



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

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Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Transitional Presidential Council dissolved on February 7, 2026 after completing its 22-month mandate under the April 2024 Political Accord, leaving Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime as sole executive authority without legislative oversight or constitutional framework. The United States deployed three naval vessels to Port-au-Prince Bay and sanctioned five CPT members for gang collaboration while publicly endorsing Fils-Aime's leadership. Kenya announced drawdown of its MSS force as the UN-authorized Gang Suppression Force begins activation with a 5,550 personnel ceiling. Armed gangs control 85-90% of Port-au-Prince and 23 communes across four departments, creating substantial obstacles to the August 30, 2026 electoral timeline.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CPT mandate expired February 7 with no successor governance structure creating executive authority vacuum.

US imposed sanctions on five CPT members and deployed warships while backing PM Fils-Aime as leader.

Kenya MSS withdrawal begins as GSF activation creates potential security gap through mid-2026.

Gang territorial control over 23 communes threatens viability of August 30 election schedule.

Food insecurity projected to reach 54% of population during March-June 2026 lean season.

DEVELOPMENT 1: CPT Dissolution Transfers Power to Unelected Prime Minister Without Constitutional Framework

The Transitional Presidential Council officially concluded its mandate on February 7, 2026 as specified in the April 3, 2024 Political Accord, dissolving without establishing a successor governance mechanism. Executive authority transferred by default to Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime who has served since November 2024 but holds no electoral mandate or constitutional legitimacy. The dissolution occurred amid escalating internal conflict after five of seven CPT members voted in late January to remove Fils-Aime from office, triggering US diplomatic intervention and targeted sanctions against CPT leadership.

Haiti now operates under an extraconstitutional arrangement with a US-backed Prime Minister as sole executive authority, no functioning legislature, no elected officials at any level of government, and national elections scheduled seven months away. No agreement exists on what governance framework should replace the CPT despite multiple proposals including a 17-member deliberative assembly suggested by the Civil Society Initiative. Former legislator Antoine Rodon Bien-Aime confirmed that numerous proposals have been presented but a unified solution remains elusive.

The CPT's tenure produced no electoral progress, no constitutional revision, and presided over

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deteriorating security conditions that resulted in over 10,000 deaths during its 22 months in power. The council's final weeks were marked by corruption allegations, US visa restrictions imposed on January 25 against two members for involvement with Foreign Terrorist Organization-designated gangs, and expanded sanctions on January 27 covering five total CPT members. The Organization of American States stated on January 22 that the CPT mandate ends February 7 per the April 2024 accord and that future arrangements rest with Haitian leadership.

The governance vacuum creates immediate risks of contested authority, institutional paralysis, and reduced international legitimacy for reform initiatives. PM Fils-Aime's authority derives entirely from US backing and an expired political accord rather than constitutional process or democratic mandate. CARICOM expressed great concern on January 27 at the internal turmoil and urged stakeholders to halt fragmentation which works only for the benefit of the gangs. BINUH head Maria Isabel Salvador Ruiz-Massieu warned on January 20 that Haiti faces a critical phase and urged governance continuity beyond February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has not had an elected president since the July 2021 assassination of Jovenel Moise and the terms of its last senators expired over three years ago. The CPT was established in April 2024 under a CARICOM-brokered accord as a temporary executive body to manage the transition to elections originally scheduled for February 2026 but subsequently postponed to August 2026.

TALKING POINTS

PM Fils-Aime now exercises sole executive authority without legislative check or constitutional legitimacy.

No successor governance structure was established before CPT dissolution despite months of negotiations.

US diplomatic backing provides external legitimacy but creates dependency relationship with no domestic institutional foundation.

Governance vacuum increases risk of competing claims to authority and institutional deadlock. Seven-month gap until August elections creates extended period of extraconstitutional rule.

Civil society proposals for deliberative assembly or consultative body were not adopted before deadline.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor Fils-Aime's first executive actions for signals on whether he will rule unilaterally or establish consultative mechanisms.

Track emergence of domestic opposition particularly from sanctioned CPT members and their

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political networks.

