



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 04, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Civil society organization MOPAL declared on January 4 that gangs control the quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and Plateau Central, directly contradicting the Gang Suppression Force's December 31 claims of retaking gang-controlled territories. Political analyst Jerry Tardieu's December 7 interview circulated widely, confirming that Article 6.1 of the May 23, 2024 decree explicitly prohibits CPT mandate extension, creating a constitutional barrier to government transition strategy. The 18-day gang operational pause continues with zero incidents reported on . Thirty-four days remain until the February 7, 2026 CPT mandate expiration, with no replacement framework visible and fundamental contradictions between international messaging and ground reality intensifying.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

MOPAL assessment contradicts GSF claims of territorial gains, declaring gangs control quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and Plateau Central.

Article 6.1 of May 23, 2024 decree explicitly prohibits CPT mandate extension, creating legal impossibility for silent maneuvers strategy.

Eighteen-day operational pause continues, representing longest sustained period without major gang violence in 2025.

Thirty-four days until February 7 constitutional deadline with no consensus on replacement governance framework.

U.S.-Canada diplomatic split remains unresolved as CARICOM and OAS maintain silence.

DEVELOPMENT 1

MOPAL Reality Check Exposes Gap Between International Messaging and Ground Reality

The Mouvman Patriyotik Pou Lavi issued a public declaration on January 4, 2026 warning that gangs now control the quasi-totality of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, Artibonite, Plateau Central, and several strategic road axes. The civil society organization stated that the population is held hostage and forced to survive under daily terror consisting of massacres, rapes, kidnappings, and forced displacements. MOPAL expressed profound concern about the prospect of a new institutional void on February 7, 2026 and called for a broad gathering of progressive and patriotic forces around a genuine project of national refoundation. The organization has been conducting consultations since July 2025 with political actors, civil society organizations, and vital forces to construct a durable exit from crisis.

MOPAL's assessment directly contradicts the Gang Suppression Force's December 31 New Year message claiming observable security milestones that have disrupted gang activities, leading to

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

arrests and recovery of assorted arms and retaking territories under gang control. The GSF stated that forward operating bases established in gang-affected areas have played a critical role in fostering security and that intensified day and night patrols have led to the re-opening of most previously inaccessible transit routes and roads in the capital. The fundamental gap between international military messaging emphasizing territorial gains and civil society ground reality assessment describing quasi-total gang control exposes a credibility crisis. MOPAL's declaration aligns with the United Nations Security Council December 29 report stating that armed gangs have overrun an estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince and the BINUH October report documenting a 210 percent increase in intentional homicides in Artibonite and Centre.

The contradiction between MOPAL and GSF assessments suggests the 18-day operational pause is not evidence of PNH or GSF military success but rather gang tactical discipline through the holiday period. The GSF's optimistic messaging appears designed to justify continued U.S. support including 7,500 troop pledges announced December 19 and legitimize the Prime Minister's December 28 no negotiations doctrine. However, MOPAL's declaration carries ground-level credibility that contradicts official narratives because the organization conducted systematic July 2025 consultations with political actors and vital forces across Haiti. With 34 days until February 7, the GSF's failure to achieve observable security milestones undermines the government's core justification for extending the CPT mandate, which claims that security improvements require continuity.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

MOPAL's January 4 declaration represents the first major civil society statement in 2026 explicitly addressing the February 7 deadline and assessing gang territorial control. The assessment that gangs control quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince contradicts not only GSF claims but also the broader international narrative that multinational security force deployment is producing measurable territorial gains.

TALKING POINTS

Civil society organization MOPAL declares gangs control quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and Plateau Central on January 4.

MOPAL assessment directly contradicts Gang Suppression Force December 31 claims of retaking gang-controlled territories and re-opening previously inaccessible transit routes.

Contradiction exposes fundamental gap between international military optimistic messaging and civil society ground reality assessment.

MOPAL declaration aligns with UN Security Council December 29 report stating armed gangs have overrun estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince.

GSF optimistic messaging appears designed to justify continued U.S. support and legitimize

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Prime Minister's December 28 no negotiations doctrine.

With 34 days until February 7, GSF failure to achieve observable security milestones undermines government core justification for CPT mandate extension.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community should reconcile MOPAL ground reality assessment with GSF optimistic claims through independent territorial control verification before February 7.

CARICOM and OAS should issue coordinated statements in early to mid-January addressing contradictions between international messaging and civil society assessments.

Humanitarian organizations should prepare for potential violence resumption when government operations fully resume January 5.

