



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

February 01, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti enters the final week before the Transitional Presidential Council mandate expires February 7 with no governance consensus reached. The US Embassy issued a security alert January 31 warning of heavy gunfire during major police operations in Croix-des-Bouquets that killed multiple gang leaders. A critical three-day political dialogue launched February 1 in Petion-Ville to negotiate post-transition architecture. International pressure intensifies against last-minute government changes as five CPT members face US visa sanctions for gang links. Security and political uncertainty converge at the most critical decision point since the 2024 gang uprising.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

US Embassy halted all personnel movements January 31 due to heavy gunfire north and south of embassy during police anti-gang operations.

Political dialogue summit launched February 1 bringing together hundreds of actors to negotiate governance framework for post-February 7 transition.

Five of seven CPT members now under US sanctions for alleged gang coordination and obstruction of anti-gang efforts.

BINUH reported 5915 deaths and 2708 injuries in 2025 from gang violence with 1.3 million internally displaced persons.

Federal court expected to rule February 2 on challenge to TPS termination affecting 350000 Haitians in the United States.

### DEVELOPMENT 1: US Embassy Security Alert and Police Operations in Croix-des-Bouquets

The United States Embassy in Port-au-Prince issued an urgent security alert evening January 31 warning of heavy gunfire and ongoing security operations north and south of the embassy and in Croix-des-Bouquets. All US government personnel movements were immediately halted though the embassy remained open for emergency services. American citizens were urged to avoid the area and monitor local media for updates.

The alert followed a major Haiti National Police operation in Croix-des-Bouquets targeting the 400 Mawozo gang stronghold with Task Force support. The operation resulted in the killing of multiple high-value gang leaders including Zotolan identified as second-in-command of Carrefour Marassa gang and Ti Pikan another influential member. Security forces recovered a M16 rifle and Kalashnikov during the operation. In response 400 Mawozo fighters launched a retaliatory attack on Tabarre 27 causing civilian casualties and forcing residents to flee their homes.

This incident occurred against the backdrop of the PNH announcement January 31 of a nationwide security reinforcement plan for February 2026. The force plans to deploy newly

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graduated officers to priority departments including Artibonite Nord Centre Nippes and Sud-Est and distribute armored vehicles to previously under-equipped departments. However Haitian media noted skeptically that similar announcements have been made before without implementation while gangs continue operations with impunity. The cycle of violence underscores the fragility of security gains and gang capacity for immediate countermeasures even in supposedly secured zones near diplomatic facilities.

The security environment remains severely degraded with armed gangs controlling an estimated 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince according to recent UN and UNODC assessments. Gangs exercise effective control over all access routes to the capital including maritime approaches to main ports internal road networks linking north and south and principal land routes to the Dominican border. This territorial dominance enables systematic extortion of commercial traffic generating substantial gang revenue while disrupting humanitarian access and business operations.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The 400 Mawozo gang emerged as one of Haiti's most powerful criminal organizations following the 2021 presidential assassination. The group gained international attention in October 2021 when it kidnapped 17 missionaries including children from a US-Canadian religious organization. The gang operates primarily in Croix-des-Bouquets and controls key transportation corridors linking Port-au-Prince to the Dominican Republic border.

### TALKING POINTS

Embassy security alert signals degraded conditions even in diplomatic zones previously considered relatively secure.

PNH killed multiple high-value gang targets but immediate retaliation demonstrates gang operational capacity.

Nationwide security reinforcement plan announced but credibility low given previous unfulfilled promises.

Current violence levels cast serious doubt on August 2026 election timeline viability.

Gang territorial control at 80 to 90 percent makes humanitarian access and commercial transport extremely hazardous.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should update security protocols and restrict non-essential movements in Port-au-Prince metro area.

Businesses should review evacuation procedures and maintain remote management capabilities

for extended disruption scenarios.

Humanitarian actors should coordinate with PNH on security corridor availability before dispatching convoys or field teams.

Electoral authorities should conduct realistic feasibility assessment of August timeline given current security constraints.

Diplomatic missions should prepare contingency plans for potential evacuation or suspension of operations if violence escalates.



## CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 2: Political Dialogue Launch and February 7 Governance Transition Crisis

On February 1 CPT co-presidents Leslie Voltaire and Edgard Leblanc Fils launched a three-day political dialogue summit at a hotel in Petion-Ville. The summit brings together hundreds of participants from political parties religious leaders labor unions and civil society to negotiate the post-February 7 governance architecture. Leblanc Fils emphasized the urgency of reaching a new political accord stating it constitutes the indispensable framework for redefining national governance and conferring a clear mandate to state authorities beyond February 7.



**Under the April 3 and 4 2024 political agreement establishing the CPT Article 12.1 explicitly states the council mandate ends February 7 2026 with Article 13 prohibiting any extension. CPT President Leslie Voltaire confirmed January 30 that the council will leave office as scheduled expressing confidence that political actors will reach an agreement before the deadline. However as of February 1 no official succession mechanism has been announced. If political actors fail to reach consensus by February 6 the UN envoy noted that the constitution allows for the prime minister to remain in office under such circumstances suggesting PM Alix Didier Fils-Aime could continue as caretaker executive authority.**

Multiple competing transition proposals have emerged from different political coalitions. A 70-plus political party coalition proposed in November 2025 a one-year transition excluding current CPT members featuring a dual executive system with transitional president and prime minister aiming for late 2026 elections. A civil society initiative suggested in January 2026 a framework for completing transition with choice between retaining current PM Fils-Aime or selecting civil society

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figure while excluding political party members from president and PM positions to prevent electoral bias. The Montana Accord Bureau advocated for three-member transitional presidential council plus technocratic cabinet with oversight body to monitor government action.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated unequivocally January 23 that the CPT must be disbanded by February 7 without corrupt individuals attempting to interfere in Haiti electoral governance for personal benefit. The UN special envoy Carlos Ruiz warned January 22 that the country no longer has time to waste on prolonged internal struggles. International pressure against last-minute government changes intensified following a failed attempt by five CPT members to dismiss PM Fils-Aime in late January which was sharply rebuked by the US State Department.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has operated without a functioning parliament since January 2020 when legislative terms expired without elections. President Jovenel Moise ruled by decree until his assassination in July 2021. The Transitional Presidential Council was established in April 2024 following a political agreement brokered by CARICOM after Prime Minister Ariel Henry resigned under pressure during a February and March 2024 gang uprising. The CPT represents Haiti's fourth transitional governance framework since 2004.

### TALKING POINTS

Political dialogue represents last opportunity to reach consensus before February 7 constitutional deadline.

Multiple competing proposals reflect genuine ideological differences but absence of agreement triggers governance vacuum.

PM Fils-Aime continuation as caretaker is constitutionally defensible fallback if no framework agreed.

International community particularly United States signals zero tolerance for mandate extension or corrupt interference.

Failure to resolve transition framework by February 6 creates institutional paralysis affecting donor coordination and security operations.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Political actors should prioritize immediate transition consensus over perfect long-term architecture to avoid constitutional crisis.

International organizations should prepare flexibility to work with interim authorities after February 7 while advocating for rapid legitimate framework.

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Businesses should plan for continued political uncertainty through second quarter 2026 and maintain contingency operations.

Diaspora organizations should monitor transition outcome closely as governance stability affects deportation policies and remittance flows.

Security forces should maintain operational readiness for potential civil unrest during transition period if consensus fails.



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#### DEVELOPMENT 3: CPT Internal Collapse and US Visa Sanctions Escalation

The CPT experienced a dramatic internal crisis in late January when five of seven voting members attempted to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime just two weeks before the council mandate expiration. On January 23 CPT members Edgard Leblanc Fils and Leslie Voltaire held a press conference announcing the decision claiming a majority vote on January 22. The US State Department issued a sharp rebuke late January 22 stating that retaining Fils-Aime was crucial for Haiti anti-gang efforts and warning that politicians aligning with violent gangs would face significant consequences.

