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January 26, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

AYITI INTEL

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Week 3: January 19-25, 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti entered its gravest constitutional crisis since the 2024 transition framework as five Transitional Presidential Council members voted January 21 to dismiss Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime just seventeen days before the CPT mandate expires February 7 2026. The United States responded with unprecedented intervention threatening sanctions against corrupt politicians while Secretary of State Marco Rubio demanded CPT dissolution by deadline. The attempted dismissal remained unpublished in Le Moniteur creating legal limbo while political parties mobilized to demand CPT departure. Security operations achieved tactical gains with 877 new police officers graduated but killed 50 civilians and displaced 5800 people since January 1. Gang Suppression Force deployment slipped to October 2026 leaving Haiti undermanned during transition. The convergence of TPS termination February 3 and CPT expiration February 7 creates dual humanitarian and governance crisis threatening remittance flows of 4.9 billion dollars annually.

WEEK IN REVIEW

January 19 2026

marked the first business day after the critical weekend passed without CARICOM emergency summit, with the CPT launching national political dialogue meeting COPPOS, KOREPAD, Montana Accord, and December 21 representatives. With exactly nineteen days until February 7 2026, -represented the absolute final window for consensus allowing eighteen to seventeen days for implementation. The dialogue occurred after CARICOM facilitation had collapsed leaving Haitian actors to negotiate their own post-February 7 governance framework. The operational timeline reality created severe constraints because with nineteen days remaining, -consensus would still require decree drafting three to five days, stakeholder consultations five to seven days, CPT approval two to three days, Le Moniteur publication one to two days, and public rollout three to five days totaling minimum fourteen to twenty-two days against seventeen-day actual window. The forty-three day gang attack pause continued as armed groups awaited dialogue outcomes before deciding whether to resume violence late January. UN BINUH mandate expiration January 31 remained unresolved, twelve days away and seven days before CPT expiration, creating dual institutional vacuum risk.

January 20 2026

The CPT concluded the second day of national political dialogue January 19 with no announced frameworks despite participation from Montana, COPPOS, KOREPAD, and December 21 groups. Le Nouvelliste reported the CPT was struggling to reach agreement and unnamed organizations refused engagement. The CPT official statement released used identical generic language to 's announcement, claiming to have successfully concluded exchanges marked by quality dialogue, without announcing any specific consensus points, governance frameworks, agreed timelines, or concrete next steps for the February 7 transition. With 18 days remaining, the absence of announced frameworks after two days of meetings with Haiti's most significant political stakeholders indicated either fundamental disagreements on core transition elements, internal CPT deadlock on which proposal to adopt, or a strategy of conducting consultations to claim legitimacy for predetermined decision rather than genuinely building consensus. A major PNH operation killed six gang members in Barbecue's Magloire Ambroise Street stronghold demonstrating improved multi-force coordination and systematic targeting of gang leadership infrastructure. The operation resulted in seizures of 18 shotguns, three AR-15 assault rifles, eight pistols, significant ammunition quantities, five drones, stolen UDMO police uniforms, bulletproof vests, and tear gas grenades.

January 21 2026

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marked seventeen days until February 7 2026 with the CPT having concluded its three-day national political dialogue without announcing any consensus governance frameworks or next steps despite consulting all major political forces over seventy-two hours of intensive consultations. The CPT stated it would examine multiple proposals submitted by different stakeholder groups to reach final resolution before February 7, confirming no consensus was achieved during dialogue and that internal deliberations must select or synthesize competing frameworks within seventeen-day remaining window. Le National reported less than two weeks from mandate end the CPT had not succeeded in bringing together all political forces despite intensive consultation process. UN Secretary-General report released January 20 documented more than 8100 killings nationwide between January and November 2025 and assessed that the transition roadmap has been worryingly slow with the objective of reinstating democratic institutions by February 2026 now at risk. Security Council briefing addressed BINUH renewal with mandate expiring January 31 in ten days. Multiple competing governance proposals submitted to CPT included COPPOS bicephalous executive model, Montana Accord Conference of Stakeholders framework, 70 plus Party Alliance proposal demanding CPT definitive end, and Civil Society Initiative seventeen-member deliberative assembly requiring CPT examination and decision in compressed timeline.

