



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

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Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Eighteen days before the February 7 CPT mandate expiration, the national political dialogue concluded its second day with no announced frameworks despite participation from Montana, COPPOS, KOREPAD, and December 21 groups, while Le Nouvelliste reports the CPT is struggling to reach agreement and unnamed organizations refuse engagement. A major PNH operation killed six gang members in Barbecue's stronghold as the 44-day pause shows signs of tactical ending. Meanwhile, 350,000 Haitian TPS holders face deportation in 14 days with federal court rulings still pending.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CPT dialogue produced no concrete outcomes after two full days with major political groups through .

PNH conducted major offensive against Barbecue stronghold killing six gang members and seizing significant weapons.

Temporary Protected Status expires February 3 affecting 350,000 Haitians with no federal court ruling issued.

Alliance of 70 political parties formed January 14 demanding CPT departure and rejecting any mandate extension.

UN BINUH mandate expires January 31 with no Security Council renewal announced as of .

DEVELOPMENT 1: CPT National Dialogue Fails to Produce Consensus After Two Full Days of Meetings

The Transitional Presidential Council concluded the second day of its national political dialogue on January 19, meeting with representatives from COPPOS-Haiti et Allies, KOREPAD, Montana Accord, and December 21 Accord groups. However, the CPT's official statement released used identical generic language to 's announcement, claiming to have successfully concluded exchanges marked by quality dialogue, without announcing any specific consensus points, governance frameworks, agreed timelines, or concrete next steps for the February 7 transition. Le Nouvelliste reported that the CPT is struggling to find a political agreement before February 7, while separately confirming that unnamed political organizations are maintaining their refusal to dialogue with the transitional council despite the ongoing meetings.

The dialogue's failure to produce announced outcomes becomes more significant when viewed against the January 14 formation of an alliance of more than 70 political parties that adopted a protocol explicitly rejecting any CPT mandate extension and demanding the council's definitive end on February 7. This alliance, which includes Grand Bloc du Peuple, Initiative du 24 avril, Opposition plurielle, Accord Karibe, DEHFI, and MP-18, called for establishment of a new

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one-year transition and general elections no later than fourth quarter 2026. The alliance was formalized four days before the CPT launched its dialogue process, suggesting significant political forces had already positioned themselves against the transitional council before consultations began.

With 18 days remaining until the constitutional deadline, the absence of any announced frameworks after two days of meetings with Haiti's most significant political stakeholders indicates either fundamental disagreements on core transition elements, internal CPT deadlock on which proposal to adopt, or a strategy of conducting consultations to claim legitimacy for a predetermined decision rather than genuinely building consensus. and represent the final realistic opportunity for announced frameworks that would allow the minimum 14 to 22 days required for proper implementation of decree drafting, stakeholder consultations, legal review, official publication, and institutional rollout.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The CPT was established under the April 3, 2024 transitional framework with a mandate explicitly set to expire on February 7, 2026, aligned with Haiti's constitutional tradition that presidential terms end on this date. The current dialogue represents the council's primary mechanism for negotiating its own succession or extension, but faces competing legitimacy claims from civil society proposals including the Montana Accord's Conference of Stakeholders model, COPPOS's reformed transition with reduced CPT, and the 70-plus party alliance's new transition framework that excludes the current council entirely.

TALKING POINTS

The CPT met all major political stakeholders over two days but announced no concrete agreements or frameworks with 18 days until mandate expiration.

An alliance of more than 70 political parties formed January 14 demanding CPT departure and rejecting any extension, four days before dialogue launched.

Le Nouvelliste confirms the CPT is struggling to reach political agreement despite consultations with Montana, COPPOS, KOREPAD, and December 21 groups.

and represent final opportunity for framework announcements allowing minimum implementation timeline before February 7.

Unnamed political organizations maintain refusal to dialogue with CPT despite ongoing meetings. Competing proposals remain irreconcilable on executive structure, timeline length, and CPT role in any extended transition.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

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International partners should establish direct communication channels with both CPT and 70-party alliance to assess feasibility of unified framework by January 22.

Stakeholders should prepare contingency plans for three scenarios: rushed transition agreement, unilateral CPT extension, or institutional vacuum on February 7.

Business and humanitarian actors should assume no governance certainty through mid-February and position for multiple outcomes including competing authority claims.