On January 29 CPT member Smith Augustin issued a letter to his colleagues withdrawing his support for the dismissal motion preventing Fils-Aime removal by reducing the anti-PM faction to a minority. Augustin stated he initially supported the dismissal believing it might facilitate the February 7 institutional transition but had reconsidered viewing further decision-making as institutional escalation with unpredictable consequences. A subsequent attempt to remove CPT coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr also failed when Augustin refused to participate.

On January 27 the US State Department imposed visa restrictions on two CPT members and one cabinet minister citing their engagement in the management of gangs and other illicit groups in Haiti and obstruction of the government anti-gang efforts. The announcement brought the total number of CPT members under US sanctions to five. The State Department did not name the individuals publicly but noted the restrictions applied to the officials and their immediate families. This escalation signals growing donor frustration with transitional authorities and represents unprecedented direct intervention in Haiti governance composition.

Three CPT members Smith Augustin Emmanuel Vertillaire and Louis Gerald Gilles face ongoing corruption charges stemming from allegations they solicited approximately 760000 dollars in

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bribes from the chairman of state-owned Banque Nationale de Credit to secure his position. The ULCC Anti-Corruption Unit demanded prosecution in December 2024 but the Port-au-Prince Court of Appeals suspended judicial summons in February 2025 citing presidential immunity. The three remain in office but excluded from the six-month rotating presidency. CPT members Voltaire and Leblanc Fils publicly criticized international interference stating everyone is seeking a Haitian resolution to the crisis but when we begin to formulate a Haitian resolution the international community intervenes with all its might.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was designed as a collective executive to prevent concentration of power following the Moise assassination and Henry premiership controversies. However the council has been plagued by internal divisions corruption allegations and accusations of gang coordination since its April 2024 formation. Previous international sanctions targeted individual Haitian elites for drug trafficking and gang financing but visa restrictions on sitting transitional government members represent an escalation in external pressure tactics.

### TALKING POINTS

Five of seven voting CPT members now under US sanctions creating unprecedented legitimacy crisis for transitional government.

Failed PM dismissal attempt demonstrates internal CPT paralysis and competing factional interests just days before mandate expires.

Corruption charges against three members undermine public trust and justify international skepticism of CPT governance.

US intervention in government composition reflects donor frustration but also raises questions about Haitian sovereignty.

Internal divisions paralyze routine decision-making on director-general appointments and policy implementation.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International donors should maintain pressure on corrupt CPT members while supporting legitimate post-February 7 transition framework.

Political actors should prioritize clean slate approach for new executive to restore domestic and international credibility.

Civil society organizations should document governance failures to inform institutional design of next transition phase.

Legal authorities should preserve corruption case files for prosecution once presidential immunity expires February 7.

Media organizations should continue investigating financial ties between CPT members and criminal networks to inform public accountability.



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### DEVELOPMENT 4: Humanitarian Crisis Reaches Emergency Levels with 5915 Deaths in 2025

The UN Integrated Office in Haiti released a devastating annual report January 30 documenting that 5915 people were killed and 2708 injured in Haiti during 2025 due to gang violence and security force operations. The fourth quarter alone October through December 2025 accounted for 1523 deaths and 806 injuries. The cause breakdown for fourth quarter shows 62 percent resulted from security force operations including private military company drone strikes 32 percent from gang violence and 6 percent from self-defense groups and Bwa Kale movement targeting suspected gang members.

The International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix documented 1287593 internally displaced persons representing 11 percent of Haiti population. This marks a 24 percent increase compared to December 2024. The geographic distribution shows 77 percent displaced in provinces outside Port-au-Prince and 23 percent in the capital with 55 percent of provincial IDPs now originating from other rural areas rather than the capital. Most IDPs at 83 percent remain with host families rather than in displacement sites creating enormous strain on fragile local resources.

In the 272 active displacement sites conditions are alarming with one latrine per 315 people on average 40 percent of sites having no health services and 18 percent of sites where no children attend school. An average of 27 women and girls experience gender-based violence daily predominantly rapes including gang rapes. The Humanitarian Coordinator reported that children constitute as much as 50 percent of gang membership due to forced recruitment and sexual violence cases attended have tripled since 2021.