Assess international community response to extraconstitutional arrangement and whether legitimacy concerns affect programming.

Watch for competing authority claims from political factions or civil society coalitions.

Evaluate whether governance vacuum creates opportunities for gang expansion or vigilante group mobilization.

Prepare contingencies for contested elections if current authority framework is not resolved before August.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: US Sanctions on CPT Members and Naval Deployment Represent Assertive Bilateral Intervention

The Trump Administration imposed visa restrictions under INA 212(a)(3)(C) on five Transitional Presidential Council members and one minister for involvement with gangs designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, marking the most direct US intervention in Haiti's internal governance since the 2004 coup. Sanctions were announced in two waves with initial restrictions on January 25 against two members later identified as Edgard Leblanc Fils and Louis Gerald Gilles, followed by expanded measures on January 27 covering three additional CPT members. The restrictions bar targeted individuals from entering the United States and signal potential for further consequences including asset freezes or criminal referrals.

Three US naval vessels including one warship and coast guard vessels deployed to the Bay of Port-au-Prince on February 3, described officially as demonstrating unwavering commitment to the security, stability, and brighter future of Haiti. The deployment was framed publicly as counter-narcotics operations but is widely interpreted as political signaling to support the governance transition and deter interference with PM Fils-Aime's authority. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned on February 5 of a steep cost for corrupt politicians supporting gangs while explicitly backing Fils-Aime's leadership.

The US Embassy in Port-au-Prince issued a public endorsement on February 5 affirming support for PM Fils-Aime as leader after the February 7 CPT dissolution. This represents a departure from previous US practice of supporting collective transitional bodies rather than individual leaders, and establishes Fils-Aime's authority as dependent on continued US backing. The convergence of sanctions targeting opposing CPT members, naval presence in the capital bay, and diplomatic

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endorsement of Fils-Aime creates an unprecedented level of direct US influence over Haiti's transition process.

The sanctions and military deployment create immediate leverage for US policy priorities including gang suppression, electoral timeline adherence, and cooperation with the Gang Suppression Force. However, the approach also exposes Fils-Aime to accusations of being a US puppet and may complicate his ability to build domestic political coalitions. Sanctioned CPT members retain political networks and constituencies that could organize resistance to what they portray as foreign interference. The duration and depth of Trump Administration commitment beyond the current gesture remains uncertain particularly if security conditions fail to improve.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United States has a history of military interventions in Haiti including the 1915-1934 occupation, 1994 Operation Uphold Democracy, and 2004 removal of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. US policy toward Haiti has traditionally alternated between periods of intensive engagement and relative neglect creating uncertainty about commitment durability.

TALKING POINTS

US sanctioned five of seven CPT members plus one minister for collaboration with terrorist-designated gangs.

Naval deployment to Port-au-Prince Bay represents most visible US military presence since 2004 intervention.

Trump Administration explicitly endorsed PM Fils-Aime as leader creating dependency relationship.

Sanctions give US leverage over political actors but may trigger nationalist backlash.

Secretary Rubio's warning of steep cost for corrupt politicians signals willingness to expand measures.

Approach marks departure from support for collective transitional bodies toward individual leader backing.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor domestic political reaction to US intervention particularly from sanctioned CPT members and nationalist factions.

Assess whether Fils-Aime leverages US backing to consolidate authority or faces legitimacy challenges.

Track Trump Administration policy signals for indicators of sustained commitment versus short-term gesture.

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Evaluate whether sanctions and military presence deter gang activity or provoke territorial expansion.

Watch for additional sanctions waves targeting other political or economic actors.

Prepare for potential shift in US posture if security gains do not materialize within three to six months.



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DEVELOPMENT 3: Kenya MSS Drawdown Begins as GSF Activation Creates Potential Security Gap

Kenya announced it will begin reducing its police deployment in Haiti after completing what it considers the primary objective of stabilizing the country, initiating a transition from the Multinational Security Support mission to the United Nations-authorized Gang Suppression Force. Kenya Foreign Affairs Principal Secretary Korir Sing'Oei confirmed the handover stating that Kenya has fulfilled its role in initial stabilization. The MSS currently fields approximately 735 Kenyan officers within a total force of roughly 1,000 personnel drawn from multiple contributing countries.