January 22 2026

Haiti's transition framework faced its most severe test when multiple CPT members attempted to revoke Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime only to be blocked by explicit U.S. warning of sanctions against destabilizing actors. Late January 21 several CPT members drafted and signed resolution to dismiss Prime Minister with initially five members signing the document but at least one later withdrew support preventing formation of working majority. Laurent Saint-Cyr serving as CPT coordinator actively opposed the maneuver and circulated letter warning that any attempt to destabilize government composition so close to critical transition deadlines would undermine entire democratic process. The attempted removal collapsed within hours after U.S. Embassy issued unusually direct public statement warning that anyone supporting government changes at this stage would be acting against American interests and that Washington would act accordingly. Deputy Secretary Christopher Landau reinforced message through social media and press briefings framing governmental change as inherently favoring gang interests with implicit threat of visa restrictions and potential sanctions-style measures against individual CPT members. PNH operations in Bercy-Arcahaie corridor and central Port-au-Prince generated approximately 6000 new displacements since January 6 straining humanitarian systems already operating at 10 percent hospital capacity. Gang territorial control remained at 80-90 percent of capital while international security force deployment lagged at 1000 personnel against 5500 target.

January 23 2026

Five of nine CPT members signed resolution to remove Prime Minister Fils-Aime on 22 January with implementation planned within thirty days despite severe warnings from United States and Canada. The signatories Fritz Alphonse Jean, Leslie Voltaire, Louis Gerald Gilles, Edgard Leblanc Fils, and Smith Augustin represented majority of nine-member body. CPT member Leslie Voltaire and CPT President pro tempore Edgard Leblanc Fils publicly confirmed the action January 23 stating Council would replace Prime Minister within maximum of thirty days. United States government responded with extraordinary severity with State Department Western Hemisphere Affairs bureau calling CPT members pursuing this path not Haitian patriots but criminals like the gangs they conspire with. Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke directly with Prime Minister Fils-Aime January 23 to reaffirm United States support for his continued leadership. Canada's embassy issued parallel statement expressing deep concern and threatening measures against any actor compromising Haiti's peace and stability. This created immediate split within Transitional Presidential Council itself with Laurent Saint-Cyr serving as CPT President pro tempore issuing statement rejecting any government change approaching February 7 deadline. Security operations along Route Nationale 1 produced tactical results but failed to restore sustained civilian access with Bercy area not yet fully secured and Montrouis displacement events demonstrating persistent insecurity.

January 24 2026

Haiti entered critical constitutional crisis as five CPT members voted January 21 to dismiss Prime Minister just two weeks before CPT mandate expires February 7 2026. United States intervened forcefully with Secretary Rubio warning corrupt politicians will pay heavy price and demanding CPT dissolution by deadline. Security operations

killed six gang members in Bercy while 50 civilians died in PNH actions since January 1. Gang Suppression Force deployment delayed until April 2026 despite urgent need. National dialogue failed to produce post-transition governance framework. Humanitarian conditions deteriorated with 5.7 million facing acute hunger and 340000 Haitians losing TPS status February 3. The standoff created profound operational uncertainty across all governance scenarios with bleak scenario analysis across all pathways and no clear resolution mechanism before February 7 deadline. PNH operations achieved territorial reclamation in Port-au-Prince core but generated civilian casualties that risked undermining operational legitimacy. International Gang Suppression Force authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 2793 remained severely undermanned with only 950 to 1000 personnel deployed with GSF Special Representative announcing first new contingents will not arrive until April 2026 with full deployment projected by October 2026.

January 25 2026

Haiti's constitutional crisis remained in procedural deadlock as five CPT members who voted January 21 to dismiss Prime Minister failed to publish resolution in *Le Moniteur* rendering it legally void. Fils-Aime and CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr appeared together January 23 at graduation of 877 new police officers projecting executive unity and securing U.S. backing. Political parties UNIR, FNC, and OPL demanded CPT depart February 7 as agreed under April 2024 transition framework. Kenya deployed 217 additional police officers January 18 bringing total MSS personnel to 1200 but GSF full deployment slipped to October 2026. The gourde held at 132-133 HTG per USD with no major security incidents in last 24 hours. Without *Le Moniteur* publication dismissal lacked legal force effectively freezing crisis in limbo. Joint Fils-Aime and Saint-Cyr appearance at National Police Academy graduation ceremony constituted tacit endorsement of Prime Minister's legitimacy and signaled executive coordination. Saint-Cyr's remarks carried unmistakable political subtext stating majority is not two, three, or five people but the people and that interests of the majority are security appearing to directly rebuke CPT members who signed dismissal resolution.

THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Executive Authority Fragmentation and International Intervention

The week's dominant political dynamic centered on the attempted removal of Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime by five CPT members creating unprecedented executive fragmentation seventeen days before the constitutional mandate expiration February 7 2026. The attempted dismissal represented fundamental breakdown in transitional governance with Fritz Alphonse Jean, Leslie Voltaire, Louis Gerald Gilles, Edgard Leblanc Fils, and Smith Augustin publicly asserting authority to replace Prime Minister within thirty days despite lacking explicit legal foundation in April 2024 decree establishing CPT. The internal split materialized when CPT President Laurent Saint-Cyr rejected dismissal attempt warning that government changes approaching deadline would undermine institutional stability and contradict transition objectives. This created competing claims to authority within council with five members asserting power to revoke Prime Minister while coordinating officer and at least three other members opposed the move.

