



# AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 15, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

RANFOR issued a statement on January 11 calling for political dialogue to establish a consensual institutional framework for the February 7 CPT mandate expiration representing the third major civil society proposal in ten days but coordination remains absent despite convergence points. Vant Bef Info reported January 14 that gang leader Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier hideouts were destroyed by kamikaze drones with PNH announcing continuation of operations in Delmas Bel-Air and La Saline. IOM reported 5800 newly displaced persons in Port-au-Prince capital coinciding with PNH counteroffensives while the 37-day gang attack pause continues. January 17 represents the last day of CARICOM critical decision window for framework announcements allowing 21-day implementation before February 7.



## QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

RANFOR calls for political dialogue on February 7 transition framework third civil society proposal in ten days

Barbecue hideouts destroyed by kamikaze drones January 14 PNH escalates operations in multiple Port-au-Prince zones

5800 newly displaced in capital per IOM coinciding with drone strikes and PNH operations

37-day gang attack pause continues despite drone strikes against gang leadership

January 17 is final day of CARICOM critical window for governance framework announcements

### DEVELOPMENT 1: RANFOR Calls for Political Dialogue Amid Civil Society Fragmentation Despite Convergence

RANFOR issued a public statement on January 11 published January 14 calling for political dialogue to address institutional uncertainties surrounding the February 7 CPT mandate expiration. The statement emphasized that February 7 will mark the end of the CPT mandate without a clearly defined and consensual institutional alternative having been announced. RANFOR called for dialogue to agree on a transitional executive consisting of president and prime minister restoring state authority strengthening security disarming armed groups organizing elections in 2026 and adopting a time-limited transition framework.

RANFOR statement represents the third major civil society proposal in ten days following the Civil Society Initiative January 6 Proposal for Completion of Transition and the Alliance Nationale de Rupture November 6 Conseil d Etat framework. Despite different structural approaches all three proposals share critical convergence points including rejection of CPT extension recognition of February 7 as hard deadline per April 3 2024 Agreement transitional executive with president and prime minister structure time-limited transitions to avoid perpetual interim governance commitment to organizing elections in 2026 and prioritization of state authority restoration security strengthening and gang disarmament as prerequisites.

CARICOM GPE January 12 statement observed there are points of convergence in the numerous proposals but criticized the slowness of actors suggesting civil society groups are failing to unify

around a single framework despite commonalities competing for legitimacy rather than coordinating and waiting for CPT or international actors to endorse specific proposals rather than self-organizing. With 23 days until February 7 and January 17 representing the last day of CARICOM critical decision window the civil society fragmentation creates risk that no single proposal gains sufficient support multiple frameworks compete post-February 7 creating dual or triple governance crisis and international actors must choose between proposals alienating those not selected.

The strategic calculation facing civil society actors is whether to continue pursuing separate legitimacy claims or rapidly unify behind a single framework that can attract the 60 percent political class rallying threshold identified by commentator Leslie Voltaire as necessary for successful transition. The absence of coordination mechanisms among RANFOR Civil Society Initiative and Alliance Nationale de Rupture despite their convergence on fundamental principles demonstrates the challenges of collective action in Haiti fragmented political landscape where institutional memory of failed consensus-building efforts and competitive legitimacy claims override strategic coordination imperatives even when facing shared constitutional deadline.



## **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Civil society proposals for transitional governance frameworks have historically struggled to achieve implementation in Haiti due to political class fragmentation competing legitimacy claims and international actor preferences for elite-negotiated settlements over broad-based consensus mechanisms as demonstrated by the 2021 Montana Accord experience where a comprehensive civil society framework failed to gain traction against executive resistance.

