



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 23, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council split into competing factions as five members voted to remove Prime Minister Fils-Aime despite severe warnings from the United States and Canada. The United States explicitly rejected the move as null and void and labeled participating CPT members as criminals allied with gangs. This executive crisis unfolds fifteen days before the constitutional mandate expiration on 7 February 2027. Security operations on Route Nationale 1 continue to produce tactical gains but fail to secure sustained access between Port-au-Prince and Artibonite. The combination of high-level institutional breakdown and persistent gang territorial control creates immediate risks to governance continuity and humanitarian corridor viability.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Five of nine CPT members signed a resolution to revoke Prime Minister Fils-Aime on 22 January with implementation planned within thirty days.

The United States and Canada issued unprecedented public warnings calling the action illegitimate and threatening measures against participating officials.

CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr rejected the revocation attempt creating an internal split in the council.

Route Nationale 1 remains contested with active operations in Bercy and displacement events in Montrouis.

Gang Suppression Force deployments remain at approximately one thousand personnel with full deployment not expected until summer 2026.

**DEVELOPMENT 1:** On 22 January 2026 five members of Haiti's Transitional Presidential Council signed a resolution to remove Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime from office. The signatories Fritz Alphonse Jean, Leslie Voltaire, Louis Gerald Gilles, Edgard Leblanc Fils, and Smith Augustin represent a majority of the nine-member body. CPT member Leslie Voltaire and CPT President pro tempore Edgard Leblanc Fils publicly confirmed the action on 23 January stating the Council would replace the Prime Minister within a maximum of thirty days. Voltaire indicated there would be a pause to allow political groups to negotiate an acceptable succession arrangement before the 7 February 2027 mandate expiration.

The United States government responded with extraordinary severity. The U.S. Embassy in Port-au-Prince issued a warning on 21 January stating that any attempt to modify the government composition at this advanced stage would be considered a maneuver to undermine transition objectives and would be null and void. The State Department's Western Hemisphere Affairs bureau escalated the language on 22 January calling CPT members pursuing this path not Haitian patriots but criminals like the gangs they conspire with. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke directly with Prime Minister Fils-Aime on 23 January to reaffirm United States support for his continued

leadership. Canada's embassy issued a parallel statement on 22 January expressing deep concern and threatening measures against any actor compromising Haiti's peace and stability.

The action created an immediate split within the Transitional Presidential Council itself. Laurent Saint-Cyr serving as CPT President pro tempore issued a statement on 22 January rejecting any government change approaching the 7 February deadline. Saint-Cyr warned that replacing the Prime Minister at this stage would undermine institutional stability and contradict the transition's objectives. This creates competing claims to authority within the council with five members asserting the power to revoke the Prime Minister while the coordinating officer and at least three other members oppose the move. The legal basis for the revocation remains contested as the decree establishing the CPT on 12 April 2024 does not explicitly grant the council authority to remove a sitting Prime Minister.

The timing amplifies the crisis. With only fifteen days remaining before the constitutional mandate expires on 7 February 2027 the thirty-day replacement timeline announced by Leblanc extends well beyond the Council's legal authority period. This raises fundamental questions about succession legitimacy and creates multiple scenarios for governance paralysis. International actors including the United Nations have explicitly called for avoiding political fragmentation and ensuring continuity during this critical phase. The United States and Canada positioning themselves as explicit opponents of the CPT majority creates unprecedented external pressure on Haiti's domestic institutional arrangements with potential sanctions or visa actions against the five signatories now a realistic possibility.



## **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

The Transitional Presidential Council was established by decree on 12 April 2024 following the resignation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry to manage Haiti's transition until elected authorities could assume office. The decree specified a mandate ending 7 February 2027 aligned with the constitutional term that would have concluded for an elected president. Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime was appointed in November 2025 replacing Garry Conille after the Council cited governance disagreements. This marks the second Prime Minister transition under CPT authority in less than three months.

## **TALKING POINTS**

The CPT majority claims authority to remove the Prime Minister but faces legal ambiguity as the founding decree does not explicitly grant this power.

United States and Canadian governments have taken the unprecedented step of publicly labeling CPT members as criminal actors allied with gangs.

Secretary Rubio's direct call to Prime Minister Fils-Aime on 23 January signals the highest level of

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United States engagement in Haiti's domestic executive crisis.

The thirty-day replacement timeline extends beyond the 7 February 2027 mandate expiration creating a succession legitimacy gap.

CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr's opposition to the revocation reveals deep internal divisions within the council that may prevent unified decision-making.

International organizations including the United Nations have called for governance continuity and avoidance of political fragmentation during the transition's final phase.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Stakeholders should prepare for multiple governance scenarios including CPT fragmentation, parallel claims to executive authority, or externally imposed interim arrangements.