Diaspora organizations should monitor whether or produce CPT announcements as indicator of orderly versus chaotic transition trajectory.

Regional bodies should clarify whether OAS institutional continuity mechanism remains operative given CARICOM facilitation collapse and BINUH expiration January 31.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: Major PNH Operation Targets Barbecue Stronghold as 44-Day Gang Pause Shows Tactical Ending

Haitian National Police conducted a major coordinated operation and against the Magloire Ambroise Street stronghold of gang leader Jimmy Cherizier, known as Barbecue, involving PNH special units including UDMO, the Armed Forces of Haiti, Gang Suppression Force, and the Prime Minister's Task Force composed of private military contractors. The operation resulted in six gang members killed, several others wounded who escaped, and seizure of 18 shotguns, three AR-15 assault rifles, eight pistols, significant ammunition quantities, five drones, stolen UDMO police uniforms bearing inspector rank insignia, bulletproof vests, and tear gas grenades. Justice and Public Security Minister Patrick Pelissier declared that the recapture of the capital is already underway, claiming that administrative center areas including the airport intersection, Delmas 19, Nazon, and Magloire Ambroise Street have transitioned from red zone to orange zone status.

The operation represents the most significant security force offensive since January 14 drone strikes on Barbecue's Delmas 6 residences, demonstrating improved multi-force coordination and systematic targeting of gang leadership infrastructure rather than territorial control operations. Minister Pelissier explicitly credited support from private companies, referring to mercenaries, with making law enforcement offensives more effective. However, his designation of cleared areas as orange zone rather than fully secured green zone confirms that no Port-au-Prince neighborhoods are completely free of gang presence despite the 44-day pause in major gang violence and intensified operations since early January.

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The Washington Post reported that gang members attacked an Associated Press videographer who was filming tactical police patrols in the capital, marking the first documented gang-initiated attack on media or security forces during the 44-day period that began December 21. This suggests gangs are transitioning from complete operational restraint to tactical defensive responses, attacking those documenting PNH operations while not yet resuming strategic offensive actions such as coordinated territorial expansion or mass displacement attacks. The shift from zero attacks to localized responses indicates the pause may be ending tactically even as gangs avoid full-scale mobilization that would forfeit their apparent strategy of maintaining partial restraint to preserve negotiating position for potential amnesty discussions as part of the February 7 transition.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has experienced episodic gang violence pauses historically when leadership transitions create uncertainty about which political actors gangs should align with or pressure, with the most notable recent pause occurring during the 2021 presidential assassination when gangs briefly suspended operations awaiting clarity on power succession. The current 44-day pause from December 21 through January 19 represents the longest sustained reduction in gang violence since 2023, coinciding with the approaching February 7 deadline when the CPT mandate expires and creating speculation that gang leader Barbecue is positioning for inclusion in transition negotiations rather than risking exclusion through continued high-profile attacks.

TALKING POINTS

PNH conducted major -operation killing six gang members and seizing 18 shotguns, three assault rifles, eight pistols, five drones, and stolen police equipment.

Justice Minister claims administrative center transitioned from red zone to orange zone but no areas designated fully secured green zone.

Operation involved five security entities including private military contractors explicitly credited by minister with improving effectiveness.

Washington Post confirms gang attack on AP videographer first documented gang-initiated attack during 44-day pause.

Minister Pelissier declaration that capital recapture is underway follows pattern of government claims not matched by sustained territorial control.

Gangs appear to be testing government with tactical responses rather than resuming strategic offensive operations.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Security planners should treat orange zone designation as contested rather than secured territory

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and maintain restrictive movement protocols.

Humanitarian actors should not interpret 44-day pause ending tactically as signal for immediate strategic gang mobilization but monitor escalation indicators.

Business continuity plans should account for possibility of rapid transition from tactical gang responses to coordinated violence if CPT announces unilateral extension.

International security assistance should prioritize sustaining PNH operational tempo through February 7 transition period to prevent gang exploitation of political uncertainty.

Media organizations should review security protocols given targeting of AP videographer during police patrol documentation.



