



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 19, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

marks the first business day after the critical weekend passed without CARICOM emergency summit, with the CPT continuing national political dialogue meeting COPPOS, KOREPAD, Montana Accord, and December 21 representatives. With exactly nineteen days until February 7, -represents the absolute final window for consensus allowing eighteen to seventeen days for implementation. The forty-three day gang attack pause continues as armed groups await dialogue outcomes before deciding whether to resume violence late January. UN BINUH mandate expires January 31, twelve days away and seven days before CPT expiration, creating dual institutional vacuum risk. Haiti enters final nineteen days with international coordination collapsed and -representing last opportunity for Haitian-led coordinated transition before operational constraints make proper implementation impossible.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CPT launches national political dialogue with major civil society and political coalitions representing final coordination window before February 7 deadline.

Gang violence pause reaches forty-three consecutive days with no attacks despite PNH operations, suggesting strategic discipline awaiting political outcomes.

UN BINUH mandate expires January 31 without renewal announcement, seven days before CPT mandate ends February 7.

CARICOM emergency summit did not materialize over weekend despite previous warnings that time is running out for Haiti transition consensus.

Montana Accord, COPPOS, and December 21 representatives meeting CPT to discuss post-February 7 governance frameworks with nineteen days remaining.

DEVELOPMENT 1: CPT National Political Dialogue Enters Final Coordination Window

The Transitional Presidential Council launched its national political dialogue January 18 and continues January 19 with meetings scheduled for four critical groups representing the absolute final window for consensus before operational impossibility. sessions include COPPOS-Haiti et Allies, KOREPAD, Montana Accord representatives, and December 21 Accord representatives. This dialogue occurs on the first business day after the critical weekend of January 18-19 passed without the anticipated CARICOM emergency summit, confirming that international facilitation has collapsed and leaving Haitian actors to negotiate their own post-February 7 governance framework with exactly nineteen days remaining before the CPT mandate expiration.

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The operational timeline reality creates severe constraints because with nineteen days until February 7, -represents the absolute final window for consensus building. If consensus is reached eighteen days remain for implementation which requires decree drafting three to five days, stakeholder consultations five to seven days, CPT approval two to three days, Le Moniteur publication one to two days, and public rollout three to five days for a total requirement of fourteen to twenty-two days. If consensus is reached seventeen days remain which represents the operationally minimum viable timeframe with high failure risk. If consensus is reached or later, only fourteen to sixteen days remain which is operationally insufficient for proper governance transition.

The groups participating present fundamentally irreconcilable proposals that complicate rapid consensus. COPPOS-Haiti presented its October 14 proposal calling for reduced CPT size, suppression of the Prime Minister position during transition, creation of a Vice-President position, and elections in November 2026 representing a nine-month extension. Montana Accord presented its December 21 proposal calling for collective resignation of CPT and Prime Minister and creation of a Conference of Stakeholders to supervise designation of transition authorities. The Civil Society Initiative presented its January 6 proposal calling for a seventeen-member deliberative assembly with an interim president drawn from civil society or high-ranking state institutions. These three major proposals converge on the principle that CPT must change but diverge fundamentally on executive structure, timeline, and leadership selection mechanisms.

Internal CPT dynamics further complicate the dialogue outcome because according to reporting from Haiti24 on January 19, certain councilors within the CPT are advocating for reduction of the institution while other factions favor mandate extension beyond February 7. This internal deadlock means that even if civil society groups unify around a single proposal the CPT itself may not approve it. With nineteen days remaining, CPT internal disagreement between extension factions, reduction factions, and departure factions creates conditions where -consensus is operationally unlikely. Any delays beyond evening create conditions for either institutional vacuum on February 7 with no agreed successor and competing legitimacy claims, rushed procedurally flawed transition with legal challenges and lack of stakeholder buy-in, or unilateral CPT extension triggering opposition mobilization from groups like MORN which declared CPT expired on December 28.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

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The CPT was established April 3 2024 through an agreement between political parties and civil society organizations to govern Haiti during the transition period leading to elections. The original transition timeline called for presidential elections and transfer of power by February 7 2026, the constitutional date marking the end of the previous presidential term. The CPT replaced the unelected government of Prime Minister Ariel Henry who resigned under international pressure in March 2024 following gang attacks that destabilized Port-au-Prince.