## **TALKING POINTS**

RANFOR January 11 statement calls for political dialogue on transitional executive state authority restoration and 2026 elections

Third major civil society proposal in ten days demonstrates proliferation without coordination despite convergence points

All proposals reject CPT extension recognize February 7 deadline propose president plus prime minister structure and prioritize security

CARICOM criticizes slowness of actors despite points of convergence in numerous proposals

23 days until February 7 with January 17 final day of critical window for framework announcements

Civil society fragmentation risks no single proposal gaining support multiple competing frameworks post-February 7 or international imposition

## **RECOMMENDED DECISIONS**

Civil society organizations should convene emergency coordination meeting by January 17 to identify single unified framework combining convergence points from RANFOR Civil Society Initiative and Alliance Nationale de Rupture proposals

International actors should clarify by whether they will endorse civil society unified framework or impose alternative structure to prevent dual governance claims post-February 7

CPT should announce by January 17 whether it accepts civil society unified framework or proposes alternative mechanism to utilize final day of CARICOM critical window

Political class leaders should signal by which civil society framework achieves 60 percent rallying threshold necessary for successful transition

Media outlets should amplify convergence points rather than differences among civil society proposals to build public pressure for coordination

Diaspora organizations should coordinate messaging supporting unified civil society framework to demonstrate international stakeholder alignment



## CONFIDENCE



### **Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

#### DEVELOPMENT 2: Barbecue Hideouts Destroyed by Kamikaze Drones as PNH Escalates Operations Against Gang Leadership

Vant Bef Info reported January 14 that hideouts belonging to gang leader Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier have been reduced to ashes by kamikaze drones. The report detailed operations in Delmas 6 Bel-Air La Saline Delmas 2 Delmas 4 Delmas 6 and downtown sectors. The Haitian National Police announced the continuation of operations in Delmas 6 affirming its determination to dislodge the armed bandits who have entrenched themselves there and to retake control of the zone. The drone strikes target the most high-profile gang leader in Haiti who commands the G9 an Fanmi e Alye coalition one of Haiti most powerful gang alliances.

The January 14 drone strikes are part of a multi-week PNH offensive that included January 6 Bel Air clashes resulting in MSF operations suspension January 9 Varreux terminal closure due to police operations and January 12 PNH press conference announcing seizure of 33 weapons and 12000 munitions. Barbecue strategic significance derives from his role as G9 leader former associations with the PHTK party and accusations of orchestrating massacres during political transitions making him a symbolic target demonstrating government capacity to strike at top-tier gang leadership. The timing of operations 23 days before February 7 suggests the government is attempting to create facts on the ground to legitimize potential CPT extension or demonstrate progress in security conditions.

The 37-day gang attack pause continues despite drone strikes against Barbecue hideouts suggesting gangs are maintaining strategic discipline rather than retaliating. This indicates gangs are not weakened per Prime Minister Fils-Aime January 10 claim but rather demonstrating restraint and that Barbecue may have relocated hideouts in advance minimizing operational impact. Gang strategic calculation appears focused on February 7 amnesty negotiations per Crisis Group December 15 warning rather than responding to PNH provocations. The BINUH October report noted that drone operations between March and September 2025 resulted in 547 deaths including 527 suspected gang members and 20 civilians including 11 children establishing precedent for

civilian casualties from drone strikes.

Director General Normil Rameau promised January 12 that routes to the South and North will reopen before February 7 reinforcing the government narrative that PNH operations are achieving territorial gains sufficient to restore transportation corridor functionality. The drone strikes against Barbecue hideouts allow the government to claim turning the tide against gangs and demonstrate state capacity to strike at gang leadership countering narratives of government impotence. However the continuation of the gang attack pause despite strikes against their most prominent leader suggests gangs maintain operational cohesion and strategic patience rather than responding with immediate retaliation creating questions about whether PNH operations are genuinely degrading gang capabilities or merely displacing leadership structures temporarily.



## **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier rose to prominence as leader of the G9 gang coalition and has been accused of orchestrating massacres in La Saline and Bel-Air during political transitions. Drone operations against gang positions began intensifying in March 2025 resulting in 547 deaths through September 2025 per BINUH reporting establishing precedent for high-casualty counteroffensives.

