



POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Sunday, December 14, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition

POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

55 days until February 7, 2026 constitutional deadline
1 day until candidate registration closes (December 15)
259 days until official election date (August 30, 2026)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Candidate registration closes Monday after an unprecedented 14-day silence with zero major opposition declarations across all media channels, creating a registration mystery resolved only when the CEP publishes the final candidate list December 22. The Bel-Air massacre enters its seventh consecutive day with at least 60 dead and no government statements, police deployment, or humanitarian access, exposing the administration's deliberate non-intervention strategy allowing gang self-purging at cost of civilian lives and state legitimacy. The United States issued a third immigration restriction in 30 days with Family Reunification Parole program termination effective December 15, combining with TPS expiration February 3 and application freeze to create triple lock closing all legal pathways for 500,000 Haitians.



QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

Registration deadline Monday December 15 concludes 14-day period with zero major opposition public declarations creating unprecedented electoral mystery resolved December 22 when CEP publishes final candidate list. Bel-Air violence continues seventh consecutive day with 60 plus dead and zero government intervention signaling deliberate non-intervention allowing Viv Ansanm internal purge. United States Family Reunification Parole program terminated December 15 marking third restriction in 30 days after application freeze and TPS termination creating complete legal pathway closure for Haitian nationals. December 22 candidate list publication will determine August 30 election viability showing either private registration success or coordinated opposition boycott. TPS expires in 51 days February 3 affecting 348,000 to 500,000 Haitian nationals losing deportation protection and work authorization.

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

DEVELOPMENT 1: The Registration Mystery Ends Monday



CONFIDENCE



High Confidence. The December 1 through 15 candidate registration period is confirmed through CEP official calendar announcements, Haiti Libre reporting, and Haiti Info Project documentation. The absence of major candidate public declarations throughout the entire 14-day period is observable fact across all mainstream Haitian media including Haiti Libre, Le Nouvelliste, AlterPresse, and Radio Metropole plus international wire services including Reuters, AFP, and Associated Press. The interpretation of this silence requires analysis pending December 22 candidate list publication which will provide definitive evidence of registration activity. The CEP has not released preliminary registration statistics or candidate counts during the registration period maintaining complete opacity about participation levels.

What's Happening

The candidate registration period reaches its final 24 hours Monday December 15 at midnight concluding a 14-day window that produced zero major public candidate declarations from recognized opposition figures or established political parties. No prominent opposition leaders including former presidents, current senators, or major party heads have held press conferences announcing presidential candidacies. No major political parties including Fanmi Lavalas, PHTK, Pitit Desalin, or OPL have issued public statements about registration completion or candidate selections for presidential, legislative, or local offices. This complete silence represents unprecedented pattern in Haitian electoral history where candidate announcements traditionally generate massive media coverage, street demonstrations, and elaborate political theater with parties competing for public attention months before registration deadlines. The silence spans both domestic Haitian outlets and international wire services that normally cover Caribbean electoral developments extensively. Social media contains only unverified speculation without official CEP confirmation or candidate statements. The CEP December 16 through 19 contestation period will allow registered candidates to challenge competitor eligibility followed by December 22 final candidate list publication representing the first official disclosure of who registered. The campaign period for August 30 election is scheduled to begin March 2026 providing eight months for candidate campaigning once the registration phase concludes.

