



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 16, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

marks the final day of CARICOM's critical decision window with zero framework announcements from the Transitional Presidential Council, civil society organizations, or international actors through 5:34 PM EST. The 39-day gang attack pause continues despite January 14 drone strikes on gang leader hideouts, demonstrating unprecedented strategic discipline as gangs prioritize February 7 amnesty negotiations over immediate retaliation. With 22 days until the February 7 2026 constitutional deadline and the critical window closed without action, the weekend becomes the decisive inflection point where CARICOM must choose between convening an emergency summit, withdrawing facilitation, or accepting compressed 14-18 day implementation timelines with heightened operational risk.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CARICOM's January 13-17 critical decision window closes with no governance framework announcements.

39-day gang attack pause continues despite January 14 drone strikes on gang leader Cherizier's hideouts.

Weekend represents last opportunity for CARICOM emergency Heads of Government summit before final three weeks.

Any framework announced January 20 or later faces compressed 18-day or shorter implementation timeline.

22 days remain until February 7 2026 Transitional Presidential Council mandate expiration.

DEVELOPMENT 1: The CARICOM Critical Window Closes Without Action

January 16 2026 marks the final day of the CARICOM critical decision window identified in the January 12 Group of Eminent Persons warning about the slowness of actors in finding common ground despite points of convergence in numerous proposals. The absence of any framework announcements through 5:34 PM EST on represents a critical failure of the coordination process and triggers three immediate implications for Haiti's February 7 constitutional deadline.

CARICOM's credibility is now at stake after the January 12 statement expressing deep concern

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implicitly set the January 13-17 window as the last opportunity for Haitian-led consensus before international intervention. The passage of this window without announcements suggests Haitian actors failed to demonstrate the patriotism CARICOM called for, CARICOM facilitation has not produced consensus despite weeks of engagement by the Eminent Persons Group holding talks with council members and political leaders, and international coordination remains paralyzed by the U.S.-Canada split reflected in Secretary Rubio's January 1 comments versus Minister Giroux's December 16 position.

With the critical window closed and 22 days until February 7, CARICOM faces three options over the weekend. Option A involves convening an emergency CARICOM Heads of Government summit to select and endorse one civil society proposal such as the Civil Society Initiative from January 6, RANFOR from January 11, or ANR from November 6, pressure the Transitional Presidential Council to accept the endorsed framework, coordinate international actors including the OAS, UN, U.S., and Canada around a unified position, and set an implementation deadline by announcing the framework January 20 for 18-day implementation. Option B involves issuing a public statement that CARICOM has exhausted facilitation efforts despite providing multiple proposals and technical support, Haitian actors have failed to demonstrate political will to reach consensus, CARICOM withdraws from the mediation role forcing Haiti to navigate February 7 unilaterally, and the international community will respond to whatever framework emerges post-February 7 rather than legitimizing any pre-February 7 arrangement. Option C involves continuing behind-the-scenes facilitation through the weekend without public statements, allowing negotiations to extend into next week but accepting a compressed 14-18 day implementation window with heightened operational risk.



The passage of without announcements means any framework announced January 20 or later faces 20 days or fewer for implementation creating operational challenges including decree drafting requiring 3-5 days, stakeholder consultations requiring 5-7 days, Transitional Presidential Council approval requiring 2-3 days, Le Moniteur publication requiring 1-2 days, and public rollout requiring 3-5 days for a minimum total of 14-22 days. This compressed timeline creates high failure risk from insufficient time for proper consultations, legal reviews, or public communication, and creates a legitimacy deficit as rushed processes undermine public confidence. With 22 days until February 7, the critical window closure without action is a strategic failure that exponentially increases risk of institutional vacuum, competing frameworks, or unilateral Transitional Presidential Council extension on February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CARICOM established its Group of Eminent Persons mediation role in mid-2024 following the collapse of the Montana Accord process and has been facilitating dialogue between the Transitional Presidential Council, civil society organizations, and political actors for over six months. The January 12 2026 statement represented CARICOM's most explicit warning about the urgency of reaching consensus before the February 7 constitutional deadline.

TALKING POINTS

The CARICOM critical decision window identified as January 13-17 has closed without any governance framework announcements from Haitian or international actors.

