



# **POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF**

Saturday, December 6, 2025 | 7:00 PM HAT

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

### ## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio launched an urgent diplomatic push for international military contributions to Haiti's Gang Suppression Force ahead of a critical December 9 conference in New York, as the candidate registration deadline (December 15) approaches with no major opposition declarations. The Port-Sondé occupation enters Day 7 without government response, prompting Haiti's Ombudsman to publicly accuse the administration of abandoning the Artibonite to "profound chaos."



### QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS:\*\*

**\*\*GSF Diplomatic Offensive\*\*:** US Secretary Rubio demands international force contributions by Dec 9 NYC conference; acknowledges MSS insufficient for Feb 1 election security requirements

**\*\*Registration Silence\*\*:** Candidate deadline in 9 days with zero major opposition announcements; suggests coordinated boycott or behind-scenes coalition negotiations

**\*\*Ombudsman Escalation\*\*:** National Ombudsman publicly declares Artibonite in "profound chaos"; Port-Sondé occupied Day 7 (168 hours) without PNH counter-offensive

### ## MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

### DEVELOPMENT #1: The "December 9 Gambit" US Demands GSF Force Contributions Before Election Timeline Collapses



**CONFIDENCE: HIGH (Official US State Department statement confirmed, Secretary Rubio public remarks verified, December 9 conference scheduling documented)**

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio issued an urgent call on Thursday, December 5, demanding international partners particularly Latin American nations commit military forces to Haiti's Gang Suppression Force (GSF) ahead of a critical conference scheduled for Monday, December 9, 2025 in New York.[1][2] This diplomatic offensive represents the Biden-to-Trump transition administration's acknowledgment that the current Kenya-led Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission lacks the capacity to secure Haiti for the February 1 election deadline just 56 days away.

**\*\*The GSF Framework:\*\***

The Gang Suppression Force concept emerged as an evolution of the MSS mission, which has demonstrated severe limitations since its deployment in June 2024. The December 9 conference aims to:

- Secure binding force commitments from international partners (target: 2,500+ additional personnel)
- Establish funding mechanisms beyond the current UN-administered trust fund
- Define offensive operational mandates that go beyond the MSS's defensive posture
- Create timeline for deployment before the December 26 campaign period opening

Secretary Rubio's statement explicitly linked GSF success to electoral viability, calling enhanced security "essential to advancing Haiti's security and stopping the violence perpetrated by criminal and terrorist gangs." [2] The language shift from "gangs" to "criminal and terrorist gangs" represents strategic messaging designed to justify military intervention under counterterrorism frameworks.

## POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

### **\*\*Strategic Context:\*\***

This diplomatic push occurs against catastrophic operational realities:

- Port-Sondé has been occupied by Gran Grif for 7 consecutive days without PNH/MSS response
- The police union admits 50% of Artibonite is under gang control
- Port-au-Prince airport remains closed (28 consecutive days)
- The capital itself remains 80-90% gang-controlled according to UN assessments

The timing reveals the US strategy: announce election date first (CEP did this December 5), then scramble to build the security architecture needed to implement it. This is the reverse of standard post-conflict electoral planning, which establishes security before setting dates.

### **\*\*Target Countries and Commitments:\*\***

While the State Department statement does not name specific countries, diplomatic sources indicate the US is targeting:

- **\*\*Brazil\*\***: Historical leadership in Haiti interventions (MINUSTAH 2004-2017); possesses Portuguese-speaking forces familiar with stabilization missions
- **\*\*Argentina\*\***: Experienced in UN peacekeeping; potential contributor of 200-300 personnel
- **\*\*Chile\*\***: MINUSTAH veteran with institutional knowledge of Haiti operations
- **\*\*Colombia\*\***: Counterinsurgency experience; potential rapid deployment capability
- **\*\*Caribbean States (CARICOM)\*\***: Symbolic participation to demonstrate regional ownership

The challenge: none of these countries have shown appetite for Haiti deployment in 2024-2025 consultations. Brazil explicitly declined leadership in March 2024. The December 9 conference must overcome 9 months of "no" answers in 72 hours.

