



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

February 05, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

With two days until the Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires on February 7 2026 the political impasse has intensified around a rejected three-member council proposal. The February 1-3 dialogue produced a transition formula combining one CPT member one Cour de Cassation judge and one civil society representative but the EDE party the 70-plus party coalition and Fanm Yo Deside coalition have categorically rejected any CPT participation beyond February 7. A Chatham House analysis published February 4 characterizes Haiti as trapped in a vicious circle where violence deters funding and funding gaps perpetuate violence. No major security incidents occurred in the last 24 hours and the exchange rate remains stable at 131.00 HTG per USD.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CPT mandate expires in 48 hours with no successor framework agreed upon
Three-member council proposal rejected by major political coalitions
Chatham House warns security-only approach insufficient without structural economic reform
Exchange rate stable no major gang attacks in last 24 hours
US-UN-OAS-CARICOM alignment supports PM Fils-Aime continuation scenario

DEVELOPMENT 1

The most significant governance development is the crystallization and immediate rejection of the three-member council proposal emerging from the February 1-3 political dialogue. The proposed structure would replace the nine-member CPT with a three-member council consisting of one current CPT member one Cour de Cassation judge and one civil society representative.

The political party Les Engages pour le Developpement issued a communique on February 3 2026 categorically refusing any CPT involvement in power after February 7. EDE calls the three-member council proposal null and void and insists on an alternative bicephalous executive architecture with a president and prime minister as

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outlined in the Consensus Politique pour le Redressement National. The Fanm Yo Deside women's coalition also rejected any vague prolongation of the CPT demanding an inclusive transition before February 7.

Gazette Haiti reported February 5 that the CPT is seeking to play a role in the new interim period despite Leslie Voltaire's January 30 declaration that the council would leave and lose legitimacy from February 8. The broader Consensus coalition refuses expeditive decisions insisting the bicephalous executive proposal reflects multiple exchanges and should be respected.

The fundamental disagreement centers on whether any CPT member can participate in post-February 7 governance. The 70-plus party coalition EDE Fanm Yo Deside and the Consensus coalition all reject CPT continuity while the CPT itself maneuvers to retain influence. With two days remaining this impasse has no clear domestic resolution path though international actors support PM Fils-Aime continuation under constitutional fallback provisions.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was installed in April 2024 following the resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry with an 18-month mandate expiring February 7 2026. The council was intended to oversee security restoration and prepare conditions for elections but has been marked by internal divisions corruption allegations and five members currently under US visa restrictions.

TALKING POINTS

Three-member council formula rejected by EDE 70-plus coalition and Fanm Yo Deside
CPT seeking post-mandate role contradicts prior commitment to leave February 7
Domestic actors demand bicephalous executive while international community backs
PM continuation

Window for negotiated consensus effectively closed with 48 hours remaining
Constitutional fallback scenario most likely but faces domestic legitimacy challenges

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor for last-hour consensus attempts or CPT member defections on February 6

Prepare contingency protocols for governance vacuum scenarios post-February 7

Assess institutional recognition strategies if PM Fils-Aime governs without presidential council

Evaluate gang exploitation risk during political transition uncertainty

Coordinate with international stakeholders on post-transition engagement parameters



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2

Chatham House published a significant policy analysis on February 4 2026 titled Haiti's Vicious Circle Funding is Needed to End the Violence But the Violence Means Funding Doesn't Come. The paper expresses serious doubt on whether Haiti will have a government after February 7 when the Transitional Presidential Council was originally set to dissolve noting that internecine battles have broken out over what should follow the council.

The analysis references the armada floating just outside Port-au-Prince alongside diplomatic pressure and quotes Secretary of State Rubio telling PM Fils-Aime that he emphasized the importance of his continued tenure to combat terrorist gangs and stabilize the island. Rubio stated the TPC must be dissolved by February 7 without corrupt actors. The paper's core thesis argues that beyond security restoration a push to rebuild Haiti's society and create jobs is vital to any lasting solution.

The Chatham House assessment signals growing international think tank consensus that the security-first approach is insufficient and that structural economic and governance reform must accompany any security gains. This represents a shift from

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purely tactical security operations toward recognition that the Gang Suppression Force alone cannot produce sustainable stability without parallel economic development and job creation initiatives.

The analysis reinforces business and investor concerns that even with improved territorial control the fundamental operating environment will remain constrained without addressing root structural issues including unemployment infrastructure deficits and governance capacity. The vicious circle framing suggests that international funding decisions will remain conservative until security improves but security cannot improve sustainably without funding for economic reconstruction.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous international interventions in Haiti including MINUSTAH from 2004-2017 demonstrated that security operations without parallel economic development produced temporary stability that collapsed after mission withdrawal. The current Gang Suppression Force deployment follows this historical pattern with focus on tactical operations rather than structural reform.

TALKING POINTS

Chatham House characterizes Haiti as trapped in violence-funding vicious circle
Security-first approach deemed insufficient without economic and governance reform
International recognition growing that GSF alone cannot produce sustainable stability
Business environment constraints will persist despite territorial security gains
Funding hesitancy reinforces security deterioration in self-perpetuating cycle

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Integrate economic development criteria into security operation planning and evaluation
Assess job creation initiatives as security stabilization multipliers not separate tracks
Coordinate international donor engagement around simultaneous security and reconstruction funding

Evaluate private sector partnership opportunities tied to territorial control gains
Monitor for international funding announcements linked to governance transition outcomes



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3

The competing transition frameworks demonstrate fundamental misalignment between international community preferences and domestic political actor demands. Six distinct proposals exist including the three-member council from CPT dialogue the bicephalous executive from 70-plus parties the PM continuation constitutional fallback the civil society initiative the Montana Accord and the COPPOS-Haiti framework.