Three civil society proposals remain uncoordinated including the Civil Society Initiative from January 6, RANFOR from January 11, and ANR from November 6.

Any framework announced January 20 faces a compressed 18-day implementation timeline creating operational risks including insufficient time for decree drafting, stakeholder consultations, legal reviews, and public communication.

The weekend of January 18-19 represents the last opportunity for CARICOM to convene an emergency Heads of Government summit before entering the final three weeks.

CARICOM's credibility depends on decisive action over the weekend after identifying the January 13-17 window as critical for Haitian actors to demonstrate political will.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM should convene an emergency Heads of Government summit over the weekend of January 18-19 to select and endorse one civil society framework and pressure the Transitional Presidential Council to accept it by January 20.

International actors including the U.S., Canada, UN, and OAS should coordinate their positions over the weekend to present a unified framework to the Transitional Presidential Council rather than maintaining the current U.S.-Canada split.

Civil society organizations including RANFOR, the Civil Society Initiative, and ANR should

attempt emergency coordination over the weekend to present a unified proposal by January 20.

The Transitional Presidential Council should announce its departure or extension framework by January 20 to allow 18 days for implementation rather than waiting until the final week of January.

Media outlets should begin daily countdown coverage starting January 20 to increase public pressure on political actors to finalize frameworks.



CONFIDENCE



Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: The 39-Day Gang Pause Continues Despite Provocation

The 39-day gang attack pause spanning December 21 2025 through January 16 2026 continues without interruption despite the January 14 drone strikes that reduced to ashes gang leader Jimmy Cherizier's hideouts in Delmas, Bel-Air, and La Saline. This represents the longest sustained period without major gang-initiated violence in Port-au-Prince on record and demonstrates unprecedented gang strategic discipline that validates the Crisis Group's December 15 assessment that gangs seek amnesty as part of the February 7 transition.

Gangs' failure to retaliate against the January 14 drone strikes targeting their most high-profile leader indicates three critical dynamics. First, gang coalitions including G9, G-Pep, and 400 Mawozo maintain consolidated command structures with centralized discipline preventing rogue factions from retaliating despite the symbolic provocation. Second, gangs view February 7 amnesty negotiations as more valuable than immediate revenge for hideout destruction, demonstrating strategic prioritization of long-term political incorporation over short-term tactical victories. Third, gangs assess PNH operations as symbolic government theater rather than existential threats, as evidenced by continued gang territorial control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince according to the MOPAL January 4 assessment.

The IOM's January 15 report of 5,800 newly displaced persons in Port-au-Prince demonstrates that PNH operations produce civilian displacement even when gangs do not retaliate. Drone strikes in densely populated areas including Delmas, Bel-Air, and La Saline force civilians to flee

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regardless of combat outcomes, meaning the humanitarian crisis compounds despite the 39-day gang attack pause. This pattern suggests PNH operations serve primarily symbolic political functions for the government rather than achieving meaningful territorial control or population protection.

With 22 days until February 7 and the CARICOM critical window closed without framework announcements, gangs face a strategic decision point in late January between January 20-25. Scenario A involves continuing the pause if behind-the-scenes negotiations signal willingness to include amnesty provisions in post-February 7 frameworks, using the pause as a show of good faith for negotiations, a demonstration of governance capacity through violence suspension, and leverage for post-February 7 roles in whatever governance structure emerges. Scenario B involves resuming violence if government maintains Prime Minister Fils-Aime's December 28 no negotiations doctrine and announces Transitional Presidential Council extension without gang engagement, with violence resumption between January 20-25 designed to pressure February 7 negotiations by demonstrating government impotence, exploit the compressed timeline as the Council struggles with implementation, and establish leverage for post-February 7 governance negotiations. Scenario C involves extending the pause through February 7 but launching major escalation in the week after February 7 between February 8-15 if no amnesty framework emerges, targeting political actors, economic infrastructure, or international facilities to force negotiations with whoever governs post-February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The current 39-day pause represents the longest sustained period without gang-initiated attacks since gang territorial control expanded to 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince in early 2024. Previous operational pauses typically lasted 7-14 days and ended with resumed violence targeting government facilities or international infrastructure.

