



# **POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF**

Thursday, December 11, 2025, 7:00 PM Haiti Time

*Intelligence for Haiti's Democratic Transition*

## POLITIK AYITI | ONE-STOP INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

58 days until February 7, 2026 constitutional deadline  
4 days until candidate registration closes (December 15)  
262 days until official election date (August 30, 2026)

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Haiti faces a confirmed electoral calendar crisis as the government officially approved August 30, 2026 as the election date, directly contradicting the widely circulated February 1 timeline still published by the CEP. This creates operational chaos for candidates registering by December 15 who do not know which election they are preparing for. The CPT mandate expires February 7, 2026, leaving a six-month constitutional vacuum with no legal extension mechanism identified. Meanwhile, the Bel-Air massacre enters its fourth consecutive day with over 60 dead and zero police intervention, signaling deliberate state acceptance of gang self-purging. Prime Minister Fils-Aimé returned Wednesday from the GSF conference without issuing any clarifying statement on these compounding institutional crises.



### QUICK SUMMARY FOR STAKEHOLDERS

The August 30 election date is now confirmed by EFE News and the approved electoral decree, but the CEP website still promotes the obsolete February 1 timeline. Candidates registering this week face massive uncertainty about which election timeline is operative. The CPT mandate expires in 58 days with no constitutional bridge to the August election. The Bel-Air gang war has killed 60 people in four days with no state intervention. PM Fils-Aimé has not clarified any of these crises since returning from New York.

### MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS

DEVELOPMENT 1: The Twin Calendars Electoral Crisis



### CONFIDENCE



**High Confidence. EFE News Agency explicitly reported on December 2 that the government approved an electoral decree setting the first round for August 30, 2026. This contradicts the CEP's October 24-25 announcement published on its official website stating February 1, 2026 as the first round date. Both timelines remain in public circulation with no official clarification issued.**

### What's Happening

Two contradictory electoral calendars are currently operative in Haiti. Timeline A, announced by the CEP in late October and widely reported in Haitian media, sets the first round for February 1, 2026, with a second round on April 12 and inauguration on May 14. Timeline B, approved by the government in early December and confirmed by international wire services, sets the first round for August 30, 2026, with a second round on December 6 and inauguration in January 2027. Candidate registration closes in four days on December 15, but candidates do not know which election they are registering for. The CEP has not updated its website or issued clarifying guidance. Prime Minister Fils-Aimé returned from New York on December 10 but has not addressed the discrepancy.

Why This Matters



**This communication failure creates operational paralysis across the entire electoral system. Candidates registering by December 15 cannot develop coherent campaign strategies without knowing whether they have 50 days or 260 days until Election Day. Political parties cannot finalize coalitions or allocate resources. International observers cannot plan deployment timelines. The confusion undermines already fragile confidence in the electoral process and provides ammunition to actors who wish to delegitimize any eventual results. More critically, the calendar discrepancy masks the deeper constitutional crisis: the CPT mandate expires February 7, 2026, meaning Haiti will have no constitutional government for six months if the August timeline is correct.**



## HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Haiti has not held national elections since 2016. The last presidential election occurred in November 2016, electing Jovenel Moïse who was inaugurated in February 2017. Moïse was assassinated in July 2021. The Transitional Presidential Council was established in April 2024 through the CARICOM-brokered political agreement, with a mandate explicitly tied to organizing elections before February 7, 2026. The CEP was reconstituted in September 2024 after years of dysfunction. Throughout this period, electoral calendar announcements have been repeatedly delayed, revised, and contradicted, creating a pattern of institutional unreliability that this latest discrepancy reinforces.

DEVELOPMENT 2: The February 7 Constitutional Vacuum



## CONFIDENCE



**Absolute Confidence. OAS Secretary-General Albert Ramdin stated explicitly in his December 9 speech to member states that governance after February 2026 when the CPT mandate formally ends is a top priority. The CPT was established with a constitutional mandate expiring February 7, 2026. No legal mechanism exists for self-extension of this mandate. The confirmed August 30 election date creates a six-month gap between mandate expiration and electoral transition.**

What's Happening

The CPT constitutional mandate expires in 58 days on February 7, 2026. If the official election date is August 30, 2026, Haiti will operate without constitutional authority for six months. The Haitian Constitution provides no mechanism for the CPT to extend its own mandate. CARICOM, which brokered the original transitional agreement, has not announced any framework for managing the post-February 7 period. The government has not proposed constitutional amendments. International partners including the OAS have identified this as a critical priority but have not presented solutions. The vacuum period would cover critical electoral preparation activities including voter registration verification, polling station setup, and security deployment for the GSF.

