



# AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Week 7: February 9-15, 2026

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti's first week under single-executive governance following the February 7 CPT dissolution revealed a catastrophic security force imbalance of 3,000 heavily armed gang fighters against 400 combat-ready police officers while humanitarian funding collapsed to 3.4 percent of documented need. The United States achieved unprecedented international consensus backing Prime Minister Fils-Aime but domestic political opposition crystallized around legitimacy concerns as no inclusive dialogue mechanisms emerged. Child recruitment by armed groups tripled in 2025 with minors now comprising 30 to 50 percent of gang membership transforming the crisis into a child protection emergency. China actively courted Haiti with financial incentives to break Taiwan diplomatic ties introducing great-power competition into what was previously treated as regional instability. Judicial and anti-corruption institutions asserted independence through TPS protection rulings and expanded ULCC investigations while security conditions deteriorated with Kenscoff corridor attacks and surging Port-au-Prince kidnappings creating humanitarian access disruption.

### WEEK IN REVIEW

February 9. The emergence of a parallel Colleague Presidentiel led partly by US-sanctioned former CPT members created immediate dual-authority crisis within 48 hours of CPT dissolution. The self-declared Colleague issued its first official communique CPR-001 establishing two institutional commissions in direct competition with Prime Minister Fils-Aime who delivered a national address flanked by security forces signaling sector backing. The United States authorized up to 5 million dollars in military financing for the Forces Armees d'Haiti marking the first such funding since the 1990s through Foreign Military Financing Program and Peacekeeping Operations for Haitian Coast Guard equipment and FAd'H non-lethal assistance. France formally endorsed the transition while three US warships remained deployed off Port-au-Prince under Operation Southern Spear. The PNH launched training for 1,200 new recruits under the P4000 program representing 40 percent force expansion over 16 months. The convergence of parallel governance structures competing international military support and accelerating police recruitment revealed institutional fragmentation at the precise moment when unified authority was most critical for democratic transition execution.

February 10. Every major international stakeholder achieved unprecedented coordination backing PM Fils-Aime within 48 hours through formal statements from US, BINUH, OAS, France, Canada, and Dominican Republic. BINUH explicitly invoked UNSCR 2814 providing legal framework for international support to interim government while OAS characterized the interim period as short purposeful and clearly directed to prevent mandate creep. Domestic political forces mobilized opposition with Kolektif Tet Ansanm warning against unilateral governance and lawyer Marc Sony Charles declaring Fils-Aime decisions unconstitutional. The rival Colleague Presidentiel issued no new communique in this cycle and the absence of international endorsement significantly diminished its near-term viability. Macroeconomic indicators remained stable with gourde holding at 131 per dollar and January customs revenue showing slight year-over-year increase. The

## AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

international consensus contrasted sharply with domestic legitimacy challenges establishing the strongest external backing for any Haitian executive since CPT formation while exposing the weakest constitutional foundation creating operationally functional but constitutionally hollow governance.

February 11. US Charge d'Affaires Wooster testified before Senate Appropriations Subcommittee revealing force imbalance of approximately 3,000 heavily armed gang fighters against only 400 effectively combat-ready PNH officers. Wooster classified Haiti's gangs as proto-insurgent movements generating between 60 and 75 million dollars annually through systematic extortion rather than traditional criminal organizations. The International Rescue Committee simultaneously warned Haiti is on the verge of humanitarian collapse with funding at only 3.4 percent of documented need. PM Fils-Aime consolidated executive authority by dismissing Economy Minister Alfred Metellus and assuming the portfolio himself removing potential rival and establishing direct control of national treasury. The United States announced additional 16 million dollars in food security funding. The testimony marked significant shift in US policy language from characterizing the challenge as gang violence to explicitly identifying it as proto-insurgency threatening state survival with combined policy reframing justifying more aggressive military intervention and financial warfare measures.