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DEVELOPMENT 3: Federal Court TPS Ruling Remains Pending with 14 Days Until 350,000 Haitians Face Deportation

Temporary Protected Status for Haiti expires February 3, 2026, affecting more than 350,000 Haitian beneficiaries in the United States, yet the federal court ruling on the termination's legality remains pending as of despite a hearing held January 6 before Judge Ana Reyes in the Eastern District of New York and separate Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals oral arguments January 14 on the government's appeal of a September district court decision finding the cancellation illegal. The Department of Homeland Security has begun issuing notifications to Haitian TPS holders advising them to prepare to leave the United States within approximately one month of the February 3 deadline unless courts block the termination, creating a situation where the government is operationally preparing for mass deportations while two federal courts deliberate whether the action is lawful.

The compressed 14-day timeline before expiration creates extreme pressure for courts to issue emergency rulings this week or next to prevent irreversible harm if they determine the termination violated law. Plaintiffs argue the cancellation was unconstitutionally motivated by racial animus given Secretary Noem's and President Trump's documented use of racist tropes to dehumanize nonwhite immigrants, violated the Administrative Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious, and ignored statutory requirements that DHS assess whether extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti persist before terminating protection. DHS claims Haiti no longer meets the threshold for protection and continued TPS is not in the national interest, despite advocacy organizations documenting that Haiti faces unprecedented violence and humanitarian collapse that make return impossible.

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The overlapping deadlines of February 3 TPS expiration and February 7 CPT mandate expiration create a five-day compressed crisis period where Haitians may be deported during Haiti's governance vacuum, returning to a country with no functioning government, ongoing gang violence, 1.4 million internally displaced persons, and 5.7 million facing severe food insecurity. The deportation of 350,000 TPS holders would eliminate billions in annual remittances that support more than 1.4 million family members in Haiti, collapsing financial flows precisely when the country requires maximum diaspora support during political transition and humanitarian emergency.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The United States first designated Haiti for Temporary Protected Status in 2010 following the devastating earthquake, with subsequent redesignations and extensions maintaining protection through multiple administrations based on ongoing extraordinary conditions including political instability, infrastructure collapse, and recurrent natural disasters. The Trump administration previously attempted to terminate Haiti TPS in 2017 and 2018, but those efforts were blocked by federal courts that found the decisions were influenced by discriminatory animus and failed to properly assess country conditions, leading to continued protection through litigation and eventual redesignation by the Biden administration in 2021 and 2023.

TALKING POINTS

TPS expires February 3 affecting 350,000 Haitians with federal court ruling pending 14 days after January 6 hearing.

DHS issuing deportation preparation notices while two federal courts deliberate whether termination is legal.

Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments January 14 on government appeal of ruling that found cancellation illegal.

February 3-7 represents compressed five-day crisis with TPS expiration followed by Haiti CPT mandate expiration.

Deportations would collapse remittance flows to 1.4 million Haitian family members during governance transition and humanitarian emergency.

Plaintiffs argue termination motivated by racial animus and ignores statutory requirement to assess country conditions.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Haitian diaspora organizations should prepare emergency legal support infrastructure for TPS holders if courts fail to block February 3 termination.

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International humanitarian actors should model scenarios for absorbing 350,000 returnees during February governance vacuum if deportations proceed.

Advocacy groups should intensify pressure on federal judges to issue emergency rulings this week given 14-day timeline before irreversible deportations begin.

Caribbean regional bodies should coordinate contingency reception capacity if mass deportations occur during February 3-7 window.

U.S. Congressional delegations should explore legislative options to extend TPS given court decision delays and Haiti crisis severity.



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DEVELOPMENT 4: UN BINUH Mandate Expires January 31 with No Security Council Renewal Announced

The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti mandate expires January 31, 2026, representing 11 days from with no Security Council resolution renewing the mission announced as of January 20 despite the council being expected to vote on a renewal draft prior to expiration. The mission's lapse would eliminate UN political coordination capacity exactly seven days before the February 7 CPT mandate expires, removing the institutional mechanism that was referenced in the OAS November 5 roadmap's clause calling for international support to ensure institutional continuity and avoid a power vacuum if the transitional council's mandate ends without a successor framework in place.