### Why This Matters

Operating without constitutional authority for six months would delegitimize every government action during that period. Laws passed, decrees issued, international agreements signed, and financial commitments made between February 7 and August 30 would lack legal foundation. This creates massive risk for international partners who require constitutional legitimacy for financial disbursements and operational partnerships. The GSF deployment, scheduled for early 2026, could find itself operating under a government with no legal standing. Political actors could challenge any electoral results by arguing the entire process occurred under an illegitimate authority. The constitutional crisis also provides opening for extra-constitutional actors to claim power, either through military intervention or gang coalition political demands.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The February 7 date has profound constitutional significance in Haiti. It marks the traditional inauguration date for Haitian presidents, commemorating the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship on February 7, 1986. The date appears throughout the 1987 Constitution as a key institutional marker. The CPT was established in April 2024 with explicit understanding that it would govern only until February 7, 2026, when elected authorities would assume power. This timeline was negotiated by CARICOM and accepted by all political actors as a hard deadline. Missing this deadline does not simply delay transition but fundamentally breaks the constitutional compact that legitimizes the current government.

### DEVELOPMENT 3: The Bel-Air Massacre and State Absence



### CONFIDENCE



**High Confidence. Multiple international news agencies including ABC News, the Washington Post, and the Council on Foreign Relations have confirmed the ongoing violence in Bel-Air beginning December 8. Death toll reporting ranges from 49 to over 60, with specific casualties confirmed including 10 child recruits, 19 women executed, and high-profile gang leaders. The violence is now in its fourth consecutive day with no reported police intervention.**

### What's Happening

The Krache Dife gang, a splinter group from the Viv Ansanm coalition, launched a territorial assault in Bel-Air on December 8 targeting rival gang leaders. The attack has resulted in over 60 confirmed deaths including 10 children who were gang recruits, 19 women executed during the violence, and at least 19 gang members. High-profile casualties include Dede, a gang leader who was beheaded, and Kempes Sanon, another prominent gang figure who was wounded. The violence has entered its fourth day as of Thursday December 11. The Haitian National Police has not deployed units to stop the fighting or restore order in the neighborhood. International media report no evidence of PNH presence in the affected area. The violence represents an internal power struggle within the Viv Ansanm gang federation.

### Why This Matters

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The PNH non-intervention signals a strategic decision to allow gang self-purging rather than risk officer casualties in gang-versus-gang conflicts. This represents a fundamental shift in security doctrine where the state accepts extreme violence in gang-controlled territories as long as it does not threaten government institutions or commercial zones. The four-day duration without intervention demonstrates this is deliberate policy, not operational incapacity. The death toll now exceeds the October Pont-Sonde massacre that triggered international condemnation. The normalization of multi-day urban warfare in the capital creates expectations that similar violence will be tolerated in future gang territorial disputes. For international partners including the GSF, this raises questions about rules of engagement and whether the mission will intervene in gang-on-gang violence or limit itself to protecting government functions.



### HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Bel-Air has been gang-controlled territory for over a decade, with periodic territorial wars between rival factions. The Viv Ansanm coalition formed in 2023 as a federation of previously independent gangs seeking to coordinate control over Port-au-Prince. The coalition has always been unstable, with member gangs maintaining separate territorial bases and leadership structures. Previous internal conflicts within Viv Ansanm have resulted in temporary violence followed by negotiated truces. The Krache Dife splinter represents a more fundamental break, suggesting the coalition structure is collapsing under pressure from security operations. The PNH non-intervention doctrine emerged gradually over 2024-2025 as gang territorial control expanded and police capacity remained limited despite MSS support.

### IMPLICATIONS BY STAKEHOLDER

International Organizations

#### TALKING POINT

The electoral calendar confusion and February 7 constitutional deadline require immediate diplomatic intervention. CARICOM and the OAS must broker a constitutional framework that either accelerates the electoral timeline or establishes legal authority for the transitional government to continue past February 7. The Bel-Air violence demonstrates that security sector support alone cannot restore order without addressing the political legitimacy crisis that prevents effective state action.

### RECOMMENDED DECISION

Convene emergency CARICOM consultations before December 20 to negotiate constitutional amendments or transitional protocols for the February 7 to August 30 governance gap. Coordinate with the UN to establish that GSF deployment will not proceed without clear constitutional authority for the host government. Use financial leverage to demand the CEP issue immediate clarification of the official electoral calendar, making it clear that continued funding depends on ending the twin calendars confusion.

Businesses

#### TALKING POINT

The six-month constitutional vacuum between February 7 and August 30 creates massive legal risk for any contracts, permits, or agreements signed during that period. Companies operating in Haiti must prepare for scenarios where the transitional government loses legal authority to enforce agreements or issue binding

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decisions. The normalization of multi-day urban warfare in Port-au-Prince demonstrates that security improvements remain fragile and reversible.

