



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

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Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti enters critical constitutional crisis as five Transitional Presidential Council members voted January 21 to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime just two weeks before the CPT mandate expires February 7 2026. United States intervened forcefully with Secretary of State Marco Rubio warning corrupt politicians will pay a heavy price and demanding CPT dissolution by deadline. Security operations killed six gang members in Bercy while 50 civilians died in PNH actions since January 1. Gang Suppression Force deployment delayed until April 2026 despite urgent need. National dialogue failed to produce post-transition governance framework. Humanitarian conditions deteriorate with 5.7 million facing acute hunger and 340000 Haitians losing TPS status February 3.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CPT majority attempts PM dismissal despite US opposition creating sanctions risk for five council members.

PNH operations achieve tactical gains in Port-au-Prince core but generate severe civilian casualties undermining legitimacy.

International Gang Suppression Force reinforcements will not arrive until April 2026 leaving five-month security vacuum.

National dialogue produced no consensus on post-February 7 governance creating state collapse risk.

TPS termination affects 340000 Haitians threatening remittance flows and potential mass deportation crisis.

DEVELOPMENT 1: CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS CPT ATTEMPTS PRIME MINISTER DISMISSAL AMID UNITED STATES OPPOSITION

Haiti's political transition collapsed January 21 when five CPT members voted to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime seventeen days before the transitional government mandate expires February 7 2026. Fritz Alphonse Jean Leslie Voltaire Louis Gerald Gilles Edgard Leblanc Fils and Smith Augustin announced the resolution publicly stating the CPT would appoint a replacement within 30 days to fully restore security and stability. The move ignored explicit warnings from the United States which views Fils-Aime retention as crucial to combating gang violence. CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr opposes the dismissal and rejected any push to undermine government stability ahead of February 7. The Compromis Historique party disavowed its representative Smith Augustin calling his signature dangerous for the Nation. Fanmi Lavalas also opposes the dismissal creating internal CPT fracture.

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Washington responded with unusually confrontational intervention. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau warned January 22 that the United States would perceive any attempt by the non-elected CPT to alter government structure at this late stage as undermining security goals. Secretary Rubio escalated January 23 calling Fils-Aime to emphasize he should remain and declaring the CPT must be dissolved by February 7 without corrupt individuals attempting to interfere in Haiti's journey toward elected governance. The US Embassy issued warnings in French and Haitian Kreyol stating politicians who support gangs and create chaos will face consequences using the Kreyol phrase pri final which some interpreted as suggesting lethal consequences.

The standoff creates profound operational uncertainty across all governance scenarios. If the CPT dissolves February 7 without succession framework Haiti will lack executive authority at the apex of gang violence. If the CPT extends its mandate unilaterally it risks domestic and international delegitimization. If five CPT members successfully dismiss Fils-Aime they invite US sanctions and potential financial isolation. The scenario analysis is bleak across all pathways with no clear resolution mechanism before the February 7 deadline.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was established following the April 2024 resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry to guide Haiti toward democratic elections and security restoration. The nine-member council with rotating presidency was designed to build political consensus but has been plagued by internal divisions corruption allegations and US visa restrictions against member Fritz Jean since its formation.

TALKING POINTS

Five CPT members face imminent US sanctions risk for attempting PM dismissal against explicit Washington warnings.

Internal CPT fracture isolates dismissal supporters with President Saint-Cyr and major parties opposing the move.

February 7 deadline creates 14-day window of maximum political uncertainty with no governance succession plan.

US intervention signals potential pivot from diplomatic pressure to direct sanctions enforcement.

Political vacuum scenarios range from executive authority collapse to illegitimate mandate extension.

Constitutional crisis compounds security emergency as gangs control 85 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should implement contingency protocols for potential executive authority vacuum after February 7 including direct engagement with institutional continuity actors outside CPT framework.

Private sector actors should activate political risk hedging strategies and reduce Port-au-Prince operational exposure through February 7 transition period.