Food security conditions remain critical with 5.7 million people suffering from severe food insecurity placing Haiti among the six largest hunger hotspots globally. Emergency IPC Phase 4 conditions persist in Port-au-Prince and IDP areas with 3.0 to 3.49 million people requiring food assistance through July 2026. An estimated 277000 children suffer from acute malnutrition. The UN launched an 880 million dollar humanitarian appeal December 17 2025 to assist 4.2 million vulnerable people focusing on urgent multisectoral interventions in West Centre and Artibonite departments where armed violence generates severe needs.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti humanitarian crisis has progressively worsened since the 2021 presidential assassination and 2022 gang territorial expansion. The situation accelerated dramatically following the February and March 2024 gang uprising that forced PM Henry resignation and triggered mass displacement from Port-au-Prince. Previous humanitarian emergencies in Haiti including the 2010 earthquake and 2016 Hurricane Matthew generated international response but current crisis occurs amid declining global humanitarian funding and donor fatigue with protracted crises.

## TALKING POINTS

Nearly 6000 deaths in 2025 represents significant escalation in violence compared to previous years with security operations causing majority of casualties.

1.3 million displaced persons constitute 11 percent of national population creating massive humanitarian burden on host communities.

Displacement site conditions with 1 latrine per 315 people risk cholera and disease outbreaks especially approaching rainy season.

83 percent of IDPs living with host families exhausts social support networks and creates secondary displacement risk.

880 million dollar humanitarian appeal unlikely fully funded given global funding constraints and competing crises.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian organizations should prioritize WASH interventions in displacement sites to prevent disease outbreaks before rainy season.

Protection actors should scale gender-based violence response given 27 daily incidents and tripling of cases since 2021.

Education partners should establish temporary learning spaces in 18 percent of sites where children have no school access.

Food security programs should expand coverage given 5.7 million facing severe food insecurity and malnutrition affecting 277000 children.

Donors should frontload funding to humanitarian appeal recognizing February through June as critical period before potential security improvements.



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#### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

##### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

US federal court ruling expected February 2 on challenge to TPS termination affecting 350000 Haitians with major implications for remittance flows and deportation risk. Political dialogue summit concludes February 3 requiring monitoring for consensus framework or collapse without agreement on post-February 7 governance. CPT members may attempt final policy decisions or director-general appointments before mandate expires creating potential for last-minute controversial actions. PNH nationwide security reinforcement deployments announced for February require verification of actual implementation versus previous unfulfilled promises.

##### THIS WEEK

February 7 CPT mandate expiration represents most critical decision point requiring identification of who addresses nation and whether formal dissolution ceremony occurs. PM Fils-Aime continuation as caretaker or new executive framework implementation determines governance stability for coming months. International donor response to post-February 7 government affects recognition sanctions relief and funding commitments. Gang strategic response to political transition period could include violence escalation to exploit uncertainty or negotiations if major leaders genuinely pursue dialogue as International Crisis Group reported.

##### STRATEGIC HORIZON

GSF Gang Suppression Force deployment progress with Special Representative Jack Christofides assuming post mid-February and first April contingent arrivals determining force generation timeline. Electoral calendar May 19 campaign launch deadline approaches requiring CEP decision to proceed postpone or admit infeasibility given security constraints. Food security trajectory into April through May lean season with Artibonite Department planting and harvest subject to gang interference. Humanitarian funding gap for 880 million dollar appeal affecting program sustainability and potential for hot meal suspension expansion and deeper ration cuts if WFP 94 million dollar shortfall persists.

##### PRIMARY SOURCES

US Embassy Port-au-Prince security alert January 31 2026

TripFoumi Haiti covering Croix-des-Bouquets police operation January 31 2026

Le Nouvelliste coverage of political dialogue launch February 1 2026

OCHA 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan December 17 2025

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PBS coverage of CPT internal crisis January 23 2026  
Vant Bef Info reporting PNH security reinforcement plan January 31 2026  
IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix Round 10 mid-2025  
UNODC organized crime and gang violence explainer January 2026  
US State Department sanctions announcement January 27 2026  
Reuters reporting on UN envoy statements January 22 2026  
ACLED Haiti violence analysis January 2026  
International Crisis Group panel discussion January 29 2026