



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Monday, December 15, 2025

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The candidate registration deadline expired today after a 15-day period with zero public declarations from major political figures. The December 22 candidate list publication will determine whether the August 30, 2026 election is viable or boycotted. Security reporting confirms the Gang Suppression Force is operational, with an 80 percent surge in anti-gang confrontations in November concentrated in Port-au-Prince suburbs, not central gang strongholds. The Bel-Air massacre enters day eight and Port-Sondé occupation enters day sixteen with no government response. The United States terminated the Family Reunification Parole program for Haiti today, completing a triple restriction on Haitian migration alongside the December 2 application freeze and February 3 TPS expiration.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Candidate registration closed today with no public declarations. December 22 candidate list will reveal boycott or private participation. Gang Suppression Force operational but focused on peripheral suburbs, not central crisis zones. Bel-Air and Port-Sondé remain unaddressed after eight and sixteen days respectively. United States FRP termination today creates immediate legal crisis for Haitian nationals.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

Development 1: The Silent Registration Period Ends Without Public Candidates

The 15-day candidate registration window for Haiti's August 30, 2026 presidential and legislative elections closed today at midnight with no major candidate announcements reported in Haitian or international media. This represents an unprecedented situation in Haitian electoral history. The registration period began December 1 following publication of the electoral decree and concluded December 15 as mandated by the Provisional Electoral Council calendar.

The absence of public declarations during the entire registration period creates two possible scenarios. First, candidates may have registered privately to avoid gang threats or media scrutiny during the submission process. Second, major opposition figures may have coordinated a boycott to delegitimize the electoral process. The December 22 final candidate list publication by the Provisional Electoral Council will resolve this uncertainty and determine the viability of the August 2026 election timeline.

The electoral calendar submitted by the Provisional Electoral Council on November 14 explicitly conditioned the timeline on three prerequisites: publication of the electoral decree within the allotted timeframe, acceptable security conditions, and availability of necessary financial resources. The first condition has been met with the December 1 decree publication. The second condition remains unfulfilled given ongoing gang occupation of Port-Sondé and the Bel-Air massacre. The third condition regarding financial resources remains unclear with no public budget announcement.

The contestation period for challenging candidacies runs December 16 through 19. If no candidates registered, this period becomes procedurally meaningless. If candidates did register privately, this period may reveal opposition challenges or attempts to disqualify specific individuals. The December 22 publication date represents the single most critical moment of the transition period to date.



Confidence: HIGH. Electoral calendar dates and registration deadline are confirmed through official Provisional Electoral Council publications and multiple independent media sources. The absence of public candidate declarations is verifiable through comprehensive media monitoring during the 15-day period.

Development 2: Gang Suppression Force Operational But Geographically Limited

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project released its December 2025 Latin America regional overview providing the most detailed assessment of Haiti security operations in November. The report confirms that police conducted anti-gang operations with assistance from the Gang Suppression Force, leading to an 80 percent surge in confrontations between gangs and security personnel during November. These operations concentrated in communes around Tabarre and Croix-des-Bouquets in the Port-au-Prince periphery.

This data confirms three critical operational realities. First, the Gang Suppression Force is deployed and conducting joint operations with Haitian National Police forces, despite the December 9 conference seeking additional international troop commitments. Second, the geographic focus remains suburban Port-au-Prince rather than central gang strongholds such as Bel-Air or Cité Soleil. Third, the 80 percent surge in confrontations indicates intensified combat activity but does not specify territorial gains, losses, or whether operations successfully disrupted gang control in target areas.

The December 9 conference secured commitments for 1,500 troops from Chad and 1,500 from Bangladesh for Gang Suppression Force expansion. However, deployment timelines remain unspecified. The current operational pattern suggests a defensive containment strategy focused on preventing gang expansion into remaining government-controlled Port-au-Prince suburbs rather than offensive operations to reclaim gang-held territories.

The absence of Gang Suppression Force operations in Artibonite department, where Port-Sondé remains under Gran Grif gang occupation since November 30, indicates either insufficient troop strength for multi-front operations or strategic prioritization of the capital region over rural areas. This geographic limitation undermines the feasibility of nationwide elections requiring security coverage across all ten departments.



Confidence: HIGH. ACLED methodology uses verified incident reports from multiple sources. The 80 percent surge statistic and geographic concentration in Tabarre and Croix-des-Bouquets are directly stated in the published report. Gang Suppression Force operational status is confirmed through institutional reporting.