TALKING POINTS

January 19 represents first business day after critical weekend passed without CARICOM emergency summit confirming international facilitation has collapsed.

CPT dialogue with COPPOS, KOREPAD, Montana, and December 21 representatives represents absolute final window for consensus allowing eighteen to seventeen days implementation timeline.

Three major civil society proposals converge on CPT must change but diverge fundamentally on executive structure, timeline, and leadership selection mechanisms.

Internal CPT deadlock between extension factions, reduction factions, and departure factions means even civil society consensus may not secure CPT approval.

If no consensus by January 22, Haiti enters final sixteen days with unilateral CPT actions or institutional vacuum assured.

Minimum viable implementation timeline requires fourteen to twenty-two days for decree drafting, stakeholder consultations, CPT approval, publication, and public rollout.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: Prepare contingency frameworks for February 7 institutional vacuum scenario given -consensus operationally unlikely due to irreconcilable proposals and CPT internal deadlock.

Private Sector: Accelerate business continuity planning for February 7-14 period assuming governance uncertainty and potential competing legitimacy claims from multiple factions.

Political Actors: Prioritize rapid consensus on minimal viable framework by January 20 evening recognizing seventeen days represents absolute minimum for implementation without procedural failures.

Diaspora: Monitor -dialogue outcomes closely as failure to achieve consensus creates conditions for either unilateral CPT extension or institutional vacuum triggering domestic mobilization.

Civil Society: Coordinate unified proposal submission by morning to maximize eighteen-day implementation window and prevent delays that create operationally insufficient fourteen to sixteen day periods.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: Gang Strategic Pause Reaches Forty-Three Days Entering Assessment Phase

The forty-three day gang attack pause continuing from December 21 through January 19 demonstrates that armed groups are extending strategic discipline specifically to assess through dialogue outcomes before making their late January decision whether to resume violence or extend the pause through February 7. The pause's continuation despite January 14 drone strikes destroying three houses belonging to Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier at Delmas 6, thirteen days of continuous PNH operations in downtown Port-au-Prince Bel Air Delmas and La Saline from January 6 through 19, and January 18 downtown cleaning operations removing barricades and clearing Grand Rue demonstrates that gangs possess sufficient territorial control and operational discipline to maintain extended restraint while monitoring political developments.

Human rights defender Pierre Esperance issued a January 18 critique highlighting the contradiction between security narrative and ground reality by questioning whether security restoration is credible when the most feared gang leaders including Barbecue, Izo 5 Segond, Vitelhomme Innocent, and Lanmo San Jou remain at large and continue to exercise verified territorial control over approximately eighty to ninety percent of Port-au-Prince. Despite official PNH spokesman claims of conducting a dynamic of restoring public order with secured patrols in areas not accessible for years, the fact that Barbecue continues to surface publicly speaking openly on behalf of Viv Ansanm and challenging state authority raises fundamental doubts about whether police can translate tactical advances into lasting territorial control.

With nineteen days until February 7 and the CPT dialogue occurring gangs face a five-day assessment window from through January 20-24 to decide their strategy. Scenario A involves resuming violence January 20-25 if -dialogue produces no consensus or announcements exclude amnesty provisions, allowing gangs to pressure transition negotiations by demonstrating government cannot secure capital without gang cooperation and establishing leverage for post-February 7 discussions. Resuming violence late January provides ten to fourteen days of pressure before February 7, sufficient to disrupt remaining humanitarian

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operations, close additional infrastructure, generate new displacement waves beyond the current 1.4 million internally displaced persons, and force government to negotiate or face transition in chaos.

Scenario B involves extending the pause through February 7 if -dialogue signals openness to negotiations even without explicit amnesty. This strategy positions gangs as responsible actors demonstrating capacity to provide security through violence suspension, allows them to claim stake in governance transition by facilitating smooth February 7 passage without disruption, and enables negotiation with whoever assumes power post-February 7 from position of strength having provided security during critical transition period. The forty-three day pause continuing through suggests gangs are waiting specifically for -to assess whether dialogue produces consensus including amnesty or negotiation provisions, whether CPT announces extension signaling government weakness exploitable through violence resumption, and whether international actors intervene creating negotiation opportunities.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The December 21 2024 start of the gang attack pause followed months of intense violence throughout 2024 during which armed groups expanded territorial control to approximately eighty to ninety percent of Port-au-Prince and carried out major attacks including the March 2024 coordinated assaults that forced Prime Minister Ariel Henry's resignation. Previous gang pauses have typically lasted days to weeks, making the current forty-three day pause unprecedented in duration and suggesting strategic calculation rather than operational weakness or security force pressure.