Diaspora networks should monitor gang territorial expansion patterns in Artibonite and Plateau Central as MOPAL assessment suggests accelerated control beyond Port-au-Prince.

Political actors should prioritize MOPAL's call for broad gathering of progressive and patriotic forces to construct replacement governance framework before February 7.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2

Article 6.1 Legal Barrier Creates Constitutional Impossibility for CPT Extension Strategy

Political analyst and former presidential candidate Jerry Tardieu stated in a December 7, 2025 interview that was circulated widely on January 4 that Article 6.1 of the May 23, 2024 decree clearly indicates that the Transitional Presidential Council cannot benefit from mandate extension. Tardieu emphasized that the CPT's mandate is coming to an end and this means Haiti is entering a period of uncertainty where it is important that the vital forces of the country, especially political parties, can find a replacement formula for the CPT by February 7 at midnight. The analyst assessed that the CPT has failed due to its incapacity to create the conditions conducive to a transmission of power to authorities to be elected on February 7, 2026. Despite describing the exercise as laborious, Tardieu expressed optimism that sufficient consensus will be obtained soon.

Tardieu's legal analysis provides clarity that fundamentally challenges the government's silent maneuvers strategy of proceeding operationally as if the CPT will govern through 2026 without

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

formal extension announcement. The explicit prohibition in Article 6.1 creates a legal impossibility for the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's January 1 endorsement recognizing progress toward 2026 elections, which implicitly accepts CPT governance through 2026. The prohibition also contradicts Prime Minister Fils-Aime's December 30 endorsement of the CEP's realistic and credible calendar requiring CPT governance through August 2026 elections with February 7, 2027 inauguration. CPT President Saint-Cyr's January 1 call to avoid drift as February 7 approaches provided no explanation of post-February 7 governance arrangements.

Any CPT mandate extension beyond February 7, 2026 would require either constitutional amendment, which is impossible without Parliament that has not existed since 2023, or new decree superseding the May 23, 2024 decree, which requires international legitimization that Canada's unconditional end statement rejects. Tardieu's optimism that sufficient consensus will be obtained soon contrasts sharply with MORN's December 28 declaration that the CPT mandate is expired, representing unilateral rejection of extension, and MOPAL's January 4 warning about a new institutional void on February 7. The absence of CARICOM or OAS statements reconciling the U.S.-Canada split suggests international actors are not coordinating on this critical constitutional question. With 34 days until February 7, Tardieu's legal analysis demonstrates Haiti faces not just a political crisis but a constitutional crisis where the CPT cannot legally extend its mandate yet no replacement formula has emerged.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The May 23, 2024 decree established the CPT's organizational structure and governance framework following the collapse of the previous transitional arrangement. Article 6.1's explicit prohibition on mandate extension was designed to prevent indefinite transitional governance and force political actors to construct permanent democratic institutions by February 7, 2026.

TALKING POINTS

Jerry Tardieu confirms Article 6.1 of May 23, 2024 decree explicitly prohibits CPT mandate extension.

Legal prohibition creates constitutional impossibility for government silent maneuvers strategy proceeding as if CPT will govern through 2026.

Article 6.1 contradicts U.S. Secretary of State Rubio's January 1 endorsement implicitly accepting CPT governance through August 2026 elections.

Any CPT extension requires either constitutional amendment impossible without Parliament or new decree requiring international legitimization Canada rejects.

Tardieu's optimism contrasts with MORN's December 28 unilateral rejection of extension and MOPAL's January 4 warning about institutional void.

With 34 days until February 7, Haiti faces constitutional crisis where CPT cannot legally extend

mandate yet no replacement formula visible.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Political parties should urgently convene broad consultations to construct replacement governance framework as Tardieu recommends before February 7 midnight deadline. International Community should clarify whether U.S. endorsement of 2026 elections supersedes Article 6.1 prohibition or requires new constitutional instrument. CARICOM and OAS should issue joint statement in early to mid-January reconciling U.S.-Canada split and addressing Article 6.1 constitutional barrier. Legal experts should publish analysis of constitutional pathways for post-February 7 governance to inform political negotiations. Civil society organizations should pressure political actors to prioritize replacement framework negotiations over silent maneuvers strategy that lacks constitutional foundation.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3

Eighteen-Day Operational Pause Masks Gang Strategic Positioning Before Resumption

The 18-day operational pause from December 21 through January 4 continued with zero incidents reported on representing the longest sustained period without major gang violence in 2025. The pause excludes isolated incidents on December 23 through 26 but confirms that gangs are strategically pausing through the holiday period covering Christmas, New Year, Independence Day, Ancestors' Day, and the weekend before resuming operations when government offices fully reopen on January 5. MOPAL's January 4 assessment that gangs control quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and Plateau Central demonstrates that the 18-day pause is not evidence of PNH or GSF military success as claimed in the GSF December 31 message but rather gang tactical discipline.