Private sector actors with operations requiring government approvals or permits should anticipate decision-making paralysis or contested authority over contracts and licenses.

International organizations should clarify which institutional actors they will recognize as legitimate counterparts for program implementation and financial disbursements.

Humanitarian agencies should establish contingency protocols for access negotiations if competing executive authorities emerge after 7 February.

Diplomatic missions should maintain direct communication channels with both CPT factions and the Prime Minister's office to preserve flexibility in rapidly changing conditions.

Political risk assessments should account for the possibility of targeted sanctions against specific CPT members including visa restrictions or asset freezes that could affect their operational capacity.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 2: Security operations along Route Nationale 1 between Port-au-Prince and Artibonite produced tactical results but failed to restore sustained civilian access or commercial movement. Haitian National Police supported by Gang Suppression Force elements conducted night operations in Bercy between Cabaret and Arcahaie on the night of 20-21 January 2026. The operation resulted in six alleged gang members killed and seizures of weapons and ammunition. HALO Solutions security monitoring confirmed the action but reported the area has not yet been fully secured with clashes ongoing and civilian return impossible. Bercy sits at a critical junction where gangs based in Canaan maintain the capacity to interdict north-south traffic.

Separate displacement events in Montrouis further north on Route Nationale 1 demonstrate the persistent insecurity across the corridor. Armed attacks in late December 2025 and early January

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2026 displaced approximately 1120 people according to International Organization for Migration assessments dated 6 January 2026. Displaced populations sheltered with host families in Rozo, Ayme, Dipen, and Saint-Marc. As of 6 January the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported Route Nationale 1 remained inaccessible at Montrouis with access to multiple localities very difficult and exposed to armed attacks. The combination of gang presence, community self-defense blockades, and displacement-related volatility created persistent interruption risk for humanitarian and commercial movements.

The operational pattern reflects a broader challenge in Haiti's security response. Police and Gang Suppression Force units can achieve tactical victories in specific locations through concentrated firepower and armored vehicle deployments. However, these gains prove fragile without sustained presence and service delivery to prevent gang reinfiltration. The Bercy-Arcahaie-Montrouis-Saint-Marc axis represents the primary land corridor connecting Port-au-Prince to northern departments including Artibonite which has experienced a 210 percent increase in intentional homicides during 2025. Without reliable Route Nationale 1 access, humanitarian agencies face severe constraints in reaching populations in Centre and Artibonite departments while commercial actors incur prohibitive costs or abandon northern markets entirely.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Route Nationale 1 has served as Haiti's primary north-south artery since colonial times connecting Port-au-Prince to Cap-Haitien and intermediate cities. The Canaan settlement north of Port-au-Prince emerged after the 2010 earthquake as an unplanned displacement camp that evolved into a permanent community. Canaan-based armed groups now exploit the settlement's proximity to Route Nationale 1 to establish checkpoints and extortion operations targeting commercial and passenger traffic.

### TALKING POINTS

Bercy operations on 20-21 January killed six alleged gang members but did not secure the area for civilian return or commercial transit.

HALO Solutions reports clashes ongoing in Bercy with the zone remaining unsecured despite tactical police gains.

Montrouis displacement reached approximately 1120 people as of early January with Route Nationale 1 access still compromised.

United Nations confirmed Route Nationale 1 remained inaccessible at Montrouis as of 6 January with localities exposed to armed attacks.

The corridor's persistent insecurity directly impacts humanitarian access to Artibonite and Centre departments which experienced a 210 percent homicide increase in 2025.

Without sustained security presence and service delivery tactical gains prove fragile and reversible

within days or weeks.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

NGOs should avoid assuming Route Nationale 1 access for programming in northern departments and develop alternative supply chain routing through maritime or air options.

Private sector logistics operators should factor convoy security costs and potential complete road closures into northern Haiti operations.

Humanitarian agencies should pre-position supplies in Saint-Marc and Gonaives to reduce dependence on Port-au-Prince resupply convoys through contested zones.

Security contractors supporting NGO or business operations should conduct route reconnaissance within 24 hours of planned movements as conditions change rapidly.

Development programs in Artibonite and Centre should incorporate security mitigation budgets of 15 to 25 percent above standard operating costs.

Staff movement policies should prohibit road travel on Route Nationale 1 north of Cabaret without armed escort and real-time threat monitoring.



## CONFIDENCE



### **High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 3: Police and Gang Suppression Force operations in central Port-au-Prince displaced approximately 6000 additional people since 6 January 2026 bringing the national internally displaced population to roughly 1.4 million representing 12 percent of Haiti's total population. Operations concentrated in Bel-Air, La Saline, Delmas 2, Delmas 4, Delmas 6, Magloire Ambroise Street, and Nazon using explosive-laden drones, heavy demolition equipment, and armored vehicles. Police claimed some downtown areas were downgraded from red to orange security status indicating modest improvements in state presence. However, the intensity of urban combat operations created severe collateral effects on civilian populations and humanitarian infrastructure.

