



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 17, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

January 17 2026 marks exactly 21 days until the February 7 Constitutional Presidential Council mandate expiration, crossing a critical three-week threshold that shifts public perception from approaching deadline to imminent countdown while compressing operational implementation windows to 18 days maximum if frameworks are announced . The CARICOM critical decision window closed without emergency summit announcements, and passed through mid-afternoon with zero developments reported, suggesting facilitation has either moved to behind-the-scenes negotiations for -announcements or collapsed entirely. The 41-day gang attack pause continues as gangs await -framework announcements before deciding whether to resume violence in late January or extend strategic discipline through February 7, with becoming the decisive inflection point for all actors.



### QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Exactly 21 days remain until February 7 CPT mandate expiration as of January 17 2026.  
CARICOM critical window closed without frameworks; silent through 3:11 PM EST.  
Gang attack pause reaches 41 consecutive days with zero major incidents in Port-au-Prince.  
January 20 represents absolute final deadline for governance framework announcements allowing 18-day implementation.  
-24-hour period determines whether coordinated transition occurs or institutional vacuum emerges February 7.

### DEVELOPMENT 1: The Three-Week Threshold: Psychological and Operational Tipping Point Reached

January 17 2026 marks exactly 21 days or three weeks until the February 7 Constitutional Presidential Council mandate expiration, representing both a psychological threshold where public and media perception shifts from approaching deadline to imminent final countdown and an operational threshold where governance transitions requiring minimum 14 to 22 days according to previous implementation analysis leave minimal margin for error or delay. The three-week countdown creates cascading pressure across multiple domains: Haitian media outlets including Le Nouvelliste, Haiti Libre, and Radio Metropole begin prominent daily countdown displays while international wire services Reuters, AP, and AFP increase Haiti coverage frequency; public anxiety escalates as institutional uncertainty prevents economic planning beyond three weeks while 350,000 diaspora Haitians facing February 3 TPS termination face remittance disruption considerations; opposition groups including MORN which declared the CPT mandate expired December 28, Montana Accord signatories, and civil society coalitions gain a clear three-week

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mobilization timeline with Week 1 for organizing protests and campaigns, Week 2 for escalating with sit-ins and demonstrations, and Week 3 compressed between February 3 TPS expiration and February 7 CPT expiration.

The three-week threshold creates decision-forcing pressure on international actors who must reconcile competing positions immediately or accept fragmented responses to February 7. CARICOM must convene an emergency Heads of Government summit this weekend January 18 to 19 or accept that February 7 will occur without coordinated regional framework, while the OAS must activate its institutional continuity clause from the November 5 Roadmap within days or become irrelevant to the transition. The United Nations BINUH mission faces particularly acute pressure as its mandate expires January 31, exactly 14 days from and seven days before the CPT expiration, requiring urgent coordination with whatever governance structure emerges post-February 7 to avoid a gap in international presence. The United States and Canada must reconcile their December split between Rubio's January 1 suggestion that elections should wait and Giroux's December 16 insistence that elections must proceed according to calendar immediately or accept that North American policy toward Haiti remains incoherent through the transition.

With 21 days remaining until February 7, January 20 becomes the absolute final deadline for framework announcements that allow even marginally adequate implementation timelines of 18 days. Any framework announced after creates 14 to 17 day windows that previous AYITI INTEL analysis has identified as operationally insufficient for proper decree drafting, multi-stakeholder consultations, CPT approval processes, Le Moniteur official publication, and coordinated public rollout required for legitimate governance transitions. The mathematical compression means that January 21 or later announcements create implementation periods shorter than the minimum viable threshold, effectively guaranteeing either rushed processes that lack stakeholder buy-in or February 7 arrival with incomplete transitions that create competing governance claims.

The three-week threshold transforms the weekend of January 18 to 19 from merely important to absolutely decisive. If no frameworks emerge by morning, Haiti enters its final three weeks with no agreed governance plan, no coordinated international position, civil society unable to unify despite convergence points identified in previous briefs, and the CPT unable to reach internal consensus between the extension faction and the departure faction. This scenario creates conditions for institutional vacuum on February 7 with multiple actors potentially claiming legitimacy including a CPT extension without constitutional basis, civil society alternative governance structures, or opportunistic political actors exploiting the chaos.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's 1987 Constitution explicitly limits transitional governance mandates to prevent indefinite

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provisional rule, a safeguard created in response to the Duvalier dictatorship's abuse of emergency powers that lasted 29 years. The Constitutional Presidential Council established April 2024 represents Haiti's fourth transitional governance mechanism since President Jovenel Moise's July 2021 assassination, with each previous transition failing to restore elected government and instead extending provisional rule through renewed crises.

### TALKING POINTS

January 17 marks exactly three weeks or 21 days until Constitutional Presidential Council mandate expires February 7 2026.

