



# **AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF**

February 07, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council formally dissolved today transferring executive power to Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime in a ceremony at Villa d'Accueil around 10:00 AM. Fils-Aime now governs alone through the Council of Ministers with no presidential oversight structure. Three U.S. warships remain deployed in Port-au-Prince Bay under Operation Southern Spear. PNH deployed massive security presence including new South Korean armored vehicles. No major security incidents occurred during transition. The CPT's dissolution was orderly but governance framework lacks institutional checks. Exchange rate remained stable at approximately 131 HTG/USD. International community backing solidifies Fils-Aime position despite domestic opposition from 70+ party coalition.



### QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CPT dissolved on schedule with formal ceremony transferring power to PM Fils-Aime who now governs without oversight body

U.S. deployed three warships to Port-au-Prince Bay under Operation Southern Spear as visible deterrence posture

PNH showcased new South Korean armored vehicles in unprecedented security deployment protecting transition ceremony

CARICOM Eminent Persons Group confirmed governance model with power exercised by Council of Ministers chaired by Prime Minister

Dissenting CPT members proposed rival Presidential College structure but lacks international recognition or backing

### DEVELOPMENT 1: CPT DISSOLVED FILS-AIME ASSUMES SOLE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY

Haiti's nine-member Transitional Presidential Council formally ended its mandate on February 7 2026 transferring executive power to Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime in a ceremony held under strict security at the Villa d'Accueil. CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr delivered farewell remarks stating our guiding principles are clear political elections and stability before symbolically handing authority to the Prime Minister. Le Nouvelliste captured the moment with the headline Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime Alone at the Helm noting he enjoys the support of the Americans which proved decisive in keeping him at the Prime Minister's Office despite a resolution never published in Le Moniteur by a majority of presidential advisers to dismiss him.

The CARICOM Eminent Persons Group following meetings with Haitian political actors announced the post-CPT governance model stating due to a lack of consensus starting this February 7 2026 power will be exercised by the Council of Ministers chaired by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime. This arrangement means Fils-Aime is the sole executive authority with no

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

presidential council collegiate body or oversight structure. The governance framework arrived at by default rather than consensus with no formal transition accord and no accountability mechanism despite provisions in the April 2024 Agreement. The civil society organization ORDEDH is advocating for a chambre de controle de la transition but none has been established.

Not all council members participated in the ceremony. Four CPT members who voted to oust Fils-Aime in January opted for an alternative Presidential College headed by Cour de Cassation judge Jocelyne Casimir with Leslie Voltaire representing the CPT and Charles Tardieu representing civil society as senior advisors. This rival structure appears sidelined by international community backing of Fils-Aime. Reuters reported Haiti entered political limbo on as the mandate of the Caribbean nation's transitional governing council ended with no succession plan in place noting the term has been marked by a deterioration in security corruption accusations and political infighting.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was established in April 2024 through a CARICOM-mediated agreement following Prime Minister Ariel Henry's resignation amid escalating gang violence and political crisis. The nine-member council was intended to govern collectively for eighteen months until February 7 2026 while organizing Haiti's first elections since 2016.

### TALKING POINTS

Fils-Aime now wields executive power alone without institutional checks or oversight body required under April 2024 Agreement

CARICOM framework confirms governance through Council of Ministers with Prime Minister as chair and sole political authority

Rival Presidential College proposed by dissenting CPT members lacks international recognition and appears stillborn

U.S. backing of Fils-Aime proved decisive in keeping him in office despite majority CPT vote to dismiss him

Transition occurred without violence or major security incident representing best-case scenario for institutional continuity



**Accountability vacuum creates risk for governance legitimacy and donor confidence going forward**

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

International organizations should establish formal oversight mechanisms to monitor Fils-Aime government actions and decisions

Donors should condition continued support on establishment of accountability framework as mandated in April 2024 Agreement

Political actors must decide between constructive engagement on electoral preparations or confrontational opposition risking sanctions

U.S. should clarify duration and scope of Operation Southern Spear naval presence to avoid perceptions of occupation

CARICOM should maintain active monitoring role through Eminent Persons Group with regular reporting on governance framework

Civil society should press for immediate establishment of chambre de controle de la transition with defined oversight powers



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

#### DEVELOPMENT 2: U.S. WARSHIPS DEPLOYED IN PORT-AU-PRINCE BAY

The U.S. Embassy confirmed on February 3 that three American naval vessels are operating in Haitian waters under Operation Southern Spear directed by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. USS Stockdale DDG 106 an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer provides advanced multi-mission warfare capabilities including anti-air anti-surface and anti-submarine systems. USCGC Stone WMSL 758 a National Security Cutter conducts long-range patrol and counter-narcotics operations. USCGC Diligence WMEC 616 a medium-endurance cutter handles coastal law enforcement missions. The deployment represents the most visible U.S. military presence in Haitian waters in recent years and coincides precisely with the CPT mandate expiration.