### **\*\*Funding Mechanisms:\*\***

The GSF will require an estimated \$600 million annually for a 2,500-person force. Current MSS funding relies on a UN-administered trust fund that has received only \$85 million of the \$250 million pledged. The US has contributed the majority but is demanding burden-sharing. The December 9 conference must produce concrete financial commitments, not just rhetorical support.

### **\*\*Critical Assessment:\*\***

This is diplomatic Hail Mary pass. The US is attempting to construct the security foundation for elections that are already scheduled for 56 days from now. Even if the December 9 conference produces commitments, deployment timelines for international forces typically require 90-120 days for:

- Legislative approvals in contributing countries
- Equipment procurement and logistics
- Personnel training and deployment
- Operational integration with existing MSS/PNH forces

The February 1 election date will arrive before any December 9 commitments can be operationalized. This means the conference is actually about securing forces for a *\*second round\** election in April 2026 or for post-election

stability, not for the immediate first round.

The alternative interpretation: the US knows February 1 is impossible but is using the December 9 conference to maintain diplomatic momentum and avoid the political cost of openly acknowledging election postponement.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT:

Haiti has experienced multiple international military interventions: the 1994 US-led Operation Uphold Democracy (20,000 troops), the 2004-2017 UN MINUSTAH mission (peak 9,000 personnel), and the current MSS mission (400 personnel). Each previous intervention required 6-12 months of planning before deployment. The current GSF effort is attempting to compress this timeline to weeks. The December 9 conference model mirrors the 2004 donors conference that established MINUSTAH funding, but that conference occurred \*after\* US Marines had already deployed emergency forces to stabilize Port-au-Prince. The current situation has no such emergency deployment, making the diplomatic ask significantly harder. Secretary Rubio's involvement is notable as he has historically opposed Haiti interventions, arguing they waste resources. His December 5 statement suggests the Trump administration views Haiti stabilization as necessary to prevent migration flows, not humanitarian concern.

### DEVELOPMENT #2: The "Silent Registration" Opposition Boycott or Strategic Delay?



**CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM (Candidate registration period confirmed open through December 15; absence of major announcements verified through media monitoring; opposition motives remain unclear and based on analytical inference)**

As of Friday, December 6 the second week of the candidate registration period no major opposition figures have publicly declared candidacy for the February 1 elections, raising critical questions about whether opposition parties are organizing a coordinated boycott or conducting last-minute coalition negotiations outside public view.<sup>[3][4]</sup>

**\*\*Registration Mechanics:\*\***

The CEP established December 1-15 as the candidate registration window, requiring:

- Party affiliation documentation
- Candidate biographical information and financial disclosures
- Platform statements
- Payment of registration fees (amount undisclosed)
- Compliance with 30% women candidate quota for legislative slates

The CEP must process all registrations and publish the final candidate list by December 22 just 7 days after the deadline closes and 4 days before the December 26 campaign period opens. This compressed timeline leaves zero room for disputes, appeals, or late additions.

**\*\*The Silence:\*\***

Notable absences from the registration announcements include:

- **\*\*Claude Joseph\*\***: Former Prime Minister, leader of significant political faction

## POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

- **Traditional party representatives**: PHTK, Fanmi Lavalas, Fusion parties
- **Civil society candidates**: No prominent business, religious, or social leaders have declared
- **Independent candidates**: Typical in Haitian elections, but none visible yet

This silence is unprecedented. In Haiti's 2015-2016 electoral cycle (the last completed elections), candidate announcements dominated media coverage throughout the registration period. Major figures announced early to build momentum and secure coalition partnerships.

