



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 22, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's transition framework faced its most severe test in the last 24 hours when multiple CPT members attempted to revoke Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime, only to be blocked by an explicit U.S. warning of sanctions against destabilizing actors. The failed institutional coup exposes deep fractures within the transition authority just days before the February 7 deadline. Simultaneously, PNH operations in the Bercy-Arcahaie corridor and central Port-au-Prince generated approximately 6,000 new displacements since January 6, straining humanitarian systems already operating at 10 percent hospital capacity. Gang territorial control remains at 80-90 percent of the capital while international security force deployment lags at 1,000 personnel against a 5,500 target.



### QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

U.S. government issued direct threat of action against CPT members supporting PM removal attempt

PNH operations in Bercy and downtown Port-au-Prince continue with heavy equipment and drone strikes

Approximately 6,000 newly displaced in capital since January 6 amid intensified security sweeps  
RN1 remains impassable at multiple points between Port-au-Prince and Artibonite

GSF force strength remains at approximately 1,000 troops with full deployment pushed to summer 2026

**DEVELOPMENT 1:** Late on January 21, several members of the Transitional Presidential Council drafted and signed a resolution to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime. Initially five members reportedly signed the document, but at least one later withdrew support, preventing formation of a working majority. Laurent Saint-Cyr, serving as CPT coordinator, actively opposed the maneuver and circulated a letter to council members warning that any attempt to destabilize government composition so close to critical transition deadlines would undermine the entire democratic process. The attempted removal collapsed within hours after the U.S. Embassy issued an unusually direct public statement warning that anyone supporting government changes at this stage would be acting against American interests and that Washington would act accordingly.

The U.S. intervention represents an unprecedented level of explicit pressure on Haitian political actors. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau reinforced the message through both social media and press briefings, framing any governmental change as inherently favoring gang interests. The warning carries implicit threat of visa restrictions and potential sanctions-style measures against individual CPT members, raising personal stakes for Haitian politicians considering institutional maneuvers. This external veto power over elite decisions demonstrates the degree to which Haiti's transition architecture now depends on international guarantees rather

than domestic political consensus.

The immediate crisis has been contained but underlying tensions within the CPT remain unresolved. Multiple political coalitions continue to advance competing proposals for post-deadline governance structures, including COPPOS-Haiti's framework for a 24-month extended transition with bicephalous executive and the Civil Society Initiative's argument that the CPT has failed its mandate and cannot legally extend itself. These divergent visions create significant uncertainty for institutional continuity beyond the deadline, with no mechanism yet established for resolving fundamental disagreements about transition architecture.

For operational actors, the failed PM removal attempt signals that basic government structures will likely persist through the immediate deadline period due to external pressure, but domestic legitimacy of those structures remains contested. International organizations and businesses should prepare for scenarios ranging from contested authority claims to informal power-sharing arrangements that preserve functional ministries while political elites negotiate broader transition frameworks. The U.S. warning also clarifies that visa restrictions and sanctions remain active tools for shaping Haitian political behavior, increasing unpredictability in elite decision-making.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was established through the April 3, 2024 political accord as a collective presidency mechanism to guide Haiti toward elections after the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and subsequent institutional breakdown. The original accord specified term limits but left ambiguity about extension conditions, creating current disputes over mandate legitimacy.

## TALKING POINTS

CPT internal divisions nearly produced government collapse within 24 hours before U.S. intervention

Washington has demonstrated willingness to use explicit sanctions threats as real-time political leverage

Multiple Haitian coalitions advance incompatible proposals for governance beyond transition deadline

No consensus mechanism exists for resolving fundamental disagreements about transition extension

International community privileges institutional continuity over strict constitutional compliance

Personal sanctions risk now factors directly into Haitian elite political calculations

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Maintain contingency plans for contested government authority after deadline with multiple claimants to legitimacy

Monitor visa restriction announcements as leading indicator of U.S. pressure on specific political actors

Engage multiple political coalition representatives simultaneously to avoid backing single transition framework

Prepare flexible contractual language for government agreements that accommodate interim authority structures

Establish clear organizational protocols for validating state signature authority in contested scenarios

Brief staff on likelihood of parallel governance claims and procedures for navigating institutional ambiguity



## CONFIDENCE



### **High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 2: Police Nationale d'Haiti operations in the Bercy area between Cabaret and Arcahaie along Route Nationale 1 have continued for more than two weeks with sustained clashes against Canaan-based gangs attempting to expand territorial control toward Arcahaie. On the night of January 20-21, PNH forces supported by government task force units and international security partners conducted operations that killed six alleged gang members and seized weapons and ammunition. Despite operations beginning January 4, security assessments indicate the Bercy corridor has not been fully secured and civilian return remains impossible due to ongoing combat. The broader RN1 corridor faces multiple simultaneous threats including community self-defense blockades near Saint-Marc and gang attacks around Montrouis that displaced approximately 1,120 people.

