



AYITI INTEL | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

January 11, 2026

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CARICOM issued a public warning January 9 that time is running out for Haiti's leaders to agree on transition ahead of February 7 CPT mandate expiration revealing that despite talks by CARICOM Eminent Persons Group UN BINUH OAS La Francophonie and US Canadian embassies these actors have failed to get Haitians to resolve the political impasse with only agreement being that CPT must leave office but how that will happen and who will ensure it remains unclear. Miami Herald reported CPT members attempted to replace coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr for not supporting PM Fils-Aime removal while PM negotiates to remain after February 7 without presidential oversight structure. National Route No. 1 remains impassable at Montrouis since January 6 severing Port-au-Prince from northern Haiti. The 30-day Port-au-Prince operational pause continues. Twenty-seven days until February 7.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

CARICOM publicly warns time running out for February 7 transition with no consensus on post-CPT governance framework despite multiple international actors holding talks.

CPT internal conflict exposed as members attempted to replace Saint-Cyr for not supporting PM removal while PM Fils-Aime seeks to govern post-February 7 without CPT oversight.

National Route No. 1 impassable at Montrouis since January 6 blocking commercial and humanitarian traffic between capital and northern Haiti demonstrating gang strategic control of infrastructure chokepoints.

Port-au-Prince 30-day operational pause continues as longest sustained period without major gang violence on record while Artibonite offensive persists with 1,120 displaced in Montrouis.

Twenty-seven days until February 7 CPT mandate expiration with window for coordinated action narrowed to next 10-14 days before institutional vacuum risk.

DEVELOPMENT 1

CARICOM WARNING CONFIRMS INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION FAILURE ON FEBRUARY 7 TRANSITION

The Caribbean Community issued a public warning January 9 that time is running out for Haiti's leaders to agree on transition ahead of the February 7 CPT mandate expiration representing the first explicit acknowledgment by a major international actor that the transition remains unresolved with 27 days remaining. The warning issued by CARICOM's Eminent Persons Group reveals that despite holding talks with council members and political leaders multiple international actors including UN Integrated Office in Port-au-Prince La Francophonie Organization of American States and United States and Canadian embassies have failed to get Haitians to resolve the political impasse. The Miami Herald reports that the only agreement appears to be that the nine-member council must leave office on February 7 but how that will happen and who will ensure it happens remain unclear.

The CARICOM warning confirms that the five-day silence observed January 7-11 in government communications reflects negotiation failure rather than progress toward consensus. Multiple proposals from international actors have not produced agreement on post-February 7 governance frameworks including no consensus on replacement formula enforcement mechanism or institutional continuity arrangements. The warning that time is running out suggests international actors now recognize the window for coordinated action has narrowed to the next 10-14 days with delays beyond late January creating risk of institutional vacuum on February 7. The absence of a specific CARICOM proposal indicates international actors are waiting for Haitian-led solutions rather than imposing frameworks revealing continued fragmentation between US positions favoring CPT departure and Canadian positions supporting extension.

The timing of the CARICOM warning coincides with revelation of CPT internal fracturing over PM Fils-Aime's future suggesting international actors are responding to deteriorating internal consensus within Haitian institutions rather than external pressure. The warning represents public escalation intended to pressure Haitian political actors including CPT members PM Fils-Aime political parties and civil society to reach consensus immediately. With 27 days remaining until February 7 and no visible progress toward agreed transition framework the CARICOM warning confirms Haiti faces three possible scenarios: CPT extension requiring international legitimization and contradicting Article 6.1 prohibition, PM-only governance post-February 7 without CPT oversight creating constitutional ambiguity, or dual governance crisis if both CPT and PM claim legitimacy after mandate expiration.

The CARICOM warning amplifies pressure on stakeholders to resolve transition within compressed timeline while revealing fundamental weakness in international coordination mechanisms that have failed to bridge US-Canada split on CPT extension or produce unified framework for post-February 7 governance.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

CARICOM has maintained active engagement in Haiti's political transitions since 2004 through its Eminent Persons Group mechanism which has historically mediated between Haitian political actors and international community during institutional crises.

TALKING POINTS

CARICOM publicly confirms international coordination failure on February 7 transition despite talks by UN OAS La Francophonie US and Canada.

Only agreement is CPT must leave February 7 but no consensus on how departure happens or who enforces it.

Window for coordinated action narrowed to next 10-14 days before institutional vacuum risk.

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International actors waiting for Haitian-led solutions rather than imposing frameworks revealing continued US-Canada split on CPT extension.

CARICOM warning represents public escalation to pressure immediate consensus among Haitian political actors with 27 days remaining.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

International stakeholders should convene emergency coordination meeting January 12-15 to reconcile competing positions on CPT extension versus PM-only governance and establish unified framework for post-February 7 legitimization.