Diplomatic missions should prepare sanctions implementation frameworks targeting CPT members who signed dismissal resolution and monitor for asset flight indicators.

Political parties should accelerate parallel governance planning with technocratic transition proposals that bypass compromised CPT actors.

Humanitarian agencies should position emergency response capacity for potential service delivery collapse if government authority fractures.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: SECURITY OPERATIONS ACHIEVE TACTICAL GAINS BUT GENERATE SEVERE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

Haitian National Police operations against gang strongholds intensified in January 2026 achieving territorial reclamation in Port-au-Prince core but generating civilian casualties that risk undermining operational legitimacy. PNH units supported by Prime Minister task force killed six gang members in Bercy between Arcahaie and Cabaret on January 20 to 21 seizing weapons and ammunition. Operations targeting Jimmy Cherizier stronghold in Delmas 6 began January 14 while sustained assaults in Bel-Air La Saline and Delmas 2 4 6 employed demolition equipment and explosive kamikaze drones. The PNH announced January 10 that 892 newly graduated officers from the 35th training class would deploy to violence-affected areas providing critical personnel reinforcement.

These operations reclaimed portions of downtown Port-au-Prince including Magloire Ambroise Street the Champ de Mars government district Delmas 19 and Nazon shifting them from red zone gang-controlled to orange zone contested status. However the humanitarian cost is severe with security force operations killing 50 civilians since January 1 and displacing 5800 people from Port-au-Prince neighborhoods. Between July and September 2025 security forces were responsible for 61 percent of all casualties with 22 percent of victims being residents struck by stray bullets at home or during daily activities. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk stated that

some security officers have continued to summarily execute individuals suspected of gang links.

The drone operations conducted by Vectus Global led by Blackwater founder Erik Prince present acute legal and ethical concerns. Between March and September 2025 drone strikes killed 547 people including 527 suspected gang members and 20 civilians among them 11 children. In September 2025 a drone attack on a birthday party killed at least eight children reportedly targeting gang leader Albert Steevenson while he was distributing gifts. Turk warned that most of these drone strikes are likely unlawful under international human rights law. Despite these concerns Vectus Global announced in August 2025 a 10-year contract with Haiti involving nearly 200 to several hundred personnel from the United States Europe and El Salvador.

The international Gang Suppression Force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2793 in September 2025 remains severely undermanned with only 950 to 1000 personnel deployed mostly Kenyans inherited from the ineffective Multinational Security Support mission. GSF Special Representative Jack Christofides announced January 22 that first new contingents will not arrive until April 2026 with full deployment projected by October 2026. Funding remains critical constraint with the UN trust fund holding only 113 million dollars of the 800 million needed annually and no donations received since August 2025.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Haitian National Police has historically struggled with capacity constraints corruption and human rights violations dating to the Duvalier era. The current security crisis reflects decades of institutional weakness compounded by post-2004 international intervention failures. Vectus Global deployment represents unprecedented privatization of security functions in a sovereign state raising legal questions about accountability under international humanitarian law.

TALKING POINTS

PNH operations reclaimed key Port-au-Prince areas but 50 civilian deaths since January 1 risk delegitimizing gains.

Vectus Global drone strikes killed 547 people including 20 civilians with UN stating most strikes likely unlawful.

Gang Suppression Force deployment delayed until April 2026 creating five-month security vacuum during political crisis.

Current GSF strength at 950 to 1000 personnel versus 5550 authorized reflects catastrophic international commitment gap.

Security force responsibility for 61 percent of casualties between July and September 2025 exceeds gang violence attribution.

Reliance on legally questionable private military operations indicates state capacity collapse.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International community should impose immediate accountability mechanisms on Vectus Global operations including independent investigation of civilian casualties and legal review under international humanitarian law.

Private sector actors should avoid Port-au-Prince red zones despite PNH claims of territorial control due to fluid security environment and civilian harm patterns.

Humanitarian organizations should document security force violations systematically to support future accountability processes and inform protection strategies.