The US UN OAS and CARICOM have converged on key principles that the CPT must dissolve February 7 that PM Fils-Aime should continue as head of government that elections should proceed in 2026 and that no CPT member extension or self-perpetuation is acceptable. This international alignment effectively supports the PM continuation scenario as the most likely outcome regardless of domestic opposition creating a legitimacy gap between international recognition and domestic political acceptance.

The Provisional Electoral Council maintains its schedule with campaign launch May 19 first round August 30 second round December 6 and inauguration February 7 2027. However the CEP previously stated elections were materially impossible before February 2026 due to insecurity and the 137 million dollar budget being only half funded. This creates additional uncertainty around whether the electoral timeline can be credibly maintained under any post-transition governance structure.

The disconnect between international backing for PM Fils-Aime continuation and

domestic demands for broader restructuring creates conditions for contested legitimacy. Political actors face a binary choice between accepting PM continuation backed by external actors or contesting the constitutional fallback while risking institutional vacuum and international isolation. The two-day window provides no realistic pathway for negotiated domestic consensus.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's constitutional provisions for executive succession remain ambiguous in the absence of an elected president. The 1987 constitution does not explicitly address scenarios where a transitional presidential council dissolves without a successor framework agreed creating legal uncertainty around PM-only governance legitimacy.

TALKING POINTS

Six competing transition frameworks reflect fundamental political fragmentation
International community aligned on PM Fils-Aime continuation scenario
Domestic actors demand bicephalous executive or broader restructuring
Electoral timeline maintained despite CEP stating elections materially impossible
Constitutional ambiguity on PM-only governance creates legitimacy vulnerability

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Assess legal basis for PM Fils-Aime governance without presidential council oversight
Evaluate international recognition protocols for various post-transition scenarios
Monitor for domestic political actor statements accepting or rejecting PM continuation
Prepare for contested legitimacy scenarios requiring stakeholder positioning decisions
Coordinate with legal advisors on constitutional interpretation uncertainties



CONFIDENCE



Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 4

No major security incidents occurred in the last 24 hours representing continued relative calm since the January 31 US Embassy alert. Recent Police Nationale d'Haiti operations in Croix-des-Bouquets on February 1 neutralized three armed individuals and seized automatic weapons while January 31 operations killed eight gang members. Justice Minister Pelissier stated on January 20 that large sections of Port-au-Prince administrative center have shifted from red zones to orange zones following operations securing the airport intersection Delmas 19 and Nazon.

Armed gangs continue to control approximately 90 percent of Port-au-Prince despite these tactical gains. The Gang Suppression Force deployment remains at 950-1000 personnel primarily Kenyan forces against an authorized strength of 5550 with full deployment expected by summer or autumn 2026. The UN Support Office advances toward its April 1 operational deadline but the Chatham House assessment reinforces that GSF alone is insufficient without structural reforms.

The exchange rate remains stable at 131.00 HTG per USD with monthly depreciation of 0.10 percent and 12-month depreciation of 0.62 percent. No significant devaluation alert has been triggered. The HOPE-HELP textile program renewal passed the US House January 11 and awaits Senate action with support from the Association of Industries but no Senate movement detected in the last 24 hours.

Humanitarian conditions remain severe with 1.5 million people displaced by gang violence massive food insecurity and an 880 million dollar 2026 humanitarian appeal targeting 4.2 million people. The FAA ban on US carriers remains in effect until March 7 and the Peligre hydroelectric facility remains offline. These constraints limit economic recovery potential even in scenarios where security operations produce territorial gains.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The exchange rate stability reflects Banque de la Republique d'Haiti intervention capacity and relatively low transaction volumes rather than fundamental economic strength. Previous gourde depreciation episodes in 2018-2019 and 2021-2022 accelerated rapidly once intervention capacity was exhausted.

TALKING POINTS

Security environment calm in last 24 hours but gangs control 90 percent of Port-au-Prince

PNH operations showing tactical gains in Croix-des-Bouquets and administrative center areas

Exchange rate stable at 131.00 HTG per USD with minimal monthly depreciation
GSF deployment at 18 percent of authorized strength with full deployment months away

Humanitarian crisis persists with 1.5 million displaced and massive food insecurity

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Monitor gang response to political transition for exploitation opportunities

Assess PNH operational continuity during governance uncertainty period

Evaluate exchange rate sustainability under potential governance vacuum scenarios

Coordinate humanitarian access protocols with security operation planners

Track HOPE-HELP Senate timeline as critical textile sector stability factor



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

February 6 represents the last day for any final-hour consensus attempts with attention on individual CPT member statements or potential defections. February 7 transition day requires monitoring for who addresses the nation whether a CPT dissolution ceremony occurs whether PM Fils-Aime issues an executive statement and gang response to political vacuum scenarios. Trump administration Supreme Court filing timeline for TPS emergency stay application remains uncertain but could move quickly.

THIS WEEK

Post-transition governance structure will clarify whether PM Fils-Aime governs alone whether any new structure emerges and international recognition statements. Security posture assessment focuses on gang exploitation of transition uncertainty and PNH operational continuity. Gang Suppression Force Special Representative Jack Christofides assumes post mid-February. Senate action on HOPE-HELP textile program extension becomes increasingly urgent for industry stability.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Electoral timeline credibility depends on whether the Provisional Electoral Council maintains May 19 campaign launch and August 30 first round dates despite material impossibility statements. Gang Suppression Force full deployment timeline of summer to autumn 2026 requires stable government counterparts for coordination. UN Support Office April 1 operational deadline and BINUH mandate through January 2027 provide mission continuity framework. Constitutional Court challenges to any post-transition governance structure could emerge if domestic actors contest PM continuation legitimacy.

PRIMARY SOURCES

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