The deployment follows Secretary of State Rubio's January 28 Senate hearing remarks that the U.S. may need a stronger military posture to confront gangs and transnational criminal networks operating in Haiti and elsewhere in the region. The Embassy statement characterized the presence as reflecting the United States unwavering commitment to Haiti's security stability and a brighter future. U.S. officials described the deployment as deterrence and support not direct military intervention. Images of the warships circulated widely on social media starting February 3 prompting widespread reaction of Haitians across the world with critics worrying the deployment could escalate tensions or be perceived as foreign intervention.

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

The timing of the deployment days before the February 7 transition deadline signals Washington's intent to prevent institutional collapse or gang exploitation of political vacuum. The presence of a guided-missile destroyer represents significant combat capability far exceeding typical counter-narcotics or humanitarian missions. The deployment provides both visible deterrence against gang mobilization and implicit support for the Fils-Aime government favored by Washington. The operation appears designed to ensure smooth power transition while demonstrating credible threat of military action if gangs attempt major attacks during vulnerable transition period.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The last major U.S. military intervention in Haiti was the 2004 deployment following President Aristide's departure when Marines secured key sites in Port-au-Prince. Subsequent U.S. military presence has primarily involved humanitarian missions following the 2010 earthquake and medical ship deployments rather than combat-capable warships.

### TALKING POINTS

Three U.S. warships deployed under Operation Southern Spear represent most visible American military presence in years

USS Stockdale guided-missile destroyer provides advanced warfare capabilities far exceeding typical counter-narcotics missions

Deployment timed precisely with CPT expiration signals intent to prevent institutional collapse or gang exploitation

Embassy characterizes presence as deterrence and support not intervention but critics worry about perception of foreign occupation

Secretary Rubio's remarks about stronger military posture provide doctrinal justification for expanded force presence

Visible naval deployment demonstrates credible threat capability while supporting Fils-Aime government transition

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Washington should clarify mission duration rules of engagement and specific objectives to avoid open-ended presence

U.S. Embassy should coordinate with Haitian government on public messaging to address sovereignty concerns

International partners should assess whether naval deployment indicates shift toward more assertive U.S. policy



**Private sector should evaluate whether warship presence improves security confidence or increases political risk perception**

Haitian civil society should monitor for mission creep or expansion beyond stated deterrence and support objectives

Regional observers should track whether deployment model extends to other Caribbean states facing security challenges



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**DEVELOPMENT 3: MASSIVE SECURITY DEPLOYMENT WITH NEW ARMORED VEHICLES**

The Haiti National Police deployed exceptional security apparatus in Port-au-Prince on February 6-7 2026 including first operational use of three new tracked armored vehicles donated by South Korea through bilateral cooperation. PNH sealed all access routes around Villa d'Accueil and Primature with multiple armored vehicles deployed along Delmas and downtown axes and strategic checkpoints reinforced at all routes leading to sensitive institutional sites. The deployment objective was to prevent any act of violence sabotage or attempted takeover in a context where heavily armed gangs continue to exert constant pressure on multiple neighborhoods. The South Korean armored vehicles represent significant capability enhancement for PNH providing protected mobility in high-threat urban environments.

Activities slowed significantly in Port-au-Prince on February 6 with reduced school attendance and public transportation amid uncertainty about the transition. The security perimeter extended beyond immediate government buildings to include major thoroughfares and gang territorial boundaries. PNH maintained visible presence with armored patrols throughout transition day sending message of state authority despite gang control of approximately 90 percent of the capital. The deployment demonstrated operational capacity and coordination suggesting improved PNH capabilities compared to previous major security operations. No major incidents occurred during the transition period indicating either successful deterrence or gang strategic decision not to test security apparatus during high-profile event.

The DCPJ Central Directorate of the Judicial Police issued arrest warrants against Youri Ralph Chevy Interim Executive Agent of Port-au-Prince Arnel Belizaire former Deputy of Delmas Tabarre and Smith Joseph charged with terrorism financing conspiracy against state security

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

criminal association and money laundering. The warrants signal continued law enforcement action against political and economic actors allegedly supporting gang operations. The timing immediately before transition suggests either completion of ongoing investigations or political pressure to demonstrate state capacity ahead of CPT dissolution. The targets include municipal and legislative figures indicating potential corruption network extending into institutional structures.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti National Police has struggled with capacity and corruption challenges throughout the transition period with gang violence overwhelming limited resources. Previous major security operations including electoral security deployments have faced equipment shortages and coordination problems limiting effectiveness against heavily armed gang networks.