The strategic importance of the Bercy-Arcahaie segment stems from its position as the primary land route connecting Port-au-Prince to northern Haiti including Cap-Haitien and the Artibonite agricultural heartland. Gang control of this corridor enables systematic extortion of commercial traffic while cutting humanitarian access to violence-affected populations in Lower Artibonite and Central Plateau. The prolonged PNH campaign indicates significant gang defensive capabilities and suggests that even with international support, Haitian security forces lack the strength to rapidly clear and hold contested territory. Operations have generated localized tactical gains but have not fundamentally altered the security calculus for road movements.

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Simultaneously with Bercy operations, PNH has intensified activities in central Port-au-Prince neighborhoods including Bel-Air, La Saline, Delmas 2/4/6, and areas near the administrative center. These operations employ explosive-laden drones, heavy demolition equipment, and armored vehicles in sustained sweeps through previously inaccessible gang strongholds. Security officials claim to have downgraded portions of downtown from red to orange security status, but operations have generated approximately 6,000 new internally displaced persons since January 6 according to IOM and OCHA. Health services have been severely disrupted, with Medecins Sans Frontieres suspending activities in Bel-Air after facilities were caught in crossfire and an ex-volunteer was killed.

The tactical pattern emerging from both Bercy and Port-au-Prince operations shows that PNH can achieve temporary territorial gains when supported by GSF personnel and private security contractors, but lacks capacity to establish sustained presence and civilian authority in cleared areas. Each operation generates displacement that strains humanitarian systems already operating at severe resource constraints, with only approximately 10 percent of hospital-capacity health facilities fully operational. For operational planning, this indicates that RN1 will remain a high-risk corridor unsuitable for routine commercial or humanitarian movement until security forces can demonstrate ability to hold cleared territory rather than simply conducting kinetic sweeps.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Route Nationale 1 serves as Haiti's primary north-south arterial road connecting the capital to breadbasket regions and second-tier cities. Gang expansion from Port-au-Prince metropolitan area into surrounding corridors accelerated sharply in 2024-2025 as armed groups sought to control revenue-generating checkpoints and expand territorial influence beyond saturated urban zones.

### TALKING POINTS

PNH operations in Bercy ongoing since January 4 without achieving territorial control sufficient for civilian return

RN1 remains impassable at multiple points due to gang activity and community blockades

Approximately 6,000 new IDPs generated in Port-au-Prince since January 6 from intensified security operations

Downtown operations employ heavy weapons and drones but lack follow-on civilian authority establishment

Medecins Sans Frontieres suspended Bel-Air activities after crossfire incident killed ex-volunteer

Only 10 percent of hospital-capacity health facilities fully operational amid displacement surge

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Designate RN1 as non-permissive for routine staff movements and commercial traffic until sustained security improvements demonstrated

Route all northern Haiti access through Cap-Haitien aviation gateway or maritime options where feasible

Maintain at least 30-day supply buffers in Port-au-Prince and regional hubs to account for unpredictable corridor closures

Develop contingency plans for rapid facility evacuation if security operations approach organizational compounds

Engage PNH and GSF for advance notification of planned operations near humanitarian sites

Prepare displacement response capacity for potential additional surges if operations expand to other gang-held zones



## CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 3: The Gang Suppression Force authorized under UNSC Resolution 2793 currently deploys approximately 1,000 personnel, primarily Kenyan police officers who arrived in multiple rotations between June 2024 and December 2025. On January 22, UN Special Envoy Carlos Ruiz-Massieu announced that additional contingents are expected to arrive by April 2026, with the force projected to reach full authorized strength of 5,500 troops by summer or autumn 2026, contingent on sustained funding and contributing country commitments. The GSF mission concept focuses on intelligence-led counter-gang operations, protection of critical infrastructure including airport and port facilities, and securing humanitarian corridors in support of PNH and Armed Forces of Haiti operations.