Medecins Sans Frontieres suspended activities at its Bel-Air facility after the site was caught in crossfire on 6 January 2026 trapping seven volunteers inside. One former volunteer was killed in related violence. MSF's suspension represents a significant loss of medical capacity in a zone where only approximately 10 percent of health facilities with hospital capacity remain fully operational. The United Nations estimates 4.9 million people require emergency medical assistance nationwide. The combination of facility closures, displacement surges, and ongoing combat operations creates acute gaps in trauma care, maternal health services, and chronic disease management for populations trapped in contested neighborhoods.

The displacement figures compound pre-existing humanitarian pressures. International Organization for Migration and United Nations assessments recorded the 6000 newly displaced between 6 and 15 January with concentrations in areas surrounding the operational zones. Displaced populations typically shelter with host families straining already limited resources or occupy informal sites lacking water, sanitation, and health services. The timing of large-scale urban operations overlaps with the final days of the Transitional Presidential Council's mandate creating uncertainty about governance continuity for humanitarian coordination and access negotiations. Protection risks including sexual violence, child separation, and exploitation increase substantially in displacement contexts where institutional oversight is weak or absent.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bel-Air and La Saline have functioned as strategic gang strongholds since the political crisis intensified in 2018. The neighborhoods provide proximity to the National Palace area, port access, and dense urban terrain that complicates conventional police operations. Previous attempts to clear these zones in 2023 and 2024 achieved temporary results but gangs typically reestablished control within weeks after security forces withdrew.

## TALKING POINTS

Approximately 6000 people displaced in Port-au-Prince since 6 January bringing national internally displaced total to 1.4 million.

Medecins Sans Frontieres suspended Bel-Air operations after facility caught in crossfire on 6 January with one ex-volunteer killed.

Only 10 percent of health facilities with hospital capacity remain fully operational while 4.9 million require emergency medical assistance.

Police operations using drones and heavy demolition equipment achieved tactical gains but at significant collateral cost to civilian infrastructure.

Displacement surges create acute protection risks including sexual violence and child exploitation in contexts with weak institutional oversight.

The operational intensity occurs during the final days before the 7 February mandate expiration complicating humanitarian coordination continuity.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian agencies should establish rapid displacement tracking systems to identify emerging protection needs and service gaps in real time.

Health sector actors should pre-position trauma supplies and mobile medical teams anticipating facility closures and access interruptions in operational zones.

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Protection specialists should deploy to new displacement sites within 48 hours to conduct vulnerability assessments and establish referral pathways.

NGO security protocols should prohibit staff presence in Bel-Air, La Saline, and Delmas operational zones during active combat phases.

Shelter and WASH agencies should prepare surge capacity for 10000 to 15000 additional displaced persons if operations expand to adjacent neighborhoods.

Advocacy platforms should engage diplomatic missions on the need for humanitarian pauses or corridors to enable medical evacuations and supply movements.



### CONFIDENCE



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DEVELOPMENT 4: The United Nations-backed Gang Suppression Force currently operates at approximately 1000 personnel far below its authorized ceiling with full deployment not expected until summer or autumn 2026. UN Special Representative Carlos Ruiz-Massieu stated on 21 January that additional contingents would arrive by April 2026 with gradual scaling to 5500 troops conditional on funding commitments and troop-contributing nation readiness. Current personnel are predominantly Kenyan police with limited heavy weapons and air mobility assets. The force conducts intelligence-led targeted counter-gang operations, protects critical infrastructure including the airport and port, and secures humanitarian corridors in support of the Haitian National Police.

The deployment timeline creates a significant capability gap during the transition's most critical phase. With the Transitional Presidential Council's mandate expiring 7 February 2027 and electoral processes scheduled for August and December 2026 the security environment must stabilize sufficiently to enable voter registration, candidate campaigning, and polling station operations. The current 1000-personnel force lacks the capacity to simultaneously hold cleared urban terrain, protect electoral infrastructure across multiple departments, and respond to large-scale gang offensives. UN officials acknowledge that even at full strength the 5500-personnel authorization represents a fraction of what conventional counterinsurgency doctrine would prescribe for a city the size of Port-au-Prince with gang forces estimated at 12000 combatants.

Operational effectiveness also depends on sustained international funding which remains uncertain. The Gang Suppression Force operates through voluntary contributions rather than assessed UN peacekeeping budgets creating month-to-month financial uncertainty. Delays in equipment procurement, ammunition resupply, and force rotation funding have constrained operational tempo in recent weeks. The force's mandate includes protecting humanitarian corridors but implementation requires coordination with UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs that often lack real-time information on GSF patrol schedules or cleared routes. This coordination gap results in

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humanitarian convoys either waiting days for confirmed security coverage or moving independently through contested areas at elevated risk.