The Gang Suppression Force was authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 2793 passed with Chapter VII enforcement powers to conduct proactive counter-gang operations to neutralize, isolate, and deter gangs independently or in coordination with Haiti National Police and armed forces. The force has an authorized ceiling of 5,550 personnel representing a substantial increase over MSS strength. The GSF received a 12-month authorization with UN Support Office coordination and passed with 12 votes in favor and three abstentions from Russia, China, and Pakistan. US Ambassador Mike Waltz stated the GSF is designed to correct MSS shortcomings.

The gap between MSS drawdown initiation and GSF achievement of full operational capacity creates a critical vulnerability window likely extending through mid-2026. Current GSF personnel levels remain far below the 5,550 authorized ceiling and the timeline for recruitment, deployment, and operational readiness is uncertain. Police operations supported by the MSS have reopened some roads in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite Department and gradually restored state presence around Champ de Mars, but BINUH head Ruiz-Massieu cautioned that such gains remain fragile and risk reversal without sustained pressure and basic service delivery.

The security force transition occurs during the most significant governance disruption since the

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February 2024 gang uprising that triggered the CPT's formation. Armed gangs control an estimated 85-90% of Port-au-Prince and have expanded into Artibonite, Centre, and Northwest departments. Gang violence killed over 10,000 people during the CPT's 22-month tenure with murder rates rising approximately 20% in 2025 compared to 2024. The Viv Ansanm coalition remains the dominant force despite internal fractures over kidnapping disputes that triggered deadly clashes in December 2025.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The MSS was deployed in June 2024 following a February 2024 gang uprising that seized control of Port-au-Prince and forced resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry. Kenya agreed to lead the mission after initial reluctance from other potential contributors, but force generation fell short of original targets and funding remained insufficient throughout the deployment.

TALKING POINTS

Kenya initiating MSS drawdown after declaring primary stabilization objectives met despite ongoing gang control.

GSF authorized for 5,550 personnel but currently far below ceiling creating capability gap.

Chapter VII enforcement powers give GSF authority for proactive counter-gang operations beyond MSS defensive posture.

Timeline to GSF full operational capacity likely extends through mid-2026 creating vulnerability window.

Security gains around Champ de Mars and key roads remain fragile per BINUH assessment.

Gang control over 85-90% of Port-au-Prince unchanged despite MSS presence.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Track GSF force generation rate and identify contributing countries to assess deployment timeline reliability.

Monitor gang territorial activity for opportunistic expansion during security transition period.

Evaluate whether Haiti National Police capacity can maintain current security gains without MSS support.

Assess impact of security gap on humanitarian access particularly during March-June lean season.

Watch for coordination failures between outgoing MSS, incoming GSF, and Haiti National Police.

Prepare contingency plans for electoral timeline disruption if security conditions deteriorate before August.



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DEVELOPMENT 4: Gang Territorial Control Over 23 Communes Threatens August Electoral Timeline Viability

Armed gangs maintain control over 23 communes across West, Artibonite, Centre, and Northwest departments creating substantial obstacles to implementation of the August 30, 2026 electoral calendar published by the Provisional Electoral Council in *Le Moniteur* on December 24, 2025. The CEP has identified these 23 inaccessible areas as requiring acceptable security environment restoration before the council can establish electoral infrastructure including voter registration sites, polling locations, and vote tabulation offices. The current schedule calls for campaign period beginning May 19, first round voting on August 30, and presidential inauguration on February 7, 2027.

Gang territorial dominance now encompasses an estimated 85-90% of Port-au-Prince and expanding zones in Haiti's agricultural heartland. The Viv Ansanm coalition remains the primary armed force despite internal fractures that emerged in December 2025 over kidnapping policy disputes resulting in deadly clashes. Security indicators show continued deterioration with casualties from January through September 2025 totaling 4,384 killed, 1,899 wounded, and 491 kidnapped. Intentional homicides in Artibonite and Centre departments increased 210% with 1,303 victims from January through August 2025 compared to 419 during the same 2024 period.