The six-month gap between current deployment and projected full strength creates a critical vulnerability window during which gang territorial control is unlikely to be fundamentally challenged. Current GSF numbers remain insufficient to conduct sustained operations beyond Port-au-Prince and immediate priority corridors, forcing reliance on episodic PNH sweeps rather than establishment of permanent security presence in contested areas. The Kenyan contingent has gained operational experience since mid-2024 but faces persistent questions about mandate sustainability given limited troop rotation capacity and dependence on external funding that has chronically underperformed donor commitments.

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International security support architecture combines the UN-authorized GSF with bilateral advisory support from the United States and other partners, creating complex coordination requirements and potential gaps in operational unity. The GSF operates under a support mandate rather than full peacekeeping authorities, limiting its ability to independently conduct certain enforcement actions. This constrains operational flexibility and creates dependencies on PNH decision-making that may not always align with international priorities. The delayed force generation also raises questions about whether the planned August 30, 2026 first-round election date remains realistic given security prerequisites for nationwide voter registration and polling station operations.

For planning purposes, stakeholders should assume that security environment improvements before mid-2026 will be limited to specific geographic zones where GSF and PNH concentrate resources, primarily downtown Port-au-Prince, airport surroundings, and select arterial routes. Gang territorial control will likely remain near current levels across most of the capital and Lower Artibonite until force strength reaches levels sufficient for simultaneous operations in multiple contested zones. The summer 2026 timeline for full deployment also suggests that any significant security dividends from the international intervention will not materialize until the second half of the year at earliest.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Kenya led the Multinational Security Support Mission beginning June 2024 after months of delay due to legal challenges and funding negotiations. The September 2025 UNSC authorization transformed the mission into the Gang Suppression Force with enhanced mandate but maintained Kenya as principal contributor and did not convert it to a traditional UN peacekeeping operation.

### TALKING POINTS

GSF currently deploys approximately 1,000 personnel against authorized ceiling of 5,500 troops  
Full force strength projected for summer-autumn 2026 pending funding and troop contributions  
Under-strength deployment limits GSF to priority corridors and critical infrastructure protection  
Current force levels insufficient to fundamentally challenge gang territorial control beyond localized operations

Kenyan contingent faces sustainability questions given rotation requirements and funding dependencies

Security environment unlikely to support nationwide electoral operations before substantial force increases

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Plan security budgets and risk assessments assuming current high-threat environment continues through at least mid-2026

Concentrate field operations in zones with established GSF presence rather than expecting broad security improvements

Monitor force generation announcements from contributing countries as leading indicator of deployment acceleration

Engage BINUH and GSF command on humanitarian corridor prioritization to align operational plans

Prepare contingency scenarios for electoral timeline adjustments if security conditions remain non-permissive

Factor delayed security improvements into annual program design and avoid over-optimistic planning assumptions



## CONFIDENCE



### **High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 4: Haiti's 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan seeks 880 million dollars to assist 4.2 million of 6.4 million people in need, representing over half the national population. The plan prioritizes West, Centre, and Artibonite departments where violence directly affects civilian populations alongside support to internally displaced person hosting communities in more stable Grand Sud and Grand Nord regions. Despite the December 18, 2025 launch, early 2026 funding remains severely constrained, forcing the World Food Programme to halve rations and suspend hot meal programs due to a 139 million dollar shortfall. Food security assessments project Crisis and Emergency phase conditions persisting through May 2026, with particularly severe impacts in Port-au-Prince, Cite Soleil, Croix-des-Bouquets, and displacement sites.

The humanitarian crisis interacts directly with security dynamics as gang territorial expansion into Artibonite and Centre departments has disrupted agricultural production in historically productive zones. Between January and August 2025, intentional homicides in these two departments increased 210 percent compared to 2024, with 1,303 victims recorded. This violence coincides with planting and harvest periods, creating cascading food security effects that extend beyond immediate conflict zones. The combination of displacement, agricultural disruption, and funding shortfalls creates conditions where humanitarian needs are expanding faster than response capacity, particularly as the 1.4 million internally displaced population requires sustained assistance.

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Operational access constraints compound funding limitations as humanitarian actors face systematic barriers to reaching populations in need. The Route Nationale 1 corridor closure affects access to Lower Artibonite while urban gang control limits movements within Port-au-Prince neighborhoods. Medecins Sans Frontieres' suspension of activities in Bel-Air after a January 6 crossfire incident illustrates that even organizations with extensive crisis experience face untenable security conditions when caught between gang positions and security force operations. With only 10 percent of hospital-capacity facilities fully operational and 4.9 million people requiring emergency medical assistance, the health system operates in a state of near collapse.