The operational pause suggests gangs are consolidating territorial control in Artibonite and Plateau Central as documented in MOPAL and BINUH assessments, observing political developments including U.S. endorsement of 2026 elections and the Prime Minister's no negotiations doctrine, and positioning for violence resumption when government operations restart. The Crisis Group's December 15 warning that gangs seek amnesty as part of the

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

February 7 transition remains operationally relevant because if the CPT lacks legitimacy post-February 7 as Tardieu's Article 6.1 analysis suggests, gangs may escalate violence to force negotiations directly challenging the Prime Minister's December 28 no negotiations doctrine. The 18-day pause represents the calm before the storm as gangs wait to exploit the CPT's constitutional expiration.

The pattern of strategic pauses followed by escalation has characterized gang operations throughout 2025, with similar pauses preceding major territorial expansion campaigns in Artibonite and Plateau Central. Human Rights Watch documented that security force operations were responsible for 61 percent of casualties from July through September 2025, with 22 percent of casualties being residents struck by stray bullets, suggesting that resumed operations when government offices reopen may produce significant civilian casualties. With 34 days until February 7, the 18-day operational pause ending coincides with the CPT's entry into its final month of constitutional legitimacy, creating conditions for gangs to test whether political uncertainty produces negotiating leverage.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Gang operational pauses during holiday periods have historically preceded major escalation campaigns as armed groups use the lull to consolidate territorial gains, reposition forces, and observe government responses. The current 18-day pause is the longest in 2025, suggesting gangs are calibrating strategy based on the approaching February 7 constitutional deadline.

TALKING POINTS

Eighteen-day operational pause from December 21 through January 4 represents longest sustained period without major gang violence in 2025.

MOPAL assessment confirms pause is not evidence of PNH or GSF military success but gang tactical discipline through holiday period.

Gangs consolidating territorial control in Artibonite and Plateau Central and observing political developments before resumption.

Crisis Group warning that gangs seek amnesty remains relevant as CPT approaches constitutional expiration without replacement framework.

Pattern of strategic pauses followed by escalation characterized gang operations throughout 2025.

Expect violence resumption January 5 through 7 when government operations fully restart with 34 days remaining until February 7.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Security forces should prepare for violence resumption within 24 to 48 hours when government operations fully resume on January 5.

Humanitarian organizations should pre-position emergency response capacity in Artibonite and Plateau Central based on MOPAL territorial control assessment.

International Community should monitor whether gang violence escalation post-January 5 is designed to force negotiations contradicting Prime Minister's no negotiations doctrine.

Political actors should assess whether 18-day pause represents gang willingness to negotiate during February 7 transition or tactical repositioning before escalation.

Civilian protection protocols should be activated given Human Rights Watch documentation that 22 percent of casualties are residents struck by stray bullets.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 4

Le Nouvelliste Frames 2026 as Year of Major Challenges and Big Decisions

Le Nouvelliste published a front page headline on January 4 stating that 2026 is a year of major challenges and big decisions for Haiti, framing the year ahead as a critical juncture for the country's democratic transition. The featured content included Jerry Tardieu's New Year message addressing courage, though the full text was not accessible in monitored sources. The headline frames 2026 as the year of reckoning with the February 7 CPT expiration representing the most immediate and consequential decision point. Haiti Libre and Le Nouvelliste also republished the IHSI Economic Accounts for 2025 on January 4, reiterating that Haiti entered its seventh consecutive year of declining economic activity with a negative 2.7 percent GDP contraction in 2025.

The negative 2.7 percent GDP contraction brings the cumulative 2019 through 2025 decline to negative 16 percent, confirming Haiti is experiencing a lost decade of economic regression. The economic collapse compounds the security and constitutional crises, as gang territorial expansion correlates directly with state capacity erosion and economic deterioration. With gangs controlling quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, and Plateau Central as MOPAL assessed, formal economic activity has contracted to isolated enclaves while informal and illicit economies expand under gang administration. The CPT's failure to reverse economic decline undermines any justification for mandate extension based on performance or progress toward stability.