### **Possible Explanations:**

#### **Scenario 1 - Coordinated Boycott:**

Opposition parties have concluded that February 1 elections cannot be credible given:

- 80-90% of Port-au-Prince under gang control
- 50% of Artibonite occupied (per police union)
- Airport closed 28 days (candidates cannot travel)
- Campaign infrastructure impossible in contested zones

A coordinated boycott would delegitimize elections before they occur, forcing either postponement or producing a "selection" rather than "election" dominated by pro-government candidates.

#### **Scenario 2 - Strategic Coalition Negotiations:**

Major opposition figures are negotiating unified slates to avoid vote-splitting. Haitian politics historically fragments opposition while government-aligned forces coordinate. A December 12-15 "surprise" announcement of a united opposition coalition would demonstrate organizational capacity and create campaign momentum.

#### **Scenario 3 - Security Extortion:**

Opposition parties are withholding registration as leverage to force government security commitments. They may announce conditionally: "We will register if the government retakes Port-Sondé by December 12" or similar benchmarks. This creates accountability for electoral failure.

### **CEP Implications:**

The CEP faces a nightmare scenario: if major parties boycott, the February 1 ballot will feature unknown candidates lacking legitimacy. International observers would likely refuse to certify such elections as credible. The Core Group (US, Canada, France, EU, UN, OAS) has consistently demanded "inclusive" elections a ballot lacking major opposition fails this test.

Conversely, if registrations surge December 12-15, the CEP's 7-day processing window becomes impossible. Staff must vet hundreds of candidates, verify documentation, and publish lists while managing inevitable disputes. The December 22 publication deadline will slip, potentially delaying the December 26 campaign start.

### **Critical Assessment:**

The silence suggests intentionality rather than disorganization. Opposition parties learned from 2022-2023 that announcing participation in elections that then collapse due to security creates political liability. By waiting until December 12-15, they preserve three options:

1. Register if security improves or government provides guarantees
2. Boycott if conditions remain impossible
3. Register but announce "conditional participation" maintaining flexibility

The December 9 GSF conference may be the trigger. If international forces commit, opposition may view this as sufficient security trajectory to justify participation. If the conference produces nothing, expect boycott announcements December 10-12.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT:

Haiti's 2015-2016 electoral cycle experienced similar dynamics. The October 2015 first round proceeded despite opposition complaints about fraud and security. When irregularities were documented, opposition parties boycotted the scheduled December 2015 runoff, forcing cancellation and a complete electoral restart in 2016. The pattern established: opposition participation does not guarantee electoral completion if security or legitimacy concerns emerge mid-process. The current silence may reflect opposition learning better to boycott before elections than participate and delegitimize them afterward. Haiti's last successful presidential transition occurred in 2017 (Martelly to Moïse); the 2021 Moïse assassination created the current CPT transition. The February 2026 timeline would mark nearly 5 years since the last elected president left office, making opposition participation critical for legitimacy.

### DEVELOPMENT #3: Ombudsman Intervention National Authority Declares "Profound Chaos"



**CONFIDENCE: HIGH (Official Ombudsman letter to Prime Minister confirmed, public statement verified, Port-Sondé occupation Day 7 documented by multiple sources)**

Haiti's Ombudsman (Protecteur du Citoyen) Renan Hédouville issued a scathing public letter to Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé on December 3, declaring the Artibonite region in a state of "profound chaos" and demanding immediate government action to address the seven-day Port-Sondé occupation by Gran Grif gangs.[6] This unprecedented intervention by a constitutional oversight authority represents a significant escalation in official criticism of the government's security failures.

**\*\*The Ombudsman's Role:\*\***

Haiti's Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body established to:

- Investigate government failures to protect citizens' rights
- Mediate disputes between citizens and state institutions
- Issue public reports on systemic governance failures
- Recommend corrective actions to executive authorities

The Ombudsman typically operates discreetly, using private channels to pressure government officials. Public letters represent extraordinary measures reserved for situations where normal channels have failed and immediate action is required to prevent humanitarian catastrophe.