Diplomatic missions should pressure donor states to fulfill GSF funding commitments before April 2026 deployment gap creates irreversible security deterioration.

Business continuity planners should assume no meaningful GSF reinforcement before Q4 2026 and adjust operational timelines accordingly.



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DEVELOPMENT 3: NATIONAL DIALOGUE FAILS TO PRODUCE POST-TRANSITION GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK

The CPT launched national consultations January 18 to 20 with over 60 political parties and civil society organizations but no consensus emerged on post-February 7 2026 governance creating conditions for state collapse. COPPOS-Haiti representing 150 parties proposed a bicephalous executive with a new prime minister and 24-month transition. The Montana Accord and December 21 Accord submitted competing proposals with no mechanism for reconciliation. CARICOM Eminent Persons Group warned January 9 that failure to reach consensus could produce unwanted repercussions and emphasized time is of the essence. The CPT has not announced any governance framework with only 14 days remaining before mandate expiration.

The dialogue failure reflects fundamental political fragmentation that has paralyzed Haiti's democratic transition since President Jovenel Moise assassination in July 2021. Major political actors including Fanmi Lavalas the Montana Accord bloc and private sector representatives maintain irreconcilable positions on transition length executive structure and electoral sequencing. International mediators including CARICOM the Organization of American States and the United

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States have failed to impose consensus despite sustained diplomatic pressure. The February 7 deadline approaches with no indication that competing factions will compromise on core governance questions.

The absence of post-transition framework creates multiple crisis scenarios. If the CPT dissolves without successor arrangement Haiti will lack executive authority including inability to deploy security forces approve budgets or negotiate with international partners. If the CPT unilaterally extends its mandate it will face domestic legitimacy crisis and potential international isolation. If competing political blocs attempt to establish parallel governance structures Haiti risks institutional paralysis or violent confrontation. The constitutional void coincides with peak gang violence humanitarian emergency and international force deployment gap.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has experienced continuous political instability since the 2004 removal of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide with failed transitions in 2004 to 2006 and 2016 to 2017 establishing pattern of extended interim arrangements. The current CPT model replicates power-sharing failures that produced government paralysis in previous transitions. Constitutional reform efforts including the 2021 referendum attempt collapsed amid political violence and popular opposition.

TALKING POINTS

National dialogue with 60 parties and organizations produced zero consensus on post-February 7 governance.

Competing proposals from COPPOS-Haiti Montana Accord and December 21 Accord offer no reconciliation pathway.

CARICOM warning of unwanted repercussions signals regional concern about governance vacuum consequences.

February 7 deadline creates binary choice between illegitimate mandate extension or executive authority collapse.

Political fragmentation since 2021 Moise assassination shows no signs of resolution despite international pressure.

Constitutional void coincides with security emergency humanitarian crisis and international force deployment gap.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should develop governance continuity protocols that bypass CPT including direct engagement with Parliament technocratic ministers and institutional holdovers to

maintain basic state functions.

Political actors should propose emergency interim arrangement with narrow mandate focused on security and humanitarian response rather than comprehensive political settlement.

Private sector should engage institutional actors including Central Bank judiciary and civil service leadership to support continuity planning independent of CPT.

Diplomatic missions should prepare for fragmented governance scenario with competing claims to executive authority and establish decision rules for recognition.

Civil society should mobilize public pressure for technocratic transition that prioritizes service delivery over political competition.



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DEVELOPMENT 4: HUMANITARIAN CRISIS INTENSIFIES AS TPS TERMINATION THREATENS REMITTANCE FLOWS

Haiti's humanitarian conditions continue deteriorating with 5.7 million people facing acute hunger and 1.4 million remaining displaced while United States Temporary Protected Status termination February 3 2026 threatens critical remittance flows. The 340000 to 353000 Haitians losing TPS legal status face 18-month departure window with potential mass deportations destabilizing Haiti further. Remittances totaling 4.9 billion dollars annually represent 21.4 percent of GDP with 62.8 percent originating from United States making TPS population economically critical. Gang control of 85 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince combined with severely limited airport access makes return extremely dangerous for deportees.