Development 3: Bel-Air Massacre Enters Eighth Day With No Official Response

The gang conflict in Bel-Air that began December 8 reached its eighth consecutive day today with no updates from official sources or media since December 13. The last confirmed casualty count reported 60 killed, with 49 deaths verified by human rights organizations and the number expected to rise as bodies are recovered. The violence reportedly stems from territorial conflict between armed groups operating in the Bel-Air commune of Port-au-Prince.

The government response pattern mirrors the Port-Sondé occupation strategy: no official statements, no police operations, no humanitarian access, and no public acknowledgment of the crisis. This non-intervention approach creates a functional cede of state authority in affected areas. The complete absence of media updates since

December 13 suggests either journalistic access restrictions due to ongoing violence or a media blackout following the initial casualty reports.

Bel-Air's strategic location in central Port-au-Prince makes the government's non-response particularly significant. Unlike Port-Sondé in rural Artibonite, Bel-Air borders key government and commercial zones. The continuation of gang violence in this location for eight days without security force intervention demonstrates either operational incapacity or strategic calculation that intervention costs exceed non-intervention costs in terms of potential casualties and resource expenditure.

The pattern of multi-day gang violence without government response has now occurred in three separate incidents within 16 days: Port-Sondé beginning November 30, Bel-Air beginning December 8, and the broader campaign period violence throughout November documented in the ACLED report. This establishes non-intervention as the default government security posture rather than an isolated incident response.



Confidence: MODERATE-HIGH. Initial casualty figures and December 8 start date are confirmed through multiple media sources and human rights organizations. The absence of updates since December 13 is verifiable through media monitoring but does not confirm whether violence continues, has subsided, or access restrictions prevent reporting. Government non-response is confirmed through absence of official statements or reported operations.

Development 4: United States Completes Migration Restriction Triple Lock

The United States officially terminated the Family Reunification Parole program for Haiti today through publication in the Federal Register. This termination becomes effective immediately and applies to all pending applications, which are now closed without processing. The program previously allowed Haitian family members of United States citizens and lawful permanent residents to be paroled into the United States while awaiting immigrant visa processing.

The Family Reunification Parole termination represents the third and final component of a comprehensive restriction architecture targeting Haitian migration. The sequence began December 2 with the freeze on new immigration applications, continued today with Family Reunification Parole termination, and will complete February 3, 2026 when Temporary Protected Status expires. This creates a 50-day countdown to legal limbo for 348,000 to 500,000 Haitian nationals currently in the United States under Temporary Protected Status.

The timing of these restrictions during Haiti's candidate registration period and electoral transition creates apparent coordination between United States immigration policy and pressure on Haiti's political process. The triple restriction removes legal pathways while Haiti faces its most severe governance and security crisis in modern history. This policy architecture forces Haitian nationals into three options: voluntary departure, deportation to a country with no functioning government, or remaining in the United States without legal status.

The policy also eliminates family-based relief mechanisms previously available to Haitian nationals. With Family Reunification Parole terminated and standard immigration applications frozen, Haitian families have no legal process to reunify relatives or adjust status regardless of United States citizen or permanent resident family relationships. This represents the most restrictive policy framework toward Haitian nationals in recent decades.



Confidence: HIGH. Federal Register publication provides definitive legal authority for Family Reunification Parole termination effective December 15, 2025. Temporary Protected Status February 3 expiration date is confirmed through Department of Homeland Security notices. The affected population estimates of 348,000 to 500,000 are reported by advocacy organizations citing government data.

IMPACT RATING

10 out of 10. CRITICAL. IMMEDIATE DECISION POINTS.

The December 22 candidate list publication will determine whether Haiti's constitutional transition proceeds or collapses. A boycott or minimal participation delegitimizes the August 30 election and triggers renewed constitutional crisis as the February 7, 2027 Presidential Council mandate expiration approaches with no succession mechanism. The Gang Suppression Force operational confirmation is positive but geographic limitations to Port-au-Prince suburbs indicate insufficient capacity for nationwide election security. The eight-day Bel-Air crisis and sixteen-day Port-Sondé occupation without government response demonstrate effective state absence in crisis zones. The United States triple migration restriction creates immediate legal emergency for half a million Haitian nationals.

IMPLICATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER

Haitian Government and Presidential Council

The December 22 candidate list will determine your political legitimacy. An empty or minimal list proves opposition boycott and eliminates credibility for the August 30 election timeline. Your February 7, 2027 mandate expiration is 419 days away with no constitutional succession plan if elections fail. The continued non-response to Bel-Air and Port-Sondé after eight and sixteen days establishes non-intervention as your default security posture, which opposition forces will cite as evidence of state failure. You must decide within one week whether to acknowledge the boycott scenario and negotiate new political arrangements or maintain the fiction of a viable election timeline.