The Haitian National Police expansion efforts complement but cannot substitute for international force presence. PNH deployed 892 new officers from its 35th graduating class in early January to high-violence areas and displacement sites. However, PNH faces recruitment challenges, equipment shortages, and morale issues stemming from sustained combat exposure and inadequate salaries. The force remains numerically equivalent to gang combatants at approximately 12000 personnel each creating a strategic parity that prevents decisive advantage without GSF heavy weapons support. International security assessments conclude that PNH can hold urban terrain with GSF assistance but lacks independent capacity for large-scale offensive operations.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Gang Suppression Force represents a transitional security mechanism created after the UN Security Council declined to authorize a traditional peacekeeping operation in 2024. Kenya committed the largest contingent under a bilateral agreement with Haiti backed by UN political support and logistical coordination. Previous international interventions including MINUSTAH from 2004 to 2017 deployed between 6000 and 12000 personnel at peak strength indicating current force levels remain substantially below historical precedents.

### TALKING POINTS

Gang Suppression Force currently operates at 1000 personnel with full 5500-troop deployment expected by summer or autumn 2026.

UN officials confirmed additional contingents arriving by April 2026 contingent on funding commitments and troop-contributing readiness.

The force protects airport, port, and critical infrastructure but lacks capacity to simultaneously hold cleared terrain and expand operations.

Haitian National Police deployed 892 new officers in January but remains at numerical parity with gang forces at approximately 12000 each.

GSF operates on voluntary contributions creating month-to-month funding uncertainty that constrains operational tempo.

Coordination gaps between GSF and humanitarian actors result in convoy delays or elevated risk movements through unsecured routes.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Security planning should assume current threat levels persist through at least mid-2026 with modest incremental improvements rather than dramatic shifts.

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NGOs and businesses should develop independent security intelligence networks rather than relying exclusively on GSF presence for threat assessments.

Organizations requiring armed escort should contract with vetted private security providers as GSF lacks capacity for routine humanitarian convoy protection.

Electoral assistance programs should budget for enhanced security measures including fortified registration sites and armored transport for materials and personnel.

Advocacy efforts should target donor capitals to secure multi-year GSF funding commitments that enable sustained operations beyond immediate emergency response.

Contingency plans should account for potential GSF withdrawal or mandate expiration scenarios if funding gaps or political disputes emerge during 2026.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

#### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor whether the five CPT members who signed the Prime Minister revocation resolution convene formal sessions or issue additional decrees asserting executive authority. Any attempt to name a replacement Prime Minister or cabinet within this timeframe would trigger immediate United States and Canadian responses potentially including visa sanctions or asset freezes. Track whether Prime Minister Fils-Aime maintains access to government offices and whether security forces continue to recognize his authority for operational directives. Observe whether Laurent Saint-Cyr as CPT President pro tempore issues counter-directives or formal legal challenges to the revocation attempt.

#### THIS WEEK

Watch for international diplomatic interventions beyond the United States and Canada particularly from CARICOM member states or the Organization of American States that could mediate between CPT factions. Monitor whether the national political dialogue produces any consensus framework for post-7 February governance arrangements or whether competing proposals from COPPOS-Haiti, Montana Accord, and 21 December Accord groups remain deadlocked. Track security operations on Route Nationale 1 to assess whether Bercy and Montrouis zones stabilize sufficiently to restore limited commercial traffic or whether gangs reestablish control. Observe whether additional health facilities suspend operations in Port-au-Prince operational zones and whether displacement figures continue rising beyond the current 6000 since 6 January.

## STRATEGIC HORIZON

The 7 February 2027 date represents the definitive decision point for Haiti's transition trajectory. Three scenarios merit preparation. First, the CPT majority succeeds in removing Fils-Aime creating a contested dual executive with international actors split on recognition and legitimacy. Second, external pressure from the United States and Canada forces the CPT majority to abandon the revocation attempt but internal council divisions prevent effective decision-making in the mandate's final days. Third, an externally brokered compromise produces an interim arrangement extending beyond 7 February with modified executive structures pending electoral outcomes. All three scenarios carry substantial governance disruption risks that will cascade into electoral timeline viability, humanitarian access negotiations, and private sector operational continuity. The Gang Suppression Force deployment timeline ensures security conditions remain fragile through at least mid-2026 regardless of political outcomes. Organizations operating in Haiti should finalize contingency plans for multiple governance scenarios by 31 January to preserve decision-making flexibility.

## PRIMARY SOURCES

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6. The Straits Times: Two top Haiti leaders signal PM could be removed (23 January 2026)
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