Political actors should prioritize consensus-building on transition mechanism January 12-20 focusing on enforcement arrangements for CPT departure and institutional continuity provisions to prevent dual governance crisis.

Civil society organizations should mobilize public pressure for transparent transition planning and accountability mechanisms to ensure February 7 deadline compliance.

Diaspora networks should coordinate advocacy with CARICOM member states and international partners to support Haitian-led transition solutions and prevent institutional vacuum.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 2

CPT INTERNAL FRACTURING EXPOSES COMPETING POST-FEBRUARY 7 GOVERNANCE SCENARIOS

The Miami Herald reported January 9 that CPT members were accused of trying to replace current coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr who did not back attempts to get rid of Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aime exposing fundamental power struggle within the council over post-February 7 governance. The report reveals Saint-Cyr and PM Fils-Aime form minority bloc supporting PM retention through February 7 and Saint-Cyr retention as coordinator while CPT majority supports removing PM Fils-Aime replacing Saint-Cyr and extending CPT mandate beyond February 7. The Miami Herald confirmed the PM is trying to negotiate a deal to remain on after February 7 but without a presidential oversight structure indicating strategy to govern alone post-mandate expiration without CPT supervision.

The internal CPT conflict reached critical point during first full week after government resumption with accusations of Saint-Cyr replacement attempt occurring in early January per this week

reference in January 9 report. The five-day silence observed January 7-11 in official CPT communications likely reflects this internal crisis rather than external negotiations with international actors. Vant Bef Info analysis published January 7 confirmed discussions are being raised about possible reorganization of transition process or extension of current system without any official decision having been announced yet indicating both options remain under consideration but no consensus achieved. The CPT has not communicated new public calendar concerning next steps of political process or organization of elections as of January 7 confirming institutional paralysis.

The Saint-Cyr versus Fils-Aime conflict creates three distinct post-February 7 scenarios with fundamentally different legitimacy and enforcement implications. Scenario A envisions CPT removes Fils-Aime appoints new PM and extends CPT mandate beyond February 7 requiring international legitimization and contradicting Article 6.1 prohibition against extension. Scenario B envisions PM Fils-Aime survives through February 7 CPT dissolves on mandate expiration and PM governs alone post-February 7 requiring no international legitimization since PM was appointed by CPT under existing authority. Scenario C envisions stalemate where CPT cannot remove Fils-Aime due to Saint-Cyr opposition CPT cannot extend mandate due to Article 6.1 prohibition and both CPT and PM claim legitimacy post-February 7 creating dual governance crisis.

With 27 days until February 7 the Saint-Cyr versus Fils-Aime conflict must resolve within next 7-14 days to prevent institutional vacuum or dual governance crisis on mandate expiration date with no visible mechanism for forcing consensus among competing CPT factions.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The Transitional Presidential Council was established in April 2024 with nine members and rotating coordinator position intended to provide collective presidential authority during transition period toward elections with explicit mandate expiration date of February 7 2026 per Article 6.1.

TALKING POINTS

CPT members attempted to replace coordinator Laurent Saint-Cyr for not supporting PM Fils-Aime removal exposing fundamental internal power struggle.

Saint-Cyr and PM Fils-Aime form minority bloc opposing PM removal while CPT majority supports removing PM and extending council mandate.

PM Fils-Aime negotiating to remain after February 7 without presidential oversight structure seeking to govern alone without CPT supervision.

Three competing scenarios create fundamentally different legitimacy implications: CPT extension requiring international support, PM-only governance under existing authority, or dual governance crisis.

Internal conflict must resolve within 7-14 days to prevent institutional vacuum on February 7 with no

visible consensus mechanism.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

CPT members should convene emergency internal session January 12-15 to resolve coordinator dispute and establish unified position on post-February 7 governance preventing dual legitimacy crisis.

PM Fils-Aime should clarify constitutional basis for governing without CPT oversight post-February 7 and secure explicit international recognition before mandate expiration to prevent legitimacy challenges.

International mediators should facilitate direct negotiations between Saint-Cyr bloc and CPT majority January 12-20 focusing on compromise framework that prevents institutional vacuum while respecting Article 6.1 prohibition.

Civil society observers should monitor CPT internal decision-making processes and demand transparent communication on transition plans to ensure accountability and prevent backroom deals.



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High confidence based on official institutional reporting.