TALKING POINTS

The 39-day gang attack pause from December 21 through January 16 continues despite January 14 drone strikes on gang leader Cherizier's hideouts demonstrating unprecedented strategic discipline.

Gangs' failure to retaliate validates the Crisis Group's December 15 assessment that gangs prioritize February 7 amnesty negotiations over immediate tactical responses to government provocations.

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The IOM's January 15 report of 5,800 newly displaced persons shows PNH operations produce humanitarian costs even without gang retaliation.

Gangs face a strategic decision point between January 20-25 to either continue the pause awaiting amnesty signals or resume violence to pressure February 7 negotiations.

Gang territorial control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince according to MOPAL's January 4 assessment remains unchanged despite drone strikes.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

The government should clarify whether Prime Minister Fils-Aime's December 28 no negotiations doctrine remains in effect or whether behind-the-scenes discussions with gang representatives are occurring to explain the 39-day pause.

International actors should assess whether the 39-day pause represents a genuine negotiation opportunity or a tactical repositioning by gangs before resumed violence in late January.

Humanitarian organizations should prepare for potential displacement spikes if gangs resume operations between January 20-25 in response to the CARICOM critical window closure without amnesty framework announcements.

The Transitional Presidential Council should decide over the weekend whether to include gang representatives in post-February 7 governance discussions to extend the 39-day pause through the constitutional deadline.

Security analysts should monitor January 20-25 for potential gang violence resumption if announcements exclude amnesty provisions from governance frameworks.



CONFIDENCE



High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3: Weekend Becomes Critical Inflection Point for February 7 Trajectory

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The absence of any announcements on January 16 during the final day of CARICOM's critical window creates maximum pressure for weekend actions on January 18-19 because political actors, international organizations, and civil society groups must now decide whether to convene emergency coordination mechanisms or accept that Haiti will navigate the February 7 constitutional deadline through uncoordinated or unilateral processes. The weekend represents the last opportunity for structured international intervention before entering the final three weeks with compressed implementation timelines.

Political actors' calculations over the weekend reveal three parallel decision tracks. The Transitional Presidential Council is waiting to see if CARICOM convenes an emergency summit over the weekend before announcing either a unilateral extension or a departure framework that addresses civil society demands. Civil society organizations including RANFOR, the Civil Society Initiative, and ANR recognize they failed to unify during the critical window and may attempt emergency coordination over the weekend to present a consolidated proposal by January 20. International actors including CARICOM, the OAS, and the UN must decide over the weekend whether to convene an emergency summit, withdraw facilitation acknowledging coordination failure, or continue silent negotiations accepting compressed timelines.

Public and media pressure intensifies with 22 days remaining until February 7 as the silent triggers three amplification dynamics. Haitian media outlets including Le Nouvelliste, Haiti Libre, and Radio Metropole will begin daily countdown coverage starting next week, transforming the February 7 deadline from an institutional concern to a public crisis narrative. Radio Metropole's January 5 framing of February 7 as a basculement or collapse/tipping point becomes the mainstream media narrative, increasing public anxiety and political pressure on the Transitional Presidential Council. Opposition movements including MORN and Montana Accord have the weekend to organize campaigns demanding Transitional Presidential Council departure if no frameworks are announced, potentially including protests or public statements by .

January 20 becomes the de facto new deadline for frameworks if the weekend passes without CARICOM emergency summit or Transitional Presidential Council announcements. A announcement creates a compressed 18-day implementation window that heightens operational risk through insufficient time for proper decree processes, increases legitimacy deficit as the public perceives rushed last-minute arrangements, and triggers gang strategic decisions as gangs assess announcements to determine whether to resume violence or extend the 39-day pause through February 7. The weekend's outcome determines whether Haiti's February 7 transition occurs through coordinated international frameworks with 18-day implementation, uncoordinated competing proposals from civil society and the Transitional Presidential Council, or institutional vacuum with no frameworks announced until the final week of January.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CARICOM's January 12 2026 statement warning about the slowness of actors in finding common ground represented the organization's most explicit deadline pressure after six months of facilitation. The silent confirms that neither the Transitional Presidential Council nor civil society organizations responded to this warning during the identified January 13-17 window.

