



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 29, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The UN Security Council voted January 29 to renew BINUH's mandate for one year until January 31, 2027, providing institutional continuity through new mandates on pre-trial detention support, high-risk detainee handling, and a 90-day DDR options report. The Conseil Electoral Provisoire signed an electoral cooperation agreement with Mexico's National Electoral Institute January 28 to strengthen technical capacity for August elections, though security conditions remain the binding constraint. CARICOM issued a statement January 27 warning that political fragmentation "works only for the benefit of gangs" while an attempt to remove CPT coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr was aborted January 29 after Smith Augustin opposed the maneuver. With nine days until the CPT mandate expires February 7, 2026, the Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime executive axis consolidates as the likely continuity government, but constitutional legitimacy remains contested absent a negotiated political accord.



### QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

BINUH mandate renewed for one year with expanded DDR planning and justice sector support mandates.

CEP-Mexico electoral cooperation agreement signed but August 30 election contingent on security improvements.

CARICOM warns political infighting benefits gangs; calls for stakeholder consensus.

Aborted attempt to remove CPT coordinator Saint-Cyr confirms five-member dismissal coalition collapse.

Nine days remain until February 7 CPT mandate expiration with no consensus successor framework.

#### DEVELOPMENT 1: UN Security Council Renews BINUH Mandate Through January 2027 With Expanded Justice and DDR Mandates

The UN Security Council voted unanimously January 29 to extend the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti mandate for one year until January 31, 2027, marking a return to standard annual renewals after the emergency six-and-a-half-month extension in July 2025. The resolution authored by Panama and the United States as co-penholders maintains BINUH's core mandate established in Resolution 2476 (2019) including political advice, support for Haitian-led political processes, good governance strengthening, human rights advancement, gender equality promotion, and PNH capacity building. US Ambassador Jennifer Locetta stated that BINUH will be integral to international stability efforts emphasizing the mission's role in electoral preparation and democratic transition support.

The resolution contains three significant new provisions expanding BINUH's operational scope.

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First, it tasks the mission with assisting Haitian authorities in addressing prolonged pre-trial detention through support to relevant institutions, language inserted at Denmark's request given thousands of detainees awaiting trial for years. Second, anticipating potential Gang Suppression Force arrests of high-profile gang leaders, the resolution authorizes BINUH to provide advisory support for the Haitian judiciary's handling of high-risk individuals as appropriate, reflecting member state concerns about corrections and justice system capacity gaps. Third, the resolution requests the Secretary-General to submit a report within 90 days outlining a full range of options and costs for UN and international support for Haitian-led Disarmament, Dismantlement, and Reintegration programming as well as justice reform, internal oversight strengthening, and accountability measures.

The DDR mandate positions BINUH to coordinate post-conflict stabilization planning as security forces establish territorial control, though implementation remains contingent on funding that has eluded the mission for years. CARICOM Secretary General had advocated to the Security Council January 26 to ensure funding for the Haiti mission, underscoring that mandate renewal without adequate resources would limit effectiveness. The decision to extend BINUH for a full year rather than another short-term extension reflects Council assessment that Haiti's transition will remain fragile well beyond February 7 and requires sustained international political engagement through 2026 and into 2027.

However, the mandate renewal does not address the immediate governance crisis. BINUH's good offices can facilitate dialogue, but with nine days until the CPT's non-renewable mandate expires and no consensus successor framework, the mission faces the prospect of operating in an institutional vacuum. The operational dilemma was underscored by CARICOM's January 27 statement expressing great concern over internal turmoil at the highest levels of the Haitian state and warning that the current impasse within the CPT renders more complex an already fraught governance transition process.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

BINUH was established in 2019 as a special political mission replacing the 15-year UN peacekeeping presence in Haiti. The mission's mandate has been renewed periodically with adjustments reflecting Haiti's evolving political and security challenges, including the transition from armed peacekeeping to political accompaniment and capacity building.

### TALKING POINTS

BINUH mandate renewal provides institutional continuity through January 2027 but does not resolve February 7 governance vacuum.

New DDR planning mandate creates framework for post-stabilization programming pending funding

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availability.

Pre-trial detention and high-risk detainee support mandates expand BINUH into justice sector gaps. Unanimous Security Council vote reflects sustained international commitment despite political fragmentation.

90-day DDR options report due April 29 will outline resource requirements for disarmament programming.

Mission effectiveness contingent on adequate funding which remains severely underfunded per 2025 humanitarian appeal performance.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should prepare for BINUH operations in institutional vacuum scenario post-February 7.

Donor governments should expedite funding commitments for DDR planning and justice sector support mandates.

BINUH should accelerate 90-day DDR options report preparation to meet April 29 deadline.

Electoral support partners should coordinate with BINUH on CEP technical assistance given August 30 timeline dependencies.