The timing of BINUH expiration creates a critical coordination gap during the precise period when international actors would need maximum diplomatic infrastructure to facilitate governance transition, broker competing legitimacy claims between the CPT and alternative frameworks such as the 70-party alliance, and coordinate potential crisis response if the February 7 deadline produces institutional vacuum or violent contestation. The Security Council is also expected to hold a 90-day briefing on Haiti with Special Representative Carlos Ruiz Massieu, but this briefing would occur after the January 31 expiration unless accelerated, meaning the council may receive situation updates without having operational mission capacity to implement recommendations.

The simultaneous collapse of multiple international coordination mechanisms including BINUH expiration on January 31, TPS termination on February 3, and CARICOM facilitation failure creates what amounts to comprehensive abandonment of international support infrastructure during Haiti's most critical two-week transition period from January 31 through February 7 and

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immediate aftermath. The OAS institutional continuity mechanism explicitly relied on sustained international engagement to prevent power vacuum scenarios, but with BINUH gone, U.S. TPS terminated, CARICOM inactive, and Canada's position unclear, no coordinated international framework exists to operationalize continuity support if Haiti's domestic political actors fail to reach consensus.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

BINUH was established in 2019 following the closure of the larger UN peacekeeping mission MINUJUSTH, with a mandate focused on political good offices, human rights monitoring, and supporting Haitian institutions in strengthening rule of law and governance. The mission has operated through Haiti's presidential assassination in 2021, multiple prime minister transitions, the CPT's formation in 2024, and escalating gang violence, serving as the primary UN mechanism for coordinating international diplomatic responses to Haiti's compounding political and security crises and providing technical support for electoral preparations and constitutional reform discussions.

TALKING POINTS

BINUH mandate expires January 31, exactly seven days before CPT mandate expires on February 7.

No Security Council renewal resolution announced as of despite expected vote prior to expiration. Mission lapse eliminates UN coordination capacity during critical two-week transition period. OAS November roadmap's institutional continuity clause relied on sustained international engagement now collapsing.

Security Council 90-day briefing expected but may occur after mission already expired. Simultaneous collapse of BINUH, TPS, and CARICOM facilitation creates international coordination vacuum.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

UN Security Council should accelerate emergency session to either extend BINUH through March or establish rapid-deployment political mission for February transition.

International partners should establish alternative coordination mechanism among major stakeholders if BINUH renewal fails before January 31.

OAS should clarify how institutional continuity support operates without BINUH capacity to coordinate international diplomatic efforts.

Humanitarian organizations should prepare for reduced UN presence during February crisis period if mission lapses.

Regional bodies should assess whether CARICOM or Organization of American States can

substitute for BINUH coordination role during transition.



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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor whether CPT announces governance frameworks on or January 21-22, representing final realistic opportunity for frameworks allowing minimum 16 to 17 days implementation before February 7, or whether dialogue failure continues past this window assuring insufficient timeline for orderly transition and triggering either unilateral CPT actions or opposition mobilization. Watch for federal courts to issue emergency rulings on TPS termination given 14-day countdown and extreme time pressure to prevent irreversible deportations beginning February 3. Track whether gangs escalate from 's tactical attack on AP videographer to broader pattern of violence against security forces or media, signaling strategic pause is ending rather than isolated defensive response.

THIS WEEK

Assess whether UN Security Council convenes emergency session to renew BINUH before January 31 expiration or allows mission to lapse seven days before CPT deadline, eliminating international coordination capacity. Monitor whether 70-party alliance that formed January 14 demanding CPT departure begins public mobilization or protest actions in response to dialogue producing no concrete outcomes after two days of meetings. Watch for additional PNH operations against gang strongholds following -Barbecue offensive to determine if government maintains operational tempo or returns to sporadic engagement pattern.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Track whether Haiti enters February 1-7 period with announced governance frameworks allowing coordinated transition, unilateral CPT extension triggering opposition resistance, or institutional vacuum with competing authority claims from CPT versus alternative bodies. Monitor interaction between February 3 TPS expiration and February 7 CPT expiration to assess whether deportations of 350,000 Haitians occur during governance chaos, creating humanitarian catastrophe as diaspora returns to country with no functioning government. Assess whether

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gangs resume strategic offensive operations in late January to pressure amnesty inclusion in transition negotiations, or maintain partial pause through February 7 awaiting post-deadline governance clarity before deciding mobilization strategy.

PRIMARY SOURCES

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