TALKING POINTS

January 16 passed without any governance framework announcements creating maximum pressure for weekend emergency coordination by CARICOM, civil society, or the Transitional Presidential Council.

The weekend of January 18-19 represents the last opportunity for CARICOM to convene an emergency Heads of Government summit before entering the final three weeks with compressed implementation timelines.

January 20 becomes the de facto new deadline for framework announcements with any announcement creating only 18 days for implementation before February 7.

Haitian media will begin daily countdown coverage starting next week transforming February 7 from an institutional deadline to a public crisis narrative.

Gangs will assess weekend and developments to determine whether to resume violence in late January or extend the 39-day pause through February 7.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM should announce by January 17 whether it will convene an emergency Heads of Government summit for January 18 or formally withdraw from facilitation acknowledging coordination failure.

The Transitional Presidential Council should hold emergency weekend sessions to decide whether to announce a departure framework by January 20 or prepare for unilateral extension beyond February 7.

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Civil society organizations should attempt emergency coordination over the weekend to consolidate the Civil Society Initiative, RANFOR, and ANR proposals into a unified framework presentable by January 20.

International media should increase coverage of the February 7 deadline over the weekend to pressure Haitian and international actors toward decisive action before .

Diplomatic missions in Port-au-Prince should coordinate over the weekend to present a unified position to the Transitional Presidential Council by morning.



CONFIDENCE



Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Will CARICOM convene an emergency Heads of Government summit over the weekend of January 18-19 to select and endorse a civil society framework or will the weekend pass without international coordination confirming facilitation has failed. Will civil society organizations including RANFOR, the Civil Society Initiative, and ANR attempt emergency coordination over the weekend to present a unified proposal by January 20. Will the Transitional Presidential Council hold emergency weekend sessions to decide whether to announce a departure or extension framework by morning.

THIS WEEK

Will the Transitional Presidential Council, Prime Minister Fils-Aime, or unified civil society announce governance frameworks on January 20 creating a compressed but potentially viable 18-day implementation timeline or will the week pass without announcements confirming entry into the final two weeks. Will gangs resume Port-au-Prince violence in late January between January 20-25 to exploit the compressed timeline and pressure amnesty negotiations or will they extend the 39-day pause through February 7 awaiting post-deadline governance negotiations. Will Haitian media begin daily countdown coverage starting January 20

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transforming the February 7 deadline into a public crisis narrative.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Will Haiti navigate the February 7 constitutional deadline through coordinated international frameworks with CARICOM endorsement or through uncoordinated competing proposals from civil society and the Transitional Presidential Council creating legitimacy deficits. Will gangs maintain strategic discipline through February 7 prioritizing long-term amnesty negotiations or resume violence in late January to establish leverage for post-February 7 governance discussions. Will the Transitional Presidential Council announce departure by February 7 or attempt unilateral extension beyond the constitutional mandate creating potential institutional vacuum or competing governance claims.

PRIMARY SOURCES

CARICOM Group of Eminent Persons statement January 12 2026 expressing deep concern about slowness of actors in finding common ground.

Haiti Libre comprehensive daily monitoring January 16 2026 showing no new political or security developments as of 5:34 PM EST.

IOM report January 15 2026 documenting 5,800 newly displaced persons in Port-au-Prince.

Crisis Group assessment December 15 2025 analyzing gang strategic calculations regarding February 7 amnesty negotiations.

Prime Minister Fils-Aime statement December 28 2025 declaring no negotiations doctrine with gang representatives.

MOPAL assessment January 4 2026 documenting gang territorial control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince.

Radio Metropole analysis January 5 2026 framing February 7 as basculement or collapse/tipping point.

Miami Herald report January 9 2026 on CARICOM Eminent Persons Group holding talks with council members and political leaders.

Civil Society Initiative proposal January 6 2026 for completion of transition.

RANFOR political dialogue call January 11 2026 and January 14 2026.

ANR framework November 6 2025 proposing Conseil d'Etat governance structure.

PNH operational reports January 14 2026 documenting drone strikes on gang leader Cherizier hideouts in Delmas, Bel-Air, and La Saline.

Secretary Rubio statement January 1 2026 on U.S. position regarding Haiti transition.

Minister Giroux statement December 16 2025 on Canadian position regarding Haiti transition.