Humanitarian actors should plan for potential operational disruptions if February 7 governance vacuum triggers security deterioration.

Private sector stakeholders should monitor BINUH mandate implementation as indicator of international commitment durability.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

#### DEVELOPMENT 2: CEP Signs Electoral Cooperation Agreement With Mexico's National Electoral Institute to Strengthen Technical Capacity

The Conseil Electoral Provisoire signed a protocol of cooperation with Mexico's Instituto Nacional Electoral on January 28 establishing a technical assistance framework to strengthen Haiti's capacity to organize August 30 first-round elections. CEP President Jacques Desrosiers and Mexican Ambassador Jose de Jesus Cisneros Chavez formalized the agreement providing for knowledge exchange, training, and technical accompaniment in electoral management. The partnership focuses on five core areas: capacity building for electoral operators, electoral registry management and updating, technology integration in election management, pre-electoral training workshops, and adherence to best practices for secure materials management and zero-gap production processes.

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Mexico brings substantial credentials to the partnership. INE has twelve years of experience managing elections and operates secure central issuance printing facilities producing millions of Mexican voter IDs employing industry best practices for secure materials management and advanced audit and control processes. Mexico previously supported Haitian voter ID production through the OAS in 2021 under a \$1.5 million contract that leveraged INE infrastructure in Mexico to produce Haitian national ID cards for use as obligatory identification in elections. The January 28 agreement extends that relationship into comprehensive electoral administration support positioning Mexico as a key technical partner alongside BINUH's political and logistical assistance to the CEP.

Ambassador Cisneros Chavez stated the agreement will contribute to organizing successful elections capable of laying foundations for institutional normalization in the country, emphasizing only credible elections can break Haiti's cycle of transitional governments. CEP President Desrosiers affirmed the protocol aims to establish a solid framework to support efforts in electoral administration and that only institutions strengthened by rigorous inter-institutional cooperation can guarantee free and transparent elections. The timing is strategic with the electoral calendar projecting August 30 for first-round voting requiring immediate technical support to finalize voter registration updates, procure materials, train operators, and establish logistical systems across Haiti's ten departments.

However, the agreement does not address the electoral calendar's fundamental contingency. CEP explicitly conditioned the August 30 date on achieving an acceptable security environment, and with gangs controlling 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince and expanding into breadbasket regions, that prerequisite remains elusive. The Mexico-CEP partnership provides technical capacity, but electoral execution depends on the Gang Suppression Force achieving territorial control gains that have so far been limited to isolated neighborhoods. The operational implication is that even with Mexican technical assistance, the CEP cannot credibly organize elections in gang-held zones, creating a scenario where elections might proceed in secure areas while excluding constituencies in Port-au-Prince and Artibonite, a partial election that would lack legitimacy.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Mexico has supported Haitian electoral processes since 2021 through INE's secure printing infrastructure and technical expertise. The partnership builds on Mexico's broader Latin American solidarity tradition and INE's regional reputation for electoral integrity, positioning Mexico as a credible non-colonial partner for Haiti's democratic transition.

### TALKING POINTS

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CEP-Mexico agreement strengthens technical capacity but does not resolve security contingency for August 30 elections.

Mexico's INE brings twelve years electoral management experience and secure voter ID production capabilities.

Partnership focuses on registry management, operator training, technology integration, and materials security.

Agreement extends 2021 OAS-coordinated relationship into comprehensive electoral administration support.

Electoral calendar explicitly conditions August 30 date on acceptable security environment not yet achieved.

Gang control of 23 communes and 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince renders operations impossible in those zones.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CEP should establish immediate implementation timeline for Mexico-INE technical assistance deliverables.

International donors should coordinate electoral funding through Mexico partnership to avoid duplication.

CEP should prepare contingency scenarios for partial elections in secure zones if gang control persists.

BINUH should integrate electoral support with Gang Suppression Force operational planning to align timelines.

Private sector should monitor CEP-Mexico implementation as indicator of August 30 election credibility.

Diaspora organizations should engage CEP on voter registration procedures for external constituencies.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

**DEVELOPMENT 3: CARICOM Warns Political Fragmentation Benefits Gangs as Aborted Attempt to Remove CPT Coordinator Confirms Coalition Collapse**

CARICOM issued a statement January 27 expressing great concern over internal turmoil taking place at the highest levels of the Haitian state and warning that the current impasse within the Haitian Transitional Presidential Council renders more complex an already fraught governance transition process. The regional body's language carried particular force stating that meanwhile the

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people of Haiti continue to suffer unimaginable violence and deprivation which is unacceptable. CARICOM emphasized that it is crucial that stakeholders put aside differences to reach consensus and confirmed that the CARICOM Eminent Persons Group remains at the disposal of all stakeholders to facilitate agreement from the multiplicity of proposals which currently exist.