Why This Matters

The 14-day registration silence creates three distinct scenarios with fundamentally different implications for August 30 electoral legitimacy and Haitian democratic transition viability. Scenario One involves widespread private registration where major opposition figures and established parties submitted paperwork directly to the CEP without public announcements to avoid gang targeting in the current security environment where public gatherings attract violence, to prevent premature political attacks from rivals seeking to undermine candidacies before official launch, or to maintain strategic surprise controlling when and how campaigns begin. This scenario would be unprecedented in Haitian political culture which celebrates public candidate declarations but might reflect rational adaptation to gang territorial control making mass rallies impossible in Port-au-Prince where 80 percent of territory remains under criminal organization dominance. Scenario Two involves coordinated opposition boycott where major parties and prominent figures deliberately abstained from registration to delegitimize the entire electoral process then plan to denounce the August 30 timeline as sham election after December 15 deadline passes. This boycott strategy has precedent in 2015-2016 electoral cycle where opposition parties withdrew participation citing fraud and irregularities leading to vote annulment. A successful boycott would destroy August 30 election credibility as international observers and diaspora communities would question whether results represent genuine democratic choice or predetermined outcome favoring government-aligned candidates. Scenario Three involves mixed participation where some established figures registered privately while major opposition coordinated boycott creating confused landscape with partial legitimacy. The December 22 candidate list publication will definitively reveal which scenario is operative through hard data showing registered candidate names, party affiliations, and office competitions. A robust list including recognizable opposition leaders and major party candidates would validate Scenario One private registration. A minimal list dominated by unknown figures or government-aligned candidates would confirm Scenario Two coordinated boycott. Mixed results would indicate Scenario Three fragmented opposition response.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haitian presidential elections historically feature elaborate multi-month candidate announcement campaigns with political parties staging massive Port-au-Prince rallies, provincial tours, and prime-time media events to launch candidacies and build name recognition. The 2015-2016 electoral cycle demonstrated how opposition boycott strategies can destabilize democratic transitions when multiple voting rounds were annulled after major parties

withdrew participation claiming systematic fraud and CEP bias. Those boycotts established precedent for using electoral process delegitimization as political weapon rather than contesting results through institutional channels. The current transition context where the CPT and CEP were imposed through CARICOM international mediation rather than emerging from national consensus creates additional boycott vulnerability as opposition figures question whether institutions serve democratic purposes or international agendas. Major opposition leaders including former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide who founded Fanmi Lavalas, former President Michel Martelly who leads PHTK faction, and prominent senators like Youri Latortue have not publicly declared participation intentions for 2026 elections. The registration period timing during December when diaspora political actors and funding sources traditionally travel to Haiti would normally see peak announcement activity making the current silence more striking. Previous electoral cycles saw candidates announce six to twelve months before registration deadlines to establish campaign infrastructure, recruit staff, and secure financing from business interests and diaspora networks.

DEVELOPMENT 2: Bel-Air Seven Day Massacre Strategy



CONFIDENCE



High Confidence. Multiple authoritative international news agencies including ABC News, The Hill, CTV News, and Latin Times confirm the ongoing Bel-Air violence beginning December 8 with consistent death toll reporting. ABC News, The Hill, and CTV News all report at least 49 people killed with human rights groups confirming the count and expecting numbers to rise as the area remains inaccessible to authorities and humanitarian organizations. Specific casualty documentation includes 19 gang members, 10 child recruits, 19 women partners of gang members executed, and one elderly man struck by stray bullet. High-profile leadership changes are confirmed with Kempes Sanon shot, wounded, and replaced by rivals Jamesly and Ti Gason. Council on Foreign Relations global conflict tracker updated December 3 confirms the violence destabilized Viv Ansanm internal hierarchy. Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier video statement is documented across multiple sources. Seven days have elapsed December 8 through 14 with no government statements or police intervention reported in any media sources.

What's Happening

The Krache Dife gang assault on rival Viv Ansanm factions in Bel-Air has now continued for seven consecutive days from December 8 through 14 with mounting casualties and zero government response across the entire week. The confirmed death toll remains at least 60 with human rights organizations expecting significant increases as the neighborhood remains completely inaccessible to authorities, humanitarian workers, and independent monitors preventing accurate casualty assessment. Documented victims include 19 gang members killed during the fighting demonstrating significant combat intensity, 10 children who were gang recruits showing the violence consumed even youth members of criminal organizations, 19 women who were partners or relatives of gang members executed by Krache Dife forces in apparent retaliation killings, and one elderly man in his sixties struck by stray gunfire representing civilian casualties. The violence fundamentally transformed Viv Ansanm leadership hierarchy with Kempes Sanon, a former Haitian National Police officer who transitioned to gang leadership and was sanctioned by United States Treasury in October 2025, shot and wounded during the December 8 initial assault then replaced by two rival commanders named Jamesly and Ti Gason while he received medical treatment for gunshot injuries. Another prominent gang leader known as Dede was beheaded during the violence in public execution demonstrating the extreme brutality characterizing the succession battle. Jimmy Barbecue Cherizier who commands the broader Viv Ansanm coalition released video statement December

9 claiming he personally ordered the attack to stop kidnapping operations in Bel-Air stating that members who continued abductions were violating coalition directives and would face consequences. As of Sunday evening December 14 representing the seventh full day of violence no official Haitian government statement has addressed the ongoing massacre, no Haitian National Police units have been deployed to stop the fighting or restore order, and no humanitarian access corridors have been established to evacuate wounded civilians or provide medical assistance to affected populations.

