



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 02, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ancestors Day national holiday produced zero new political or security developments as government offices and the U.S. Embassy remained closed through the three-day weekend. The fourteen-day operational pause in gang violence that began December 21 continues through January 2, representing the longest sustained period without major attacks in 2025. The unresolved diplomatic split between the United States and Canada on the February 7 constitutional deadline persists with no statements from CARICOM, OAS, or the CPT addressing the legitimacy crisis. Government operations resume January 5, restarting both operational and political clocks with thirty-six days remaining until the constitutional reckoning that will determine whether Haiti faces orderly transition or power vacuum.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

January 2 Ancestors Day holiday yielded zero new developments due to government closure.

Fourteen-day operational pause in gang violence continues, longest sustained period in 2025.

U.S.-Canada diplomatic split on February 7 deadline remains unresolved with no international statements.

Government operations resume January 5 with thirty-six days until CPT mandate expiration.

Critical two-week window January 5-18 determines whether orderly transition or power vacuum emerges.

DEVELOPMENT 1: FOURTEEN-DAY OPERATIONAL PAUSE EXTENDS THROUGH HOLIDAY WEEKEND

The continuation of the operational pause through January 2 Ancestors Day marks fourteen consecutive days without major gang violence from December 21 through January 2, excluding isolated December 23-26 incidents. This represents the longest sustained period without significant attacks in 2025 and confirms that armed groups are strategically extending their holiday pause through the three-day weekend.

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combining January 1 Independence Day, January 2 Ancestors Day, and the regular weekend before government operations resume January 5. The pattern demonstrates that gangs retain full operational capacity to activate and deactivate violence at will despite the PNH general mobilization announced December 28 and the December 27 donation of twenty-five U.S. armored vehicles to Haitian security forces.

The strategic pause serves multiple gang objectives during the holiday period. First, it allows consolidation of positions and resupply operations following the December 24 Minoterie drone strike that killed dozens of gang members. Second, it provides space to observe political developments including U.S. Secretary Rubio's January 1 endorsement of progress toward 2026 elections, Prime Minister Conille's January 1 unity rhetoric, and the government's normalization strategy that proceeds as if the CPT will govern through 2026 despite the February 7 constitutional deadline. Third, the pause positions armed groups for escalation when government offices reopen January 5, with thirty-six days remaining until the deadline that gangs can exploit for leverage in potential amnesty negotiations despite the PM's December 28 no-negotiations doctrine.

The fourteen-day pause does not indicate military defeat of gang control over eighty percent of Port-au-Prince. Rather it demonstrates sophisticated strategic planning by armed groups who understand that periodic operational pauses during major national holidays reduce international pressure while preserving capacity for resumed violence targeting economic infrastructure including markets, ports, and hospitals. The Government Suppression Force and PNH lack the operational capacity to dislodge entrenched gang positions during these pauses, as evidenced by the absence of government offensive operations during the fourteen-day period when gang forces were theoretically vulnerable during their own stand-down.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's armed groups have demonstrated pattern of strategic operational pauses during major national holidays since 2023, using these periods for consolidation while avoiding international attention that sustained violence during patriotic celebrations would generate.

TALKING POINTS

Fourteen-day operational pause represents longest sustained period without major gang violence in 2025.

Pause demonstrates gang operational sophistication and strategic planning capacity rather than military defeat.

Government forces failed to exploit gang stand-down period with offensive operations to reclaim territory.

Thirty-six days until February 7 deadline creates leverage opportunity for gangs seeking amnesty despite no-negotiations doctrine.

Violence resumption expected January 5-7 when government operations restart and holiday pause rationale expires.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International security partners should pre-position rapid response capabilities for expected violence resumption January 5-7.

CARICOM and OAS should convene emergency coordination sessions during January 5-10 window before gang violence escalates.

Humanitarian organizations should accelerate pre-positioning of medical supplies and trauma response teams in Port-au-Prince hospitals.

Private sector entities should review security protocols and supply chain continuity plans for January 5-10 operational period.