United States intervention achieved unprecedented level of explicit pressure on Haitian political actors. U.S. Embassy issued direct warning that anyone supporting government changes would be acting against American interests and Washington would act accordingly. Deputy Secretary Christopher Landau escalated framing governmental change as inherently favoring gang interests with implicit threat of visa restrictions and potential sanctions against individual CPT members. Secretary of State Marco Rubio called Prime Minister Fils-Aime directly January 23 reaffirming U.S. support for his continued leadership while publicly demanding CPT dissolution by February 7 without corrupt individuals attempting to interfere. Canada issued parallel statement threatening measures against any actor compromising peace and stability. The coordinated U.S.-Canadian positioning represented external veto power over elite decisions demonstrating degree to which Haiti's transition architecture depends on international guarantees rather than domestic political consensus.

The procedural stalemate emerged when five CPT members failed to publish dismissal resolution in *Le Moniteur* the official gazette required for legal validity. Without publication dismissal lacked legal force effectively freezing

crisis in limbo. Fils-Aime and Saint-Cyr joint appearance January 23 at police graduation ceremony constituted tacit endorsement of Prime Minister's legitimacy with Saint-Cyr's remarks stating majority is not two, three, or five people but the people directly rebuking five-member faction. Political parties UNIR, FNC, and OPL escalated pressure demanding CPT departure February 7 with UNIR Secretary General emphasizing 2026 is dedicated to elections which must be held according to constitutional provisions. Compromis Historique party publicly disavowed Smith Augustin despite his dismissal resolution signature. The convergence of internal CPT division, international sanctions threats, and domestic political mobilization created conditions where no clear resolution mechanism existed before February 7 deadline with scenarios ranging from rushed transition agreement, unilateral CPT extension, or institutional vacuum with competing authority claims.

Security Operations Effectiveness Versus Humanitarian Cost

Haitian National Police operations throughout the week achieved tactical territorial gains in Port-au-Prince core but generated severe civilian casualties threatening to undermine operational legitimacy and sustainability. PNH units supported by Prime Minister task force and international security partners conducted sustained operations in Bercy, Bel-Air, La Saline, Delmas neighborhoods, and downtown government district employing demolition equipment, explosive kamikaze drones, and armored vehicles. January 20-21 operation in Bercy killed six gang members and seized 18 shotguns, three AR-15 assault rifles, eight pistols, significant ammunition, five drones, stolen police uniforms, bulletproof vests, and tear gas grenades. January 14 strike targeted Delmas 6 stronghold of Viv Ansanm leader Jimmy Cherizier known as Barbecue demolishing residences and reducing gang leader's capacity to re-establish in area. Minister Pelissier declared capital recapture already underway with airport intersection, Delmas 19, Nazon, and Magloire Ambroise Street transitioning from gang-controlled red zone to contested orange zone status.

The humanitarian cost proved severe with security force operations killing 50 civilians and displacing 5800 people from Port-au-Prince neighborhoods since January 1. Between July and September 2025 security forces were responsible for 61 percent of all casualties with 22 percent of victims being residents struck by stray bullets at home or during daily activities. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Turk stated some security officers continued to summarily execute individuals suspected of gang links. Drone operations conducted by Vectus Global led by Blackwater founder Erik Prince presented acute legal and ethical concerns with strikes between March and September 2025 killing 547 people including 527 suspected gang members and 20 civilians among them 11 children. September 2025 drone attack on birthday party killed at least eight children reportedly targeting gang leader Albert Steevenson while distributing gifts. Turk warned most drone strikes likely unlawful under international human rights law yet Vectus Global announced August 2025 a 10-year contract with Haiti involving nearly 200 to several hundred personnel.

The operational pattern demonstrated PNH and Gang Suppression Force units could achieve tactical victories in specific locations through concentrated firepower and armored vehicle deployments but gains proved fragile without sustained presence and service delivery to prevent gang reinfiltration. PNH graduated 877 new officers January 23 representing largest single-class addition in recent years and first tangible output of P4000 program aiming to train 4000 police by early 2026. However effectiveness remained uncertain as officers completed only four months training compared to standard police academy timelines and deployed into gang-controlled zones where recent operations generated high civilian casualties. Route Nationale 1 remained contested with Bercy operations ongoing since January 4 without achieving territorial control sufficient for civilian return and Montrouis displacement events demonstrating persistent insecurity across corridor. Gangs maintained 80-90 percent territorial control of Port-au-Prince despite downtown gains indicating tactical advances had not fundamentally altered security calculus for civilian movements or commercial operations.