### RECOMMENDED DECISION

Suspend any major capital commitments or long-term contract negotiations until constitutional clarity emerges on post-February 7 authority. For existing operations, ensure all critical agreements are finalized before February 7, 2026. Revise security protocols to assume PNH will not intervene in gang territorial disputes, meaning private security must be capable of autonomous protection without state backup. Consider relocating staff dependents before February 7 given the political uncertainty.

### Political Actors

### TALKING POINT

Candidates registering by December 15 must immediately demand written clarification from the CEP on which electoral calendar is operative. Registering under the wrong timeline could invalidate candidacies or waste months of campaign preparation. The February 7 CPT mandate expiration provides leverage to demand constitutional guarantees before committing to an electoral process that may occur under illegitimate authority.

### RECOMMENDED DECISION

Form a unified candidate coalition to submit formal written demand to the CEP by December 13 requiring official clarification of the electoral calendar with legal citations. Refuse to proceed with registration without written confirmation. Simultaneously engage CARICOM representatives to demand their mediation on the February 7 constitutional crisis, making it clear that candidates will not legitimize an election held under unconstitutional authority. Use the December 15 registration deadline as leverage, threatening mass boycott if clarity is not provided.

### Diaspora

### TALKING POINT

The twin calendars crisis confirms that Haiti's electoral process remains dangerously disorganized despite years of international support. The February 7 constitutional deadline approaching without any transition plan suggests the political class has not seriously prepared for elections. Diaspora communities should prepare for extended uncertainty and potential constitutional crisis scenarios including possible rejection of electoral results or refusal by losing parties to accept transitions.

### RECOMMENDED DECISION

Diaspora organizations should document the current confusion by archiving contradictory official statements and media reports to establish clear record of institutional dysfunction. Coordinate with international partners to demand transparent electoral calendar clarification. For diaspora considering return or investment decisions, treat the February 7 to August 30 period as high-risk with no constitutional certainty about governmental authority. Support diaspora voting rights advocacy while recognizing that any 2026 election may face legitimacy challenges that complicate diaspora participation.

### WHAT TO WATCH NEXT

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### Today

Will the Prime Minister Office issue any statement on the GSF conference outcomes or address the electoral calendar discrepancy before the end of Thursday. Monitor whether the CEP responds to media inquiries about the contradictory timelines. Track whether the Bel-Air violence extends into a fifth day or whether any PNH deployment occurs.

### This Week

The December 15 candidate registration deadline will reveal which electoral timeline candidates believe is operative based on their public statements and campaign launch strategies. Watch for any CARICOM or OAS statements addressing the February 7 constitutional deadline. Monitor whether the CEP updates its official website to reflect the August 30 timeline or maintains the February 1 information. Track whether gang violence spreads beyond Bel-Air or whether the Krache Dife splinter successfully consolidates territorial control.

### Strategic

The period from now until February 7 represents the final 58 days to establish constitutional mechanisms for governance continuity past the CPT mandate expiration. If no framework emerges by late January, expect accelerating political crisis and potential challenges to transitional government legitimacy. The GSF deployment timeline becomes critical as it may determine whether security improvements occur under constitutional or extra-constitutional authority. Watch for any political actors beginning to position themselves for post-February 7 power claims if the constitutional vacuum is not resolved.

### PRIMARY SOURCES

Haiti Info Project Twitter announcement on CEP electoral calendar October 2025

Haiti24 report on CEP setting February 2026 election date

FCN Haiti coverage of CEP electoral calendar announcement

Wikipedia entry on 2026 Haitian general election citing November 14 CEP submission

Haiti Info Project Twitter post on electoral decree approval

EFE News Agency report on Haiti approving electoral decree for August 30 2026 election published December 2 2025

OAS Secretary-General Albert Ramdin speech to member states December 9 2025 addressing February 2026 governance crisis

ABC News report on Bel-Air violence and dozens killed in gang warfare

Vant Bef Info Facebook post on Bel-Air gang violence outbreak

Council on Foreign Relations Global Conflict Tracker updated entry on Haiti instability

YouTube video documentation of Bel-Air casualties and violence

Click Orlando news coverage of 19 women executed in Bel-Air gang violence

Washington Post report on Kempes and Dede casualties in Bel-Air gang power struggle

Le Quotidien report on Prime Minister travel to GSF conference

Haiti Libre coverage of Prime Minister attending GSF international conference

Latin Times report on new countries offering troops to GSF including Chad and Bangladesh

Haiti Libre official electoral calendar announcement

CEP official website statement on candidate registration period

Le Monde reporting on gang-squeezed Port-au-Prince neighborhoods

ReliefWeb humanitarian country team messaging on GSF deployment November 2025



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