### TALKING POINTS

PNH deployed new South Korean armored vehicles for first time providing enhanced capability in urban combat environments  
Security perimeter extended across Port-au-Prince with sealed access to Villa d'Accueil Primature and major thoroughfares  
Transition day occurred without major incidents suggesting successful deterrence or gang strategic restraint  
DCPJ arrest warrants target municipal legislative and business figures on terrorism financing and state security charges  
Deployment demonstrated operational coordination capacity suggesting improved PNH capabilities compared to previous operations  
New armored assets provide protected mobility against small arms and light weapons reducing officer vulnerability

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

PNH should maintain enhanced security posture through initial post-transition period to prevent gang testing of new government  
International partners should accelerate armored vehicle and equipment deliveries to sustain operational momentum



**Fils-Aime government should publicly recognize PNH performance to build institutional morale and public confidence**

Security planners should assess whether transition deployment model scales to broader territorial

recovery operations

Donors should evaluate equipment needs based on demonstrated operational capacity during transition security mission

Civil society should monitor arrest warrant prosecutions to ensure due process and avoid political persecution



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### DEVELOPMENT 4: POST-CPT GOVERNANCE LANDSCAPE AND STAKEHOLDER IMPLICATIONS

Le Nouvelliste described Fils-Aime as the new strongman of Haiti now facing security challenges with 90 percent of Port-au-Prince under gang control and over 10000 killed during 22 months of CPT rule. He must organize first elections since 2016 with CEP schedule targeting August 30 2026 first round while governing with U.S. backing but facing domestic opposition from 70+ party coalition EDE Montana Accord and Fanm Yo Deside. The accountability vacuum with no oversight body established despite April 2024 Agreement provisions creates legitimacy risks. Fils-Aime must coordinate with Kenya-led GSF reaching full deployment by summer-autumn 2026 while managing domestic political opposition viewing arrangement as externally imposed.

French Ambassador Antoine Michon told RFI on February 5 that it is very difficult to organize an electoral process in current conditions acknowledging fundamental tension between election timelines and security realities. The four dissenting CPT members proposal for three-person Presidential College with Judge Casimir Voltaire and Tardieu appears to lack international backing. With U.S. warships in the bay and Washington's explicit endorsement of Fils-Aime this alternative structure is unlikely to gain traction unless the Prime Minister's government fails operationally. The transition shifts key operational question from who governs to can Fils-Aime govern effectively alone with BINUH renewed mandate through January 2027 and UNSOH April 1 deadline for GSF logistical support providing institutional anchors.



**International organizations now have single executive counterpart simpler than nine-member CPT but lacking institutional checks with accountability risks donors should monitor. The transition was orderly with no violence no disruption and stable exchange rate representing best-case scenario for business continuity. U.S. naval presence and HOPE HELP renewal signal provide modest confidence in continued engagement but fundamental operating environment unchanged with 90 percent gang control FAA ban until March 7 and degraded infrastructure. Political actors face strategic choice between constructive engagement with Fils-Aime government particularly on electoral preparations or confrontational opposition risking international sanctions.**



## **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Haiti has not held national elections since 2016 when President Jovenel Moise was elected. His assassination in July 2021 triggered constitutional crisis with no functioning parliament and disputed executive authority leading to April 2024 CARICOM-mediated transition agreement establishing the CPT.

## **TALKING POINTS**

Fils-Aime now governs alone without institutional checks facing 90 percent gang control and 10000+ deaths during transition  
French Ambassador acknowledges fundamental difficulty organizing elections in current security conditions  
70+ party coalition EDE Montana Accord and Fanm Yo Deside represent significant domestic opposition to U.S.-backed arrangement  
International community has single executive counterpart but accountability vacuum creates donor risk  
Orderly transition without violence represents best-case scenario but fundamental operating environment unchanged  
CEP targets August 30 2026 first round but feasibility depends on security improvements and territorial access

## **RECOMMENDED DECISIONS**

International organizations should establish formal monitoring of Fils-Aime government with regular accountability reporting  
Political opposition should engage constructively on electoral preparations while maintaining pressure for oversight framework

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

U.S. should balance support for Fils-Aime with insistence on accountability mechanisms and inclusive governance

Donors should condition continued assistance on measurable progress toward electoral preparation and security improvement

GSF deployment should prioritize territorial recovery enabling voter registration and electoral infrastructure access

Civil society should mobilize for oversight body establishment as mandated in April 2024 Agreement framework



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### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

#### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Fils-Aime first official address as sole executive will signal policy priorities cabinet confirmation and governance framework approach with international recognition statements from UN Secretary-General U.S. State Department CARICOM and EU providing diplomatic validation. Gang response will indicate whether Viv Ansanm or other groups test new power structure through attacks or provocations. Dissenting CPT members must decide whether to accept dissolution or contest arrangement through rival Presidential College structure.

### THIS WEEK



**Supreme Court TPS appeal filing by Trump administration will determine timeline for protections continuation affecting Haitian diaspora planning and remittance flows. GSF Special Representative Jack Christofides assumes post mid-February providing operational leadership for Kenya-led mission. CEP statement on feasibility of August 30 first round will signal realistic electoral timeline versus political commitment. Senate HOPE HELP action on textile program extension affects private sector confidence and employment.**

### STRATEGIC HORIZON



**Accountability framework movement toward establishing oversight body will determine governance legitimacy and donor confidence sustainability. U.S. warship duration under Operation Southern Spear signals Washington's commitment level and intervention posture. Electoral timeline assessment must balance CEP schedule against French Ambassador's acknowledgment that organizing process is very difficult in current conditions. GSF full deployment timeline and territorial recovery operations will determine whether security improvements enable electoral preparation. Political opposition strategy between constructive engagement and confrontation will shape domestic legitimacy and international support dynamics.**

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