Why This Matters

The seven-day duration of extreme violence without any government response transcends bureaucratic delay or operational incapacity representing instead a deliberate strategic policy decision by the Fils-Aime administration and CPT leadership. The Haitian National Police and government security apparatus possess sufficient force projection capability to intervene in Bel-Air as demonstrated by previous operations in gang-controlled territories during 2024 when coordinated PNH and Multinational Security Support missions temporarily retook neighborhoods. The decision not to intervene signals calculated acceptance of gang self-purging doctrine where the administration permits and arguably encourages internal criminal organization violence betting that rival factions weakening each other through combat ultimately benefits eventual state operations to retake territory. This strategic calculation appears to prioritize reducing total gang combat effectiveness and eliminating problematic gang leaders like Kempes Sanon who maintained networks within government institutions without risking Haitian National Police officer casualties or expensive ammunition and equipment expenditures. However, this non-intervention gambit carries massive strategic costs including normalization of week-long urban warfare in the capital creating public expectation that extreme violence is tolerable, complete state absence from affected neighborhoods destroying governmental legitimacy among populations experiencing violence, zero humanitarian protection for civilian populations trapped in combat zones violating basic state responsibility, fundamental erosion of rule of law as residents witness government deliberately allowing criminal organizations to kill civilians without consequence, and potential triggering of cascading violence as other gang coalitions interpret non-intervention as permission to resolve internal disputes through massacre. The death toll of at least 60 now substantially exceeds the October Port-Sonde massacre that killed approximately 70 people and triggered urgent international condemnation plus calls for immediate security intervention, yet the Bel-Air violence has produced no comparable governmental response or international pressure. For international partners including the pending Gang Suppression Force deployment this non-intervention policy raises critical mission scope questions about whether international forces will intervene in gang-on-gang violence to protect civilians or limit operations to defending government institutions and strategic infrastructure accepting civilian casualties in gang territories as unavoidable.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bel-Air has functioned as gang-controlled territory for over a decade serving as strategic neighborhood adjacent to downtown Port-au-Prince and National Palace grounds making it valuable real estate for criminal organizations seeking to project power into governmental heart. The Viv Ansanm coalition formed in 2023 as federation of previously independent gang organizations seeking to coordinate territorial control across metropolitan Port-au-Prince and present unified resistance front against government security forces and international interventions. The coalition structure has always been inherently unstable as member gangs maintained separate territorial bases, independent command hierarchies, competing economic interests from kidnapping ransoms and extortion payments, and personal rivalries among gang leaders who cooperated tactically while pursuing individual power accumulation. Previous internal Viv Ansanm conflicts in 2024 resulted in temporary violence lasting days followed by negotiated truces brokered by coalition leadership seeking to preserve united front against external threats. The Krache Dife splinter represents more fundamental organizational break suggesting the coalition structure is collapsing under combined pressure from government security operations, pending

international Gang Suppression Force deployment creating incentive for gang leaders to secure individual positions, and internal disputes over kidnapping proceeds and territorial boundaries. The Haitian National Police non-intervention doctrine evolved gradually throughout 2024 and 2025 as gang territorial control expanded to approximately 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince metropolitan area according to United Nations assessments while police capacity remained limited despite Multinational Security Support mission presence. Previous PNH operations focused on defending government institutions, airport, port facilities, and main commercial corridors while effectively ceding residential neighborhoods to gang control.

DEVELOPMENT 3: The US Immigration Triple Lock



CONFIDENCE



Absolute Confidence. The Family Reunification Parole program termination is documented in official Federal Register notice published December 14, 2025 with effective date December 15, 2025. The Department of Homeland Security Federal Register entry explicitly states termination of FRP processes for Colombians, Cubans, Ecuadorians, Guatemalans, Haitians, Hondurans, and Salvadorans. The TPS termination for Haiti is documented in Federal Register final notice published November 27, 2025 setting February 3, 2026 at 11:59 PM as official expiration. Immigration application freeze for 19 countries including Haiti was reported by CBS News and other outlets December 2, 2025. The three restrictions represent coordinated sequence targeting Haitian nationals specifically.