February 12. UNICEF reported child recruitment by armed groups tripled in 2025 with minors now comprising 30 to 50 percent of gang membership and some recruits as young as age nine transforming Haiti's security crisis into child protection emergency requiring immediate programmatic response and altered rules of engagement for incoming forces. China is actively courting Haiti with financial incentives to break its 70-year diplomatic relationship with Taiwan introducing great-power competition into what was previously treated as regional stability challenge. Caribbean Security Group CEO Austin Holmes testified that China offering infrastructure financing and development assistance creating strategic implications as Haiti is one of Taiwan's 12 remaining diplomatic allies globally. UNICEF estimated that armed groups use boys as scouts and ammunition carriers while subjecting girls to sexual violence and forced domestic labor with primary drivers being poverty affecting more than 60 percent of population surviving on less than four dollars per day. The convergence of child protection emergency and geopolitical competition revealed that Haiti's crisis now extends beyond security and humanitarian domains into fundamental questions of state sovereignty and international alignment affecting US regional influence calculations.

February 13. Federal Judge Ana Reyes refused to stay her TPS ruling preserving protections for over 350,000 Haitians while reading death threats against her in open court demonstrating judicial independence under political pressure. The ULCC announced it will expand investigations beyond the 30-day asset declaration requirement for former CPT members directly targeting Louis Gerald Gilles, Smith Augustin, and Emmanuel Vertilaire implicated in BNC corruption scandal. The Superior Council of the Judiciary barred all judges from political activity through Resolution CSPJ-SP/02-2026/887 foreclosing proposals to install Court of Cassation judge as provisional

## AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

president. Canada-funded Morne-Casse training center neared completion with 200-officer capacity and first instructor training scheduled for end of February targeting specialized anti-gang units. These developments signaled institutional assertions of independence in post-CPT transition framework with judiciary refusing political entanglement, anti-corruption mechanisms advancing accountability probes, and federal courts protecting diaspora economic lifelines against executive branch termination attempts creating separation of powers dynamics that constrain unilateral governance approaches.

February 14. Viv Ansanm gangs burned farmer homes in Kenscoff marking seventh major attack phase since January 2025 targeting sole viable road connecting Port-au-Prince to southern departments while kidnapping-for-ransom operations surged in capital targeting professionals. PM Fils-Aime exercised first municipal appointment authority installing new Port-au-Prince commission but political dialogue remained frozen since February 7 despite international calls for inclusive consultation mechanisms. The Kenscoff corridor represents critical strategic infrastructure as gang control of National Routes 1, 2, and 3 leaves this mountain route as primary alternative for humanitarian organizations accessing South and Southeast departments where IRC reports 1.4 million displaced persons requiring aid distribution. Judge Reyes TPS stay denial created temporary stability but Trump administration can escalate to higher courts creating extended uncertainty period as DHS admission of possessing addresses of TPS holders in Springfield Ohio signals enforcement infrastructure preparation. The targeting of farmers specifically revealed economic warfare tactics aimed at food security disruption beyond territorial acquisition creating food weaponization scenarios that compound already severe crisis conditions.

February 15. Security conditions deteriorated materially across Port-au-Prince despite ongoing police operations with kidnappings rising for several weeks in Delmas corridor including priest, lawyer, and judge among current hostages. Gang leader Izo openly participated in and financed carnival activities in Village de Dieu with no official government response demonstrating operational impunity. Haiti experiencing critical security force transition gap as Kenya-led MSS with approximately 1,000 personnel begins drawdown while Gang Suppression Force not expected until April 2026 creating three-to-six-month vulnerability window. Elections remain scheduled for August 30 first round but CEP flags 23 gang-controlled communes as inaccessible and faces 137 million dollar unfunded budget. TPS court decision expected before February 19 affecting legal status and work authorization for 350,000 Haitians with potential immediate impact on remittance flows critical as approximately 60 percent of population lives on less than one dollar per day. The convergence of deteriorating security, delayed international force deployment, and diaspora legal uncertainty created compounding pressures on already fragile transition framework.

### THEMATIC ANALYSIS

Governance Legitimacy Paradox Under International Backing. The week demonstrated Haiti's most acute governance legitimacy challenge since the April 2024 political accord as

## AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

unprecedented international consensus supporting PM Fils-Aime contrasted sharply with domestic political fragmentation and constitutional hollowness. Within 48 hours of February 7 CPT dissolution, every major international stakeholder issued formal recognition statements with BINUH invoking UNSCR 2814 to establish legal framework, OAS characterizing interim period as short and purposeful, and US France Canada plus Dominican Republic completing consensus. This coordination reflects advance diplomatic planning and shared assessment that governance vacuum posed greater risk than imperfect transitional authority. However, domestic opposition immediately crystallized with Kolektif Tet Ansanm warning against unilateral governance, lawyer Marc Sony Charles declaring decisions unconstitutional, and over 220 registered political parties unable to achieve consensus on successor framework. The paradox creates operationally functional governance with strong external legitimacy but weak constitutional foundation and limited domestic political buy-in. This configuration enables PM Fils-Aime to exercise executive authority including municipal appointments and ministerial dismissals but leaves transition vulnerable to domestic political pressure and legitimacy challenges particularly as August 30 electoral timeline approaches requiring broad political consensus for candidate registration and voting legitimacy. The January 2025 polling showing 52 percent distrusted CPT and 51 percent distrusted prime minister indicates weak mandate for transitional institutions generally creating sustainability questions regardless of international backing strength.

Security Force Imbalance and Proto-Insurgency Reframing. Wooster Senate testimony on February 11 fundamentally reframed Haiti's security challenge from gang violence to proto-insurgency by quantifying force disparities that threaten state survival. The revelation that approximately 3,000 heavily armed gang fighters operate under coordinated command structures against maximally 400 combat-ready PNH officers produces effective combat ratio of 7.5 to 1 in gang favor. Wooster characterized armed groups as proto-insurgent movements rather than criminal organizations noting they now control territory generate systematic revenue and challenge state authority in ways exceeding traditional organized crime. The gangs generate between 60 and 75 million dollars annually according to Haiti Finance Ministry estimates primarily through extortion of shipments transiting from Dominican Republic enabling parallel state operations with systematic taxation of street vendors, bus companies, industrial parks, and seaports. This revenue sustainability means military operations alone cannot defeat economically self-sustaining armed groups requiring financial disruption through sanctions and supply chain interdiction to complement security operations. The policy reframing justifies more aggressive military intervention and financial warfare measures while establishing existential urgency for Gang Suppression Force deployment given revealed force imbalance. UNICEF child recruitment data showing minors comprise 30 to 50 percent of gang membership with tripled recruitment in 2025 adds child protection emergency layer requiring altered rules of engagement and international humanitarian law compliance. The combination of force imbalance, economic self-sustainability, and child combatant prevalence transforms security response requirements from counternarcotics model to counterinsurgency framework incorporating territorial control objectives, financial warfare, and child demobilization protocols creating significantly more complex operational environment than traditional policing approaches.

## AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Humanitarian System Collapse and Child Protection Emergency. The week revealed complete breakdown of humanitarian response capacity as IRC declared Haiti on verge of collapse with funding at catastrophic 3.4 percent of documented need making effective operations impossible. World Food Programme forced to cut rations in half and suspend meals for newly displaced due to funding shortfalls requiring 44 million dollars through April 2026 but unable to support even reduced programming at current levels. More than 8,000 killed in 2025 representing 20 percent increase over 2024 while gender-based violence cases reached 8,000 up 25 percent and 1.4 million people displaced with half being children. The most alarming indicator is sexual violence against children increased 1,000 percent since 2023 while child recruitment by armed groups rose 700 percent in first quarter 2025 alone. UNICEF needs 30 million dollars to assist every child requiring release, reintegration, education, and trauma support but humanitarian funding collapse creates operational impossibility. World Bank warns human capital deficits could cost Haiti up to 51 percent of future revenues from nutrition and education failures creating reinforcing negative dynamics where security failure drives humanitarian crisis which fuels armed group recruitment. The 270,214 forcibly returned in 2025 with nearly 20 percent already internally displaced before leaving and 60 percent recidivism rate demonstrates deportation ineffectiveness while adding pressure to collapsed reception capacity. The funding crisis at 3.4 percent of need represents near-total international donor disengagement occurring simultaneously with worst protection indicators in modern Haitian history creating conditions for mass starvation and systematic child exploitation without immediate emergency mobilization to close massive financing gap.