Opposition Political Actors

If you coordinated a registration boycott, December 22 will reveal your leverage. However, boycott strategy only succeeds if paired with alternative governance proposals. The Presidential Council mandate expires February 7, 2027, creating a constitutional vacuum. You must present a credible succession mechanism before mandate expiration or accept responsibility for institutional collapse. If major figures did register privately, December 22 will reveal who defected from boycott coordination and created competitive dynamics within opposition ranks.

International Community and Donor States

Your December 9 conference secured Gang Suppression Force troop commitments from Chad and Bangladesh but provided no deployment timeline. The ACLED data shows current operations are geographically limited to Port-au-Prince suburbs. You must determine whether to fund nationwide Gang Suppression Force expansion or acknowledge that August 30 elections cannot proceed in current security conditions. The December 22 candidate list will force a decision point: continue supporting a potentially boycotted election or negotiate a new political transition framework. Your credibility depends on matching security commitments to electoral timeline requirements.

Haitian Diaspora and Temporary Protected Status Holders

You face immediate legal crisis. Family Reunification Parole terminated today, eliminating your last family-based relief mechanism. Temporary Protected Status expires February 3, 50 days from today, affecting up to 500,000 Haitian nationals. You must make deportation contingency plans, pursue legal challenges to the triple restriction

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architecture, or accept undocumented status in the United States. The coordination of these restrictions during Haiti's electoral registration period suggests intentional pressure but provides no legal recourse. Organize legal resources and community support networks before the February 3 deadline.

Security and Humanitarian Actors

The eight-day Bel-Air crisis and sixteen-day Port-Sondé occupation without humanitarian access demonstrate you cannot operate in active conflict zones without government security support. The government non-response pattern means you must develop access strategies that do not depend on security force escorts or government coordination. Pre-position medical supplies and emergency resources in accessible border areas of conflict zones. The Gang Suppression Force's suburban focus means central Port-au-Prince slum areas and rural Artibonite will remain unsecured for humanitarian operations.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

72-hour priority: December 16 through 19 contestation period

Monitor whether any candidacy challenges are filed during the official contestation period. Challenge filings would confirm that candidates registered even without public declarations, providing the first signal of electoral viability before December 22 publication.

One-week critical event: Sunday, December 22, final candidate list publication

The single most important event of the entire transition period. The Provisional Electoral Council will publish the official list of registered candidates for August 30, 2026 elections. This list will definitively reveal whether major opposition figures registered privately or coordinated a boycott. An empty or minimal list with unknown candidates collapses the August 2026 election timeline and triggers constitutional crisis planning.

Ongoing security monitoring: Bel-Air and Port-Sondé status

Track whether government security forces respond to the now eight-day Bel-Air massacre or sixteen-day Port-Sondé occupation. Any operational response would indicate a shift from the current non-intervention posture. Continued absence of response confirms permanent state withdrawal from these territories.

Countdown tracking: 50 days to Temporary Protected Status expiration

Monitor legal challenges to the triple restriction architecture and Department of Homeland Security implementation planning for February 3 Temporary Protected Status expiration. Track whether advocacy organizations secure court intervention or congressional action before the deadline.

PRIMARY SOURCES

HaitiLibre, official calendar of upcoming elections, November 2025

Haiti Info Project social media, candidate registration deadline announcement, December 2025

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project, Regional Overview for Latin America and Caribbean, published December 2025, covering November 2025 security operations

ABC News wire service, Bel-Air gang violence casualty report, December 13, 2025

Latin Times, gang conflict in Port-au-Prince including Viv Ansanm leader death, December 13, 2025

CNN, Gran Grif gang attack on Port-Sondé in Artibonite region, December 1, 2025

Federal Register volume 90 number 241, termination of Family Reunification Parole program for Haiti, December 15, 2025

Forum Together advocacy organization, fact sheet on Temporary Protected Status termination impact, 2025

Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker, Haiti instability entry, updated December 2025

Provisional Electoral Council official website, electoral calendar and registration procedures, November-December 2025

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Haiti Info Project social media, December 9 Gang Suppression Force conference troop commitments from Chad and Bangladesh
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025 Haiti country chapter, gang violence documentation

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Confidence Ratings Explained: HIGH indicates multiple institutional sources with converging data. MODERATE-HIGH indicates institutional sources with some gaps in coverage or verification. MODERATE indicates partial institutional confirmation requiring additional verification. These ratings reflect analytical certainty based on source quality, corroboration, and information gaps, not subjective probability assessments.