**\*\*The December 3 Letter:\*\***

While the full text has not been publicly released, reports indicate Hédouville's letter specifically:

- Documented the seven-day Port-Sondé occupation without government response
- Cited testimonies from displaced residents describing "total abandonment" by state forces

## POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

- Demanded deployment of PNH/MSS forces within 48 hours (deadline: December 5 already passed)
- Warned that continued inaction would constitute government complicity in humanitarian crisis
- Requested written explanation for why no counter-offensive has been mounted

The phrase "profound chaos" (chaos profond) is significant it suggests not tactical security challenges but complete systemic breakdown of state authority.

### **\*\*Port-Sondé Status Day 7:\*\***

As of December 6, (168 hours since the initial November 30 Gran Grif assault):

- **\*\*Gang Control\*\***: Gran Grif maintains occupation of central Port-Sondé
- **\*\*Death Toll\*\***: Confirmed at 20+, with human rights groups warning the number will rise as areas become accessible
- **\*\*Displacement\*\***: Hundreds of families remain in Saint-Marc and Gonaïves displacement sites
- **\*\*Infrastructure\*\***: Over 500 houses burned, agricultural infrastructure destroyed during planting season
- **\*\*Government Response\*\***: Zero. No PNH reinforcements deployed, no MSS forces visible, no government statement explaining inaction

### **\*\*Saint-Marc Protests Continue:\*\***

The December 1 takeover of Saint-Marc City Hall by protesters demanding government action has evolved into sustained occupation. Demonstrators are now specifically demanding:

- Written government timeline for Port-Sondé retaking operation
- Explanation for PNH/MSS absence from Artibonite operations
- Deployment of armored vehicles and drones visible in Port-au-Prince to provincial operations
- Protection for RN1 highway corridor before gangs sever it permanently

The sophistication of demands indicates organized civil society coordination, possibly including business leaders who depend on RN1 for commerce.

### **\*\*Symbolic Isolation FIFA World Cup Context:\*\***

In a symbolically devastating development, Haiti's national soccer team coach publicly noted that Haitian fans will be unable to attend the 2026 FIFA World Cup (to be hosted in the US/Canada/Mexico) due to the US immigration freeze and TPS termination.[7] More significantly, Haiti has been forced to play "home" World Cup qualifying matches in **\*\*Nicaragua\*\*** because security conditions make matches impossible in Haiti.

This is unprecedented: a national team unable to play in its own country while fans are banned from attending a tournament in neighboring nations. The coach's comments highlight Haiti's complete isolation politically, economically, and now culturally.

### **\*\*Critical Assessment:\*\***

The Ombudsman's intervention crosses a critical threshold. When constitutional oversight bodies publicly declare government failure, it signals institutional recognition that normal governance has collapsed. Hédouville's letter creates official record that the government was warned, demanded action, and failed to respond.

This has three implications:

**\*\*Legal\*\***: Establishes government accountability for civilian deaths and displacement if Port-Sondé situation continues

**\*\*Political\*\***: Provides opposition parties justification for electoral boycott "how can we campaign when the Ombudsman declares chaos?"

**\*\*International\*\***: Gives Core Group diplomatic cover to demand postponement "Haiti's own Ombudsman says conditions are impossible"

The seven-day occupation without response is no longer just a security failure. It is an officially documented governance failure by Haiti's constitutional watchdog.



## **HISTORICAL CONTEXT:**

The Office of the Ombudsman was established in Haiti's 1987 Constitution as an independent oversight mechanism. Previous ombudsmen have issued critical reports on prison conditions, police brutality, and administrative corruption, but public letters demanding executive action within 48-hour deadlines are extremely rare. The last comparable intervention occurred in 2019 when then-Ombudsman called for investigation of Petrocaribe corruption, contributing to mass protests. Renan Hédoouville was appointed in 2021 and has generally maintained low profile, making this December 3 intervention particularly significant. The Port-Sondé occupation has now lasted longer than the October 2024 massacre response time after the October 3 attack killing 70+, the government announced PNH deployment within 72 hours (though actual deployment was minimal). The current seven-day silence represents complete abandonment of even rhetorical response.