Geopolitical Competition and Institutional Independence Assertions. The week introduced new strategic dimension as China actively courts Haiti with financial incentives to break 70-year Taiwan diplomatic relationship while judicial and anti-corruption institutions asserted independence constraining unilateral executive governance. Caribbean Security Group CEO Holmes testified that China offering infrastructure financing and development assistance targeting Haiti as one of Taiwan's 12 remaining diplomatic allies with 2026 marking 70th anniversary creating symbolic significance for potential diplomatic realignment. Beijing gaining foothold in Haiti would establish Chinese presence 90 miles from Cuba and 600 miles from US mainland while reducing Taiwan's diplomatic allies from 12 to 11 transforming what was previously treated as regional stability challenge into domain where great-power interests directly intersect with Haiti's transition. Simultaneously, institutional independence assertions emerged through multiple channels. Federal Judge Reyes refused TPS termination stay while reading death threats in open court preserving protections for 350,000 Haitians demonstrating judicial independence under political pressure. ULCC announced expanded investigations beyond asset declarations directly targeting former CPT members implicated in BNC scandal with Director Hans Joseph surviving removal attempts and maintaining institutional position. Superior Council of Judiciary barred all judges from political activity foreclosing proposals for Court of Cassation judge as provisional president establishing judicial boundaries against executive entanglement. These institutional assertions create separation of powers dynamics that constrain PM Fils-Aime unilateral governance approaches while Chinese competitive diplomacy offers alternative patron with

## AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

potentially fewer governance conditionalities than Western partners creating leverage for Haitian leaders in negotiations affecting both democratic transition trajectory and regional security architecture.

### TREND ANALYSIS

**Executive Authority Concentration Without Constitutional Legitimacy.** Direction is consolidating as PM Fils-Aime exercised municipal appointment authority, dismissed Economy Minister assuming portfolio himself, and operated without visible inclusive dialogue mechanisms despite international calls for consultation. The trend shows movement from collective CPT decision-making to concentrated single-executive governance backed by unprecedented international consensus but lacking domestic constitutional foundation or political buy-in. Conditions for continuation include sustained US backing, absence of major policy failures, and prevention of rival governance structure emergence. Conditions for reversal include domestic opposition consolidation, security deterioration attributable to governance decisions, or international community withdrawal of support due to unilateral governance approach. Critical inflection point arrives as electoral preparation deadlines approach requiring broad political consensus for candidate registration and voting legitimacy that concentrated authority model may not generate creating sustainability questions for February 7, 2027 inauguration timeline.

**Security Deterioration Despite Increased International Engagement.** Direction is worsening as kidnappings surge in Delmas corridor, gang leader Izo operates with public impunity financing carnival activities, Kenscoff corridor faces seventh attack phase threatening southern humanitarian access, and Viv Ansanm coalition expands into previously safe areas. Murder rate rose 20 percent in 2025 with Artibonite and Centre departments seeing 210 percent increase while Wooster testimony revealed catastrophic 7.5 to 1 force imbalance favoring gangs. The trend demonstrates that current PNH operations, Kenya MSS presence, and planned GSF deployment have not reversed gang territorial control or reduced violence lethality despite increased security sector attention and resources. Conditions for continuation include delayed GSF deployment creating three-to-six-month transition gap, gang economic self-sustainability through extortion revenues, and child recruitment acceleration providing manpower replacement. Conditions for reversal require GSF full deployment by October 2026, financial warfare measures disrupting gang revenue streams, and territorial control operations beyond highway clearance targeting gang economic infrastructure and recruitment networks. Critical determinant is whether April 2026 GSF arrival produces immediate territorial gains or faces operational constraints requiring extended buildup period before combat effectiveness achieved.

**Humanitarian Funding Collapse Creating Protection Cascades.** Direction is accelerating downward as 2026 appeal funded at less than 4 percent of need forcing WFP ration cuts, UNICEF child protection programming gaps, and IRC collapse warnings. The trend shows progressive international donor disengagement from Haiti humanitarian response occurring simultaneously with worst protection indicators including 1,000 percent increase in child sexual

## AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

violence, 700 percent surge in gang recruitment, and 8,000 killed in 2025. Conditions for continuation include competing global humanitarian priorities, donor fatigue after decades of Haiti assistance, and security conditions preventing effective aid delivery creating disincentive for funding commitments. Conditions for reversal require major donor emergency mobilization in Q1 2026, visible security improvements enabling humanitarian access, and governance credibility signals from Fils-Aime administration demonstrating effective resource management. Critical threshold is whether UNICEF 30 million dollar child protection appeal and WFP 44 million dollar food gap generate donor response within next 30 to 45 days before malnutrition indicators deteriorate irreversibly and child recruitment becomes institutionally embedded within gang structures creating long-term demobilization challenges.