Three-week threshold creates psychological shift to imminent deadline triggering daily media countdown coverage and escalating public anxiety across Haiti and diaspora communities.

January 20 represents absolute final deadline for governance framework announcements allowing 18-day implementation windows before February 7.

Any framework announced after creates 14 to 17 day periods identified as operationally insufficient for legitimate decree drafting, consultations, approvals, and rollout.

Weekend of January 18 to 19 is final opportunity for coordinated international and domestic frameworks before compressed timelines guarantee rushed or incomplete transitions.

Failure to announce frameworks by creates conditions for institutional vacuum February 7 with competing governance claims and potential violence.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM Eminent Persons Group should convene emergency virtual coordination evening or morning to assess whether emergency Heads of Government summit is viable for announcement.

CPT internal negotiations should accelerate to reach consensus on extension versus departure framework by evening to allow public announcement with international coordination.

United States and Canada should conduct urgent bilateral consultations this weekend to reconcile December policy split before and present unified North American position.

Civil society coalitions including RANFOR, Civil Society Initiative, and ANR should attempt weekend unification discussions to present single framework rather than competing proposals.

International financial institutions and humanitarian organizations should finalize February 7 contingency plans this weekend for scenarios including governance vacuum, competing claims, or violence resumption.

Haitian private sector associations should issue public statement morning calling for immediate framework announcements and warning of economic consequences from continued uncertainty.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

DEVELOPMENT 2: The Silent Weekend: CARICOM Emergency Summit Window Closing

The absence of any announcements through 3:11 PM EST on January 17 combined with the closure of CARICOM's critical decision window spanning January 13 to 17 without framework releases suggests that the weekend emergency summit option identified in previous AYITI INTEL briefings as the decisive inflection point is not materializing according to the anticipated timeline. The silent creates three plausible interpretations: CARICOM may announce an emergency Heads of Government summit on January 18 for immediate convening evening or January 20 utilizing the final 24 hours of the critical weekend for rapid coordination among member states, the silence may indicate intensive behind-the-scenes negotiations occurring among CPT internal factions attempting to reach consensus, CARICOM Eminent Persons Group mediating between the extension and departure positions, and civil society groups attempting weekend unification before announcements, or the silent weekend confirms that CARICOM facilitation has collapsed with Haitian actors remaining deadlocked and international actors paralyzed by the unresolved United States-Canada split leaving February 7 to occur without coordinated governance frameworks.

The CARICOM critical window was explicitly identified in previous intelligence reporting as January 13 to 17 representing the final five-day period when coordinated regional facilitation could produce frameworks allowing sufficient implementation time before February 7. That window closed January 16 without announcements of emergency summits, framework selections from the three major civil society proposals, or CPT coordination mechanisms, shifting the decisive period to the weekend of January 18 to 19. If CARICOM had maintained its December facilitation momentum following the Eminent Persons Group interventions that produced temporary CPT stabilization after the November internal crisis, the expectation was that would produce at minimum an announcement of weekend summit scheduling even if final frameworks required additional days. The silence followed by continuation through mid-afternoon suggests either delayed decision-making or abandoned facilitation efforts.

Behind-the-scenes negotiations remain plausible given the January 9 Miami Herald reporting that revealed internal CPT divisions with President Edgard Leblanc Saint-Cyr isolated on extension questions while other members favor frameworks allowing departure. CARICOM mediation between these factions could be occurring through private channels with Eminent Persons Group members conducting shuttle diplomacy among the nine CPT members including the seven voting members and two observers to broker compromise positions that allow announcements. Civil society coordination among RANFOR's January 11 proposal, the Civil Society Initiative's January 6 framework, and the ANR's November 6 roadmap could similarly be progressing through weekend discussions given the convergence points identified in previous analysis including

shared emphasis on electoral preparation and governance transition mechanisms.

However, the alternative interpretation that CARICOM facilitation has collapsed cannot be dismissed given the pattern of international coordination failures throughout Haiti's transition since April 2024. The December United States-Canada split remains unresolved with no public indications of bilateral consultations occurring this weekend to reconcile positions, while the OAS November 5 Roadmap's institutional continuity clause has not been activated despite the approaching deadlines. BINUH's January 31 mandate expiration in exactly 14 days occurs with no visible coordination on post-February 7 arrangements, suggesting international actors are paralyzed rather than negotiating. If facilitation has collapsed, will pass without framework announcements leaving Haiti to enter the final three weeks with status quo persistence and mounting risks of unilateral CPT extension attempts triggering opposition mobilization.



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CARICOM's facilitation role in Haiti dates to the April 2024 Transitional Presidential Council formation when the regional body brokered agreements among competing political factions to establish nine-member governance structure. Previous CARICOM interventions in Haiti's political crises including the 2004 transition following President Jean-Bertrand Aristide's departure established patterns of regional mediation that broke down when domestic actors refused compromise, suggesting current silence may indicate similar deadlock rather than productive negotiations.