Gang Suppression Force Deployment Failure and Structural Security Gaps

The international security response demonstrated catastrophic implementation failure with Gang Suppression Force deployment timeline slipping from immediate post-mandate to October 2026 leaving Haiti critically undermanned during most volatile transition period. UN Security Council authorized GSF September 30 2025 with mandate for up to 5550 personnel yet only 1200 deployed four months later with 1000 being Kenyan police inherited from ineffective Multinational Security Support mission. Kenya deployed additional 217 officers January 18 demonstrating ongoing

commitment as lead contributor but highlighting sluggish international force generation. GSF Special Representative Jack Christofides announced January 22 first new contingents beyond Kenya will not arrive until April 2026 with full deployment projected October 2026 creating five-month vacuum when Haiti's security needs are most acute.

Funding remained critical constraint with UN trust fund holding only 113 million dollars of 800 million needed annually and no donations received since August 2025. United States contributed just 15 million to trust fund while Canada provided 63 million representing severe international commitment shortfall. GSF operates on voluntary contributions creating month-to-month funding uncertainty that constrains operational tempo and prevents long-term planning. BINUH head Carlos Ruiz Massieu warned January 21 security gains remain fragile and risk reversal without sustained pressure and basic service delivery. The force protects airport, port, and critical infrastructure but lacks capacity to simultaneously hold cleared terrain and expand operations creating conditions where PNH tactical advances cannot be consolidated into permanent territorial control.

Haitian National Police deployed 892 new officers in January but remained at numerical parity with gang forces at approximately 12000 each. PNH seized 25 firearms and 14269 cartridges between January 1-18 and arrested three traffickers demonstrating sustained operational activity but insufficient to shift strategic balance. Coordination gaps between GSF and humanitarian actors resulted in convoy delays or elevated risk movements through unsecured routes. Between March and September 2025 Vectus Global drone operations provided tactical support but generated international criticism for unlawful strikes killing civilians including children. The structural security gap means Haiti enters February transition period with security forces incapable of protecting electoral infrastructure, securing humanitarian corridors, or preventing gang territorial expansion. Twenty-three communes remain under gang control rendering Electoral Council operations impossible and making August 30 2026 election date operationally infeasible without dramatic security improvements that current force structure and deployment timeline cannot deliver.

Humanitarian Crisis Convergence with Political Transition Deadline

Haiti's humanitarian emergency reached critical inflection point with 5.7 million people facing acute food insecurity, 1.4 million internally displaced, and TPS termination February 3 threatening remittance flows of 4.9 billion dollars annually representing 21.4 percent of GDP. The convergence of TPS expiration and CPT mandate end February 7 created four-day dual crisis period when migration policy uncertainty combined with governance institutional vacuum. The 340000 to 353000 Haitians losing TPS legal status faced 18-month departure window with potential mass deportations destabilizing Haiti further given 62.8 percent of remittances originate from United States making TPS population economically critical. Gang control of 85-90 percent of Port-au-Prince combined with severely limited airport access made return extremely dangerous for deportees with no safe housing or support networks available.

Humanitarian conditions extended beyond Port-au-Prince with gangs expanding into Artibonite and Centre departments where killings increased 210 percent January to August 2025 versus 2024. Armed attacks in Montrouis December 23-25 displaced 1120 people and National Road 1 remained impassable at Montrouis segment as of January 6 due to gang activity. Health services were severely disrupted with only approximately 10 percent of hospital-capacity facilities fully operational and 4.9 million needing emergency medical care. Medecins Sans Frontieres suspended activities in Bel-Air after facilities caught in crossfire and ex-volunteer killed demonstrating risks even experienced crisis responders faced. WFP forced to halve rations and suspend hot meals due to 139 million dollar funding gap. The 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan targets 4.2 million people with 880 million dollar appeal facing severe early-year funding shortfalls.

Security operations generated additional humanitarian strain with approximately 6000 newly displaced in capital since January 6 amid intensified security sweeps. PNH operations in Bercy and downtown Port-au-Prince employed heavy equipment and drone strikes producing tactical gains but displacing populations into already overwhelmed humanitarian systems. IOM assessments documented displacement populations sheltering with host families across multiple localities creating pressure on community resources and services. The combination of ongoing gang violence, security force civilian casualties, displacement pressures, food insecurity, health system collapse, and impending TPS deportations created conditions for catastrophic humanitarian deterioration. Mass deportations could flood displacement camps with returnees lacking shelter or livelihood options while remittance disruption

would immediately impact household food security, healthcare access, and small business operations across all departments. Absence of functional governance after February 7 would paralyze humanitarian coordination and service delivery with international agencies already facing severe access constraints requiring humanitarian corridor negotiations with multiple armed groups and competing authorities.