The humanitarian financing gap creates direct operational risks for international organizations and businesses as unmet needs drive population movements, increase security threats, and destabilize areas previously considered relatively secure. Internally displaced populations place strain on host community resources, potentially generating tension and localized conflict over scarce services. The combination of food insecurity, health system breakdown, and massive displacement creates conditions conducive to disease outbreaks, further complicating operational environments. Organizations should prepare for scenarios where humanitarian conditions deteriorate faster than security improvements materialize.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has faced chronic humanitarian needs since the 2010 earthquake, but the post-2021 political crisis and gang territorial expansion transformed manageable challenges into acute emergency conditions. Gang control of agricultural zones and supply routes represents a structural shift that converts urban violence into nationwide food security crisis.

### TALKING POINTS

HRP targets 4.2 million people with 880 million dollar appeal facing severe early-year funding shortfalls

WFP forced to halve rations and suspend hot meals due to 139 million dollar funding gap

Approximately 1.4 million internally displaced persons require sustained assistance across multiple sectors

Gang expansion into Artibonite agricultural zones generated 210 percent increase in homicides and disrupted production

Only 10 percent of hospital-capacity health facilities fully operational with 4.9 million needing emergency medical care

MSF suspended operations in Bel-Air after crossfire incident exposing risks even for experienced crisis responders

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Prioritize life-saving interventions over medium-term resilience programming given resource constraints and access limitations

Establish supply chain redundancy including pre-positioning in multiple locations to account for corridor closures

Coordinate closely with WFP and OCHA on food security hotspots requiring urgent resource allocation

Develop protocols for temporary program suspension and staff withdrawal if security conditions around sites deteriorate

Monitor IDP population movements as early warning indicator for security situation changes

Integrate health system capacity assessments into all field operation planning given facility limitations



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## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor for any renewed CPT attempts to alter government composition now that initial PM removal effort has failed and U.S. warning is public. Additional institutional maneuvering could trigger immediate sanctions announcements or escalated international pressure. Watch for CARICOM or OAS statements responding to governance tensions as regional organizations assess transition stability. Track PNH operational announcements regarding Bercy corridor as sustained combat beyond three weeks suggests either imminent breakthrough or potential operational stalemate requiring tactical adjustments.

## THIS WEEK

National dialogue meetings between CPT and political coalitions scheduled to continue with sessions involving Montana accord representatives, December 21 accord signatories, and additional civil society formations. Substantive proposals emerging from these discussions could shape post-deadline transition architecture or conversely expose irreconcilable divisions requiring external mediation. GSF and PNH will likely announce results from ongoing Port-au-Prince

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

operations including any additional neighborhoods downgraded from red security status or conversely any tactical withdrawals from previously cleared areas. Humanitarian coordination meetings will address displacement response for approximately 6,000 new IDPs since January 6 and potential additional movements if operations expand.

### STRATEGIC HORIZON

The period between now and early April represents final window for achieving meaningful security improvements before projected GSF force expansion begins. Failure to demonstrate sustainable territorial control gains during this period will likely drive reassessment of August 30 election date feasibility and potentially force electoral calendar adjustments. International donor decisions on HRP funding in first quarter will determine whether humanitarian response can scale to meet expanding needs or must conduct further program cuts. Post-deadline governance arrangements will crystallize between late January and mid-February as political actors either converge on consensus transition framework or fragment into competing authority claims requiring international arbitration.

### PRIMARY SOURCES

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7. Security Council Report monthly forecast on Haiti (January 2026)
8. HaitiLibre reporting on PNH operations in Bercy corridor (22 January 2026)
9. HALO Solutions weekly security report covering Bercy operations (6-13 January 2026)
12. Reuters reporting on GSF deployment timeline and force strength (22 January 2026)
13. UN Security Council briefing transcript by BINUH Special Representative (20-21 January 2026)
14. Relief Web publication of 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan documents (December 2025)
15. The New Humanitarian in-depth feature on gang violence and food security (21 January 2026)
16. IMF Staff-Monitored Program documents on Haiti macroeconomic indicators (2025)
17. U.S. State Department travel advisory for Haiti (current as of January 2026)