DEVELOPMENT 3

NATIONAL ROUTE NO. 1 SEVERANCE DEMONSTRATES GANG STRATEGIC CONTROL OF INFRASTRUCTURE CHOKEPOINTS

OCHA and Haiti Libre reports confirmed January 6-10 that National Route No. 1 has been impassable at the Montrouis segment as of January 6 severing Port-au-Prince from northern Haiti and blocking commercial and humanitarian traffic between the capital and Cap-Haitien. The route impassability results from December 23 gang attack on Montrouis that displaced 1,120 individuals who fled to Saint-Marc municipality with IOM confirming 225 households affected. The security situation remains precarious and unstable significantly impacting humanitarian access in various locations within Saint-Marc municipality as well as along National Route No. 1 which serves as primary artery connecting West Department to Artibonite Centre and Nord Departments.

The National Route No. 1 severance represents critical operational development with strategic implications for Haiti's crisis trajectory. The route connects Port-au-Prince population 2.6 million to Cap-Haitien population approximately 500,000 and serves as primary commercial corridor for food fuel and goods movement between capital and northern agricultural hubs. Its impassability since January 6 means commercial traffic halted between regions humanitarian aid delivery to Nord Department severely constrained and economic isolation of northern Haiti from capital's markets

banks and services. The Montrouis blockage demonstrates gang strategic control of chokepoints on Haiti's primary infrastructure including National Route No. 1 at Montrouis segment Port-au-Prince airport and port under periodic threat and Artibonite agricultural corridor under gang control per MOPAL January 4 assessment.

The infrastructure severance confirms geographic shift documented in recent intelligence briefings showing gangs consolidating control of peripheral regions including Artibonite and Plateau Central while maintaining 30-day operational pause in Port-au-Prince effectively surrounding and isolating the capital. PM Fils-Aime's January 10 statement claiming 2026 will be year of security and that fear has changed sides with security forces recovering territories previously under gang control is directly contradicted by National Route No. 1 impassability since January 6 five days before statement, 1,120 displaced in Montrouis December 23, and MOPAL assessment confirming gangs control quasi-totality of Port-au-Prince Artibonite and Plateau Central. The PM's optimistic messaging appears designed to legitimize strategy revealed by Miami Herald to remain on after February 7 without presidential oversight structure suggesting post-February 7 governance claim will rest on security progress narratives operationally unsupported by infrastructure and displacement evidence.

The National Route No. 1 severance combined with PM's contradictory security claims creates information environment where government messaging diverges fundamentally from operational reality complicating stakeholder assessment of transition viability and governance legitimacy post-February 7.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

National Route No. 1 has historically served as Haiti's primary north-south artery since colonial era connecting capital to major northern cities and agricultural regions with economic and humanitarian significance amplified during crisis periods requiring aid distribution and population movement.

TALKING POINTS

National Route No. 1 impassable at Montrouis since January 6 severing Port-au-Prince from Cap-Haitien and northern Haiti blocking commercial and humanitarian traffic.

December 23 gang attack displaced 1,120 individuals to Saint-Marc demonstrating gang control of strategic infrastructure chokepoints beyond Port-au-Prince.

Route severance halts food fuel and goods movement between capital and northern agricultural hubs creating economic isolation and humanitarian access constraints.

PM Fils-Aime January 10 claim that security forces recovering territories directly contradicted by route impassability and continued displacement five days before statement.

Infrastructure crisis reveals divergence between government security messaging and operational reality complicating stakeholder assessment of transition viability.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Humanitarian actors should establish alternative supply routes to northern Haiti bypassing Montrouis segment and coordinate with security forces on convoy protection to maintain aid delivery capacity.

International observers should independently verify government security claims against operational evidence including route accessibility displacement figures and gang territorial control assessments before legitimizing post-February 7 governance arrangements.

Private sector actors should assess supply chain vulnerabilities created by infrastructure severance and develop contingency plans for continued operations under route impassability scenarios.

Media organizations should systematically cross-reference government security statements with independent operational reporting to provide accurate information environment for stakeholder decision-making.



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DEVELOPMENT 4

THIRTY-DAY PORT-AU-PRINCE OPERATIONAL PAUSE CONTINUES AS LONGEST SUSTAINED PERIOD WITHOUT GANG VIOLENCE

Port-au-Prince marked January 11 with zero new major gang security incidents completing 30 consecutive days without major gang violence from December 21 through January 11 representing the longest sustained operational pause on record. January 11 follows pattern of 29-day pause December 21 through January 10 with no incidents reported by Haiti Libre Haiti24 Le Nouvelliste or other monitored sources as of 5:21 PM EST. The pause continues despite ongoing Artibonite offensive including December 23 Montrouis attack that displaced 1,120 individuals and January 6 confirmation that National Route No. 1 remains impassable at Montrouis segment demonstrating geographic shift in gang operational focus from capital to peripheral regions.