## **TALKING POINTS**

Barbecue hideouts destroyed by kamikaze drones January 14 in Delmas Bel-Air La Saline and downtown sectors

PNH announces continuation of operations targeting most high-profile gang leader in Haiti

Operations occur 23 days before February 7 suggesting effort to demonstrate government progress on security

37-day gang attack pause continues despite strikes indicating gang strategic discipline not weakness

BINUH reports drone operations March-September 2025 killed 20 civilians including 11 children establishing casualty precedent

Director General Rameau promises routes to South and North will reopen before February 7

## **RECOMMENDED DECISIONS**

International observers should monitor civilian casualty reports from January 14 drone strike zones given BINUH precedent of 20 civilian deaths including 11 children from previous drone operations PNH should clarify operational objectives of Barbecue targeting whether temporary displacement or permanent degradation of G9 command structure

Civil society organizations should document displacement patterns from Delmas Bel-Air and La Saline to assess humanitarian impact of drone operations

Media outlets should investigate whether Barbecue was present in targeted hideouts or had relocated in advance to determine actual impact on gang leadership

International community should assess whether PNH operations represent sustainable security gains or temporary displacement ahead of February 7 deadline

Humanitarian organizations should pre-position medical resources in operational zones anticipating potential civilian casualties from continued drone strikes



## CONFIDENCE



**Moderate confidence based on partial institutional reporting.**

### DEVELOPMENT 3: 5800 Newly Displaced in Port-au-Prince Capital as PNH Operations Produce Humanitarian Crisis

International Organization for Migration reported January 15 that more than 5800 people have been displaced in the heart of Port-au-Prince capital. The displacement coincides with January 14 drone strikes against Barbecue hideouts and multi-week PNH operations in Delmas Bel-Air La Saline and downtown sectors. The 5800 new displacements compound the existing 1.4 million internally displaced persons crisis reported by UNICEF December 10 and occur in context where only 40 percent of Port-au-Prince medical facilities remain operational per MSF January 11 warning meaning displaced civilians lack healthcare access.

The timing of displacement coinciding with PNH counteroffensives demonstrates that government operations in densely populated areas are producing civilian displacement as collateral effects even as the 37-day gang attack pause continues. Civilians are fleeing combat zones where PNH operations including drone strikes are targeting gang positions in neighborhoods like Delmas Bel-Air and La Saline that have high residential density. The BINUH October report established precedent for civilian casualties from drone operations noting 20 civilian deaths including 11 children between March and September 2025 suggesting January 14 drone strikes likely produced similar casualties beyond the 5800 displacement figure.

The humanitarian crisis compounds as displaced persons join 1.4 million existing IDPs in a city where medical infrastructure has collapsed to 40 percent operational capacity. MSF January 11 warning that health facilities are severely compromised means displaced civilians from January 14-15 operations lack access to medical care trauma treatment or humanitarian assistance. The displacement pattern suggests PNH operations are prioritizing territorial gains and gang leadership targeting over civilian protection considerations with Director General Rameau January 12 promise to reopen routes to South and North before February 7 indicating government prioritizes transportation corridor restoration over minimizing civilian displacement.

The displacement occurs 23 days before February 7 CPT mandate expiration creating additional humanitarian pressure during the constitutional transition period. If PNH continues intensive operations in densely populated gang-controlled zones through late January and early February to demonstrate security progress before the deadline additional displacement waves are likely. The existing IDP crisis of 1.4 million persons combined with collapsed medical infrastructure and 5800 new displacements in a single 24-48 hour period demonstrates the humanitarian system inability to

absorb continued PNH operation impacts creating risk of acute humanitarian emergency if operations escalate further.



## **HISTORICAL CONTEXT**

Haiti IDP crisis reached 1.4 million persons per UNICEF December 10 reporting representing one of the Western Hemisphere largest displacement emergencies. Port-au-Prince medical infrastructure collapsed to 40 percent operational capacity per MSF January 11 with gang territorial control preventing humanitarian access to affected populations.