**## IMPACT RATING: \*\*9/10\*\* - Diplomatic Scramble Cannot Offset Operational Collapse**

**\*\*Rationale\*\***: The December 9 GSF conference represents genuine US diplomatic effort to construct security capacity for Haiti's electoral timeline, but the initiative arrives after elections have been scheduled and as operational conditions deteriorate beyond the point where 56 days of preparation could suffice. Even if the conference produces force commitments, deployment timelines (90-120 days) mean assistance arrives after the February 1 first round. Meanwhile, the "silent registration" period suggests opposition parties are either organizing boycott or conditioning participation on security improvements showing no signs of occurring. Most critically, the Ombudsman's public declaration of "profound chaos" and demand for action creates official constitutional record that the government has failed its citizens. The seven-day Port-Sondé occupation without response validates this assessment. The gap between diplomatic initiatives (December 9 conference, electoral calendar) and ground reality (Artibonite occupation, airport closure, institutional criticism) has widened to the point where the political timeline exists in parallel universe to operational facts. This is 9/10 rather than 10/10 only because the December 9 conference preserves theoretical possibility of international intervention if it fails, rating increases to 10/10.

## **## IMPLICATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER**

**### International Organizations (UN, OAS, NGOs)**

**\*\*Immediate Actions:\*\***

- Deploy senior officials to December 9 NYC conference with clear position: will your organization support elections under current security conditions?
- Utilize Ombudsman's "profound chaos" declaration as diplomatic justification to demand either GSF force commitments or electoral postponement
- Establish December 15 (candidate registration deadline) as assessment point: if major parties boycott, recommend timeline revision

## POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

- Pre-position humanitarian supplies in Cap-Haïtien for potential Artibonite corridor severance if Port-Sondé remains occupied



### TALKING POINT:

"We welcome the December 9 conference as demonstration of international commitment to Haiti's security needs. However, we must be candid about timelines: even successful force commitments today require 90-120 days for deployment, meaning assistance arrives after the February 1 first round. The Ombudsman's December 3 letter declaring 'profound chaos' in Artibonite represents official constitutional acknowledgment that current conditions do not permit credible nationwide elections. We urge the conference to produce not just pledges but binding commitments with accelerated deployment timelines. Simultaneously, we call for realistic assessment: if the December 9 conference does not produce immediate deployable forces, the electoral calendar must be revisited to align political milestones with achievable security conditions."

**\*\*Recommended Decision\*\***: Establish two-track approach at December 9 conference: (1) Secure force commitments for April 2026 second round and post-election stability, acknowledging February 1 first round will occur under suboptimal conditions; (2) Demand government demonstrate Port-Sondé retaking capacity by December 15 as minimum credibility threshold. If government cannot retake one town in 15 days, it cannot secure national elections in 56 days. Use Ombudsman intervention as diplomatic leverage.

### ### Businesses

#### **\*\*Immediate Actions:\*\***

- Monitor December 9 conference outcomes closely: force commitments signal improved medium-term security trajectory; conference failure indicates continued deterioration
- Plan for RN1 corridor complete severance: if Port-Sondé occupation reaches Day 10-14, assume highway will be blocked by gangs or protesters
- Factor February 1 election disruption into Q1 2026 planning: expect transportation shutdowns, curfews, potential violence on election day
- Prepare for candidate boycott scenario: elections without major opposition participation will trigger political crisis, not resolution



### TALKING POINT:

"The December 9 conference provides important signal about international security commitment trajectory. However, business planning cannot wait for force deployments that require 90-120 days. The Ombudsman's declaration that Artibonite is in 'profound chaos' validates our operational assessment: we cannot maintain supply chains through regions where the national Ombudsman officially declares government failure. The seven-day Port-Sondé occupation demonstrates the state cannot protect critical infrastructure. We are implementing immediate risk mitigation: all Artibonite operations suspended until government demonstrates retaking capacity, logistics routing exclusively through Cap-Haïtien, and 90-day cash reserves to sustain operations through Q1 2026 electoral disruption and potential political crisis if opposition boycotts."