## TALKING POINTS

CARICOM critical decision window of January 13 to 17 closed without emergency summit announcements or governance framework releases.

January 17 passed through mid-afternoon with zero developments reported continuing the pattern of silence from international and domestic actors.

Three interpretations remain plausible: emergency summit announcement for convening, behind-the-scenes negotiations for frameworks, or facilitation collapse.

Behind-the-scenes negotiations scenario requires CPT internal consensus, CARICOM mediation between factions, and civil society unification discussions producing announcements.

Facilitation collapse scenario is supported by unresolved United States-Canada split, OAS inaction on institutional continuity clause, and BINUH coordination gaps with January 31 expiration.

evening through morning represents critical 24-hour period determining whether Haiti transitions via coordination, unilateral actions, or status quo vacuum.

## RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM Chair should issue public statement clarifying regional body's position on February 7 frameworks to end speculation about facilitation status and summit viability.

CPT should convene emergency plenary session to vote on extension versus departure question and announce decision with or without international coordination.

United Nations BINUH leadership should coordinate urgent consultations with CARICOM, OAS, United States, and Canada this weekend to align international positions before .

Haitian civil society coalitions should issue joint public statement evening outlining unified position on governance frameworks to pressure CPT and international actors.

International media covering Haiti should prepare coverage scenarios for coordinated frameworks, unilateral CPT extension, or continued silence to inform global stakeholders.

Opposition groups including MORN and Montana Accord should finalize mobilization plans this weekend for launch if no frameworks announced creating peaceful pressure mechanisms.



## CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 3: The 41-Day Gang Pause: Strategic Patience Approaching Deadline

The 41-day gang attack pause spanning December 21 2025 through January 17 2026 continues through the first day of the critical weekend with zero major gang-initiated violence incidents reported in Port-au-Prince, demonstrating that gangs are extending their strategic discipline through the weekend to assess whether CARICOM emergency summit announcements or CPT and civil society framework releases materialize before making their late January decision on whether to resume violence or continue restraint through February 7. The pause's continuation through represents the longest sustained period without gang-initiated attacks in Port-au-Prince since comprehensive monitoring began, maintained despite the January 14 government drone strikes on hideouts associated with gang leader Jimmy Cherizier known as Barbecue and the January 15 IOM report documenting 5,800 newly displaced residents in the capital suggesting gangs are conducting intelligence gathering on the same weekend developments monitored by all other actors rather than retaliating against provocations.

Gang strategic patience has demonstrable limits based on the approaching three-week countdown to February 7 which creates pressure for gangs to make positioning decisions in late January between January 20 and 25. If gangs decide to resume Port-au-Prince violence in late

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January, this timing allows them to pressure governance negotiations for 10 to 14 days before February 7 while the constitutional deadline creates maximum leverage for amnesty discussions as political actors scramble to stabilize security conditions before the transition. If gangs extend the pause through February 7, they forfeit immediate leverage during the transition window but position themselves for post-February 7 negotiations with whoever governs whether that is a CPT extension, civil society alternative structure, or opportunistic political actors, gambling that the new government will be more amenable to amnesty provisions than the current Council. If gangs wait until post-February 7 to escalate violence between February 8 and 15, they risk missing the transition window when amnesty negotiations are most viable as new governance structures may consolidate power and international attention may shift away from Haiti.

The 41-day pause demonstrates that gangs have consolidated sufficient territorial control estimated at 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince according to the January 4 MOPAL assessment to maintain extended operational restraint without losing ground to rival groups or government forces. This territorial consolidation means gangs can afford strategic patience through the weekend and into late January without immediate threats to their positions, but the three-week countdown creates a deadline for strategic patience because prolonged restraint beyond February 7 could signal weakness to rival factions or create openings for government offensives. The pause also suggests gangs are sophisticated enough to recognize that violence resumption during the final three weeks before February 7 could be counterproductive if it hardens government and international positions against amnesty while violence in the post-February 7 chaos could position gangs as stability brokers if new governance structures prove weak.