## **TALKING POINTS**

IOM reports 5800 newly displaced in Port-au-Prince capital January 15 coinciding with PNH drone strikes and operations

Displacement compounds existing 1.4 million IDP crisis in context of 40 percent medical facility operational capacity

Civilians fleeing densely populated combat zones in Delmas Bel-Air and La Saline where PNH operations target gang positions

BINUH precedent shows drone operations killed 20 civilians including 11 children March-September 2025

PNH operations prioritize territorial gains and route reopening over civilian protection considerations  
Additional displacement waves likely if intensive operations continue through late January approaching February 7

## **RECOMMENDED DECISIONS**

International humanitarian organizations should pre-position emergency medical and shelter resources for anticipated additional displacement if PNH operations intensify approaching February 7

IOM should conduct rapid assessment of 5800 newly displaced persons to determine immediate needs and identify vulnerable populations requiring priority assistance

MSF and health partners should establish mobile medical units in displacement zones given 40 percent operational capacity of fixed facilities

UN agencies should pressure PNH to adopt civilian protection protocols for operations in densely populated areas to minimize displacement and casualties

International community should provide emergency humanitarian funding anticipating additional displacement waves from continued PNH operations

Civil society organizations should document civilian displacement patterns to establish accountability for humanitarian impacts of security operations



## **CONFIDENCE**



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

**DEVELOPMENT 4: January 17 Represents Final Day of CARICOM Critical Window for Framework Announcements**

January 17 2026 represents the last day of the CARICOM critical decision window spanning January 13-17 for governance framework announcements that allow 21-day implementation before February 7 CPT mandate expiration. The absence of announcements through January 15 two-thirds through the window suggests Haiti is entering final compressed timeline scenario. With 23 days until February 7 and no framework announced by three scenarios exist for through weekend period.

Scenario A involves announcements where CPT Prime Minister Fils-Aime civil society or CARICOM announce governance frameworks on January 17 utilizing the last viable day for 21-day implementation. This requires CPT internal consensus among all nine members including seven voting members and two observers agreement on extension mechanism or departure framework civil society coordination where RANFOR Civil Society Initiative and Alliance Nationale de Rupture unify around single proposal and international legitimization where CARICOM OAS and UN endorse framework publicly. The technical requirements for 21-day implementation include decree drafting institutional consultations approval processes publication in official gazette and stakeholder coordination across multiple actors making the absolute deadline for adequate implementation timeline.

Scenario B involves weekend emergency summit where if no announcements occur by CARICOM convenes emergency Heads of Government summit over weekend January 18-19 to impose framework by selecting one civil society proposal and pressuring CPT to accept declare facilitation suspended by withdrawing from mediation forcing Haitian actors to navigate February 7 unilaterally or coordinate U.S.-Canada split through final attempt to reconcile Secretary Rubio January 1 endorsement of elections and CPT versus Minister Giroux December 16 unconditional end position. Emergency summit scenario represents CARICOM last intervention opportunity before Haiti enters final three weeks with compressed implementation timeline insufficient for adequate institutional preparation.

Scenario C involves extended silence through weekend into next week creating final three weeks period spanning January 20 through February 7 with 18 days or fewer for implementation. This creates operational insufficiency with inadequate time for decree drafting consultations approvals and publication public panic as media basculement countdown coverage intensifies opposition mobilization where MORN and Montana Accord organize campaigns demanding CPT departure and gang violence resumption expected late January spanning January 20-25 to exploit approaching deadline. If announcements occur January 20 the 18-day implementation window represents absolute minimum timeline with high operational failure risk given complexity of transitional governance framework establishment requiring multiple institutional actor coordination.

The deadline represents critical inflection point determining whether Haiti transitions via coordinated framework announced with 21-day implementation international imposition through CARICOM

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

weekend summit or fragmented collapse with no framework and multiple competing claims post-February 7. Director General Rameau promise to reopen routes before February 7 PNH drone strikes against Barbecue hideouts and civil society proliferation of proposals without coordination all occur within this compressed timeline creating conditions where governance security and humanitarian crises converge at constitutional deadline absent framework announcement by .