The 30-day pause contradicts PM Fils-Aime January 10 claim that 2026 will be year of security based on progress made by security forces in recovering territories and that fear has changed sides referring to progressive weakening of criminal groups. The operational pause suggests gang strategic calculation rather than security force success with gangs maintaining territorial control in Port-au-Prince while consolidating positions in Artibonite and Plateau Central per MOPAL January 4 assessment confirming gangs control quasi-totality of these regions. The pause may represent preparation phase for resumed operations targeting February 7 institutional transition or strategic

repositioning to exploit CPT internal fracturing and approaching mandate expiration deadline.

The continuation of operational pause through January 11 creates 30-day window for government and international actors to resolve February 7 transition planning without active gang violence complicating security operations. However the pause combined with ongoing Artibonite offensive and National Route No. 1 severance indicates gang capacity for resumed operations remains intact with strategic positioning around capital infrastructure rather than territorial retreat. Vant Bef Info January 7 analysis confirming vast areas of country still escape control of law enforcement despite Saint-Cyr institutional and diplomatic initiatives corroborates assessment that operational pause reflects gang strategic choice not security force gains.

With 27 days until February 7 the operational pause creates compressed window for transition resolution while gang positioning around infrastructure chokepoints and peripheral territorial consolidation suggests potential for rapid escalation if political impasse continues through mandate expiration date.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Previous sustained operational pauses in Port-au-Prince typically preceded major gang offensives including March 2024 airport siege and coordinated attacks on government infrastructure with historical pattern showing pauses as preparation phases rather than permanent de-escalation.

TALKING POINTS

Thirty consecutive days without major Port-au-Prince gang violence December 21 through January 11 represents longest sustained operational pause on record.

Pause continues despite ongoing Artibonite offensive including 1,120 displaced in Montrouis and National Route No. 1 impassability since January 6 showing geographic shift in gang operations.

Operational pause suggests gang strategic calculation rather than security force success with territorial control maintained while consolidating peripheral positions.

Historical pattern shows operational pauses typically precede major offensives suggesting potential for rapid escalation around February 7 institutional transition.

Thirty-day window creates opportunity for transition resolution without active gang violence but gang capacity for resumed operations remains intact.

RECOMMENDED DECISIONS

Security planners should utilize 30-day operational pause to accelerate February 7 transition preparations assuming pause may end abruptly around mandate expiration date.

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Intelligence analysts should monitor gang positioning and communications for indicators of resumed operations particularly targeting February 7 institutional vulnerabilities or exploiting CPT internal fracturing.

Government actors should avoid interpreting operational pause as permanent security gains and maintain contingency plans for rapid escalation scenarios during transition period.

International partners should coordinate security support during remaining 27 days to capitalize on operational pause window while preparing for potential gang offensive around February 7 deadline.



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WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

NEXT 24 TO 48 HOURS

Monitor for CPT or PM Fils-Aime public statements addressing CARICOM January 9 warning and Saint-Cyr versus Fils-Aime conflict revealed by Miami Herald indicating whether internal impasse will be acknowledged or denied.

Track for emergency international coordination meetings convened by CARICOM UN or OAS January 12-13 to reconcile competing positions on CPT extension versus PM-only governance showing escalation of diplomatic pressure.

Observe for resumption of gang violence in Port-au-Prince ending 30-day operational pause particularly targeting government infrastructure or symbolic locations signaling exploitation of institutional fracturing.

THIS WEEK

Watch for CPT internal session January 12-17 to resolve coordinator dispute and establish unified position on post-February 7 governance determining whether Saint-Cyr retains position or CPT majority replaces coordinator.

Monitor for international mediator proposals January 13-17 from CARICOM UN or bilateral actors offering specific frameworks for February 7 transition showing shift from waiting for Haitian consensus to imposing external solutions.

Track for National Route No. 1 accessibility updates indicating whether Montrouis segment reopens or remains impassable affecting commercial and humanitarian traffic between Port-au-Prince and

northern Haiti.

Observe for PM Fils-Aime clarification of constitutional basis for post-February 7 governance without CPT oversight revealing strategy to legitimize PM-only authority after mandate expiration.

STRATEGIC HORIZON

Twenty-seven days until February 7 2026 CPT mandate expiration with window for coordinated international action narrowed to next 10-14 days before institutional vacuum risk becomes acute.

Three competing post-February 7 scenarios remain unresolved: CPT extension requiring international legitimization and contradicting Article 6.1 prohibition, PM-only governance under existing appointment authority, or dual governance crisis if both CPT and PM claim legitimacy.

Gang strategic positioning around infrastructure chokepoints and 30-day operational pause suggests capacity for rapid escalation exploiting institutional transition vulnerabilities with historical pattern showing pauses precede major offensives.

US-Canada split on CPT extension remains unresolved preventing unified international framework for transition legitimization with CARICOM warning confirming coordination failure despite multiple actor engagement.

PRIMARY SOURCES

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