



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

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Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti confronts three simultaneous critical decision points within five days. A U.S. federal court ruling expected today will determine deportation risk for 350,000 Haitian TPS holders as protections expire February 3. Political dialogue concludes February 3 with no announced consensus on post-February 7 governance framework despite international pressure and constitutional deadline. Security conditions remain tense following January 31 U.S. Embassy alert though no major incidents occurred in the last 24 hours. The exchange rate holds at 131.20 HTG/USD while gang territorial control persists at 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

U.S. District Judge Ana Reyes ruling expected today on TPS termination affecting 350,000 Haitians with protections expiring February 3.

Transitional Presidential Council political dialogue ends February 3 with no public consensus on succession framework five days before mandate expiration.

No major security incidents in last 24 hours following January 31 Embassy alert but PNH-gang violence cycle continues.

Exchange rate stable at 131.20 HTG/USD despite political uncertainty and security deterioration.

BINUH mandate renewed to January 2027 but operational effectiveness requires stable Haitian government counterpart.

DEVELOPMENT 1

U.S. District Court Judge Ana Reyes is expected to rule today on whether to pause Temporary Protected Status termination for Haiti affecting approximately 350,000 TPS holders plus 150,000 with pending applications. TPS protections expire February 3 2026 at 11:59 PM placing this population at immediate deportation risk. Judge Reyes stated during January 7 hearings she would issue her ruling by February 2 and expressed skepticism about the administration's safety justification telling the DHS attorney the evidence does not allow determination of whether TPS holders can safely

return to Haiti.

The legal backdrop involves contradictory U.S. government positions. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled January 28 that DHS Secretary Kristi Noem exceeded her statutory authority when terminating TPS for Haiti and Venezuela finding actions were not reached in accordance with procedures established by Congress. However the Supreme Court previously allowed terminations to proceed pending final resolution meaning the Ninth Circuit ruling has no immediate practical effect. Judge Reyes' separate case in D.C. District Court could provide emergency relief through a pause order. The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince characterized Haiti as currently at stage four to not travel like a war zone and has removed 80-90 percent of personnel due to insecurity yet the same U.S. government claims conditions are safe enough for half a million Haitians to be returned.

Community terror is widespread according to Guerline Jozef of the Haitian Bridge Alliance who reports planned 30-day ICE raids targeting major cities with Haitian populations including Springfield Ohio, Charleroi Pennsylvania, San Diego and New York City. Springfield officials are bracing for an ICE surge particularly notable as the city was the center of racist smears during the 2024 presidential campaign. On February 2 elected officials including Massachusetts State Representative Latyna Humphrey and Everett Massachusetts Mayor Robert Van Campen held community meetings calling for TPS extension emphasizing that Temporary Protected Status has allowed Haitian families to live work and contribute safely in communities.

Operational implications are severe across multiple domains. Remittances totaling 4.1 billion dollars in 2024 representing 18.43 percent of Haiti's projected 2026 GNDI could decline 10-15 percent if 350,000 working-age TPS holders lose employment authorization. Deportation logistics face insurmountable barriers as Toussaint Louverture Airport operates under FAA commercial flight ban until March 7, gangs control airport access roads, and Haiti lacks reception capacity for mass returns. Political pressure from TPS termination creates additional destabilization pressure on already fragile transition government. Regional spillover would likely accelerate boat migration to Florida, Bahamas and Turks and Caicos if deportations proceed.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Temporary Protected Status for Haiti was initially designated following the January

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2010 earthquake and has been extended continuously through multiple administrations based on extraordinary and temporary conditions preventing safe return.

TALKING POINTS

Judge Reyes ruling today determines immediate fate of 350,000 Haitians with work authorization and deportation protection expiring February 3.

U.S. government maintains contradictory positions claiming Haiti safe for deportations while Embassy describes war zone conditions and removed 80-90 percent personnel.

Deportation of TPS holders would eliminate 400-600 million dollars in annual remittances representing 10-15 percent of Haiti's 4.1 billion dollar 2024 total.

Haiti lacks physical capacity to receive mass deportations with airport under FAA ban through March 7, gang control of access routes, and no reception infrastructure.

Political mobilization increasing with elected officials, Congressional Black Caucus and Caribbean-American caucus coordinating advocacy for legislative TPS extension.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should prepare contingency protocols for potential 10-15 percent remittance decline impact on humanitarian needs if ruling denies pause.

Businesses with Haitian workforce exposure in U.S. operations should prepare for potential labor disruption if work authorizations terminate February 3.

Legal services organizations should pre-position individual asylum application support as fallback if TPS termination proceeds.

Haitian diaspora advocacy groups should leverage favorable ruling if obtained to intensify Senate pressure for legislative TPS extension before protections expire.