TREND ANALYSIS

Political Legitimacy Deterioration

Haiti's transitional governance legitimacy continued deteriorating throughout the week with domestic and international actors openly challenging CPT authority and competing frameworks proliferating without convergence. The primary driver was CPT internal deadlock exposed through attempted Prime Minister dismissal creating public split between five members asserting removal authority versus coordinating officer Saint-Cyr and at least three other members opposing the move. Secondary drivers included three-day national dialogue January 18-20 producing no announced consensus frameworks despite consulting all major political forces, 70-plus party alliance formed January 14 demanding CPT definitive end February 7 and rejecting any extension, and political parties UNIR, FNC, and OPL escalating pressure for unconditional departure. Observable indicators included CPT inability to publish dismissal resolution in *Le Moniteur* revealing procedural paralysis, unnamed political organizations refusing dialogue participation despite intensive consultation process, and *Compromis Historique* party disavowing its own CPT representative Smith Augustin. The trend trajectory is deteriorating with acceleration as February 7 deadline approaches. Likely continuation conditions exist through mandate expiration given irreconcilable competing proposals from COPPOS bicephalous executive, Montana Conference of Stakeholders, Civil Society Initiative seventeen-member assembly, and 70-plus party one-year transition creating deadlock that compressed timeline makes operationally impossible to resolve. Reversal conditions would require external mediation producing unified framework with CPT internal consensus and domestic political buy-in within remaining days representing extremely low probability outcome.

Security Force Tactical Gains Without Strategic Consolidation

Haitian security forces achieved tactical territorial gains in Port-au-Prince core neighborhoods throughout the week but failed to consolidate advances into sustained presence enabling civilian return or service delivery restoration. Primary drivers included PNH operations with Prime Minister task force and international security partner support employing demolition equipment, explosive drones, and armored vehicles achieving localized gang force defeats and weapons seizures. Secondary drivers included 877 new PNH officer graduation January 23 providing personnel reinforcement and Kenya deployment of 217 additional police January 18 bringing MSS total to 1200. Observable indicators included Minister Pelissier designation of airport intersection, Delmas 19, Nazon, and Magloire Ambroise Street transitioning from red zone gang-controlled to orange zone contested status, January 20-21 Bercy operation killing six gang members and seizing significant weapons cache, and PNH seizure of 25 firearms and 14269 cartridges between January 1-18. However trend trajectory is stabilizing without improvement indicated by Bercy operations ongoing since January 4 without achieving territorial control sufficient for civilian return, gangs maintaining 80-90 percent territorial control of Port-au-Prince despite tactical advances, Route Nationale 1 remaining impassable at multiple points, and security force actions killing 50 civilians and displacing 5800 people since January 1 undermining operational legitimacy. Likely continuation conditions exist through mid-2026 given GSF full deployment delayed to October 2026, PNH personnel levels remaining at numerical parity with gang forces at approximately 12000 each, and funding constraints limiting operational tempo with UN trust fund holding only 113 million of 800 million needed annually and no donations since August 2025. Reversal conditions would require GSF deployment acceleration, sustained funding commitments enabling permanent PNH presence in cleared areas, and service delivery restoration demonstrating state capacity representing low probability given current deployment timeline and funding gaps.

International Coordination Collapse

International coordination mechanisms for Haiti crisis response deteriorated throughout the week with CARICOM facilitation absent, BINUH mandate expiring January 31 without announced renewal, and bilateral actors pursuing

uncoordinated interventions based on competing priorities. Primary drivers included critical weekend January 18-19 passing without anticipated CARICOM emergency summit confirming regional facilitation had collapsed, UN Security Council failing to announce BINUH renewal despite January 31 expiration creating seven-day vacuum before February 7 CPT expiration, and United States adopting increasingly unilateral approach with direct sanctions threats against CPT members and TPS termination February 3 without international coordination. Secondary drivers included GSF deployment delays despite September 2025 Security Council authorization indicating implementation failure, funding shortfalls with UN trust fund receiving no donations since August 2025, and OAS institutional continuity clause lacking operational mechanisms given BINUH expiration eliminates coordination capacity. Observable indicators included January 21 Security Council briefing addressing BINUH renewal without producing resolution vote, U.S.-Canadian parallel statements threatening measures against CPT members representing bilateral coordination outside multilateral frameworks, and humanitarian agencies establishing direct coordination with GSF and UNSOH advance teams bypassing collapsed political mission coordination. Trend trajectory is deteriorating with likely continuation conditions through February transition given no announced emergency summits or coordination mechanisms to replace collapsed CARICOM facilitation and expiring BINUH mission. Reversal conditions would require last-minute BINUH renewal enabling coordination through February transition, CARICOM emergency session producing unified position on post-February 7 governance, or OAS activation of institutional continuity mechanisms with clear coordination protocols representing moderate probability given international community concern about governance vacuum but low probability of achieving implementation before February 7 deadline.

