruling expected this week on government motion to overturn stay.

TPS holders benefit from two independent legal protections -- Judge Reyes's stay and the Ninth Circuit January 28 ruling.

Termination of TPS for 350,000 Haitians would directly impact remittance flows critical to Haiti's economy.

Legal framing by state coalition emphasizes economic and public health harm to US states.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Diaspora advocacy organizations should prepare community communications covering all D.C. Circuit scenarios including stay upheld, stay reversed, and remand.

International financial institutions tracking Haiti remittances should model TPS termination impact scenarios on household income and HTG liquidity.

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BINUH and OCHA should include potential returnee flows in contingency planning for humanitarian capacity under a TPS termination scenario.  
Haitian government should proactively engage US State Department on remittance corridor protection independent of TPS litigation outcome.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

#### DEVELOPMENT 4: OAS PERMANENT COUNCIL -- FIRST MAJOR MULTILATERAL HAITI SESSION POST-CPT

The OAS Permanent Council will convene a regular meeting on February 18, 2026, at 09:30 EST at OAS headquarters in Washington to address developments in the political situation in Haiti. Secretary General Albert Ramdin will present a progress report. The meeting is the first major multilateral forum on Haiti's governance trajectory since the CPT mandate expired on February 7 and Fils-Aime assumed sole executive authority. The three OAS focus areas for Haiti are: security coordination and monitoring of the Gang Suppression Force; political dialogue and governance arrangements beyond the February 2026 CPT expiration; and election preparation and support.

The meeting takes place while the post-CPT institutional framework remains undefined. Fils-Aime has consolidated executive authority without a formal multilateral endorsement of the new governance arrangement. The OAS has previously signaled concern through Ramdin's warnings that gangs operate with apparent freedom and his calls on member states to step up commitments in real terms. Whether the Permanent Council formally recognizes the Fils-Aime government's legitimacy or presses for a defined political roadmap will shape the diplomatic environment for the next 60 to 90 days.

The GSF force generation timeline is the most actionable agenda item. First contingents are expected in April 2026, with a ceiling of 5,550 personnel and pledges reaching 7,500. The Kenya-led MSS currently provides approximately 1,000 personnel in a drawdown posture. The gap between current operational capacity and the April GSF arrival represents the period of greatest security vulnerability, and OAS pressure for accelerated deployment or expanded MSS bridging is the most operationally significant outcome the session could produce.

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Electoral support remains a secondary but structurally important agenda item. The CEP calendar targeting August 30 for a first round requires stable security conditions that do not currently exist across the capital. Any OAS statement on electoral viability or timeline adjustment would carry significant weight for donor funding decisions, party registration compliance deadlines, and the international credibility of the Fils-Aime government's conditional electoral framing announced earlier the same week.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The OAS has maintained a continuous Haiti engagement mandate since the 2004 governance crisis and provided election observation for every Haitian electoral cycle since 2006. The February 18 session follows a November 2025 Ramdin roadmap update that prioritized security-election sequencing. Multilateral recognition of post-CPT governance arrangements has historically been determinative for international funding access and political legitimacy in Haitian transitions.

### TALKING POINTS

OAS Permanent Council meets February 18 for first major Haiti governance discussion since CPT expiration on February 7.

Secretary General Ramdin will present a progress report on security, political dialogue, and elections.

GSF April deployment timeline and force generation gaps are the most operationally urgent agenda items.

OAS posture toward Fils-Aime government's legitimacy will shape the diplomatic environment for the coming quarter.

Electoral calendar viability assessment may influence CEP funding commitments and compliance enforcement.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should deploy observers to the February 18 OAS session and circulate Ramdin's progress report to field operations within 24 hours.

Governments considering GSF contributions should treat the February 18 meeting as the deadline for updated force generation commitments.

NGOs and businesses should assess operational plans against two OAS outcome scenarios --

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affirmation of current trajectory versus pressure for formal political dialogue mechanism. Analysts should track whether OAS language on the February 7 CPT expiration characterizes the Fils-Aime government as a legitimate caretaker or as requiring additional mandate.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

#### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

The OAS Permanent Council convenes February 18 at 09:30 EST; Secretary General Ramdin's progress report will signal whether the multilateral community formally endorses the Fils-Aime post-CPT governance arrangement or presses for a new political dialogue mechanism -- the primary diplomatic variable for the coming quarter. Government operations resume February 19 following the Carnival holiday; watch for new decrees, appointments, or policy announcements from the Prime Minister's office. The D.C. Circuit TPS ruling may be issued at any point this week; a stay reversal would immediately affect 350,000 Haitians and trigger remittance impact cascades.

#### THIS WEEK

The South Korean armored vehicle deployment to strategic locations, announced as imminent on February 16, should become visible in the next five to seven days; deployment locations will indicate whether the PNH is prioritizing highway corridors, critical infrastructure, or residential zone reestablishment. Post-Carnival kidnapping trend data will clarify whether the apparent suppression of incidents during the holiday reflects genuine security improvement or reporting delays. The Ministry of Defense will face pressure to clarify the FAd'H union warning following its public circulation; any disciplinary action will indicate the severity of internal tensions. GSF force generation updates from contributing countries may emerge in the margins of the OAS meeting.

#### STRATEGIC HORIZON

The April 2026 GSF deployment window is the defining variable for the entire electoral timeline.

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If contributing nations fail to meet force generation commitments, the August 30 first-round target becomes structurally untenable, and the Fils-Aime government's conditional electoral framing will be tested by partners who funded the electoral calendar. The TPS litigation trajectory through the D.C. Circuit will determine remittance stability for the second and third quarters of 2026. The HOPE/HELP textile renewal -- House approved, Senate pending -- represents the primary economic stabilization mechanism available for immediate congressional action. Humanitarian funding at 3.4 percent of required levels constitutes a structural risk amplifier for all security and political scenarios through the election cycle.

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