### OUTLOOK FOR THE UPCOMING WEEK

PM Fils-Aime faces immediate decision on political dialogue initiation versus continued unilateral governance as international calls for inclusive consultation mechanisms contradict current operational approach. If dialogue framework announced with concrete deliverables before June electoral preparation deadlines, this would address domestic legitimacy concerns and create consensus foundation for August 30 timeline. If unilateral governance continues without visible consultation, domestic opposition likely consolidates around legitimacy deficit narrative accelerating as campaign period approaches creating electoral boycott risks. Probability assessment suggests continued unilateral approach more likely given international backing strength and absence of immediate crisis forcing dialogue concession.

TPS court ruling expected before February 19 determines legal status for 350,000 Haitians with immediate work authorization and deportation protection implications. If Judge Reyes issues final ruling maintaining protections, this preserves remittance flows and diaspora economic lifeline through appellate process creating extended stability period. If Trump administration prevails on appeal or Reyes reverses preliminary injunction, accelerated deportations begin into crisis environment with 90 percent capital gang control creating humanitarian catastrophe and remittance collapse. Probability assessment suggests protections maintained through immediate February 19 deadline but ultimate resolution requires Supreme Court involvement creating multi-month uncertainty period.

Security force transition gap crystallizes as Kenya MSS drawdown timeline becomes explicit while GSF April deployment approaches. If Kenya announces specific withdrawal schedule without coordinated GSF arrival synchronization, vulnerability window extends through spring creating gang opportunity for territorial consolidation. If GSF advance elements arrive March establishing coordination mechanisms with PNH before Kenya departure, transition gap minimizes. Trigger event is Kenya Foreign Affairs official statement on drawdown timeline following Principal Secretary Sing'Oei announcement that mission achieved primary stabilization objective creating presumption of imminent departure.

## STAKEHOLDER IMPLICATIONS

International Community. The unprecedented consensus backing PM Fils-Aime creates coordination advantage but generates dependency risk as governance sustainability relies on sustained external support rather than domestic legitimacy. UNSCR 2814 provides legal framework for BINUH engagement while GSF deployment timeline targets April first contingents and October full deployment creating six-month operational planning window. Critical decision point arrives if domestic opposition consolidates requiring choice between maintaining PM backing despite legitimacy concerns or pressing for inclusive dialogue that could delay electoral timeline. OAS characterization of interim period as short and purposeful establishes expectation management preventing mandate creep but creates pressure for visible progress on security and electoral preparation benchmarks within 60 to 90 days. Humanitarian funding crisis at 3.4 percent of need requires emergency donor mobilization closing massive gap or accepting operational collapse with protection cascades including child recruitment acceleration and malnutrition crisis. China diplomatic courting of Haiti necessitates competitive response through development assistance acceleration or acceptance of potential Taiwan relationship termination affecting regional influence calculations. Timing constraint is March to April period when multiple decision windows converge including GSF deployment, ULCC investigation outcomes, TPS appellate resolution, and electoral preparation milestone deadlines creating compressed timeframe for policy adjustments.

Private Sector and Investors. Macroeconomic stability with gourde holding at 131 per dollar and January customs revenue showing year-over-year increase provides short-term operational continuity but security deterioration creates medium-term disruption risks. Kenscoff corridor attacks threaten sole logistics route to southern departments requiring either aerial transport at prohibitive costs or acceptance of gang checkpoint taxation affecting supply chain economics. Gang leader Izo public impunity financing carnival activities signals state enforcement incapacity creating business environment where criminal organizations operate without legal consequences affecting investment climate and contract enforcement reliability. USCG port compliance deadline approaching could trigger vessel denials at US ports if Haiti fails to meet international security standards creating trade disruption scenarios for import-export operations. Workforce impacts from accelerating deportations particularly in northern departments receiving TPS termination flights may affect labor availability in sectors employing diaspora-connected populations. Water quality findings showing 83 percent of packaged water failing standards creates public health liability for corporate operations requiring independent testing protocols. Decision windows include Q1 2026 for contingency planning on Kenscoff alternative routes, March to April for USCG compliance response preparations, and immediate period for workforce assessment given TPS uncertainty. Risk mitigation priorities center on logistics redundancy, compliance verification for port operations, and supply chain diversification reducing single-point dependencies on gang-controlled infrastructure.