TALKING POINTS

Forty-three consecutive days without major gang-initiated violence represents longest sustained pause on record despite PNH operations and drone strikes.

Gangs control approximately eighty to ninety percent of Port-au-Prince with major leaders including Barbecue remaining at large despite January 14 targeted strikes.

through January 20-24 represents critical five-day assessment window for gang strategic decision on violence resumption or pause extension.

If -dialogue produces no consensus or excludes amnesty, expect violence resumption January 20-25 providing ten to fourteen days pressure before February 7.

If dialogue signals negotiation openness, gangs may extend pause through February 7 as show of good faith for post-deadline role discussions.

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Human rights defender critique highlights contradiction between government claims of restoring public order and reality that feared gang leaders remain operationally active.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: Prepare rapid humanitarian response capacity for potential violence resumption late January if -dialogue fails to produce consensus frameworks.

Private Sector: Implement enhanced security protocols for January 20-25 period assuming possible gang violence resumption if political dialogue excludes armed group interests.

Political Actors: Consider whether governance frameworks should include mechanisms for armed group demobilization discussions to extend forty-three day pause through February 7 transition.

Diaspora: Monitor gang leader public statements during January 20-24 assessment period for signals of violence resumption intentions or negotiation openness.

Humanitarian Organizations: Position emergency supplies and evacuation capacity for potential displacement surge if gangs resume attacks late January exploiting political transition chaos.



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DEVELOPMENT 3: Dual Institutional Vacuum Risk As BINUH Expires Before CPT Mandate

The UN BINUH mandate expires January 31 2026, twelve days away and seven days before the February 7 CPT mandate expiration, creating a critical coordination gap where Haiti faces two institutional vacuums simultaneously with the UN political mission withdrawal and the CPT mandate ending. As of January 19, no UN Security Council resolution renewing BINUH has been announced despite expectations that the Council would vote on renewal before the January 31 expiration. The absence of renewal announcement with twelve days remaining creates fundamental uncertainty about whether the international community will maintain coordinated presence for the February 7 transition or withdraw from political mediation role leaving Haiti to manage the deadline unilaterally.

BINUH was established in 2019 as the UN political mission for Haiti with previous renewals occurring on twelve-month cycles from 2019 through 2025. The July 14 2025 renewal extended

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BINUH to January 31 2026 for only six and one half months, the shortest renewal period, with official rationale citing uncertainty surrounding the future of UN response in Haiti and perception that BINUH is increasingly undersized to meet the emergency. BINUH's mandate functions include good offices advisory and political awareness, supporting Haitian authorities in governance political dialogue security justice and human rights promotion, and coordinating with OAS CARICOM and bilateral donors on integrated international response.

The critical timeline creates severe coordination challenges because January 19 marks twelve days until BINUH expiration and nineteen days until CPT expiration. If BINUH expires January 31 without renewal, Haiti operates February 1 through 6 for six days without UN political mission before CPT mandate ends February 7. This dual vacuum scenario eliminates the UN coordination mechanism required to activate the OAS Roadmap Version 3 institutional continuity clause from November 5 2025 stating that if the Presidential Transitional Council were to expire without legitimate successor, the OAS CARICOM and UN would work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum. Without BINUH presence February 1-7, the UN lacks institutional mechanism in Haiti to coordinate with OAS and CARICOM on emergency governance frameworks.