What's Happening

The United States Department of Homeland Security published Federal Register notice December 14, 2025 announcing immediate termination of the Family Reunification Parole program for Haiti and six other countries effective December 15, 2025. The FRP program previously allowed certain Haitian family members of United States citizens or lawful permanent residents to be paroled into the United States while awaiting immigrant visa processing providing temporary legal status and work authorization during what often became multi-year wait periods for visa availability. This December 15 termination represents the third major immigration restriction specifically targeting Haitian nationals within 30-day period creating coordinated policy sequence closing legal pathways. The first restriction occurred December 2, 2025 when the administration announced freezing all pending immigration applications for 19 countries including Haiti suspending processing for green cards, asylum claims, naturalization petitions, and family reunification cases. The second restriction was published November 27, 2025 in Federal Register confirming Temporary Protected Status termination for Haiti with official expiration date February 3, 2026 at 11:59 PM local time affecting approximately 348,000 to 500,000 Haitian nationals currently residing in United States with TPS designation. After February 3 expiration Haitian TPS holders will lose deportation protection, employment authorization, and legal status transforming into undocumented immigrants subject to removal proceedings. The combined effect of these three restrictions creates complete closure of legal immigration pathways for Haitian nationals as the application freeze prevents new entries, FRP termination blocks family reunification parole channel, and TPS expiration eliminates temporary protected status that has sheltered hundreds of thousands for years.

Why This Matters

The three coordinated immigration restrictions create unprecedented crisis for Haitian diaspora communities in United States representing the most restrictive policy environment for Haitian nationals in modern immigration

POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

history. The December 2 application freeze immediately suspended processing for tens of thousands of pending cases including green card applications from Haitian nationals who had waited years in immigrant visa queues, asylum claims from recent arrivals fleeing gang violence, naturalization petitions from long-term residents seeking citizenship, and family reunification cases for relatives of United States citizens. This freeze creates indefinite legal limbo for applicants who invested significant financial resources in application fees and legal representation. The December 15 FRP termination effective immediately blocks the primary legal pathway for Haitian family members to join United States relatives while awaiting immigrant visas eliminating the temporary parole status that previously provided work authorization and deportation protection during wait periods. The February 3 TPS expiration represents the most devastating component affecting 348,000 to 500,000 Haitian nationals who have lived in United States for years or decades under temporary protected status many establishing families, purchasing homes, starting businesses, and integrating into American communities. After February 3 these individuals lose employment authorization making them unemployable in formal economy, lose deportation protection making them subject to removal proceedings at any time, and lose legal status transforming into undocumented immigrants forced to choose between remaining in United States illegally or returning to Haiti where gang control covers 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince and state collapse makes economic survival nearly impossible. The triple lock policy creates massive humanitarian crisis as hundreds of thousands face impossible choices between legal limbo in United States or return to country experiencing state failure. The restrictions also eliminate remittance flows from diaspora to Haiti as deportees lose employment and remaining community members redirect resources to legal defense rather than family support. For United States immigration system the policies create massive enforcement challenge as hundreds of thousands transition to undocumented status overwhelming detention capacity and deportation resources while triggering legal challenges in federal courts.



HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Temporary Protected Status for Haiti was first designated following the devastating January 2010 earthquake that killed over 200,000 people and destroyed Port-au-Prince infrastructure. The program was repeatedly renewed by Democratic and Republican administrations based on ongoing country conditions including political instability, gang violence, natural disasters including Hurricane Matthew in 2016, and persistent inability of Haitian government to safely receive and reintegrate returnees. At its peak TPS covered approximately 500,000 Haitian nationals living in United States many for over a decade establishing deep roots in American communities. Previous administration attempted TPS termination in 2018 but faced legal challenges and policy reversals. The Family Reunification Parole program was established to reduce immigrant visa backlogs by allowing family members to wait in United States rather than home countries while visa numbers became available reducing separation periods for mixed-status families. The program processed thousands of Haitian applicants annually providing legal pathway for family unity. The December 2 application freeze represents unprecedented broad suspension affecting multiple visa categories simultaneously and targeting specific countries rather than applying universal processing delays. The coordination of all three restrictions within 30-day window suggests deliberate policy strategy to eliminate all legal pathways for Haitian nationals rather than incremental tightening of specific programs.

IMPLICATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER

International Organizations

TALKING POINTS

The candidate registration silence ending Monday December 15 requires emergency diplomatic engagement to determine whether major opposition participated through private submissions or coordinated boycott as the

POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

December 22 candidate list publication will provide first definitive evidence of electoral viability. The seven-day Bel-Air massacre without government intervention confirms that security sector capacity building programs alone cannot restore order without political will to protect civilian populations in gang-controlled territories. The United States immigration triple lock closing all legal pathways for 500,000 Haitian nationals creates massive humanitarian crisis requiring coordinated international response including potential third-country resettlement options and emergency assistance for returnees. The February 7 CPT mandate expiration approaching in 55 days without constitutional resolution framework threatens to delegitimize transitional government creating legal vacuum for seven months until August 30 elections.

RECOMMENDED DECISION

Deploy high-level CARICOM and OAS diplomatic missions Monday December 16 immediately after registration deadline closes to engage CEP leadership demanding preliminary registration statistics before December 22 list publication to enable early assessment of opposition participation. Convene emergency Organization of American States consultation December 17 to evaluate candidate list implications and develop coordinated response framework if major opposition boycott is confirmed. Establish formal position that continued international electoral support including technical assistance, observer missions, and financial resources is contingent on genuine multi-party competition with credible opposition participation. Demand immediate Haitian government briefing on Bel-Air non-intervention policy requiring explanation of strategic rationale and civilian protection protocols. Coordinate humanitarian access mission to Bel-Air regardless of ongoing violence establishing medical evacuation corridors and civilian safe zones. Engage United States government at highest levels regarding immigration triple lock requesting humanitarian exemptions or delayed implementation for TPS expiration to prevent mass deportations to state failure conditions. Prepare emergency returnee assistance framework including UNHCR coordination for potential third-country resettlement and IOM programs for forced returns. Accelerate constitutional crisis mediation establishing CARICOM-brokered framework for CPT mandate extension or transitional protocols covering February 7 through August 30 governance gap.

Businesses

TALKING POINTS

The registration silence and pending December 22 candidate list publication create extreme uncertainty about political stability timeline as elections without credible opposition would face immediate legitimacy challenges potentially triggering civil unrest or institutional paralysis disrupting commercial operations. The seven-day Bel-Air massacre demonstrates gang territorial control remains entrenched despite international security assistance with government deliberately maintaining non-intervention policy allowing violence in workforce residential neighborhoods. The United States immigration triple lock threatens to disrupt Haitian-American business networks as 500,000 TPS holders lose employment authorization and potential deportations eliminate established commercial relationships and remittance flows. The February 7 constitutional deadline approaching without resolution means businesses will operate under government lacking constitutional authority for seven months creating legal risks for contracts, regulatory decisions, and permits issued during unconstitutional period.

RECOMMENDED DECISION

Suspend all major capital commitments and long-term contract negotiations until December 22 candidate list publication provides definitive evidence of electoral viability and opposition participation levels. Develop comprehensive scenario planning for three December 22 outcomes including robust multi-party participation indicating legitimate election, minimal participation confirming opposition boycott and delegitimized process, or mixed results requiring further assessment before investment decisions. Accelerate timeline for expatriate dependent relocations before February 7 constitutional deadline given compounding political uncertainty, gang

POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

violence normalization, and potential institutional instability. Ensure all critical business agreements, permits, licenses, regulatory approvals, and contract renewals are finalized and executed before February 7, 2026 to secure constitutional foundation before governance vacuum begins. Establish dedicated legal review process for any agreements requiring signature between February 7 and August 30 to assess enforceability risks if transitional government actions during unconstitutional period are later challenged in courts. Revise workforce security protocols assuming Haitian National Police will not intervene in gang territorial disputes in employee residential neighborhoods requiring enhanced private security for transportation, housing, and emergency evacuation. Review business continuity plans for scenarios including mass TPS deportations disrupting United States operations, remittance flow collapse affecting Haitian purchasing power, and potential civil unrest if December 22 candidate list confirms opposition boycott.