Caribbean governments should prepare maritime interdiction and reception protocols for likely acceleration of boat migration if mass deportations commence.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2

The Transitional Presidential Council launched three-day political dialogue February 1-3 at Petion-Ville hotel bringing together hundreds of participants from political parties, religious leaders, unions and civil society to negotiate post-February 7 governance architecture. As of February 2 no official announcement of consensus or agreed framework has been detected in available sources despite CPT co-presidents Leslie Voltaire and Edgard Leblanc Fils emphasizing urgency of reaching new political accord as the indispensable framework for redefining national governance beyond February 7. The dialogue faces fundamental legitimacy challenges as during the first day January 18 four of six invited political blocs declined participation arguing there is no dialogue possible with the CPT that must leave power at any cost on February 7.

Multiple competing transition frameworks remain on the table without convergence. A coalition of 70-plus political parties proposed in November 2025 a one-year transition excluding current CPT members with dual executive system of transitional president plus prime minister and elections in late 2026. A civil society initiative from January 5 presented framework choosing between retaining PM Fils-Aime or selecting civil society figure while excluding political party members from president and PM positions to prevent electoral bias. The Montana Accord proposed in August 2025 a three-member transitional presidential council plus technocratic cabinet with oversight body. A coalition of former prime ministers proposed one-year extension starting February 7.

International community positions are explicit and unified. UN Special Representative Carlos Ruiz warned January 20 that the country has no time to waste on prolonged internecine fighting and urged stakeholders to find common ground ahead of February 7. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated unequivocally January 23 that the CPT must be disbanded by February 7. The OAS reiterated January 22 that the CPT mandate ends February 7 per the April 3 2024 Agreement which explicitly prohibits extension. UN envoy Ruiz noted January 22 that if political actors fail to reach

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consensus by February 7 the constitution allows for the prime minister to remain in office under such circumstances suggesting PM Alix Didier Fils-Aime could continue as caretaker executive.

The Montana Accord maintains hardline position rejecting dialogue with CPT. On January 26 the Montana Accord Bureau welcomed the dismissal of the Prime Minister and called for sovereign transition. On January 16 Montana signatories pressured the CPT to act before February 7 demanding PM Fils-Aime removal and replacement with interim head of government whose mandate would end February 6. They alleged corruption, insubordination and unauthorized foreign relations prejudicial to national sovereignty. This position conflicts with U.S. and UN support for Fils-Aime continuation and risks Montana marginalization if international community recognizes PM-led caretaker government post-February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The April 3 2024 Agreement that created the Transitional Presidential Council specified a mandate ending February 7 2026 with explicit prohibition on extension.

TALKING POINTS

Political dialogue concludes February 3 with no announced consensus on post-February 7 governance framework despite three days of negotiations.

Four competing transition proposals remain on table including 70-plus party coalition, civil society initiative, Montana Accord and former PM coalition.

International community unified that CPT mandate ends February 7 with U.S., UN and OAS explicitly stating no extension permitted under April 3 2024 Agreement.

Constitutional fallback allows PM Fils-Aime to continue as caretaker executive if political actors fail to reach consensus by February 7 deadline.

Montana Accord hardline rejection of CPT dialogue conflicts with international support for PM continuation and risks marginalization.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Political parties should prioritize immediate transition consensus over perfect architecture as February 7 deadline leaves no time for prolonged negotiations.

International organizations should pre-position flexibility to work with interim authorities February 7-forward likely PM Fils-Aime continuation while advocating for rapid consensus.

CPT members should recognize personal corruption vulnerabilities post-mandate and negotiate immunity provisions in transition accord rather than attempting mandate extension.

Civil society actors should focus dialogue on concrete decision-making authority for February 7-forward government rather than ideological purity on composition.

Electoral timeline should be explicitly conditioned on measurable security benchmarks rather than aspirational dates detached from 80-90 percent gang territorial control reality.



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DEVELOPMENT 3:

No major gang attacks or security incidents were reported in the last 24 hours February 1-2 representing tense calm following the U.S. Embassy January 31 security alert warning of heavy gunfire and halting all personnel movements. The Embassy alert followed major Haiti National Police operation in Croix-des-Bouquets targeting the 400 Mawozo gang which killed high-value leaders including Zotolan second-in-command of Carrefour Marassa gang and Ti Pikan. In retaliation 400 Mawozo launched attack on Tabarre 27 causing civilian casualties and displacement. On January 30 a Viv Ansanm coalition attack on Tet Ka Jak in Marigot killed 6-7 people including one child, wounded four and resulted in houses burned and businesses looted.