The absence of BINUH renewal announcement as of January 19 suggests three possible interpretations. Interpretation A involves last-minute renewal where UN Security Council is waiting for January 20-24 outcomes from CPT dialogue and potential governance frameworks before deciding BINUH renewal terms, potentially extending twelve months if consensus emerges or three to six months if deadlock persists. Interpretation B involves February 1-7 emergency session where UN Security Council schedules emergency meeting to simultaneously address BINUH renewal and February 7 CPT expiration creating coordinated international response. Interpretation C involves withdrawal strategy where UN Security Council allows BINUH to expire January 31 as planned withdrawal signaling shift from political mission to security mission through GSF plus humanitarian response through OCHA without political mediation role, confirming international community no longer attempting to broker Haiti political transitions.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

BINUH replaced the earlier UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti including MINUSTAH which operated 2004-2017 and MINUJUSTH which operated 2017-2019. The transition from peacekeeping to political mission reflected international community assessment that Haiti required diplomatic engagement and institutional support rather than military stabilization. The

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January 31 2026 mandate expiration coincides with broader international debate about effectiveness of UN political missions in complex crises and whether alternative mechanisms like the GSF can provide more targeted security support.

TALKING POINTS

UN BINUH mandate expires January 31, twelve days away and seven days before February 7 CPT mandate expiration creating dual institutional vacuum risk.

No UN Security Council renewal announced as of January 19 despite expectations of vote before January 31 expiration date.

If BINUH expires without renewal, Haiti operates February 1-6 without UN political mission before CPT mandate ends eliminating coordination mechanism.

July 2025 BINUH renewal for only six months reflected uncertainty about UN role and perception that mission undersized for Haiti emergency scale.

OAS institutional continuity clause requires UN coordination with OAS and CARICOM but BINUH expiration eliminates UN presence for February 1-7 period.

Three interpretations possible: last-minute renewal awaiting dialogue outcomes, emergency session February 1-7, or planned withdrawal from political mediation.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International Community: Clarify BINUH renewal status by January 25 latest to avoid coordination vacuum during final week before February 7 CPT expiration.

Private Sector: Prepare for scenario where both UN political mission and CPT mandate expire creating February 1-7 period without clear international or domestic governance frameworks.

Political Actors: Coordinate directly with OAS and CARICOM on contingency mechanisms for February 1-7 period assuming BINUH expiration eliminates UN coordination presence.

Diaspora: Monitor UN Security Council deliberations during January 20-31 for signals of international community commitment level to Haiti transition support.

Humanitarian Organizations: Establish direct coordination channels with OAS CARICOM and bilateral donors independent of BINUH assuming political mission may not be present February 1-7.



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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Will CPT dialogue with COPPOS, KOREPAD, Montana Accord, and December 21 representatives on January 19 and January 20 produce consensus on post-February 7 governance framework by evening, allowing seventeen days for implementation representing operationally minimum viable timeline, or will pass without consensus confirming Haiti enters final seventeen days with no coordinated plan. Monitor for official CPT announcements evening or morning either declaring consensus framework with implementation timeline or acknowledging continued dialogue without agreement. Consensus by evening enables marginally adequate implementation, while or later consensus creates operationally insufficient fourteen to sixteen day periods assuring institutional vacuum or rushed procedurally flawed transition.

THIS WEEK

Will gangs resume Port-au-Prince violence during late January period from January 22 through January 26 to exploit political chaos and pressure amnesty negotiations, or will they extend the forty-three day pause through month end awaiting post-February 7 vacuum for negotiation leverage. Monitor downtown Port-au-Prince, Bel Air, Delmas, La Saline, and Cite Soleil for signs of gang mobilization including barricade reconstruction, armed group movements, or attacks on humanitarian corridors. Violence resumption late January provides ten to fourteen days of pressure before February 7 sufficient to disrupt transition, while pause extension through January 31 suggests gangs waiting for February 1-7 coordination vacuum to negotiate from strength position.

STRATEGIC HORIZON



Will UN Security Council announce BINUH renewal before January 31 expiration maintaining international coordination presence for February 7 transition, or will mandate expire creating seven-day gap from February 1-6 when Haiti operates without UN political mission before CPT mandate ends. Monitor Security Council calendar for scheduled votes on Haiti during January 20-31 period and statements from permanent members on BINUH future. Standard twelve-month renewal signals unexpected confidence in Haiti stability prospects, short three to six month renewal indicates continued uncertainty about UN role, and expiration without renewal confirms international withdrawal from political mediation leaving Haiti to manage February 7 unilaterally with OAS institutional continuity clause lacking UN coordination mechanism.

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