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The April 3 2024 Agreement established CPT mandate with implicit February 7 2026 expiration through 18-month transition framework. CARICOM has facilitated multiple rounds of consultations since April 2024 but Haitian political actors have consistently demonstrated slowness in decision-making per CARICOM GPE January 12 criticism creating pattern of delayed consensus-building approaching constitutional deadlines.

### TALKING POINTS

January 17 is final day of CARICOM critical window for framework announcements allowing 21-day implementation

No announcements through January 15 suggests Haiti entering compressed timeline scenario

Three scenarios exist: announcements with 21-day implementation CARICOM weekend emergency summit or extended silence creating 18-day window

21-day implementation requires decree drafting consultations approvals publication and stakeholder coordination

If announcements delayed to January 20 only 18 days remain creating operational insufficiency risk

Extended silence expected to trigger public panic opposition mobilization and gang violence resumption late January

### RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CPT should convene emergency session by end of business January 17 to announce governance framework or departure mechanism utilizing final day of critical window

CARICOM should issue ultimatum by morning requiring framework announcement by end of day or triggering weekend emergency Heads of Government summit

Civil society organizations should present unified framework by morning incorporating convergence points from RANFOR Civil Society Initiative and Alliance Nationale de Rupture to enable single proposal endorsement

International community should coordinate messaging clarifying whether they will endorse Haitian-led framework or impose alternative structure if silence continues

Media outlets should intensify coverage of deadline to build public pressure for framework announcement

Prime Minister Fils-Aime should address nation evening clarifying government position on February 7 transition mechanism



**CONFIDENCE**



**High confidence based on official institutional reporting.**

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor for governance framework announcements by CPT civil society or CARICOM by end of business January 17 representing final day of critical window for 21-day implementation timeline before February 7. Track whether civil society organizations convene emergency coordination meeting to unify RANFOR Civil Society Initiative and Alliance Nationale de Rupture proposals into single framework. Observe whether CARICOM issues public ultimatum requiring announcements or announces weekend emergency Heads of Government summit for January 18-19.

THIS WEEK

Assess whether CARICOM convenes emergency summit over weekend January 18-19 if no announcements occur representing last international intervention opportunity before compressed 18-day timeline. Monitor PNH operations continuation following January 14 Barbecue drone strikes to determine if additional displacement waves occur from intensified counteroffensives. Track whether gang attack pause extends beyond 37 days through weekend or if violence resumes late January exploiting compressed timeline approaching February 7.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Evaluate whether Haiti transitions via coordinated framework with adequate implementation timeline international imposition through CARICOM weekend summit or fragmented collapse with multiple competing governance claims post-February 7. Monitor if gangs resume Port-au-Prince violence late January spanning January 20-25 to pressure amnesty negotiations as February 7 approaches. Assess whether 5800 newly displaced from January 14-15 operations represent initial wave of larger humanitarian crisis if PNH intensifies operations through late January demonstrating security progress before constitutional deadline.

PRIMARY SOURCES

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2. Vant Bef Info - Les refuges du chef de gang Barbecue reduits en cendres par des drones kamikazes - January 14 2026
4. CARICOM Group of Eminent Persons - Statement on points of convergence and slowness of actors - January 12 2026
5. Haiti National Police - Press conference on weapons seizure and operations continuation -

## AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 12 2026

6. Medecins Sans Frontieres - Warning on 40 percent Port-au-Prince medical facility operational capacity - January 11 2026
7. UNICEF - Report on 1.4 million internally displaced persons in Haiti - December 10 2025
8. BINUH - Report on drone operations casualties March-September 2025 - October 2025
10. Civil Society Initiative - Proposal for Completion of Transition - January 6 2026
11. Alliance Nationale de Rupture - Conseil d Etat framework proposal - November 6 2025
13. Prime Minister Fils-Aime - Statement on weakened gang situation - January 10 2026
14. PNH Director General Normil Rameau - Promise to reopen routes to South and North before February 7 - January 12 2026
9. Crisis Group - Warning on gang amnesty negotiations approaching February 7 - December 15 2025