Political Actors. The absence of functioning dialogue mechanisms since February 7 creates

## AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

strategic dilemma for opposition forces between accepting marginalization under PM unilateral governance or organizing boycott campaigns risking international community censure. KTA collective warning against unilateral governance establishes opposition messaging template but lacks enforcement mechanisms given PM international backing strength. Electoral calendar shows May 19 campaign start requiring party registration and candidate nomination processes but CEP silence on compliance procedures creates uncertainty whether electoral framework will accommodate opposition participation or proceed with limited field. The 220-plus registered parties demonstrate fragmentation preventing unified alternative governance proposal giving PM tactical advantage in negotiations. ULCC expanded investigations targeting former CPT members create accountability pressure but also political weapon potential if prosecutions appear selective rather than systematic affecting rule of law perceptions. Critical decision point is whether opposition consolidates around single alternative framework before June or accepts participation in August 30 process under current governance structure. Timing considerations include March 9 ULCC asset declaration deadline as first accountability test, April to May period for electoral framework negotiations, and ongoing international engagement determining whether external actors press for inclusive dialogue or maintain current PM backing. Strategic calculation centers on whether boycott threat generates consultation concessions or whether international community proceeds with elections despite limited political participation accepting legitimacy deficits to maintain timeline.

Diaspora. TPS ruling expected before February 19 creates immediate legal status uncertainty for 350,000 beneficiaries affecting work authorization, deportation protection, and remittance capacity. Judge Reyes stay denial preserves protections pending appeal but Trump administration escalation to higher courts compresses decision timeline creating planning impossibility for long-term commitments. DHS admission of possessing Springfield Ohio addresses signals enforcement infrastructure preparation for targeted operations if legal protections eventually fall creating demonstration effect concerns. Remittance flows represent critical economic lifeline as approximately 60 percent of Haiti population lives on less than one dollar per day making sudden disruption economically devastating for recipient households. Electoral participation provisions in electoral law create diaspora voting opportunities but individuals facing deportation unlikely to engage politically or consider return for voting purposes reducing diaspora electoral engagement precisely when financial support most needed. Carnival closures February 16 to 18 reduce consular service availability during critical TPS decision window creating administrative backlog if adverse ruling requires documentation updates. Immediate priorities include monitoring US court filings daily through February 19, preparing legal clinics for post-ruling guidance, and coordinating with consular officials for extended service hours. Medium-term considerations center on whether diaspora organizations maintain electoral engagement or shift focus to deportation defense affecting political transition support and February 7, 2027 inauguration legitimacy. Strategic question is whether diaspora maintains dual-track approach supporting democratic transition while defending TPS protections or whether legal uncertainty forces complete prioritization of immigration status preservation over Haiti political engagement.

## AYITI INTEL | WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

### SOURCES

Haiti Government Communication Office PM Fils-Aime national address February 7, 2026  
France Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official statement on CPT end and transition February 9, 2026  
OAS General Secretariat Statement E-019/26 on Haiti Political Transition  
BINUH Statement on End of Transitional Presidential Council Mandate  
United States Department of State Statement on Haiti Transition February 7, 2026  
Canada Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand Statement February 9, 2026  
Vant Bef Info Colleague Presidentiel CPR-001 communique February 9, 2026  
Kolektif Tet Ansanm pou Ayiti Formal Note February 8, 2026  
Better World Campaign Senate hearing analysis with Wooster and Holmes testimony February 10, 2026  
International Rescue Committee Humanitarian collapse press release February 11, 2026  
UNICEF ReliefWeb Child recruitment tripled report February 12, 2026  
Taiwan Plus News China courting Haiti testimony February 12, 2026  
US News Judge refuses stay on TPS ruling February 12, 2026  
Le Nouvelliste English ULCC expands scrutiny beyond wealth declarations February 12, 2026  
Le Nouvelliste CSPJ bars magistrates from political participation  
HaitiLibre Anti-gang training center dedicated to specialized units  
Tele Haiti and Pacific Kenscoff gang arson attacks February 13, 2026  
Reuters Haiti CPT mandate transition coverage February 2026  
CSIS Haiti Embarks on Another Rocky Political Transition February 8, 2026  
UN News Haiti crisis at breaking point Security Council briefing January 20, 2026  
Human Rights Watch World Report 2026 Haiti chapter  
World Food Programme Haiti emergency 44 million gap and ration cuts January 14, 2026  
Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Haiti 2026 Security and Foreign Assistance Priorities hearing record  
AlterPresse Horizon toujours incertain Analysis February 10, 2026