Diaspora networks should activate family communication protocols and emergency assistance mechanisms before January 5 resumption.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2: U.S.-CANADA DIPLOMATIC SPLIT REMAINS UNRESOLVED

AS DEADLINE APPROACHES

The diplomatic split between the United States and Canada on the February 7 constitutional deadline persists with no resolution during the January 1-2 holiday period. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio's January 1 statement recognizing progress toward 2026 elections implicitly endorses CPT governance extending through 2026, while Canadian Ambassador Sebastien Giroux's December 16 declaration that February 7 represents the unconditional end of the CPT mandate creates fundamental contradiction in international positioning. The absence of any clarifying statements from CARICOM, the OAS, the UN BINUH mission, or the CPT itself during the January 1-2 period indicates that international actors and the Haitian government are avoiding the constitutional reckoning during the holiday blackout.

The unresolved split creates three urgent questions that become critical when government operations resume January 5. First, will CARICOM issue a statement reconciling the U.S.-Canada positions or will the regional body maintain silence as the February 7 deadline approaches in thirty-six days. Second, will the OAS operationalize its institutional continuity clause committing to work with Haitian authorities to avoid power vacuum, and if so does this mean endorsing CPT extension aligned with the U.S. position or negotiating a new transitional framework aligned with the Canadian position. Third, will the CPT formally announce a mandate extension mechanism or continue the silent maneuvers strategy reported by Vant Bef Info on December 31 that normalizes extension without explicit announcement.

The diplomatic vacuum produces a legitimacy crisis with profound implications for the post-February 7 period. The U.S. endorsement provides international cover for CPT extension and continued governance through 2026 elections, but Canada's unconditional end position means the Council will lack full international legitimacy after February 7 even if it continues governing. This international split mirrors the domestic divide where the MORN movement declared the CPT expired on December 28 while Prime Minister Conille endorsed the CEP's realistic and credible electoral calendar on December 30. With thirty-six days remaining until the constitutional deadline, the next two to three weeks from January 5 through January 25 represent the critical window for whether international actors negotiate a unified position or allow the CPT to govern in a legitimacy twilight zone with partial but not universal recognition.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous transitional governments in Haiti have operated in legitimacy gray zones when international community members held divergent positions on constitutional authority, creating governance paralysis and security vacuum exploitation by armed groups.

TALKING POINTS

U.S.-Canada split on February 7 deadline creates fundamental contradiction in international support for Haitian transition.

Zero statements from CARICOM, OAS, or UN during January 1-2 holiday period indicates avoidance of constitutional crisis.

CPT silent maneuvers strategy normalizes mandate extension without formal announcement or constitutional mechanism.

Thirty-six days remaining creates two-to-three week window for international coordination before crisis point.

Legitimacy twilight zone allows CPT to govern with U.S. endorsement but Canadian rejection and domestic opposition.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CARICOM should convene emergency Ministerial meeting during January 5-10 to forge unified position on post-February 7 framework.

OAS should clarify institutional continuity clause implementation through formal statement by January 15.

International Partners Group should coordinate diplomatic messaging to avoid public contradictions that undermine CPT legitimacy.

Canadian government should either reconcile position with U.S. stance or provide alternative framework proposal by January 20.

CPT should issue formal statement on mandate extension mechanism by January 15 to avoid legitimacy collapse on February 7.



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DEVELOPMENT 3: GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS RESUMPTION JANUARY 5 RESTARTS CRITICAL CLOCKS

The resumption of government operations January 5 following the three-day holiday weekend restarts both operational and political clocks that have been paused during the fourteen-day period from December 21 through January 2. The U.S. Embassy reopens January 5 after closure January 1-2, Haitian government offices resume normal operations, and major media outlets return to full reporting capacity after reduced holiday staffing. This operational restart occurs with thirty-six days remaining until the February 7 constitutional deadline, creating a compressed timeline for any negotiations to extend the CPT mandate through constitutional amendment, international agreement, or new transitional framework.