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Le Nouvelliste's framing of 2026 as a year requiring major challenges and big decisions reflects growing recognition within Haitian media and civil society that the February 7 deadline represents an inflection point that cannot be avoided through silent maneuvers or procedural postponement. The headline suggests institutional actors, political parties, and international stakeholders must confront fundamental questions about Haiti's governance structure, security architecture, and economic model rather than continuing transitional arrangements that have produced seven consecutive years of GDP contraction and gang territorial expansion to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince. With 34 days until February 7, the major challenges and big decisions Le Nouvelliste references include constructing a replacement governance framework, reconciling the U.S.-Canada diplomatic split, and determining whether gang territorial control can be reversed without fundamental changes to current security strategies.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's seven consecutive years of economic decline from 2019 through 2025 represent the longest sustained contraction in modern Haitian history, surpassing previous crisis periods. The negative 16 percent cumulative GDP decline correlates directly with gang territorial expansion, state capacity erosion, and the collapse of democratic institutions including Parliament.

TALKING POINTS

Le Nouvelliste frames 2026 as year of major challenges and big decisions with February 7 CPT expiration as most immediate decision point.

Negative 2.7 percent GDP contraction in 2025 brings cumulative 2019 through 2025 decline to negative 16 percent confirming lost decade.

Economic collapse compounds security and constitutional crises as gang territorial expansion correlates with state capacity erosion.

CPT failure to reverse economic decline undermines justification for mandate extension based on performance or progress toward stability.

Le Nouvelliste framing reflects recognition that February 7 deadline represents inflection point requiring confrontation of fundamental governance questions.

With 34 days remaining, major challenges include constructing replacement framework, reconciling U.S.-Canada split, and reversing gang territorial control.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Economic actors should prepare for potential currency instability and market disruption during February 7 transition period given seven-year GDP contraction pattern.

International financial institutions should develop contingency frameworks for continued operations if February 7 produces governance void.

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Political parties should incorporate economic recovery strategies into replacement governance framework negotiations.

Private sector stakeholders should assess whether continued transitional governance can reverse negative 16 percent cumulative GDP decline or requires structural reforms.

Diaspora remittance networks should prepare for potential disruption if February 7 constitutional crisis produces banking system instability.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Government operations fully resume on January 5 creating trigger for gang violence resumption ending the 18-day operational pause. Expect armed groups to test security force response capacity within 24 to 48 hours, potentially targeting critical infrastructure or civilian populations in Port-au-Prince, Artibonite, or Plateau Central. Monitor whether violence escalation is designed to force negotiations contradicting the Prime Minister's December 28 no negotiations doctrine.

THIS WEEK

CARICOM and OAS statements addressing the U.S.-Canada diplomatic split and Article 6.1 constitutional prohibition on CPT mandate extension expected between January 5 and 15. International coordination failure through mid-January would confirm absence of consensus on post-February 7 governance framework with 30 days remaining. Political party consultations on replacement governance framework should accelerate if Tardieu's optimism about sufficient consensus is accurate.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

CPT formal statement addressing February 7 deadline and Article 6.1 prohibition expected between January 10 and 20 unless silent maneuvers strategy continues through late January. Absence of CPT statement by January 20 would leave 18 days until constitutional expiration without announced transition plan, increasing probability of institutional void. Gang territorial consolidation in Artibonite and Plateau Central may accelerate if security forces prioritize Port-au-Prince defense over regional expansion prevention.

AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

PRIMARY SOURCES

Revue Politique et Parlementaire, Jerry Tardieu interview on Article 6.1 CPT mandate prohibition, December 7, 2025

Le Nouvelliste, Front page headline framing 2026 as year of major challenges and big decisions, January 4, 2026

UN Security Council Report, Armed gangs overrun estimated 90 percent of Port-au-Prince assessment, December 29, 2025

Human Rights Watch, Security force operations responsible for 61 percent of casualties July through September 2025

Crisis Group, Gangs seek amnesty as part of February 7 transition warning, December 15, 2025

U.S. State Department, Secretary of State Rubio endorsement of progress toward 2026 elections, January 1, 2026

Reuters, U.S. pledges up to 7,500 security personnel for Haiti, December 19, 2025

Le Nouvelliste, IHSI Economic Accounts showing negative 2.7 percent GDP contraction in 2025, January 4, 2026

Vant Bef Info, MOPAL public declaration on gang territorial control, January 4, 2026

Haiti Libre, Gang Suppression Force New Year message claiming territorial gains, December 31, 2025

BINUH October report, 210 percent increase in intentional homicides in Artibonite and Centre, October 2025

Caribbean National Weekly, Prime Minister rejects gang negotiations statement, December 28, 2025