Gangs are likely conducting assessments of evening through morning announcements to determine their late January strategy based on whether amnesty provisions appear in governance frameworks. If civil society proposals selected by CARICOM or announced by CPT include security sector reform language that could provide pathways to amnesty, gangs may interpret this as sufficient good faith to extend the pause through February 7 as a demonstration of restraint that strengthens future negotiations. If frameworks maintain the government's consistent no negotiations doctrine with gangs receiving no signals of potential amnesty considerations, violence resumption in late January becomes more likely as gangs calculate that pressure is necessary to force recognition. If no frameworks are announced by and silence continues through the final three weeks, gangs face strategic uncertainty about whether to escalate immediately or wait until post-February 7 when governance structures and negotiating partners become clear.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous gang operational pauses in Haiti have typically lasted 7 to 14 days maximum before violence resumed, making the current 41-day pause unprecedented in duration and suggesting fundamentally different strategic calculations by gang coalitions. The December 2024 violence

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pause coincided with international pressure for CPT departure and civil society mobilization, indicating gangs time operational decisions to maximize leverage during political inflection points rather than pursuing continuous violence strategies that could unite opposition against them.

### TALKING POINTS

Gang attack pause reaches 41 consecutive days from December 21 through January 17 marking longest sustained period without major Port-au-Prince violence on record.

Pause continues despite January 14 government drone strikes and January 15 IOM displacement reports suggesting gangs prioritize strategic positioning over tactical retaliation.

Late January period between January 20 and 25 represents critical decision window for gangs on whether to resume violence, extend pause, or wait until post-February 7.

Violence resumption in late January allows 10 to 14 days of pressure before February 7 when leverage is maximum for amnesty negotiations as political actors scramble.

Pause extension through February 7 forfeits immediate leverage but positions gangs for post-transition negotiations with new governance structures that may be weaker.

-announcements on governance frameworks and amnesty provisions will inform gang strategic decisions for late January operational choices.

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Government security forces should avoid additional provocative operations against gang positions this weekend to maintain intelligence gathering value of the pause through frameworks.

Civil society proposals being finalized this weekend should explicitly address security sector reform pathways that could provide future amnesty considerations without immediate commitments.

CARICOM mediation efforts should incorporate security stabilization mechanisms into any governance frameworks announced to incentivize gang restraint continuation.

International humanitarian organizations should preposition supplies and evacuation protocols for late January through early February assuming potential violence resumption if no frameworks emerge.

Haitian National Police should conduct urgent force posture assessments this weekend to prepare for potential gang offensives in late January if strategic patience ends.

Intelligence monitoring should intensify on gang communications and movements during -period when framework announcements may trigger operational decision shifts.



### CONFIDENCE



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

#### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

##### NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

January 18 determination of whether CARICOM announces emergency Heads of Government summit for convening or whether the critical weekend passes without international coordination confirming facilitation collapse. CPT internal negotiations reaching consensus on extension versus departure framework by evening to allow public announcement with or without international support. Civil society coalitions finalizing weekend unification discussions to present single governance proposal morning rather than competing frameworks that enable continued deadlock. Gang operational assessments of -framework announcements informing late January strategic decisions on violence resumption versus pause extension.

##### THIS WEEK

January 20 as absolute final deadline for governance framework announcements allowing 18-day implementation windows before February 7 with any delays creating operationally insufficient 14 to 17 day periods. Late January period between January 20 and 25 as gang decision window on whether to resume Port-au-Prince violence to pressure negotiations or extend 41-day pause through February 7 as show of good faith. BINUH mandate expiration approaching January 31 requiring urgent coordination on post-February 7 international presence arrangements with only 14 days remaining.

##### STRATEGIC HORIZON

February 3 TPS termination affecting 350,000 Haitians creating compressed crisis period with diaspora remittance disruptions four days before CPT expiration. February 7 Constitutional Presidential Council mandate expiration in exactly 21 days representing inflection point for governance vacuum, competing legitimacy claims, or coordinated transition depending on frameworks announced. Post-February 7 period between February 8 and 15 as potential window for gang violence resumption if strategic patience extends through transition or opportunistic political actors exploiting chaos to claim governance authority.

##### PRIMARY SOURCES

4. Agence France-Presse monitoring January 17 2026 confirming CARICOM critical window closure without frameworks.

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5. IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix report January 15 2026 documenting 5,800 newly displaced in Port-au-Prince capital.
8. CARICOM Eminent Persons Group December 2024 interventions stabilizing CPT after November internal crisis.
11. OAS Haiti Roadmap November 5 2025 including institutional continuity clause for governance transitions.
3. Reuters wire service monitoring Haiti coverage January 17 2026 confirming no international developments or diplomatic announcements.
7. Miami Herald reporting January 9 2026 on CPT internal divisions between Saint-Cyr and majority on extension question.
2. Le Nouvelliste monitoring January 17 2026 confirming absence of governance framework releases or CPT communications.
1. Haiti Libre comprehensive news monitoring January 17 2026 through 3:11 PM EST confirming zero new developments reported.
6. MOPAL gang territorial control assessment January 4 2026 estimating 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince under gang control.
9. United States Secretary of State Rubio statement January 1 2026 suggesting elections should wait for stability.
10. Canada Foreign Affairs Minister Giroux statement December 16 2025 insisting elections must proceed according to calendar.