The January 5 resumption serves as critical indicator day across multiple domains. On security, the first twenty-four to forty-eight hours after government reopening will demonstrate whether gangs resume violence immediately or extend the operational pause, with resumption confirming that the fourteen-day pause was purely strategic rather than capacity-related. On governance, the CPT must either issue a statement addressing the February 7 deadline or continue the silent normalization strategy that proceeds without formal extension announcement. On international coordination, CARICOM and the OAS face decision point on whether to convene emergency sessions addressing the U.S.-Canada split during the January 5-10 window or wait until late January when only ten to fifteen days remain before February 7.

The timing creates cascading pressure across all actors. If gang violence resumes January 5-7 targeting economic infrastructure as expected, this will compound the political crisis by demonstrating government impotence as the constitutional deadline approaches. If the CPT maintains silence on the February 7 deadline through

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mid-January, this confirms the silent maneuvers strategy that normalizes extension without legitimate constitutional mechanism. If international actors fail to coordinate unified position during the January 5-18 window, the result will be the legitimacy twilight zone where the CPT governs with partial international recognition but faces domestic opposition from MORN and civil society groups challenging its constitutional authority after February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti's previous transitional periods have demonstrated that compressed timelines for constitutional transitions without clear international and domestic consensus produce power vacuums that armed groups exploit for territorial expansion and amnesty leverage.

TALKING POINTS

January 5 resumption restarts operational and political clocks after fourteen-day holiday pause.

First twenty-four to forty-eight hours after reopening indicate whether gang operational pause ends immediately.

Thirty-six days until February 7 creates compressed timeline for any mandate extension negotiations.

CPT must choose between formal extension announcement or continued silent normalization strategy.

Two-to-three week window January 5-25 determines orderly transition versus power vacuum outcome.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Security stakeholders should monitor violence indicators closely during January 5-7 window for resumption patterns.

Political analysts should track CPT statements during January 5-15 for signals on mandate extension approach.

International organizations should position coordination mechanisms for rapid

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deployment if violence escalates during January 5-10.

Media organizations should increase Port-au-Prince coverage capacity to document post-holiday developments.

Civil society groups should prepare contingency mobilization plans if CPT pursues mandate extension without constitutional legitimacy.



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Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Gang violence resumption within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of government reopening January 5 would signal end of strategic operational pause and return to pattern of attacks targeting economic infrastructure. Direction of travel is toward escalation as gangs test government capacity and exploit approaching February 7 deadline for amnesty leverage. Primary risk is coordinated attacks on markets, ports, or hospitals during January 5-7 window demonstrating government impotence.

THIS WEEK

CARICOM or OAS emergency coordination sessions during January 5-10 would indicate international actors recognizing urgency of February 7 deadline and negotiating unified position on post-deadline framework. Direction of travel depends on whether U.S.-Canada split can be reconciled or whether legitimacy twilight zone emerges. Primary risk is continued diplomatic silence allowing CPT silent normalization strategy to proceed without international legitimization mechanism.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

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CPT formal statement on mandate extension mechanism by January 15 would clarify governance approach for post-February 7 period and provide basis for international coordination. Direction of travel is toward either orderly transition through negotiated extension or power vacuum through constitutional deadline expiration without legitimate successor. Primary risk is legitimacy collapse on February 7 if CPT governs without constitutional authority and faces domestic opposition plus partial international rejection.

PRIMARY SOURCES

TimeAndDate.com Haiti Public Holidays 2026

U.S. Embassy Haiti Facebook January 1-2 Closure Notice

Haiti Libre News Portal January 2 2026

Vant Bef Info December 31 2025 CPT Silent Maneuvers Report

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio January 1 2026 Statement

Canadian Ambassador Sebastien Giroux December 16 2025 Statement

MORN Movement December 28 2025 Statement

Prime Minister Garry Conille December 30 2025 CEP Calendar Endorsement

PNH December 28 2025 General Mobilization Announcement

U.S. State Department December 27 2025 Armored Vehicles Donation