Humanitarian Access Constraint Intensification

Humanitarian access constraints intensified throughout the week with gang territorial control maintaining 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince, Route Nationale 1 impassable at multiple points, security operations generating displacement and civilian casualties, and funding gaps forcing program reductions. Primary drivers included gang expansion into Artibonite and Centre departments where killings increased 210 percent January to August 2025, Route Nationale 1 insecurity with Bercy-Arcahaie corridor contested despite PNH operations since January 4 and Montrouis attacks displacing 1120 people, and security force operations displacing 5800 people since January 1 while killing 50 civilians creating populations requiring assistance in increasingly inaccessible areas. Secondary drivers included MSF suspension of Bel-Air activities after facilities caught in crossfire exposing risks for experienced responders, health system operating at approximately 10 percent of hospital-capacity with 4.9 million needing emergency medical care, WFP forced to halve rations and suspend hot meals due to 139 million dollar funding gap, and 2026 Humanitarian Response Plan appeal for 880 million facing severe early-year funding shortfalls. Observable indicators included IOM assessments documenting 6000 newly displaced since January 6 requiring immediate assistance, OCHA reporting Route Nationale 1 inaccessible at Montrouis with access to multiple localities very difficult and exposed to armed attacks, and humanitarian agencies unable to negotiate corridor agreements with multiple armed groups and competing authorities given governance fragmentation. Trend trajectory is deteriorating with likely continuation conditions through mid-2026 given gang territorial control unlikely to shift dramatically without GSF full deployment delayed to October 2026, TPS termination February 3 threatening remittance flows funding household assistance and small business operations, and CPT expiration February 7 potentially paralyzing humanitarian coordination if governance vacuum materializes. Reversal conditions would require sustained security improvements enabling corridor reopening, major donor funding commitments closing HRP gaps, and governance stabilization providing coordination mechanisms representing low probability given current security trajectory, funding environment, and political crisis convergence.

OUTLOOK FOR THE UPCOMING WEEK

The period January 26 through February 1 represents the absolute final opportunity for coordinated governance transition before February 7 2026 constitutional deadline with three plausible scenarios meriting preparation. First scenario involves CPT publishing Prime Minister dismissal resolution in Le Moniteur triggering immediate U.S. sanctions designations against Fritz Jean, Leslie Voltaire, Louis Gerald Gilles, Edgard Leblanc Fils, and Smith Augustin under Global Magnitsky or Haiti-specific authorities creating dual executive with contested legitimacy and international recognition split. This outcome is moderately likely based on five CPT members' public confirmation of dismissal intention and thirty-day replacement timeline though procedural paralysis preventing Le Moniteur

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publication suggests internal deadlock may persist. Trigger events include CPT majority convening formal sessions to assert executive authority or naming replacement Prime Minister forcing U.S. sanctions response and creating parallel government structures.

Second scenario involves national dialogue producing negotiated framework for post-February 7 governance enabling coordinated transition with modified executive structures and electoral timeline. This outcome is low probability given three-day dialogue January 18-20 produced no consensus despite consulting all major political forces, competing proposals from COPPOS, Montana, 70-plus party alliance, and Civil Society Initiative remain irreconcilable on executive structure and timeline length, and compressed six-day window January 26-31 insufficient for proper decree drafting, stakeholder consultation, CPT approval, Le Moniteur publication, and institutional rollout requiring minimum fourteen to twenty-two days. Trigger events include CARICOM emergency session or OAS intervention producing external mediation that forces rapid consensus, U.S.-Canadian diplomatic pressure compelling CPT internal unity on single framework, or political parties converging on minimal viable transition mechanism.