CARICOM's most pointed warning targeted the strategic consequences of continued political infighting. The statement declared that CARICOM's foremost hope is for a halt to current fragmentation which works only for the benefit of the gangs, and for the restoration of lasting political stability, security and peace in Haiti so that elections can be held and attention refocused on economic growth and sustainable development for the benefit of all Haitians. The statement concluded with a direct appeal calling on all Haitian stakeholders to put the future of their people and country above all else and to act responsibly with urgency and patriotism.

Against this backdrop, two Haitian media outlets reported January 29 that an attempt to remove CPT coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr was aborted after CPT member Smith Augustin opposed the maneuver. The strategic significance is profound. Saint-Cyr as CPT president pro tempore controls the transmission of resolutions to Le Moniteur, the official gazette where government decisions acquire legal force. The five-member CPT majority has been unable to publish their January 21 resolution dismissing Prime Minister Fils-Aime because Saint-Cyr refuses to transmit it. Removing Saint-Cyr would have theoretically allowed the five members to install a new coordinator willing to publish the dismissal resolution, but Augustin's opposition consistent with his January reversal when his party Compromis Historique disavowed his participation in the dismissal effort fractured that strategy.

The aborted removal attempt suggests the five-member coalition is politically exhausted. Two members were sanctioned by the United States January 25 with visa revocations for gang operation involvement. Fritz Alphonse Jean was sanctioned in November 2025. Augustin has been disavowed by his party and now opposes further destabilization. Emmanuel Vertilaire representing Moise Jean-Charles' Pitit Dessalines party has functionally aligned with the Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime executive axis despite his party leader's opposition. The dismissal coalition's collapse leaves Saint-Cyr and Fils-Aime as the de facto continuity government, but their position lacks constitutional grounding post-February 7 absent a negotiated political accord.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The CPT was established in April 2024 with a non-renewable mandate expiring February 7, 2026 to manage Haiti's transition following President Moise's assassination and subsequent political collapse. Internal divisions have paralyzed the council since its inception with competing factions aligned with different political parties and foreign patrons undermining governance effectiveness.

## TALKING POINTS

CARICOM warns political fragmentation works only for benefit of gangs requiring urgent stakeholder consensus.

Aborted Saint-Cyr removal attempt confirms five-member dismissal coalition political exhaustion. Saint-Cyr controls Le Moniteur transmission blocking publication of Fils-Aime dismissal resolution. Smith Augustin opposition to removal maneuver follows party disavowal and marks strategic reversal.

US January 25 sanctions on two CPT members further weakens dismissal coalition leverage. CARICOM Eminent Persons Group remains available to facilitate negotiations but lacks enforcement mechanism.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Political actors should engage CARICOM EPG mediation in final nine days before February 7 deadline.

International partners should coordinate messaging emphasizing gang beneficiary dynamic of continued infighting.

Saint-Cyr and Fils-Aime should announce post-February 7 continuity framework to prevent institutional vacuum.

Private sector should prepare for Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime caretaker government scenario as most likely outcome.

Civil society organizations should mobilize public pressure for negotiated political accord before February 7.

Diaspora communities should leverage family networks to communicate urgency of political consensus to Haiti-based actors.



## CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 4: Saint-Cyr and Fils-Aime Consolidate as Likely Post-February 7 Continuity Government Despite Constitutional Ambiguity

With nine days until the CPT mandate expires February 7, 2026, Laurent Saint-Cyr and Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime have consolidated as the de facto executive axis likely to form a caretaker government absent a negotiated political accord. The aborted January 29 attempt to remove Saint-Cyr confirms his control over Le Moniteur transmission and eliminates the five-member coalition's last leverage to publish the dismissal resolution. Former interim president

Jocelerme Privert argued January 26 that there will be no institutional vacuum after February 7 because the constitution allows the prime minister and government to continue if no successor authority is installed, providing legal cover for a Fils-Aime caretaker government.

The Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime consolidation reflects international backing and domestic political exhaustion. The United States and Canada have consistently supported Fils-Aime and opposed the dismissal effort, with Secretary of State Rubio stating January 23 that the CPT must be dissolved by February 7. The January 25 US visa revocations targeting two CPT members who supported dismissal further weakened the opposition coalition. Emmanuel Vertilaire's functional alignment with Saint-Cyr despite his party leader's opposition indicates erosion of the dismissal bloc. Smith Augustin's reversal after party disavowal removes another potential vote for Saint-Cyr removal.