The humanitarian emergency extends beyond Port-au-Prince with gangs expanding into Artibonite and Centre departments where killings increased 210 percent in January to August 2025 versus 2024. Armed attacks in Montrouis December 23 to 25 displaced 1120 people and National Road 1 remained impassable at Montrouis segment as of January 6 due to gang activity. The gourde remained stable at 131.14 HTG per USD but 5800 people were displaced from Port-au-Prince neighborhoods by PNH operations since January 1 adding to existing displacement crisis. Toussaint Louverture Airport maintains severely limited commercial traffic with FAA ban through March 2026 constraining humanitarian cargo and personnel movement.

The convergence of TPS termination political crisis and security vacuum creates conditions for catastrophic humanitarian deterioration. Mass deportations could flood displacement camps with

returnees lacking shelter or livelihood options. Remittance disruption would immediately impact household food security healthcare access and small business operations across all departments. The absence of functional governance after February 7 would paralyze humanitarian coordination and service delivery. International humanitarian agencies already face severe access constraints with MSF still awaiting humanitarian corridor agreement before resuming Port-au-Prince and Carrefour activities.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has depended on diaspora remittances since the Duvalier era with flows increasing after the 2010 earthquake and subsequent migration waves. TPS was first designated for Haiti in January 2010 following the earthquake and has been extended multiple times under both Democratic and Republican administrations. Previous mass deportation episodes including the 2017 to 2019 period produced local economic shocks and social tensions.

TALKING POINTS

TPS termination February 3 affects 340000 to 353000 Haitians threatening 4.9 billion in annual remittances.

Remittances represent 21.4 percent of GDP with 62.8 percent from United States making TPS population economically critical.

5.7 million people face acute hunger while 1.4 million remain displaced creating baseline humanitarian emergency.

Gang control of 85 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince makes return extremely dangerous for deportees.

Airport access severely limited with FAA ban through March 2026 constraining both commercial and humanitarian operations.

PNH operations displaced 5800 people since January 1 adding to existing displacement crisis.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International organizations should pre-position emergency humanitarian response capacity anticipating potential returnee influx and remittance shock impacts on household food security.

Diaspora organizations should establish emergency assistance networks for TPS holders facing deportation and develop remittance continuity strategies.

Private sector should assess supply chain vulnerabilities from potential remittance disruption particularly in retail food and consumer goods sectors.

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Humanitarian agencies should negotiate humanitarian corridor agreements immediately to ensure continued access regardless of governance transitions.

Development partners should prepare budget support mechanisms to offset potential remittance decline and maintain basic service delivery.



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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

US sanctions announcement targeting CPT members who signed PM dismissal resolution under Global Magnitsky Act or Haiti-specific authorities. CPT emergency session to formalize PM replacement or Saint-Cyr procedural blocking. Fils-Aime public statement signaling US coordination level and positioning. PNH operations continuation in Bercy with civilian return timeline indicating operational sustainability. Gourde exchange rate movement beyond 132 to 133 HTG per USD signaling capital flight.

THIS WEEK

BINUH mandate renewal vote by January 31 determining continued political mission presence. National dialogue outcome announcement on post-February 7 governance framework with failure to announce consensus by January 28 suggesting vacuum likely. Gang retaliation attacks in Port-au-Prince or Artibonite responding to PNH operations. Business community statement from Chamber of Commerce potentially including strike or operational suspension. CARICOM emergency meeting to address CPT crisis before February 7 deadline.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

February 7 CPT mandate expiration creating executive authority vacuum or illegitimate extension. April 2026 Gang Suppression Force first contingent deployment five months after mandate authorization. August 30 first-round elections contingent on security improvements and funding with no progress on either front. TPS deportation implementation beginning April 2027 after 18-month departure window. Constitutional reform process restart depending on governance stabilization.

PRIMARY SOURCES

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