Third scenario involves CPT mandate expiring February 7 without successor framework creating institutional vacuum with competing authority claims from CPT members asserting extension authority, political parties establishing alternative transition bodies, and Prime Minister Fils-Aime continuing under constitutional provision permitting PM to remain if no successor appointed. This outcome is highly likely representing default trajectory absent successful implementation of scenario one or two. Trigger events include January 31 BINUH mandate expiration without renewal eliminating international coordination capacity during final week, failure to publish governance framework announcement by January 28 confirming insufficient time for implementation, and political party mobilization including protests or demonstrations pressuring CPT departure. Cause-effect logic suggests institutional vacuum would paralyze government decision-making, create competing legitimacy claims requiring case-by-case international actor recognition decisions, and eliminate coordinated electoral planning making August 30 2026 election date operationally infeasible. Risk assessment indicates scenario three carries highest probability approximately 60 percent versus scenario one at 30 percent and scenario two at 10 percent based on current trajectory, time constraints, and political actor positioning.

STAKEHOLDER IMPLICATIONS

International Community

International actors face unprecedented complexity navigating Haiti's overlapping crises requiring immediate contingency positioning for multiple governance scenarios and coordination mechanism alternatives. The CPT internal split between five members asserting Prime Minister dismissal authority versus coordinating officer Saint-Cyr and opposing faction creates competing claims to executive legitimacy with international recognition decisions determining operational counterparts for program implementation and financial disbursements. United States and Canada explicit sanctions threats against CPT members who signed dismissal resolution signal willingness to use bilateral coercive measures potentially fragmenting international community response if other actors maintain different recognition policies. BINUH mandate expiration January 31 without announced renewal eliminates UN political mission coordination capacity during final week before February 7 creating vacuum in humanitarian coordination, diplomatic facilitation, and human rights monitoring requiring alternative mechanisms through OAS, bilateral embassies, or ad hoc arrangements.

TPS termination February 3 coinciding with CPT expiration February 7 creates compressed four-day period when migration policy and governance uncertainty converge requiring coordinated planning on deportation timeline, returnee reception capacity, and remittance flow preservation. Humanitarian Response Plan appeal for 880 million faces severe early-year funding shortfalls with WFP requiring 44 million through April and multiple agencies forced to reduce programs threatening service delivery collapse if governance vacuum materializes. Electoral assistance programs planning for August 30 2026 elections face operational impossibility with 23 communes under gang control, GSF deployment delayed to October 2026, and governance crisis preventing Electoral Council coordination. Operational decisions include establishing direct communication with both CPT factions and Prime Minister's office to preserve flexibility, clarifying recognition criteria for post-February 7 authorities, activating OAS institutional

continuity mechanisms, coordinating TPS deportation phasing with Haitian reception capacity, securing emergency humanitarian funding for February-March period, and developing electoral timeline contingencies accounting for likely August 30 delay. Decision pressure points concentrate January 26-31 when BINUH renewal and governance framework announcements determine coordination architecture for transition period.

Private Sector and Investors

Private sector operations face severe disruption risks from political crisis convergence, security volatility, and humanitarian deterioration requiring defensive positioning and contingency activation. The attempted Prime Minister dismissal creates executive authority uncertainty with government approvals, permits, contracts, and licenses potentially contested if parallel executive structures emerge or institutional vacuum materializes February 7. Any agreements requiring state signature authority will face validation challenges if competing entities claim executive legitimacy necessitating clear organizational protocols for determining counterpart authority. Security operations achieving tactical gains but killing 50 civilians and displacing 5800 people since January 1 demonstrate continued high-risk environment for personnel and assets with gangs maintaining 80-90 percent Port-au-Prince territorial control despite PNH advances. Route Nationale 1 insecurity constrains supply chain operations with Bercy-Arcahaie corridor contested and Montrouis segment impassable affecting commercial traffic to northern markets.

TPS termination February 3 threatens remittance flows of 4.9 billion dollars annually representing 21.4 percent of GDP with immediate impacts on consumer purchasing power in retail, food, and consumer goods sectors as household income declines. The 340000 Haitians losing legal status include significant portion of diaspora remittance senders with deportation implementation beginning potential April 2026 after 18-month departure window creating sustained economic contraction pressures. Currency stability at 132-133 HTG per USD may not hold if political crisis escalates with capital flight pressures materializing through gourde depreciation affecting import costs and inflation. Toussaint Louverture Airport severely limited commercial traffic with FAA ban through March 2026 constrains business travel and cargo operations while gang control near port facilities creates access vulnerabilities for import-export activities. Operational decisions include activating political risk hedging strategies and reducing Port-au-Prince exposure through February transition period, developing flexible contractual language accommodating interim authority structures, establishing independent security intelligence networks beyond GSF presence, assessing supply chain redundancy with pre-positioning in multiple locations, modeling remittance disruption impacts on consumer market segments, and preparing business continuity plans for potential extended instability if governance vacuum persists beyond February. Decision pressure points require activation by January 31 to position for February 3-7 crisis convergence period with ongoing reassessment through March depending on post-deadline governance outcomes.