However, the constitutional legitimacy of a post-February 7 Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime caretaker government remains contested. The CPT's mandate is explicitly non-renewable and terminates February 7 with no provision for extension. While Privert's interpretation that the prime minister can continue in a caretaker capacity has constitutional precedent, this would create a government without a head of state, an anomalous situation in Haiti's semi-presidential system. Political parties that opposed Fils-Aime's appointment or supported the dismissal effort may refuse to recognize a caretaker government lacking CPT authorization, though their ability to contest it operationally is limited given Saint-Cyr's control over Le Moniteur and international backing for executive continuity.

Civil society actors issued a public statement January 28 warning that if no responsible and inclusive solution is agreed before February 7, Haiti risks entering a new phase of institutional vacuum, violence and chaos with consequences not only for Haitians but for the broader Caribbean, the Americas and the international community. The National Conference of Actors for New Governance sent a letter to CARICOM Secretary General Dr. Carla Barnett January 23 seeking intervention to establish an impartial and inclusive framework to initiate negotiations among Haiti's various stakeholders. The convergence of UNSC mandate renewal, CARICOM alarm, and civil society appeals creates maximum diplomatic pressure on Haiti's political class to negotiate a transition framework in the final nine days, but no breakthrough has materialized as of January 29 and Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime continuity appears the default outcome.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's history of transitional governments includes multiple instances of caretaker administrations operating in constitutional gray zones following presidential removals or mandate expirations. The current crisis echoes the 2016 post-Martelly transition when interim president Privert extended his mandate beyond constitutional limits, though that situation involved a functional parliament which does not exist in 2026 with legislative elections delayed since 2019.

## TALKING POINTS

Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime consolidation represents most likely post-February 7 continuity scenario. Constitutional interpretation allows prime minister to continue in caretaker capacity pending successor installation.

US and Canada backing provides international legitimacy despite domestic opposition.

Five-member dismissal coalition politically exhausted after sanctions and party disavowals.

Civil society warns of institutional vacuum risks but lacks mechanisms to force political negotiations.

Nine days remain for political accord but Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime continuity appears default outcome.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should prepare operational plans for engagement with Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime caretaker government.

Businesses should treat Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime continuity as baseline scenario for February 7 planning.

Political actors should communicate clear signals of recognition or non-recognition to manage stakeholder expectations.

CARICOM should intensify EPG mediation efforts in final nine days to broker political accord if possible.

Civil society organizations should mobilize public monitoring of post-February 7 legitimacy claims.

Diaspora communities should prepare for potential instability spike if contested legitimacy triggers street protests or gang exploitation.



## CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Official UNSC vote tally and resolution text publication for BINUH mandate renewal with full provisions detail.

Whether Saint-Cyr and Fils-Aime announce formal post-February 7 caretaker government framework or maintain strategic ambiguity.

Five-member CPT coalition response to aborted removal attempt including any final efforts to publish dismissal resolution.

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### THIS WEEK

First implementation deliverables from CEP-Mexico electoral cooperation agreement including training schedules and registry update timelines.

CARICOM Eminent Persons Group activity including any shuttle diplomacy or formal mediation sessions in final nine days.

Whether political parties issue statements recognizing or rejecting Saint-Cyr/Fils-Aime post-February 7 legitimacy.

Additional US or Canadian sanctions or policy statements ahead of February 7 deadline.

### STRATEGIC HORIZON

Gang Suppression Force deployment timeline adherence with partner country troop commitments and UNSOH February 1 BINUH support services milestone.

PNH operational tempo on RN1, RN2, RN3 roadblock clearance following January 25

CPT-PM-PNH commitment to reconquest of national territory.



**Gourde exchange rate volatility beyond 133-135 HTG/USD threshold signaling capital flight or confidence collapse if February 7 vacuum materializes.**

Civil society mobilization including protests or demonstrations ahead of February 7 expressing public opposition to contested caretaker government.

Secretary-General 90-day DDR options report due April 29 outlining full range of disarmament program support and costs.

### PRIMARY SOURCES

UN Security Council Report - Haiti Vote on BINUH Mandate Renewal

BINUH - SRSG Speech to UN Security Council Briefing

Haiti Libre - CEP Signs Protocol of Cooperation With Mexico INE

Info Haiti - Aborted Attempt to Depose CPT Coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr

US Mission to the United Nations - Explanation of Vote Following BINUH Resolution Adoption

CARICOM - Statement on Ongoing Turmoil in Haitian Executive

Le National - CEP and Mexico INE Electoral Cooperation Agreement

Nevis Pages - Haitian Group Seeks CARICOM Intervention Amid PM Removal Efforts

Reuters - UN Evacuates Staff as Gangs Deepen Control Over Capital

US Embassy Haiti - Security Alert on Port-au-Prince Access Restrictions

Le Nouvelliste - Jocelerme Privert Statements on Institutional Continuity

Gazette Haiti - CPT Members Confirm Decision to Revoke Prime Minister