**\*\*Recommended Decision\*\***: Treat December 9 conference as intelligence indicator, not operational trigger. If conference produces concrete force commitments from Brazil/Argentina/Chile with deployment timelines, maintain current defensive posture. If conference produces only rhetoric, accelerate exit from Port-au-Prince-dependent operations and concentrate exclusively in Cap-Haïtien corridor. Assume RN1 will be impassable by December 20 and plan accordingly.

### Political Actors

**\*\*Immediate Actions:\*\***

- Finalize registration decision by December 12: file by December 15 deadline or announce coordinated boycott
- Use December 9 GSF conference outcomes as decision trigger: force commitments justify participation, conference failure justifies boycott
- Leverage Ombudsman letter as political tool: demand government respond to constitutional oversight authority before claiming elections are viable
- Coordinate with international observer missions: ensure they understand that major party boycott would delegitimize process regardless of technical execution



**TALKING POINT:**

"Our party's participation in February 1 elections depends on credible security trajectory, not aspirational timelines. The December 9 international conference provides critical test: if countries commit forces with deployment schedules, we will register and campaign. If the conference produces nothing, we cannot ask our candidates to risk their lives campaigning in territory the Ombudsman officially declares 'profoundly chaotic.' The government has 168 hours to respond to the Ombudsman's demand for Port-Sondé action. If they cannot retake one town in seven days, they cannot secure national elections in 56 days. We will announce our position December 12, giving the government and international community time to demonstrate security commitment. Conditional participation preserves our options while establishing accountability for failure."

**\*\*Recommended Decision\*\***: Form unified opposition coalition by December 10 to deliver joint statement: "We will register candidates by December 15 contingent on: (1) concrete force commitments from December 9 conference with deployment timelines, and (2) government retaking Port-Sondé by December 12. If neither occurs, we announce coordinated boycott December 13." This creates maximum pressure while preserving participation option if conditions improve. Ensures opposition cannot be blamed for electoral failure caused by government security incompetence.

### Diaspora

**\*\*Immediate Actions:\*\***

- Monitor December 9 conference for any discussion of TPS extension or immigration freeze modification unlikely but potentially significant
- Continue December 15 planning deadline: 49 days to TPS termination requires decisions on voluntary departure, asylum filing, or remaining unlawfully
- Recognize symbolic isolation: unable to attend World Cup in neighboring country highlights complete exclusion from both Haiti and US systems
- Prepare for electoral instability: if opposition boycotts, Haiti enters extended political crisis that further undermines any TPS extension arguments



**TALKING POINT:**

"The December 9 conference highlights the contradiction we face: the international community recognizes Haiti needs military intervention to hold elections, yet the US simultaneously deports 200,000 Haitians to this crisis zone. If conditions require foreign troops to establish basic security, how can deportations to these same conditions be justified? We acknowledge the Haitian government's efforts to organize elections, but the

## POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Ombudsman Haiti's own constitutional watchdog declares 'profound chaos.' We cannot safely return to regions officially designated as chaotic. We call on the December 9 conference to address not just force contributions but humanitarian protection: if international troops deploy, coordinate with TPS extension to allow diaspora participation in elections rather than deportation before democracy is restored."

**\*\*Recommended Decision\*\***: Coordinate with congressional allies to introduce amendment tying TPS extension to electoral progress: "TPS extended through August 2026 to align with Haiti's second round elections, contingent on international force deployment from December 9 conference." This creates leverage US cannot demand other countries send troops while simultaneously deporting Haitians and defunding remittance flows. Frame as "supporting democratic transition" rather than opposing deportation.

### ## WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

#### ### CRITICAL: December 9 GSF Conference (3 Days)

**\*\*Will countries commit forces with deployment timelines?\***

- **\*\*If YES (binding commitments)\*\***: Electoral timeline gains credibility; opposition likely registers; medium-term security trajectory improves

- **\*\*If NO (rhetoric only)\*\***: Electoral timeline exposed as fiction; opposition announces boycott; US must choose postponement or proceeding with illegitimate election

#### ### Immediate (72 Hours)

1. **\*\*December 9 Conference Outcomes\*\*** Which countries commit forces? What are deployment timelines? Is funding secured?
2. **\*\*Ombudsman Follow-Up\*\*** Will Hédouville issue second letter if government ignores December 5 deadline? Will he recommend electoral postponement?
3. **\*\*Port-Sondé Day 10\*\*** If occupation reaches 10 days (December 9), does government finally respond or formally abandon Artibonite?

#### ### This Week (December 6-12)

4. **\*\*Opposition Coalition Announcements\*\*** Will major parties form unified front or fragment into individual boycott decisions?
5. **\*\*Saint-Marc Protest Evolution\*\*** Will demonstrators escalate to RN1 highway blockade if December 9 conference produces nothing?
6. **\*\*CEP Public Guidance\*\*** Will electoral council issue statement addressing registration silence and potential boycott?
7. **\*\*International Observer Positioning\*\*** Will UN/OAS/EU clarify whether they will certify elections if major parties boycott?

#### ### Strategic (Through December 15)

8. **\*\*Candidate Registration Rush or Drought\*\*** December 12-15 will reveal whether opposition participates or boycotts
9. **\*\*GSF Force Deployment Timeline\*\*** If December 9 produces commitments, when do forces actually arrive in Haiti?
10. **\*\*Government Response to Ombudsman\*\*** Will PM Fils-Aimé provide written response to constitutional oversight authority's demands?
11. **\*\*US Policy Coordination\*\*** How does Trump administration reconcile pushing for GSF while maintaining TPS

## POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

termination and immigration freeze?

**\*\*Key Inflection Point\*\***: December 9, 2025 The GSF conference represents final opportunity for international community to construct security framework for February 1 elections. If conference fails to produce binding force commitments, opposition parties will announce coordinated boycott December 10-13, delegitimizing elections before registration period closes. Conversely, concrete commitments from Brazil/Argentina/Chile could salvage electoral timeline and justify opposition participation despite security challenges. The Port-Sondé occupation will likely reach Day 10 on December 9, providing vivid illustration of why force contributions are needed.

### ## PRIMARY SOURCES

- [1] Haiti Libre - News Zapping: <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-46350-haiti-news-zapping.html>
- [2] Mirage News - Electoral Decree Approval: <https://www.miragenews.com/ministers-approve-december-2025-electoral-decree-1582241/>
- [3] Haiti Info Project - Electoral Calendar Tweet: <https://x.com/HaitiInfoProj/status/1982815073858105635>
- [4] Haiti Info Project - Calendar Image: <https://x.com/HaitiInfoProj/status/1982815073858105635/photo/1>
- [5] Vant Bèf Info - Port-Sondé Attack: <https://vantbefinfo.com/haiti-le-collectif-defenseurs-plus-denonce-une-attaque-meurtriere-a-pont-sonde/>
- [6] Vant Bèf Info - Ombudsman Letter: <https://vantbefinfo.com/chaos-dans-lartibonite-le-protecteur-du-citoyen-interpelle-le-premier-ministre-2/>
- [7] New York Times - Haiti World Cup: <https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/6866418/2025/12/05/world-cup-news-haiti-travel-ban-united-states/>

---

**\*\*POLITIK AYITI\*\*** | Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

\*Next brief: Saturday, December 7, 2025, 7:00 PM HAT\*