Political Actors

TALKING POINTS

Candidates who registered by Monday December 15 must immediately secure written CEP confirmation specifying registration validity for August 30, 2026 election with constitutional legal citations to prevent future timeline disputes or candidacy challenges. The December 22 candidate list publication will define entire competitive landscape revealing whether elections feature genuine multi-party democratic competition or reduced fields dominated by government-aligned candidates that undermine result credibility internationally. The registration silence from major opposition creates strategic fork where participating candidates can position themselves as legitimate democratic actors engaging transition process while boycotting parties risk political irrelevance and exclusion from August 30 governance. The February 7 CPT mandate expiration provides constitutional leverage to demand CARICOM-brokered extension frameworks before committing campaign resources to electoral process potentially occurring under illegitimate governmental authority.

RECOMMENDED DECISION

Form emergency unified candidate coalition Monday December 16 immediately after registration closes to submit formal written demands to CEP requiring preliminary registration statistics and party participation data before December 22 final list publication. Demand written guarantees from CEP that all completed registrations will be honored under final August 30 timeline with no procedural disqualifications or technical rejections. Establish public participation criteria setting December 22 candidate list as firm decision point for continued electoral engagement with explicit withdrawal conditions if major opposition boycott is confirmed or constitutional crisis remains unresolved. Engage CARICOM representatives immediately demanding their active mediation on February 7 constitutional deadline making clear participating candidates will not legitimize elections held under unconstitutional authority without international guarantees of governance continuity and legal validity. Develop dual-track campaign strategies optimized for eight-month timeline with official March 2026 public launch while maintaining organizational flexibility to pivot to boycott position if electoral conditions deteriorate or legitimacy collapses. Coordinate with international election observer organizations establishing independent monitoring of CEP candidate list compilation process ensuring transparency and preventing manipulation of registration data. Demand CEP publish comprehensive registration statistics by December 18 showing total candidate numbers disaggregated by office type, political party affiliation, and geographic distribution to enable public assessment of participation levels and competitive balance before final list publication.

Diaspora

TALKING POINTS

The United States immigration triple lock represents existential crisis for 500,000 Haitian TPS holders facing

POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

employment authorization loss February 3 and potential mass deportations to gang-controlled Haiti where 80 to 90 percent of Port-au-Prince remains under criminal organization territorial dominance. The candidate registration silence and December 22 list publication will determine whether diaspora communities should invest resources in August 30 electoral participation or prepare for extended political crisis if major opposition boycott is confirmed. The February 7 constitutional deadline approaching without transition framework confirms Haitian political class has failed to prepare for democratic elections despite years of international pressure and CARICOM mediation. The seven-day Bel-Air massacre without government response demonstrates that security conditions remain dangerous for diaspora return travel even for voting purposes as state deliberately maintains non-intervention in gang violence.

RECOMMENDED DECISION

Diaspora organizations must immediately mobilize legal defense networks for TPS holders facing February 3 expiration coordinating with immigration attorneys to file emergency stay applications, humanitarian exemptions, and potential class action challenges to triple lock policy. Document all three immigration restrictions systematically archiving Federal Register notices, policy announcements, and implementation timelines to establish comprehensive legal record for court challenges. Organize emergency community meetings during December 15 through 22 period to prepare TPS holders for loss of employment authorization advising on legal options, emergency financial planning, and potential return scenarios. Coordinate with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and international protection organizations exploring third-country resettlement options for TPS holders who cannot safely return to Haiti given state failure conditions. Monitor December 22 candidate list publication organizing rapid diaspora analysis to assess opposition participation and electoral legitimacy before committing resources to voter registration drives or campaign support. Establish diaspora observer delegations for December 22 CEP list publication and subsequent electoral process providing independent documentation separate from official government reporting. Defer major financial commitments to political candidates or parties until January 2026 when constitutional framework for post-February 7 governance becomes clearer and candidate viability can be assessed based on campaign development and opposition participation confirmation. Develop comprehensive contingency plans for mass deportation scenarios including emergency assistance funds for returnees, reintegration support networks, and security protocols for forced returns to gang-controlled areas. Support diaspora voting rights advocacy while maintaining realistic expectations that August 30 election may face fundamental legitimacy challenges if December 22 list confirms opposition boycott making result acceptance and governmental transitions uncertain.

WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

Today

Monitor whether any major candidate or political party issues final-hour announcement Sunday evening before Monday December 15 midnight registration deadline potentially breaking 14-day silence pattern with dramatic last-minute declaration. Track whether CEP issues any preliminary statements regarding registration activity levels, candidate counts, or party participation ahead of December 22 official list publication. Observe whether Bel-Air violence extends into eighth consecutive day or shows any signs of resolution as Krache Dife consolidates territorial control. Watch for any Haitian government statements addressing seven-day massacre or explaining strategic rationale for non-intervention policy. Monitor United States implementation of Family Reunification Parole termination effective December 15 including any last-minute legal challenges or policy clarifications.

This Week

Monday December 15 midnight marks candidate registration deadline closing the window and forcing all electoral participants to commit without further delay. Tuesday December 16 begins CEP contestation period through

POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

December 19 allowing registered candidates to challenge competitor eligibility on constitutional, legal, or procedural grounds. Track whether major opposition parties issue post-deadline statements explaining participation decisions or formally announcing boycott strategies to delegitimize August 30 process. Monitor whether CEP releases any preliminary registration statistics Tuesday through Friday showing total candidate numbers by office before December 22 final list publication. Observe whether CARICOM or OAS issue emergency statements addressing registration silence and electoral viability concerns. Watch whether Haitian government finally responds to Bel-Air crisis after full week of violence or maintains non-intervention doctrine. Track whether United States provides any TPS implementation guidance or deportation timeline clarifications following February 3 expiration. Monitor legal challenges to immigration triple lock including potential emergency injunctions or class action filings in federal courts.

Strategic

Sunday December 22 candidate list publication represents the single most consequential event for 2026 electoral legitimacy with robust major party participation indicating genuine democratic competition versus minimal participation confirming coordinated opposition boycott and fundamental legitimacy crisis. A boycotted election would collapse August 30 timeline requiring emergency CARICOM renegotiation of entire transition framework. The period from now until February 7 represents final 55 days to establish constitutional mechanisms for governance continuity past CPT mandate expiration with failure to resolve by late January triggering accelerating political crisis and potential international partner withdrawal from transition support. Monitor whether Gang Suppression Force deployment timeline announcements clarify mission rules of engagement particularly regarding intervention in gang-on-gang violence like Bel-Air massacre versus limiting operations to government institution protection. Track whether additional Viv Ansanm leadership figures receive targeted sanctions following Kempes Sanon pattern and whether subsequent internal organizational responses create security operation windows. Observe February 3 TPS expiration implementation including actual deportation operations, humanitarian exemptions, legal challenge outcomes, and potential mass return scenarios requiring emergency assistance. Watch for cascading gang violence beyond Bel-Air as other criminal organizations interpret government non-intervention as permission to resolve internal disputes through massacre potentially spreading violence across Port-au-Prince neighborhoods.

PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Libre official calendar announcement for upcoming elections
Haiti Info Project Twitter post on CEP electoral calendar
Wikipedia entry on 2026 Haitian general election
Le Nouvelliste article on candidate qualification requirements
ABC News report on dozens killed in Haiti capital as armed men break from gang coalition
The Hill coverage of gang violence in Haiti capital
Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker on Haiti instability
CTV News report on dozens killed in Haiti gang coalition fighting
Latin Times report on violent clashes between Haitian gangs killing dozens
Federal Register notice on termination of Family Reunification Parole processes published December 15, 2025
ILCM fact sheet on Temporary Protected Status for Haiti
Federal Register notice on termination of Haiti TPS designation published November 28, 2025
CBS News report on Trump administration halting immigration and citizenship for 19 countries
Jeelani Law USCIS updates on TPS for Haiti
Forum Together fact sheet on termination of Temporary Protected Status for Haiti
All Tech is Human global election guide for Haiti 2025
Facebook post from Widden Official on presidential candidate speculation
US State Department international travel information for Haiti

POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

Le Monde international reporting on gang-squeezed Port-au-Prince neighborhoods
AlterPresse Haitian media coverage



This intelligence brief is produced by POLITIK AYITI, a service of KreyolGenius Intelligence Services. For subscription information or to provide feedback on this brief, contact info at kreyolgenius.com. All sources are verified through multiple channels and confidence ratings reflect analytical certainty based on source triangulation and institutional reliability assessment.