Political Actors

Haitian political actors enter decisive period requiring rapid strategic positioning on post-February 7 governance frameworks versus mobilization for CPT departure and regime change. The 70-plus party alliance formed January 14 demanding CPT definitive end February 7 represents significant political force including Grand Bloc du Peuple, Initiative du 24 avril, Opposition plurielle, Accord Karibe, DEHFI, and MP-18 with capacity for street mobilization and protest actions if CPT attempts unilateral extension. Individual parties UNIR, FNC, and OPL escalated demands for unconditional CPT departure with UNIR emphasizing 2026 dedicated to elections under constitutional provisions and FNC specifying exit February 6 at 11:59 PM. However no unified alternative transition framework has emerged from opposition forces with competing proposals from COPPOS bicephalous executive, Montana Conference of Stakeholders, and Civil Society Initiative seventeen-member assembly remaining irreconcilable on executive structure, timeline length, and leadership selection mechanisms.

The CPT internal split between five members asserting Prime Minister dismissal authority versus Saint-Cyr and opposing faction creates opportunity for political actors to align with different CPT factions potentially securing positions in post-February 7 arrangements. U.S. sanctions threats against five CPT members who signed dismissal resolution make alignment with that faction carry personal risk of visa restrictions or asset freezes while Saint-Cyr faction maintains international backing. Political party representatives must decide whether to prioritize negotiated transition frameworks through continued dialogue participation versus opposition mobilization demanding clean break from CPT and establishment of new transition body. Compromis Historique party disavowal of its CPT

representative Smith Augustin despite dismissal resolution signature demonstrates risks of party-CPT member disconnect affecting political positioning.

Operational decisions include accelerating parallel governance planning with technocratic transition proposals that bypass compromised CPT actors, coordinating unified opposition framework from disparate parties to present viable alternative to CPT extension, engaging directly with OAS and international actors on post-February 7 recognition criteria, preparing mobilization capacity for protests if CPT publishes dismissal resolution or attempts unilateral extension, establishing communication with security forces to assess loyalty dynamics in contested authority scenarios, and developing electoral coalition strategies for potential August 30 2026 elections if governance stabilizes. Decision pressure points concentrate January 26-28 when CPT must announce governance framework or face mobilization pressures, with final positioning required by February 1 before transition week begins. Key risks include fragmented opposition enabling CPT extension by default, premature mobilization triggering security force response before critical mass achieved, and international actors imposing external framework that excludes significant political forces from post-transition arrangements.

Diaspora

Haitian diaspora communities face converging crises requiring urgent coordination on TPS advocacy, remittance continuity strategies, and transition period planning. The 340000 to 353000 Haitians losing TPS legal status February 3 have nine days remaining to secure extension applications or alternative status options with 18-month departure window before potential deportation beginning April 2026. Diaspora organizations must provide urgent legal guidance to affected TPS holders on available options including asylum applications, adjustment of status possibilities, or voluntary departure planning. The timing creates additional pressure as TPS termination coincides with CPT expiration February 7 creating four-day period when both migration policy and governance uncertainty peak making return conditions extremely dangerous with gang control of 80-90 percent of Port-au-Prince and severely limited airport access.

Remittance flows totaling 4.9 billion dollars annually represent 21.4 percent of GDP with 62.8 percent originating from United States making TPS population economically critical to Haiti's household survival and business operations. Deportation implementation would disrupt remittance patterns affecting relatives' food security, healthcare access, education expenses, and small business liquidity. Diaspora must develop remittance continuity strategies anticipating potential sender deportations and recipient displacement from gang violence or security operations that displaced 5800 people since January 1. The political crisis compounds planning challenges as institutional vacuum after February 7 could paralyze government services affecting documentation, banking access, and coordination of returnee reception if mass deportations occur.

Operational decisions include engaging with U.S. Congress members and advocacy organizations for TPS extension or phased implementation given Haiti instability, establishing emergency assistance networks for deportees requiring immediate shelter and livelihood support, coordinating with Haitian government on returnee reception protocols despite political crisis, developing remittance continuity mechanisms if senders lose legal status and income capacity, advocating with international community for governance stabilization recognizing diaspora stake in Haiti democratic transition, and mobilizing diaspora political influence in host countries to pressure for coordinated international response. Decision pressure points require immediate activation given February 3 TPS termination and February 7 CPT expiration with ongoing coordination through March-April if mass deportations begin. Diaspora communities represent critical stakeholder with economic leverage through remittances and political influence in host countries but face severe time constraints requiring emergency response coordination across multiple advocacy and service delivery fronts simultaneously.

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