CEP president Jacques Desrosiers declared in October 2025 that an earlier electoral calendar proposing February 1, 2026 first round voting was impossible due to gang violence and funding gaps. The revised August timeline assumes security improvements that appear unlikely without full Gang Suppression Force deployment and sustained counter-gang operations through the May campaign launch date. The electoral decree published in *Le Moniteur* included provisions for 30% women candidate requirements and overseas voter participation but compliance mechanisms remain undefined with no party registration process yet initiated.

The convergence of governance vacuum, security force transition gap, and gang territorial expansion creates substantial risk of electoral timeline disruption. Political activity has been frozen during the CPT dissolution crisis with no major party rallies, candidate announcements, or coalition formations reported. The campaign period scheduled to begin in 103 days requires accessible territory, functioning security, and political organizing space that does not currently exist in gang-controlled zones. Food insecurity projected to affect 54% of the population during

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the March-June lean season will further constrain electoral preparation and voter mobilization capacity.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has not held national elections since 2016 legislative polls and the last presidential election was in 2015. Multiple electoral calendars have been announced and abandoned since President Moise's assassination in July 2021 due to security deterioration, funding shortfalls, and political instability. The Provisional Electoral Council was reformed multiple times amid allegations of bias and incompetence.

TALKING POINTS

Gang control of 23 communes prevents CEP access required for electoral infrastructure establishment.

August 30 first round date assumes security improvements unlikely without full GSF deployment.

Campaign period begins May 19 requiring 103 days of political organizing space restoration.

No party registration or candidate announcement activity has begun despite approaching deadlines.

Electoral decree includes women candidate and overseas voting provisions but implementation mechanisms undefined.

March-June food insecurity peak coincides with critical electoral preparation period.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor security restoration in 23 gang-controlled communes monthly to assess electoral timeline viability.

Track CEP announcements on party registration opening and compliance with electoral decree requirements.

Evaluate whether GSF deployment timeline aligns with May campaign launch or creates need for additional postponement.

Assess political actor willingness to participate in elections under current security and governance conditions.

Watch for CEP statements on funding adequacy particularly for overseas voting infrastructure.

Prepare analysis of alternative scenarios including partial elections in accessible zones or further timeline extension.



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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

PM Fils-Aime expected to issue first executive actions or public statements defining his authority framework and whether consultative mechanisms will be established. US diplomatic activity will signal whether Washington maintains intensive engagement or reduces visibility after February 7 transition point. Gang territorial movements particularly around Port-au-Prince periphery and Artibonite corridor may indicate opportunistic expansion during governance vacuum period.

THIS WEEK

GSF deployment announcements from contributing countries will clarify force generation timeline and operational readiness projections. Domestic political opposition may organize through sanctioned CPT members and their networks challenging Fils-Aime's sole authority. CEP could release party registration procedures and electoral decree implementation details if governance clarity permits forward movement on August timeline.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Security force transition gap extending through mid-2026 creates vulnerability period for gang expansion and humanitarian access deterioration. March-June food insecurity peak affects 5.91 million people during critical electoral preparation period potentially disrupting campaign logistics and voter mobilization. May 19 campaign launch deadline will test whether security improvements materialize sufficiently for political organizing or require additional electoral calendar revision.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Radio France Internationale French service February 6 2026 on CPT assessment and US naval deployment

Radio France Internationale English service February 7 2026 on CPT dissolution and sexual violence trends

HaitiLibre January 25 2026 on initial US sanctions against CPT members

Sputnik Africa February 7 2026 on Kenya troop drawdown announcement

Capital FM Kenya February 6 2026 on MSS to GSF transition details

United Nations News January 20 2026 on Security Council crisis briefing

CARICOM statement January 27 2026 on Haiti political turmoil

Reuters wire service February 7 2026 on CPT mandate expiration and political transition

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Le Nouvelliste January 27 2026 on expanded US sanctions coverage

HaitiLibre December 24 2025 on revised electoral calendar publication

AlterPresse Port-au-Prince February 6 2026 on pre-transition tensions

Organization of American States statement January 22 2026 on governance framework