Armed gangs control an estimated 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince with the most authoritative recent sources converging on approximately 90 percent. A February 1 Americas Quarterly analysis characterized this as criminal governance noting gangs do not just terrorize they govern by taxing residents, settling disputes, controlling access to markets and deciding who may work, trade or leave. The UN Integrated Office in Haiti documented 5,915 deaths and 2,708 injuries in 2025 with fourth quarter alone accounting for 1,523 deaths and 806 injuries. Significantly 62 percent of Q4 casualties resulted from security force operations including private military contractor drone strikes, 32 percent from gang violence and 6 percent from self-defense groups.

The PNH announced February 1 nationwide security reinforcement for February 2026 with newly graduated officers to be deployed to Artibonite, Nord, Centre, Nippes and Sud-Est departments and armored vehicles distributed to previously under-equipped areas. However Haitian media outlet Vant Bef Info noted skeptically that the PNH has issued similar announcements before without results while gangs continue to operate with impunity. The Gang Suppression Force remains severely understrength at approximately 950-1,000 personnel primarily 700-plus Kenyan police against authorized ceiling of 5,550. Major elements are expected to arrive summer 2026 at earliest.

Gender-based violence has surged with Medecins Sans Frontieres reporting January 28 that sexual abuse cases at their Port-au-Prince clinic have tripled in the past four years as gang violence surges. An average of 27 women and girls experience gender-based violence daily predominantly rapes including gang rapes. Private military operations continue with Vectus Global the firm founded by Erik Prince providing drone and helicopter strike support to Haitian authorities. Between March 1 and December 30 2025 drone strikes resulted in 973 deaths including 934 suspected gang members and 39 residents including 16 children. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights assessed that most of these drone strikes are likely unlawful under international human rights law.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Gang territorial control of Port-au-Prince has expanded from estimated 60 percent in early 2024 to current 80-90 percent representing unprecedented criminal governance in Haitian history.

TALKING POINTS

No major security incidents in last 24 hours following January 31 U.S. Embassy alert represents tense calm not sustainable security improvement.

Gang territorial control at 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince with criminal governance including taxation, dispute resolution and market access control.

PNH February reinforcement announcement follows pattern of unfulfilled promises while gangs continue operating with impunity according to Haitian media.

Gang Suppression Force severely understrength at 950-1,000 personnel against 5,550 authorized with major elements not expected until summer 2026.

Gender-based violence surging with 27 women and girls experiencing violence daily predominantly rapes including gang rapes per MSF reporting.

Private military drone strikes killed 973 people in 2025 including 39 residents and 16 children with UN assessing most strikes likely unlawful.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should maintain humanitarian operations firewall from political negotiations and prepare for continued difficult access conditions through Q2 2026.

Businesses should plan for 12-18 month continuation of current difficult conditions with security gains requiring sustained GSF deployment not expected before Q3 2026.

Security force coordination should focus on breaking PNH operation and gang retaliation cycle rather than announcing reinforcements without implementation capacity.

Humanitarian actors should prioritize gender-based violence response capacity given surge in sexual violence and MSF reporting of tripled case loads.

Electoral officials should explicitly condition August 2026 timeline on measurable

security benchmarks verified by independent monitors rather than aspirational dates.

Political actors considering gang negotiations should recognize rule of law versus security improvement tradeoff as most consequential transition decision.



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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

TPS Ruling Release today February 2 determines fate of 350,000 Haitians with pause providing temporary relief but likely triggering administration appeal while denial enables ICE enforcement beginning February 3. Political Dialogue Conclusion February 3 final day of Petion-Ville summit monitoring for joint communique announcing agreed transition framework or acknowledgment of failure to reach consensus. CPT Final Actions February 3-7 watch for last-minute decisions including director-general appointments or policy announcements versus complete paralysis with potential for surprise PM dismissal attempt if anti-Fils-Aime faction regroups.

THIS WEEK

February 7 Transition Mechanics determine who addresses the nation whether CPT holds formal dissolution ceremony whether PM Fils-Aime announces caretaker role continuation and whether Laurent Saint-Cyr remains coordinator pending successor framework. International Donor Statements February 7-10 will clarify whether U.S., Canada and EU recognize post-February 7 government with funding commitments or withholding pending legitimacy clarification. Post-February 7 Governance Structure implementation of whatever framework emerges monitoring for formation of new executive, actual CPT member departures and potential constitutional court ruling on transition legality.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

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Gang Suppression Force Deployment Progress with Jack Christofides assuming Special Representative role mid-February and first April contingent arrivals determining countries contributing personnel. Security Operations Escalation monitoring PNH announced February reinforcement plan for actual deployments versus another unfulfilled promise with gang counter-offensives likely if pressure intensifies. TPS Legislative Action if court ruling favorable monitoring Senate consideration of legislative TPS extension while if unfavorable tracking Congressional Black Caucus and Caribbean-American caucus pressure campaign intensity. Electoral Timeline Viability August 2026 first round should be considered aspirational pending security verification by May-June monitoring of territorial control improvements.

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